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New York, April 8, 1929, 
10 o'clock A. M. 
Trial continued. 
Same appearances. 
SAUL LEVY, witness on behalf of the plaintiff, re-
sumed, further testified as follows: 
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, at the time of adjournment 
we were discussing those accounts that had been 
assigned several times; and I think you gave some 
summary of some of them. Now, as I understand 
you, six of these invoices were assigned just once; 
twenty-seven of the invoices were assigned twice; 
seven of the invoices were assigned three times, and 
one of the invoices assigned four times. Is that 
a correct summary of what you found to be the 
fact? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As I understood it you were basing that state-
ment upon the work sheets of Touche, Niven & Co. 
as compared with the accounts receivable ledger 
and such letters, particularly the letters of Huth 
and Bingham as were received and have been 
marked in evidence from the people of whom in-
quiry was made by Touche, Niven & Co.? A. Yes, 
sir. But it was only the letters from Huth & Com-
pany and Bingham that were involved in this com-
parison. 
Mr. Podell: Now, if you will be good 
enough, Mr. Marshall, to produce the letters, 
all of the other letters besides those already 
produced. 
Mr. Marshall: They are all in the work 
sheets, I think. 
Mr. Podell: Have you got them (handed)? 
1448 
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Q. Can you readily separate the other replies 
that were received? I will have somebody do that 
and save time. A. It would take considerable time. 
Q. I will have somebody do that. Do you find 
any record on the work sheets of Touche, Niven & 
Co. that a letter had been received from J. B. 
Moors & Company? A. I see the name J. B. 
Moors included in a list that was submitted by 
Fred Stern & Company to Touche, Niven & Co., a 
list of all banks with whom some time or another 
during the year Stern had had some dealings. 
Q. Will you look at Schedule No. 2 in evidence, 
prepared by yourself, Exhibit 80? Your first item, 
' which is taken, as I understand it, verbatim from 
the work sheets, that is Item No. 5, do you see a 
reference there to record following shipments sold 
to Dunlap, paid for by them, shown by J. B. Moors 
& Company on their confirmation letter, December 
31, 1923? A. Yes, sir. That refers to a journal 
entry prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. There was 
some reference in that journal entry to a letter 
which they had received from J. B. Moors. 
Q. Have you any such letter, or have you been 
able to find any such letter among the work sheets? 
Would you have to look through, or would you 
know? A. It would necessitate my going through 
all of these sheets. 
Mr. Marshall: I would be glad to help 
you find it if you want me to. 
Q. Have you prepared, Mr. Levy, a detailed 
schedule referring to Schedule No. 3 of accounts re-
ceivable assigned to Huth & Company and William 
Brandt's Sons & Company, Bingham & Company, 
agent, as at December 31, 1923? A. Yes, sir, I 
have prepared such a schedule. 
1451 
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Q. And what did you prepare that from? A. 
That was prepared from the papers and documents 
that I have just testified to, and books; and that is 
from the letters received from Huth & Company, 
the letters from Bingham & Company, the schedule 
of accounts receivable, in the Touche-Niven work-
ing papers and from the customer's ledger account. 
Mr. Podell: I offer that in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection as to the 
basis upon which it is made, and the further 
objection that it is perfectly irrelevant and 
immaterial. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 84.) 
Q. Now, summarizing this schedule, Mr. Levy, 
out of a total of 41 accounts, how many purport to 
have been assigned more than once? A. Thirty-five 
out of the forty-one appear to have been assigned 
more than once. 
Q. And the schedule is a detailed schedule of 
the account and to whom assigned? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, do I understand you correctly that if 
you take these individual accounts on Touche-
Niven's working papers to see to whom they were 
assigned, and compare them with the accounts re-
ceivable ledger, the same accounts, at least certain 
of them, would appear to have been assigned to 
different people? A. The same invoices. 
Q. The same invoices, is that right? I mean, the 
working sheets do not agree with the statement of 
assigned accounts in the accounts receivable ledger? 
A. In some instances they agree and in some in-
stances they do not. 
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Q. On the other hand, if you compare the work-
ing papers with the two letters of Huth and Bing-
ham, there is a difference there? A. In some in-
stances, yes, sir. 
Q. In some instances they agree and in some in-
stances they do not? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If you take the two letters alone, you have 
stated, I think, that there are certain accounts that 
would appear to have been claimed by both of these 
concerns to have been assigned to them, the iden-
tical account, as of a specified date, as of Decem-
ber 31st, 1923? A. Yes, sir. Two invoices were 
claimed to be held and assigned to them. 
Q. By each of them? A. By each, yes, sir. 
Q. So that none of these documents agree among 
themselves to whom these assignments were made 
or outstanding as of December 31st, 1923? A. That 
is correct. 
Q. Now, I assume that in its effect upon the net 
assets, if the same account is assigned three or four 
times, will not necessarily reduce the net assets of 
the concern, will it? A. I am not sure that I 
understand your question, but the question as to 
whether or not an account has been assigned does 
not relate to the amount of net assets on hand. 
Merely as to whether those assets are free or are 
hypothecated. 
Q. Merely shows whether the assets, the par-
ticular accounts receivable, are free or pledged? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. But has that situation any significance to an 
accountant? A. It is a very important 
Q. Quite aside from assets? A. Quite aside from 
assets, it has a very important significance, I would 
say. 
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Q. And what is that significance which it has to 
an accountant looking over those books? A. In a 
situation of this sort, where out of forty-one invoices 
I find that thirty-five appear to be assigned doubly 
and triply, it certainly is an indication to me of 
something radically wrong. Those things would 
not happen unless there was a reason for them and 
I would expect that that reason would be financial 
difficulties of some sort or irregularities of some 
other kind within the organization. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out the 
part in which he says—gives his conclusion 
at the end. 
Mr. Podell: He has a perfect right to, 
your Honor. 
The Court: I will allow it as his opinion 
as an expert. That is the only basis upon 
which it is offered. 
Mr. Marshall: He made a statement not 
as if it were an opinion, but as a fact. 
The Witness: I believe I stated that I 
would suspect that might be the fact. It 
would be some indication of the likelihood 
and it would call for further examination 
and further investigation. 
Q. Well now, do you not consider it a piece of 
dishonesty for any merchant to take the same ac-
count on several occasions or a number of accounts 
so that there is no possibility of just an inadvertent 
mistake, to take a large proportion of the accounts 
and assign them to a number of different people? 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
do not see how he can pass on the question 
of dishonesty. 
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Mr. Podell: An accountant examining 
books, to find out whether they are an honest 
set of books or a dishonest set of books, 
whether it is an accurate statement or an in-
accurate statement, whether it is a true state-
ment or a fraudulent statement I think that 
is proper. 
The Court: If you put it on that theory, 
I doubt it, Mr. Podell. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. What would be your conclusion, or the con-
clusion of any accountant using ordinary care and 
prudence with respect to the reliability, the hon-
esty, the accuracy of that financial statement, if 
you find a condition of affairs such as you have de-
scribed? 
Mr. Marshall: Now, if your Honor please, 
he may be an expert on accountancy, but he 
is not an expert on honesty, and I do not 
think anybody could go on the stand as an 
expert on honesty. 
Mr. Podell: I am asking for conclusions 
by an accountant who is familiar with books 
and competent to pass an opinion as to what 
is prudent care, that is all. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. I can tell you in a few words just what my 
mental reaction would have been. 
The Court: Go ahead and tell us. 
Q. Tell us. A. As an experienced accountant, 
familiar with business matters in connection with 
my business of examination of books of account, I 
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would, of course, know that it was most unusual 
and irregular for the same invoice to be assigned to 
two people, and when I find a recurrence of that 
sort of thing as frequently as it recurs here, my 
suspicion would be strengthened, and I would im-
mediately look for the reason for that; knowing as 
a matter of common sense, as well as of a matter 
of professional experience, that irregularities of 
that sort are not done as a matter of idle amuse-
ment. There usually is some hidden reason for it, 
and I would search for that reason. 
Q. When a man has an ample quantity of good 
accounts receivable, or an ample quantity of assets 
to pledge, is it your experience that he would resort 
to that kind of practice? A. Why of course not, 
if he had a sufficient 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being 
argumentative. 
Mr. Podell: It is not argumentative. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: I except. 
Q. Now Mr. Levy, you have given a statement of 
what the conclusions of an accountant using ordi-
nary and prudent care would be or should be on 
finding these separate things that you have stated. 
Now, if an accountant finds all of these items that 
you have described in the course of his examination, 
to wit, that the inventory must be reduced by more 
than $200,000, that accounts receivable have no 
support in the records of shipments and in the sales 
journal or memorandum book or journal voucher 
that is supposed to support them, and his accounts 
receivable aggregate over $700,000, in fact $957,000, 
that a creditor who would normally have an ac-
count payable, is reported on the books to be a 
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debtor in the sum of $113,000, and that a number 
of accounts have been assigned to different people, 
the same accounts assigned to different people, hav-
ing a general situation like that, with your knowl-
edge of those books, tell the jury what an ordinary 
reasonable prudent careful accountant—nothing 
extraordinary—what would be his conclusions from 
the entire situation? A. Well, he couldn't help con-
cluding that there was something radically wrong 
with the entire situation, that these people probably 
were in financial difficulties, and that there were 
manipulations in their accounts. The effect of all 
of these things would be cumulative and it would 
put him in a highly suspicious frame of mind, and 
put him on his guard and make him feel that he had 
to exhaust every means at his command to investi-
gate these items and to ascertain the actual facts 
before he could certify to the balance sheet. 
Q. Would that include communication with the 
accounts receivable, those that owed the money on 
the accounts? A. In my judgment that would be 
indispensable in this situation. 
Q. Regardless of what the client wished. For 
the accountant's protection, I am talking about. A. 
If I were to certify to his statement, of course. I 
could not compel him to let me write to those ac-
counts, but I might have to withdraw from the ex-
amination if he did not permit me to do so. 
Q. Or when you do certify to a statement, certify 
to a statement disclosing these things that you have 
described? A. Yes, sir, very fully. 
Q. What you have stated to this jury just a 
moment ago, is that a general recognized principle 
of accountancy? 
Mr. Marshall: Which? I think that is 
too indefinite. 
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The Court: The conclusions he has just 
drawn. 
Q. The conclusions you have just stated, is that 
within general recognized principles of account-
ancy? 
Mr. Marshall: I am still vague as to what 
he means by that question, and I object to 
it for that reason. He does not tell us what 
of his numerous conclusion he is now re-
ferring to. 
The Court: Or of this summation that 
has just been primarily made. I will allow 
it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Witness: May I have the question 
again please? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
The Witness: Yes, sir. 
Q. Who are your authorities on accountancy? 
Who is generally recognized as the leading author-
ity? I mean in the way of text, text books? A. 
There are numerous authorities. I think Mont-
gomery on Auditing is regarded generally by all 
accountants as the leading American authority. It 
has been a standard textbook fifteen years, prob-
ably, and is to-day. 
Mr. Podell: You may examine. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Mr. Levy, when were you engaged as an ex-
pert in this case? A. Some time early this year, I 
believe. I think it was January of this year. 
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Q. And shortly after that is the first time that 
you ever looked at the books of Fred Stern, or the 
work sheets of Touche, Niven & Co.? A. The first 
time I knew anything about this case, yes, sir. 
Q. And by whom were you engaged? A. By Mr. 
Limburg. 
Q. That is, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what have you been paid for your work 
and testimony so far? A. So far? 
Q. Yes. A. I have been paid a retainer of 
$250.00. 
Q. And do you expect to get paid anything fur-
ther? A. I expect to be paid for every day of time 
I devote to this case, yes, sir. 
Q. And about how much do you expect to be 
paid? A. Exactly $300 per day. 
Q. $100 a day? A. Yes, sir, that is my arrange-
ment with Mr. Limburg. 
Q. That is, every day you are here in Court you 
get $100, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. It does not 
matter 
Q. Whether it is in Court or the work you have 
done outside? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you are also an attorney, are you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Admitted to the practice of law in this state? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And in the course of your presentation here, 
you have presented it as an accountant and from 
your knowledge of law, as an attorney? A. I don't 
recall that I have testified to any question of law. 
I have testified to my examination of these books 
and to my knowledge of what is regular and usual. 
In 
Q. But you 
1475 
1476 
493 
Saul Levy—For Plaintiff—Cross. 1477 
Mr. Podell: Let him finish, please. Go 
ahead. 
A. Regular and usual in the practice of account-
ancy. 
Q. You can not forget you are an attorney, quite, 
can you? A. Not when you remind me of it. 
Q. Is that the only time you remember you are 
an attorney? A. I wouldn't say that. 
Q. Now, you recognize that as an expert witness 
here, you are in effect an advocate, whether you 
are an attorney or not? A. That is not so. 
Q. You would not say that you are an advocate? 
A. That is not so, no, sir. I am not an advocate. 
I would like to make a further statement with re-
spect to that. 
Q. No. You have answered the question on that. 
You said you were not an advocate. A. Most em-
phatically so. 
Q. I think we can make up our minds about that. 
Mr. Podell: There is no occasion for that 
remark, Mr. Marshall. Ask questions, please. 
Do not make remarks. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please-— 
The Court: Come along; do not let us 
waste time. Let us get started and move. 
Q. When you went over these books, did you dis-
cuss them at all with Mr. Djorup? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you knew that Mr. Djorup had been over 
the books in some detail? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He had been accountant for the receiver and 
trustee in bankruptcy of Stern, had he not? A. I 
understand that is so. 
Q. You also understood that he was the account-
ant for Ultramares, did you not? A. I learned that 
only the other day. 
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Q. But he had been over the books before you? 
A. So he told me. 
Q. Did he tell you that he had had the assistance 
of Mr. Romberg on parts of these books? A. No, 
sir. 
Q. But you had the help and advice of Mr. Djorup 
in locating some of these things which you have 
testified to in court? A. He worked with me to a 
large extent. I also worked independently. 
Q. But he was able to show you certain things 
and save you a good deal of time and effort in going 
over these books, was he not? A. Yes, that is so. 
Q. Now, before you ever started on these books, 
you knew that Stern & Company was bankrupt, did 
you not? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were told, were you not, by Mr. 
Djorup, what he thought was wrong with the books 
or with Stern? A. Told some of the things, yes. 
Q. Yes. So that you were very much in the posi-
tion of a doctor performing an autopsy, were you 
not—the man was dead and you wanted to find out 
what he died of? A. To some extent, I would say 
yes. I do not know enough about the medical pro-
fession to answer that question. 
Q. What I am trying to bring out is that the 
point of view that you took when you made this 
audit was a different point of view than the point 
of view that would be taken by an auditor auditing 
the books of a going concern, is that not so? A. No, 
sir. 
Q. Well, now— A. Not the point of view. 
Q. Just a minute. You said no. Now, let us see. 
Here you have a concern that is bankrupt, that is 
dead; you are told by Mr. Djorup that he believes 
certain things caused the bankruptcy. Now, do 
you not begin therefore from a different point of 
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view than an auditor called in to audit the books 
of the ordinary going concern? A. But I wasn't 
auditing the books with a view to ascertaining their 
financial condition. We knew that. 
Q. That is just the point I am trying to make. 
A. You asked me about my point of view. 
Q. You were auditing it for a different purpose, 
from a different point of view than Touche-Niven 
was? 
Mr. Podell: There are two questions in 
that—-different purpose and different point 
of view. Which are you speaking of? Let 
the witness understand. 
Q. You were auditing them for a different pur-
pose that Touche-Niven, were you not? A. For 
a different purpose, yes, sir. 
Q. And you were auditing them consequently 
from a different point of view, were you not? A. 
No, sir, because my very purpose was to ascertain 
what their point of view should have been in view 
of the state of the records. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, you were trying to find out 
what their point of view should have been? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. That was your point of view? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Their point of view was to determine what 
the books of account showed as of December 31, 
1923, is not that so? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, are not those different points of view? 
A. Stated as you state them now, I will state yes. 
Q. Now, you would not claim, would you, that 
there was only one plan of audit that was proper 
for any kind of examination? A. No, sir. 
Q. Nor would you say, I suppose, that any par-
ticular order of procedure was essential because of 
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any given audit? A. Oh, certain things are essen-
tial in every audit, yes, sir. 
Q. But I mean the order of procedure? A. That 
depends largely upon circumstances. 
Q. Yes. The audit on the whole depends largely 
on the discretion of the man in charge, how far he 
is to go and as to what order he is to take things 
up, is not that correct? A. Yes, that is so. 
Q. Now, as an attorney, you know the difference, 
do you not, between what is hearsay and what a 
man knows of his own knowledge, do you not? A. 
Yes, sir. As an attorney, I think I do. 
Q. Now, if you can remember that you are an 
attorney for just one minute, as I have just re-
minded you of it 
Mr. Podell: May I suggest that counsel 
put a question instead of making prefatory 
speeches? 
The Court: I think so, yes, sir. Let us 
have the question. 
Mr. Marshall: I was just about to put the 
question when Mr. Podell interrupted. 
Mr. Podell: Let us have the question. We 
are all trying to save time. Let us have 
the question. 
Mr. Marshall: Perhaps if you would not 
interrupt, we would save time. 
Mr. Podell: I would not have to interrupt 
if you asked a question properly. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, with this knowledge of yours in mind, 
will you state whether in your opinion an audit is 
not on the whole in almost every instance based 
upon hearsay so far as the accountant is concerned? 
A. Largely so, but I must qualify that from a legal 
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standpoint, because recent legislation has made 
book entries proof. They are no longer mere 
hearsay. 
Q. But as far as the accountant is concerned, 
Mr. Levy, he does not know any of the facts in the 
books, does he? A. No, sir. He merely knows 
what they purport to state. 
Q. What they purport to state. That is correct. 
So that when he goes through the balance sheet, 
take the item of cash—he counts the cash in the 
petty cash drawer; he does not know of his own 
knowledge that that cash belongs to the concern, 
does he? A. No, sir. But he finds it there in the 
regular course of his audit, and he usually makes 
a surprise audit as to cash. 
Q. But it might very well be that that cash is 
put in out of the president's pocket and will be 
taken out again a month later, is not that so? A. 
That might be, yes, sir. 
Q. Now, on the question of accounts receivable, 
does not the auditor have to depend on the books 
and the information that is given to him, that the 
accounts receivable are genuine? A. Not entirely. 
Q. Supposing he were to write to a customer, is 
it not possible that a man with a well worked out 
scheme to defraud, could have someone write back 
an answer to the accountant's letters? A. That is 
possible, but it is most unlikely that all of his cus-
tomers would be involved in that sort of con-
spiracy. 
Q. Is it a customary thing to find, for example, 
that the head of a concern is a crook and that the 
whole of his organization is crooked? A. No, sir, 
that is not customary. 
Q. That is a pretty rare thing, is it not? A. 
Yes, sir. 
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Q. So that if you found that all of the heads of 
a concern, the president, the cashier, the credit 
man and the sales manager were all engaged in a 
conspiracy to defraud, you would say that was a 
pretty unusual circumstance, would you not? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you are pretty well acquainted, are you 
not, with the accounting profession? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I think you just said you regarded Mont-
gomery as an authority? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now tell me whether you have heard of the 
following accountants, and whether you regard 
them as men of good standing: George O. May? 
A. Yes, sir, very highly reputed. 
Q. Charles B. Couchman? A. Yes, sir. He is 
the author of a textbook. 
Q. Henry B. Fernald? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Alan R. Dunlap? A. I don't think I have 
heard of him. 
Q,. S. B. Cboley? A. I don't think I have heard 
of him. I have probably heard of his firm. 
Q. Earl A. Saliers? A. I have heard of him, 
yes, sir. I do not know of him as a man who has 
had any broad practical experience. He was a 
professor at Yale, I believe, and the editor of a 
certain handbook on accountancy. I happened to 
have met him professionally a number of years ago. 
Q. You know that handbook, do you not? You 
know that handbook? A. Yes, sir, I have a copy 
of it in my library. 
Q. And you know that it there says that it is a 
pretty dangerous thing for an auditor to follow 
any given method of auditing a set of books, any 
given audit program? A. I don't recall that quota-
tion, but I think it is sound in principle. 
Q. It is a sound principle? A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Now, how long have you known of the firm of 
Touche, Niven & Co.? A. How long have I known 
of them? 
Q. Yes. A. Oh, perhaps thirteen years. I think 
as long as I have been in the practice of public 
accountancy, as long as I have done public account-
ing work. 
Q. And except for whatever opinion you may 
have formed of this audit in the course of your en-
gagement here, they are a reputable firm, so far 
as you know? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that, your Honor. 
That is not an issue here. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Podell: I except. 
A. I have always known of them as a very repu-
table firm. I wouldn't hesitate—that is, answering 
your question before my contact with this case, if 
anyone had asked me whether their statements 
were reliable, I would say that they could be relied 
upon. 
Q. You always regarded them as honest men? 
A. Certainly. 
Mr. Podell: Whom? Regarded whom? 
Who are they? There are a lot of people in 
there. He does not know everybody in 
Touche, Niven & Co. I move to strike the 
last statement out. 
The Court: Touche-Niven is purely a 
partnership name, that is all, and he refers 
to the firm. Is that what you refer to? 
The Witness: Yes. I might say I would 
regard any reputable C. P. A. as an honest 
man until I learned of something to the 
contrary. 
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Mr. Podell: Is that all? 
Mr. Marshall: That is all. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. There has been some statement here as to 
any given method is a dangerous method to follow. 
You were asked about that? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you explain the reason for that a little 
more fully? A. One of the most important reasons 
for that is that we start with a certain tentative 
program in mind, but that program contemplates 
ordinary usual circumstances, the appearance of 
regularity in the accounts. If, in the course of 
our work, we encounter unusual circumstances 
which arouse suspicion, then, of course, one must 
depart from his ordinary usual audit program, be-
cause the fundamental object of the audit is to 
ascertain and to confirm facts. 
Q. So that there is no such thing, once an un-
usual situation is found, then the accountant must 
use every resource at his command to get at the 
truth? A. Certainly. That is where his experience 
as an accountant comes into play. 
Q. Now, tell the jury what was the nature of 
your engagement. What were you asked to do? 
There was some discussion here as to the point of 
view. Of course, you knew that this concern was 
bankrupt, did you not? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to Mr. Podell mak-
ing a speech for the witness. I think he had 
better ask a question. 
The Court: Yes. Sustained. 
Q. Will you tell us what the nature of your— 
what were you asked to do on this job? A. I was 
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given a general summary of the situation. I was 
asked to examine the records, to examine Touche-
Niven's working papers, and to report on what I 
found and whether from those books of account and 
whether from the working papers of Touche-Niven 
these errors should have been discovered by them 
in the course of their audit. 
Q. Either were or should have been, is that it? 
A. Either were or should have been, yes, sir. 
Q. And that is the way— A. I was asked to ex-
press an opinion as to whether or not they had 
done what they should have done in connection with 
this audit. 
Q. And it is from that point of view that you 
approached it? A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. This is not the first time you have testified, is 
it, Mr. Levy? A. In the course of my ten years I 
have testified a number of times, yes, sir. 
Q. One of the principal items of your work, is 
it not? A. No, sir. 
Q. A very frequent item of work? A. Not as 
frequent as I would like to have it. It is interest-
ing work. 
Q. At $100 a day? A. It is just one of a number 
of things I do in the general practice of ac-
countancy. 
Q, I see. A. I would estimate that surely less 
than 5 per cent. of my time, surely less than that. 
Q. About how many times have you testified? A. 
Oh, I don't know. Perhaps a half a dozen times. 
Perhaps somewhat more than that. 
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Q. Now, have you ever found any two audits that 
are identical? A. That is a hard question to an-
swer. I would have to answer yes or no. I will 
find certain things that are present in all audits, 
and they differ in certain other respects. 
Q. They all differ somewhat, do they not? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. So that you cannot really— A. Just as two 
human beings always differ in some respects. 
Q. That is just the point. So you cannot really 
go in with any preconceived idea of how you are 
going to make an audit; you have got to use your 
discretion in the course of it? A. You have a gen-
eral idea as to what you are going to do. 
Q. You know your business? A. Yes. And if 
you had made that audit in prior years, then you 
ought to know almost definitely what you are go-
ing to do. 
Q. But they all differ from year to year, you find 
different things? A. To some extent, depending 
on your findings in the course of the work. 
Q. And in the main, the order and the way you 
do it depends on the use of your discretion, does 
it not? A. To a large extent depending on circum-
stances, yes, sir. 
By Mr. Podell, 
Q. You always expect honesty and you always 
expect reasonable care in the making of any audit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. No matter what plan you pursue? A. Yes, 
sir. 
Q. Have you ever testified against an account-
ant's firm in your life? 
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Mr. Marshall: I object; it is immaterial. 
Mr. Podell: Every accountant is called 
upon more or less to furnish details of any 
audit he has made, and he has a right to say 
whether he has testified. 
The Court: Yes. 
Q. Have you ever testified in any suit against 
accountants? A. Never. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. 
The Court: All right, sir; step down. 
(Witness excused.) 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, the 
other day we were to be permitted to put in 
the balance sheets for the years 1921 and 
1920, and I now offer them in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: What are those? 
The Court: 1920 and 1921 balance 
sheets. 
Mr. Podell: Let me see them first. I ask 
for the audit of 1922. 
Mr. Marshall: That was in evidence and 
then it was stated we could put in the rest 
of them. The Court so ruled. 
The Court: That was in. 
Mr. Podell: I do not remember, your 
Honor, making any such rulings. I submit 
they ought to be reserved for his case, and 
not clutter up my case. I am presenting my 
case. I do not know about those things. I 
have never gone into them and never seen 
them in my life. 
Mr. Marshall: There is no reason why he 
should put in one year without all of them. 
The Court: That is what we agreed on 
when the question came up over the 1922 re-
port. 
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Mr. Podell: Then they should be marked 
for identification. 
The Court: No. I allowed them in evi-
dence. 
Mr. Podell: I do not want to contradict 
your Honor about making an agreement, but 
frankly I have no recollection. 
The Court: We will mark them for iden-
tification, until that has been verified. My 
recollection was that, although it may be at 
fault. Mark them for identification. 
(Received and marked Defendants' Ex-
hibits J and K for Identification.) 
The Court: Who is the next witness now? 
Mr. Podell: I am getting some papers 
ready, your Honor. Is it understood that 
all the work sheets and the letters are in 
evidence? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: Now, Mr. Djorup, will you 
take the stand? 
CHRISTIAN DJORUP, was recalled as a witness: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. You are an accountant by profession, Mr. 
Djorup? A. I am. 
Q. And have been practicing accountancy how 
long? A. Since 1910. 
The Court: Talk a little louder; the jury 
cannot hear. 
Q. Since 1910? A. Yes. 
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Q. And prior to that time have you had ex-
perience in accounts, accountancy work, or book-
keeping? A. Since 1898. 
Q. Since when? A. 1898. 
Mr. Podell: Just talk to me over here, so 
that these last jurors can hear. 
Q. Just tell us briefly what does that experience 
embrace, and what does it include; first, with what 
firm are you now? A. My own firm, Christian 
Djorup & Company, which was started in 1913. 
Prior to that time, with Marwick Mitchell & Com-
pany, for over thirteen years, and before that time 
in Wall Street offices. I was employed with other 
companies, Redmond & Company, and other con-
cerns, for twelve years. In between I have been in 
the import and export business, I mean as an ac-
countant in Egypt from 1905 to 1906, and as an ac-
countant I have specialized in foreign exchange 
and in foreign trade, and particularly in rubber and 
silk houses of that kind. 
Q. Now, did you take possession of books and 
records of Fred Stern & Company at the time when 
the receiver in bankruptcy took possession? A. 
Prior to that time. 
Q. Just when, what day, did you go in there to 
take possession? A. On the 3rd of January, 1925. 
Q. That was before the receivership? A. Before 
the receiver was appointed, I was called by Mr. 
Hunt of the Chemical National Bank, whether I 
could jump in that afternoon in the office of Fred 
Stern & Company on behalf of the creditors' com-
mittee, to find out how the situation was, and how 
the financial standing was of the concern. I started 
working that same afternoon, on Saturday 
Q. Before you come to that, did you take posses-
sion then of all of those books that had been marked 
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in evidence? A. On the 3rd of January I did not 
take possession but all the books were not in the 
office and I had not located all the books at that 
time, but I took full possession of the records on 
the 7th of January, when the receiver was ap-
pointed. 
Q. Now, that was about a week or so after Stern 
died? A. Stern, I believed, died on the 2nd of 
January. 
Q. You took possession of them on the 7th. 
Whom did you find in there when you came in? A. 
When I came in I found Mr. Von Goeben in the 
office of Fred Stern & Company, and I believe his 
son. 
Mr. Marshall: Which Mr. Von Goeben? 
The Witness: And I believe his son, and 
they asked me to go ahead with the work. 
Q. From that day, that is the 7th of January, 
up to the beginning of this trial, have you had cus-
tody and charge of the books and records of Fred 
Stern & Company? A. I have continuously, for I 
was engaged by the receiver, and subsequently by 
the trustee as accountant. 
Q. As accountant? A. And I have the records 
in my own office. 
Q. And you are now the accountant for the 
trustee in bankruptcy? A. I am. 
Q. And originally engaged by the creditors' com-
mittee, and also at the same time, before the trustee 
was elected, you were acting as accountant for the 
receiver? A. That is right. 
Q. With the exception of such entries you might 
have made in checking up the various books of ac-
counts and records, can you state to the Court and 
jury that these books and records that have been 
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marked in evidence, are the same as they were at 
the time when you took possession? A. The books 
and records are the same as they were when I took 
possession. A great many of the records we had to 
write up ourselves. On Monday, the 5th of Janu-
ary, Romberg brought in the general ledger and 
the journal vouchers for the first six months of 1924. 
The general ledger was an empty book without an 
entry. We wrote up the general ledger from 
Q. You are talking now of entries made up for 
the year 1924? A. 1924. 
Q. With respect to the year 1923, and such rec-
ords as there were with respect to that year, with 
the exceptions of such notations as you made in 
checking over, are they the same? A. The records 
for the year 1923 are the same as when we came to 
the office and took possession. 
Q. In fact, these books and records have been 
in your office, that is, the Christian Djorup & Com-
pany? A. From the time we gave up the office of 
Fred Stern & Company. 
Q. And you had care of them? A. First I had 
them in the office of Fred Stern, when I took posses-
sion of these records. 
Q. Now, did you make an extensive audit, or an 
audit of these books, or what did you do in con-
nection with them, when you came in? A. When I 
came in and found that assets were short of lia-
bilities, I was presented with a statement of Fred 
Stern & Company's financial condition as of De-
cember 31, 1923, by two members of the creditors' 
committee, and I was looking for a million dollars— 
to find it quickly. I told my accountants that were 
working with me—"Look for a million dollars." 
Whether they lost a million dollars during 1924 or 
where it went to, when they did not find it, I looked 
1520 
1521 
508 
1522 Christian Djorup—For Plaintiff—Direct. 
for it myself and found $957,000, within a couple 
of hours, through the credit memorandum book, 
where there was entered the reversal of invoices 
made out in November and December, 1923; they 
were all reversed by one touch in the credit memo-
randum book in March 
Mr. Marshall: May we have the date of 
this reversal, to show it was after our audit? 
The Court: Yes. 
A. Yes, it was entered in the March credit memo-
randum book, 1924. 
Mr. Marshall: After the date of this bal-
ance sheet? 
The Witness: After the accountants were 
out, of course. 
Q. How do you know that, Mr. Djorup? A. For 
the report of Touche, Niven & Co. dated—after the 
report was out, the report of Touche-Niven was 
dated February, 1924, I believe. 
Q. Then you found $957,000 of fake accounts 
receivable? A. Yes, I found this Monday evening. 
Also other circumstances, and went on Tuesday 
morning back to Mr. Hunt, to tell him it was in-
solvent a year ago. They did not believe it, for 
there was a statement—I said positive, I would 
swear to it, and the next day we went through the 
receivership. 
Q. And so you found a million dollars—you 
found at least it was not there? A. Yes, the million 
had disappeared. 
Q. And it had been lost during the course of 
1924? Or rather, that particular million had never 
existed at the end of 1923? A. That is right. 
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By the First Juryman. 
Q. You came there and did not find all the books, 
you say; where did they come from after? A. The 
books were in our office. 
Q. You said they were not there? A. The gen-
eral ledger was not in the office, that was brought 
in on Monday morning by Romberg. 
Q. Monday morning, what date? A. 5th of Jan-
uary. 
Q. From where? A. From his home with the 
journal voucher. He was supposed to help me, but 
he only attended to things after I found them. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. That was Romberg? A. Yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. What books—state in answer to the juror, 
please, what books did you find there, when you 
came there, and what books did Romberg bring in 
afterwards? A. He only brought in an empty 
journal ledger. I looked for the general ledger. 
There was no general ledger. 
Q. For the year 1924? A. For the year 1924. 
Q. Just so that we will be sure, you understand 
the question, Mr. Djorup—state what books did you 
find in the office when you first came there? A. All 
the other books. In other words, cash receipt and 
disbursements. 
Q. All the other books does not mean very much. 
Name them first. A. Cash receipts and disburse-
ments. Purchase journal, or debit memorandum 
book. Invoice register. I made a mistake before— 
sales journal. Debit memorandum book—say sum-
mary, debit memorandum book. Purchase journal. 
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Invoice register. Credit memorandum book for 
allowances, returns, and so forth. The shipment 
records for incoming and outgoing shipments. Lot 
books. 
Q. Which books? A. Lot books. 
Q. What are those? A. Par East books and 
European books showing rubber that was received, 
and how it was disposed of. 
Q. Yes. A. The bank ledger was kept up to date, 
showing the relationship with banks as to com-
mercial letters of credit, and acceptances. 
Q. Now, is it correct to say that you found all 
the books that have been marked in evidence with 
the exception of one which you have described as 
what? A. General ledger for 1924. 
Q. And that was brought in by whom? A. By 
Romberg on the 5th of January. 
Q. Was it the 1923 general ledger? A. The 1923 
general ledger was in the office, and I tied it up 
with a statement of Touche, Niven & Co. 
Q. I beg your pardon? A. I tied it up with the 
statement of Touche, Niven & Co. 
Q. We will come to that. Now, Mr. Djorup, did 
you then proceed to make and go over the audit of 
the statement that had been made by Touche, Niven 
& Co. for the year 1923; did you have that with you 
in mind? A. At first I wanted to find all the assets 
I could find. 
Q. I know you told us what you did at first. Did 
you at any time thereafter examine the certified 
statement, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 of Touche, 
Niven & Co. and likewise in connection with the 
books? A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Now, just tell us what you did in that con-
nection; make it as brief as you can? A. I tried 
to ascertain whether they were insolvent also in 
1922 and in 1921. 
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Q. We are not interested in 1922 or 1921. We 
are interested in 1923. A. I check back all the rec-
ords for the year 1923. 
Q. You did check back? A. Yes, some of them, 
my accountants did. 
Q. When you found those $957,000, just what did 
you do in that connection, to check up with that, 
and the accuracy of the statement of Touche, Niven 
& Co.; did you go to any of the supporting books? 
A. We checked back all the shipments received and 
all the shipments made by the lot numbers. I 
wanted to find whether Stern had taken some 
rubber and sold it and did not account for it to 
the corporation, for that would have been another 
means of getting away with money; so we checked 
all the shipments back for 1924 and 1923, to ascer-
tain what rubber had been received and what 
rubber had been sold, and found, of course, addi-
tional shipments that came in in 1923. 
Q. How did you check that; what books did you 
use? A. We checked all the shipment books. 
Q. The shipment books, the books of shipment 
made by Stern & Company? A. Books of shipment 
made by Stern & Company, and books of shipment 
received by Stern & Company from the Far East, 
from London, and from the local market. 
Q. Was there any time when you were asked— 
or when you took the statement furnished by 
Touche, Niven & Co., and checked it up with the 
books, was there any time when you did that—do 
you understand my question? A. In January, 1925. 
Q. You did that? A. Yes. 
Q. What did you find; did you examine the work 
sheets of Touche, Niven & Co.? A. In January 
1925, we went to the office of Touche, Niven & Co. 
and called their attention to the fact that I 
found out those fake invoices. Then two account-
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ants I believe were sent over by Mr. Rea to Touche, 
Niven & Co.'s office to check back the entries there, 
and he also checked back the United Baltic invoices, 
and told one of my accountants, Smidt, over the 
phone, that it corresponded with my findings that 
the United Baltic invoices amounted 
Mr. Marshall: I object to what this man 
said. 
Mr. Podell: You are not allowed to do 
that. 
Mr. Marshall: What somebody else told 
his assistants I object to. 
The Court: Will this testimony be more 
or less cumulative of the other witness? 
Mr. Podell: Very much so. Our primary 
purpose in calling this witness is to get his 
conclusions with regard to the facts found. 
The Court: Why don't you put hypotheti-
cal questions to him? 
Mr. Podell: I think that will probably 
save us a lot of time. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. First, did you examine the accounts 
The Court: Gentlemen of the Jury, I do 
not know whether you caught the signifi-
cance of my statement. I am asking counsel 
as to whether or no this witness' testimony 
would not be of a character alleged to be 
confirmatory of that which the previous wit-
ness has said, and which as he says, as a 
matter of his own knowledge, he knows it 
would be, now he is going to put hypothetical 
questions based on the same proposition as 
already asked of the previous witness, in-
stead of going over the whole thing again. 
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Mr. Podell: There is one item that is not 
cumulative, and I would like to cover that 
first. 
The Court: All right. 
Mr. Marshall: I take it your Honor is not 
telling the jury that this man would give the 
same opinions as did the last witness? 
The Court: No, I say based on the ques-
tions asked. I do not know. 
Q. Mr. Djorup, did you look into the United 
Baltic account? A. I did. 
Q. On the books and records of Stern & Com-
pany? A. I did. 
Q. Tell us briefly what you did, what books and 
records you looked at? A. From the United Baltic 
shipment record in which the shipments received 
from the United Baltic are kept separately from 
the other shipments that came from Singapore and 
London. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
want to specifically object to any testimony 
from this book because this was Exhibit 6 
which I believe Romberg said he thought had 
not been given to Touche, Niven & Co. 
Mr. Podell: What is that? 
The Court: He said it had not been given 
to Touche, Niven & Co. 
Mr. Podell: What is that? 
Mr. Marshall: That is Exhibit 6, the 
United Baltic Company book. 
Mr. Podell: He did not say anything of 
the kind. Your Honor will remember what 
he said. This is the second time counsel has 
made that statement. 
Mr. Marshall: I was right. 
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Mr. Podell: You were wrong the last 
time and wrong again. Counsel is referring 
to that point when Mr. Romberg said what 
misled me about this book that it had hand-
writing in it that he did not recognize, but 
that when he turned the book over and saw 
the handwriting for subsequent years, he rec-
ognized it as a book that had been in the 
files and in the handwriting of one of the 
employees, and was in the premises Janu-
ary and February of 1924. Now, it was not 
a case where anybody had to pick up books 
and hand them to these people when they 
were making an audit. The book was there. 
That is all we are required to show. 
The Witness: May I make a remark about 
the book? 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute, please. Are 
you so anxious that you cannot let me talk? 
The Witness: I am sorry. 
Mr. Marshall: I call your Honor's atten-
tion to page 140. 
The Court: Tell me what it says. 
Mr. Marshall (reading from stenogra-
pher's minutes) : "Q. All these others you 
did not know? A. No, they never saw this 
one. Mr. Marshall: Exhibit 6." 
Mr. Podell: Will you let me show the 
Judge the correction that he made on cross-
examination? 
Mr. Marshall: No, it was in your exam-
ination. Romberg was the cashier and the 
man in charge of the general bookkeeping 
system of Stern, the man who testified here 
to that. 
Mr. Podell: May I have these minutes for 
a moment. I am getting my copy and I will 
show you what he said thereafter. 
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The Court: I remember this witness testi-
fying 
Mr. Podell: Not this witness, your Honor. 
I am confident of that and I will read it to 
you in a moment. This same question came 
up before. Opposition in regard to these 
things is very essential. 
The Court: But you have to identify 
them as books that were there. 
Mr. Podell: We go a little further than 
that, and we take the position that if when 
these accountants going through these rec-
ords found any important record missing or 
unavailable to them, that it would have been 
their duty to make inquiry to get that record, 
or else—to stop. 
The Court: Stop. 
Mr. Podell : I am talking of the cross-ex-
amination of Romberg. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, 
there might have been other books which 
would have given all the information we were 
after. They are trying to say that this book 
was there in that condition at that time. 
The Court: There may have been other 
books. I want this book connected with the 
conditions that existed there. It may not 
be a necessary book to your examination at 
all—I am quite familiar with that proposi-
tion. 
Mr. Marshall: It ought to be connected 
in its present form. 
The Court: I am afraid it will have to 
be. 
Mr. Podell: Of remittances received from 
the United Baltic, there ought to be some 
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book somewhere. So far there is no evi-
dence there was more than this book. If they 
will produce any other records, if they had 
shipments received from the United Baltic, 
we will be glad to introduce them. 
Mr. Marshall: We do not have those rec-
ords, Mr. Podell. 
The Court: Would they be in any other 
book? 
By Mr. Podell (reading from testimony given by 
Romberg upon this trial) : 
"Q. Did you conceal that book from anybody? A. 
No. 
Q. So far as you know, did anybody conceal it 
from the accountants? A. No. 
Q. You have identified it previously as being one 
of the books kept by Fred Stern & Company? A. 
Yes. 
Q. So that so far as you know had Touche-Niven 
sought to use it or ask for it, it was there available 
for them? A. Right. 
Q. That is correct? A. Yes." 
Mr. Podell: And we will not take any 
more time with that. 
Mr. Marshall: He said he did not know 
the book, so how could he conceal it? 
Mr. Podell: He said he did. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Now, what is the answer of the witness? 
(Record repeated as recorded.) What did you find 
• by examination of that book? A. That we found 
shipments from the United Baltic, from pages on 
which we wanted to get the invoices. 
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Q. Pardon me, Mr. Djorup. I would like to be 
particularly clear about this item. What book did 
you look at first, at the accounts payable ledger 
first? A. No, the United Baltic shipment. 
Q. Did you look at the accounts payable ledger 
first; either yes or no? A. Yes, at the United Baltic 
account. 
Q. You looked at the United Baltic account; was 
it one of the accounts? A. Yes. 
Q. And the first book you looked at was? A. I 
found in the United Baltic account the accounts 
payable ledger. 
Mr. Marshall: Let us have that ledger he 
is talking about. 
Mr. Podell: It is in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like to have it 
now as he testifies. 
The Court: Let us have it. I think that 
is right. We shall be able to follow. 
The Witness: That is it (indicating). I 
found in 1924, in March, 1924, a number of 
credit items which showed the date of 1923. 
That is how I immediately went over ship-
ments that had been received in 1923, and 
had not been recorded. 
Q. Then what was your next step? A. The in-
voice register where those invoices were recorded 
in 1924. 
Q. And what did you find in the invoices? A. 
How about letting me have the invoice register of 
1924? 
Q. Please tell us what you found. Answer my 
question. A. Invoices entered in 1924 which were 
all dated prior to December 31, 1923, for rubber 
bought from United Baltic Corporation. 
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Q. Yes. When you speak of invoices you speak 
of money of the United Baltic that Stern owed to 
the United Baltic? A. Money that Fred Stern 
owed to the United Baltic. 
Q. Now, was the United Baltic among the ac-
counts payable or among the accounts receivable? 
A. The United Baltic was in the accounts payable 
ledger which contained 
Q. Go ahead. A. Which contains accounts pay-
able and dealers' accounts. 
Q. And dealers' accounts? A. As a differenti-
ation from customers' accounts. 
Q. From what? A. Customers' account which 
are in the accounts receivable ledger. 
Q. Is it customary to find in the accounts pay-
able ledger an indebtedness to a creditor? A. The 
United Baltic Corporation being a foreign shipper 
would usually have a large credit balance, unless 
they draw drafts against commercial letters of 
credits, when the balances would be approximately 
even. 
Q. There would be no occasion in the ordinary 
course of business when the United Baltic would 
owe money to Stern? 
Mr. Marshall: I object. He is testifying 
to Stern's course of business. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: What is the ground of ob-
jection? 
The Court: You are testifying, instead of 
the witness. 
Mr. Podell: I do not know how I can ask 
that differently because I am calling spe-
cific attention to a specific item. 
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Q. Is it customary to find in an accounts pay-
able ledger that there is a heavy indebtedness to 
a creditor? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think it makes 
much difference whether it is customary. 
The Court: I allow it. 
Q. Now, what did you do to check up this item 
of indebtedness to a creditor; what did you do after 
the accounts payable ledger, where did you go to, 
what book? A. To the book of original entry from 
which those credits came. 
Q. And what was that book? A. The invoice 
register. In the invoice register I found all the in-
voices for merchandise received prior to December 
31, 1923. 
Q. Now, we want that invoice register. A. And 
to find out what became of that merchandise I 
looked for a record which would show me what 
shipments had been received for those invoices, and 
then found this shipment record which showed me 
that merchandise was sold in 1923. The invoice— 
that is one of these books. 
Q. All right; we will get that, Mr. Djorup. Did 
you find that Stern had omitted those invoices 
from the United Baltic account that should have 
been charged up as a liability for the year 1923, 
in the sum of $371,000 odd? A. We tabulated those 
invoices and the invoices aggregated £82,552-16-6. 
Q. I want to save time on that account. You 
will help me, Mr. Djorup, and answer my questions 
yes or no, please? A. Yes. 
Q. What was the amount that you found in dol-
lars and cents that he had omitted to charge? A. 
To credit $371,487.80, to credit to the United Baltic 
Corporation. 
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Q. With that amount for the year 1923; is that 
right ? A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Djorup, was that the liability that 
Stern owed to the United Baltic, that item? A. 
The ledger account showed a debit balance. 
Q. I did not ask you that—was the sum of 
$371,487.80 a liability which Stern should have 
entered upon his books prior to December 31, 1923? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That had not been entered? A. Right. 
Q. What did the account show; what did he have 
entered? A. The account showed a debit balance. 
Q, Of how much? A. Of $113,199.60. 
Q. Upon a correction of that item, what would 
have been the true state of the balance as revised? 
A. $258,288.20. 
Q. What would have been due from whom to 
whom? A. It would have been due from Stern to 
the United Baltic Corporation. 
Q. So that that resulted from his omission to 
enter up the $371,000 as due to the United Baltic 
and resulted in an over-statement of the assets of 
over a quarter of a million dollars? A. That is 
correct. 
Q. And an under-statement of liabilities in that 
amount; it is the same as an over-statement of the 
assets, is that right? A. That is right. 
Q. Now, did you in checking up this figure, did 
you communicate with the United Baltic Corpora-
tion? A. We took it up with the agent of the 
United Baltic in State Street. 
Q. In State Street? A. Yes, 24 State Street, 
Q. They had an office here, had they not? A. 
They had an office here in New York. 
Q. And have you got the invoices of the United 
Baltic for these shipments? A. Yes, those we 
found in the office of Fred Stern & Company. 
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Q. You found them there the very first day you 
came in? A. It may have been the second or third 
day. 
Q. I mean as soon as you looked for them you 
found them? A. As soon as we looked for them we 
found them. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have those? 
The Witness : Yes (handing papers). 
The Court: What is that exhibit? 
Mr. Marshall: No. 24. 
Q. Have you heard the testimony here in court 
of Mr. Saul Levy, who proceded you, with respect 
to the various items that he testified to? A. Yes, I 
have. 
Q, Assuming that an accountant comes into an 
establishment like Fred Stern & Company, and 
finds there that in the inventory that was furnished 
him, that there had been included merchandise ag-
gregating $215,795.27, which should not have been 
included; that there had been included $20,000 
worth of accounts receivable which should not have 
been included; that there had been omitted $67,000 
of accounts payable which should not have been 
omitted, and the accountant, by reason of those 
omissions of inventory is compelled to reduce the 
inventory by the sum of three hundred and three 
odd thousand dollars—I withdraw that figure. 
The Court: $303,861. 
Q. (Continuing) The result of which is to re-
duce the net assets by the sum of three hundred and 
three odd thousand dollars—assuming that he finds 
accounts receivable entered in the ledger in the sum 
of $950,000 off for which there were no supporting 
entries, either in the sales memo book or sales 
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journal or in the shipping record; assuming that he 
finds the condition of affairs that you have de-
scribed in regard to the United Baltic account; and 
assuming that he finds on a comparison of the ac-
counts receivable ledger, his own working sheets, 
and communications from bank creditors and other 
creditors that various accounts have been assigned, 
forty-one accounts that he has investigated have 
been assigned more than once—thirty-five accounts 
out of forty-five have been assigned more than once 
—and that accountant is then required to furnish 
a certified statement, what, in your judgment, 
would an accountant, exercising reasonable care, 
just ordinary care, finding such a condition of af-
fairs, what would he have been required to do? A. 
Refuse to give a statement. 
Q. And why do you make that statement—he 
should have refused to give a certified statement in 
such form as appears in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1? 
Mr. Marshall: He said he should refuse 
to give a statement. Mr. Podell is trying to 
ask leading questions. 
The Court: Our whole attention is di-
rected towards Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, so 
when he says—to refuse to give a state-
ment, there could be no other deduction ex-
cept as that which is represented by Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 1. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not understand that. 
I do not think Mr. Podell should lead him. 
The Witness: I would refuse to give a cer-
tified balance sheet. 
Q. You will have to talk up louder. A. I would 
refuse to give a certified balance sheet when I 
found conditions as existed in Fred Stern & Com-
pany. 
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Q. You should have refused to give a certified 
balance sheet except upon what? 
The Court: He would refuse to give a cer-
tified balance sheet based on the conditions 
as found in Fred Stern & Company. It is 
awfully warm, gentlemen, won't you talk up, 
Mr. Witness, please. Reaching makes it 
harder for all. 
Q. If he did furnish any certified statement, in 
what respect should he have qualified it, if at all? 
A. A most exhaustive examination would have to 
be made first, to even give a qualified statement in 
a condition of that kind. 
Q. And the qualifications should have then re-
quired him to make full disclosure in the state-
ment that he had furnished of such conditions as I 
have described, if he found them? A. A certificate 
would be of no value 
Q. Whether it would be of value or not, that is 
another question; but in furnishing a certificate 
should he have made full disclosure of conditions 
such as I have described? A. If a certificate is 
given, yes. 
Q. If it is given? A. Yes. 
Q. You said that if the client insisted upon get-
ting a certificate and did not wish to have those 
qualifications, and denied in writing, what should 
the accountant have done? First, as to the ac-
counts receivable, what should he have done? A. 
Just a minute, on all crude rubber 
Mr. Marshall: I object to this as not call-
ing for a mere matter of information. He is 
going into what he thinks physically hap-
pened, and that is not a matter that he can 
get here. 
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The Court: I will allow the question. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Court: Exception for counsel for the 
defendant. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Did you understand my question; you are fa-
miliar with these letters that have just been shown? 
A. In the crude rubber business 
Q. I cannot hear you. A. In all audits of crude 
rubber importers, one should either communicate 
with the customer from whom the money is due or 
see that the payments for the money are received 
for the invoices during the course of the examina-
tion, if the examination has not been made. 
Q. What is the usual 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out that 
answer as not responsive. 
Mr. Podell: I think it is very responsive, 
if you will allow me to ask one more ques-
tion. 
Q. What are the usual terms— A. The usual 
terms in the rubber trade are net cash ten days for 
dealers and thirty days usually is the maximum for 
tire and rubber manufacturers. They sometimes 
give trade acceptances when they want a longer 
time. 
Q. So that if an accountant who is auditing these 
books waits thirty days, he will know whether 
most of those accounts are fake or whether or not 
they are genuine? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Q. That is his answer, your Honor. A. I have not 
finished my answer. 
1571 
1572 
525 
Christian Djorup—For Plaintiff—Direct. 1573 
The Court: It may be his answer, but he 
also said in the meantime there may be ac-
ceptances given which would even continue 
the further auditing of the books by the ac-
countant. 
Mr. Podell: An acceptance in payment. 
The Court: That may be. I think the 
question is beyond what the witness said. 
The witness gave the answer what the cus-
tomary thing would be, but he concluded 
that if the accountant waited thirty days be-
fore he gave his report, then he would know 
whether they were all paid or not. 
Mr. Podell: I will reframe it. 
Q. If your maximum terms in the rubber trade 
are thirty days, would you say it was the duty of 
the accountant to communicate with the people who 
owed the money, to find out whether they owed 
the money or to wait those thirty days? A. 
Usually the accountant does not come in the office 
until two or three weeks after the close of the 
audit, and before the audit is finished, the thirty 
days are expired; so that the accountant can either 
communicate with the customer on the 31st day 
of December when the crude rubber importer stands 
for the communication or he says that the money 
has been received during the course of the audit, 
but those customers where the money is not re-
ceived, should be looked into and communicated 
with, particularly after our 1921 experience with 
all the crude rubber houses. 
Mr. Podell: I will consent to that being 
stricken out—after the 1921 experience. 
The Court: Strike it out. 
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Q. Surely this audit was as of December 31, 1923, 
was it not? A. Right, 
Q. And the work sheets show at least the state-
ment was not given until 24th of February? A. 
24th of February which is almost sixty days after 
the end of the year. 
Mr. Podell: You may cross-examine. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, Mr. Djorup, you referred in looking to 
these invoices, Exhibit 24, you went to them, didn't 
you, after you had seen this account of the United 
Baltic in the general ledger? A. That is right, 
Q. Will you turn to that account, please, the 
accounts payable ledger, Exhibit No. 17? A. Yes, 
accounts payable ledger. 
Q. Now, that purports to be entered after the 
date of the balance sheet certified to by Touche, 
Niven & Co.; is not that so? A. That is right. 
Q. And so when you came to that account you 
had right there in the books the sign post showing 
in effect that in March, 1924, accounts payable were 
entered which should have been entered in 1923? 
A. Right. 
Mr. Marshall: May I show this to the 
jury, your Honor? 
The Court: Yes. 
(Mr. Marshall explaining to the jury the 
accounts payable ledger.) 
Q. That is the first and only entry of these lia-
bilities, is it not? A. No. The invoice register is 
used as a posting medium for this book. 
Mr. Podell: Wait a moment. Mr. Mar-
shall has told the jury that is the only one. 
You told them that right here. 
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Mr. Marshall: You asked whether it was 
a reversing entry. 
Mr. Podell: Is that what is called a re-
versing entry, that is, the 1st of October of 
the posting? 
The Witness: That is the first posting on 
the original books which were entered at the 
time when the shipments were received in 
1923. 
Q. Were you there, Mr. Djorup; how do you know 
that? A. It must have been. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike that out. 
The Court: Strike it out. 
Q. And this is not a reversing entry, is it? A. 
No, that is not a reversing entry; that is a posting. 
Q. But you cannot say of your own knowledge 
that it was in the other book from which you say 
it was posted in 1923, can you? A. No. The orig-
inal book from which that was posted was only en-
tered in 1924. 
Mr. Marshall: You are giving the impres-
sion that he knows it was entered. 
Mr. Podell: I am not. 
Q. You are not testifying from your own knowl-
edge as to anything in this business in 1923? A. 
I was not there in 1923. 
Mr. Marshall: That is the point. 
Q. You did not intend to give the impression, 
did you, that it was customary in 1924, when this 
audit was made, it was customary for accountants 
to circularize customers of a concern, accounts re-
ceivable customers? A. You mean communicate 
with the accountants receivable? 
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Q. Yes. A. That has been customary for years 
with crude rubber houses, silk houses, dealers in 
coffee, and other concerns. 
Q. It was not the general custom, was it? A. 
To my knowledge it is the general custom. 
Q. You mean you always did? A. I always did 
for the past fifteen years. 
Q. But you do not say it is the general custom of 
other accountants, do you? A. Accountants that 
are familiar with that line of business would com-
municate either with the customers or see the 
money is received before they quit. 
Q. Do you know of any other accountants besides 
yourself that does that? A. I do not know what 
other accountants are doing. 
Q. You do not know of any one else? A. (No 
reply.) 
Q. Would you communicate to a customer with-
out knowing what the other accountants are doing 
in that connection? A. That has been advocated 
in 1918 by the Federal Reserve Board. 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute; I object to 
what was advocated. 
Mr. Podell: He wants any customer and 
the witness is referring to a well recognized 
authority, the Federal Reserve Board. 
Mr. Marshall: That is not a justified 
statement. He is talking about what was ad-
vocated, not the custom. We are asking 
what the custom was. He said he did not 
know what other accountants did in the mat-
ter. 
The Court: I understand that, Mr. Mar-
shall. 
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Q. Now, as a matter of fact, did not you know 
that the Federal Reserve Board Bulletin says that 
"circularizing customers is optional"; is not that 
so? 
Mr. Podell: Are you talking about this 
industry? 
A. Yes, it is optional in the case of a merchan-
dise concern. 
Q. Does not the Federal Reserve Bulletin say 
that? A. With 5,000 customers you would not com-
municate with each customer. 
Q. It applies only to the merchandise concern of 
5,000 customers? A. No. Accountants use their 
discretion. 
The Court: He answers by saying it is 
a matter of discretion. 
Q. Now, I ask you whether you do not know that 
the Federal Reserve Bulletin says: "Optional. The 
best verification of an open balance is a confirma-
tion by the customer. Therefore, if time permits, 
and the client does not object, it is advisable to 
circularize the customer." It is held optional, you 
know that—I do not think the stenographer can 
hear you. A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you know, don't you, that accountants 
are not in the custom of guaranteeing their audits? 
Mr. Podell: Nobody claims that they 
guarantee their audits. 
A. I do not know what you mean by that. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. There is 
no such thing. 
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The Court: There is no such claim here, 
Mr. Marshall, and the Court will charge that 
there is no such guarantee. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor will so 
rule, that there is no guarantee at all—— 
The Court: I will charge it as a matter 
of law. 
Mr. Podell: And I will stipulate. We are 
not suing under a guarantee, and you know 
it. You know perfectly well that we are not 
suing on any guarantee. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know what your 
next amendment will be. 
Q. I understood you to say that you are an ex-
pert in foreign trade and foreign trade accounting? 
A. I am considered that. 
Q. What is that? A. I am considered that. 
Q. Did not you testify that you were this morn-
ing? 
Mr. Podell: Is not that an answer? 
The Court: I cannot hear either one of 
you now. 
Q. Didn't you testify that you were this morn-
ing? A. I testified that I had been specializing on 
foreign exchange and foreign trade audits for fifteen 
years or more, and I am considered an authority 
on foreign exchange. 
Q. Would you say that this is a correct state-
ment : "If banks would inspect and appraise mer-
chandise used as collateral for documents, and 
would refuse to accept those documents without 
inspection of the certificates signed by reputable 
examiners, many frauds perpetrated through docu-
ments could not occur." Is that a correct state-
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ment? A. I wrote that sixteen years ago, but the 
custom has not been adopted in the United States 
as yet. 
Q. But you still believe that that would prevent 
frauds being perpetrated? A. Yes, that would cut 
down frauds. 
Q. Yes? Yes or no? 
Mr. Podell: He has answered. 
Mr. Marshall: He is arguing. He has 
stated it would cut down frauds. 
Q. Now, with respect to lending money on trust 
receipts, would you say, "Being a credit and a 
trust, or rather a trusting business, very accurate 
accounting and a continuous follow-up system as 
to the credit and standing of customers is impera-
tive''? A. Yes. 
Q. And that is still your opinion? A. It has 
always been my opinion. 
Q. And did you say "that the credit department 
of a bank or a concern lending money should ob-
tain frequent information as to the responsibility 
of its active customers"? A. I wrote all that. 
Q. You wrote that away back in 1912, didn't 
you? A. Yes. 
The Court: He is asking if that is still 
your opinion? 
The Witness : Of course. 
Q. Now, did you write this: "Frequently banks 
will release to the customer under trust receipt the 
collateral received under acceptance agreements. 
They often overlook the fact that they hold only 
a lien, like a chattel mortgage, on merchandise 
which originally belonged to the customer, and that 
to be effective and against other creditors, in case 
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the customer should get into financial difficulties, 
such chattel mortgage must be recorded." You 
wrote that? A. Yes. 
Q. You wrote that as recently as 1926? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: The law happens to be quite 
different. Mr. Djorup is entitled to his view, 
but the question is, what are we entitled to? 
Q. Did you then go on to say at the same time: 
"For the protection of the banking community and 
to restrict dangerous inflation of business, it is of 
the utmost importance to standardize the accept-
ance business and recognize only one kind of trust 
agreement, namely, the legal and valid documents, 
the terms of which will be lived up to by the mer-
chants and strictly enforced by the bank." You 
wrote that? A. Yes, that is my opinion against 
bankers. 
Q. And it still is? 
Mr. Podell: Is that the practice? 
A. No, it is not. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to being inter-
rupted in the midst of the examination that 
way. 
Mr. Podell: I submit, your Honor, we are 
wasting a lot of time. 
The Court: No, I think it is important 
as to the question of contributory negligence. 
Mr. Podell: If the practice is universally 
the other way, how does it become important 
what the opinion of any one individual in 
the community might be? 
The Court: You made him your expert, 
Mr. Podell: Not on that subject. I have 
not asked him a single question about that. 
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The Court: Now it is cross-examination 
as to what an accountant should have done, 
as compared to what a man lending money 
should have done. I will allow the ques-
tion. 
Mr. Podell: I except. 
Q. Did you go on to say, "Recently"—this is in 
1926—"recently the author had occasion to investi-
gate acceptances and trust receipt agreements made 
by bankers with a merchant who became bank-
rupt." You said that—you remember saying that? 
A. Yes, but I talked to bankers at a convention 
in Dallas. 
Q. The person who became bankrupt, to whom 
you are referring there, was Stern, was it not? A. 
I believe so, though I did not mention any names. 
Q. Are you not certain in that book of yours, 
written in 1926, that you were referring to the 
audit you had made of Stern's books in the year 
1925—were you not referring to Stern there? A. 
No. Some examples which I put down from my 
experience, gotten from Stern's records, yes, with-
out mentioning the names. 
Q. "Recently the author had occasion to investi-
gate acceptances and trust receipt agreements made 
by bankers with a merchant who became bankrupt. 
To illustrate the dangers attached to lax investi-
gation of the transactions upon which the accept-
ance agreements are based and to the careless is-
suing of trust receipts, the following examples are 
cited—" And then do you remember you gave two 
illustrations drawn from your experience in this 
Stern's affair, is not that so? A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recollect—I will shorten this by 
handing you a copy of your book in this connec-
tion. You refer to the way fourteen tons were 
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imported under a commercial letter of credit and 
you show how that was pledged several times, and 
then you say—you end up by saying, "the actual 
merchandise, amounting to fourteen tons, was sold 
and the invoices were assigned to a fourth institu-
tion from which another advance was obtained." 
Now, was not that fourth institution named there 
the Ultramares Corporation (handing paper) ? A. 
It might have been, or it may have been another 
concern. 
Q. Well, to your best recollection, is not that 
the Ultramares Corporation? A. This particular 
fourteen tons 
Q. It describes a typical Ultramares transac-
tion? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. It does not 
do anything of the kind. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q. You are not sure whether it is an Ultramares 
transaction or not, is it? A. I am not positive. 
Q. But you go on to say, "Of course, banks will 
hold that the best credit department cannot pro-
tect the bank against fraud." Did you say that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you believe that still? A. I still believe 
that. 
Q. "This may be true, but even in connection 
with old customers, undue chances should not be 
taken." That is still your opinion? A. That I 
have been preaching to banks for twenty years. 
Q. "Where the banks do not actually import or 
own and have title in the merchandise, a trust re-
ceipt should not be executed. When an acceptance 
agreement is made, based upon assignment of in-
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voices, the bank should communicate with the 
buyer of the merchandise and obtain confirmation 
that the customer is aware of such assignment, and 
particularly that he has not been notified of a prior 
pledge or assignment to some other institution." 
You said that? A. I say a lot, but the bankers will 
tell you it is all theory. 
Q. But you said that in your book, and you be-
lieve that to be true? That is still your opinion? 
A. I know and you know that there are two 
kinds 
Mr. Marshall: Now 
Mr. Podell: He is entitled to answer. 
Please do not interrupt the answer. He is 
trying to give it, 
Mr. Marshall: It is not responsive. 
The Court: Then I will strike it out. 
Mr. Podell: It may be partly his opinion. 
Mr. Marshall: I will reframe the question. 
Mr. Podell: I submit—is the question 
withdrawn? 
The Court: Yes. 
Q. Are you still of the same opinion that you 
were in 1926 with respect to the matter I just read 
from your book? A. This is all like my old book, 
which is like lecturing in my courses at the New 
York University. That is theory as compared with 
the actual practice that I find in every bank. I 
have examined fifty-six banks 
The Court: What we want to know is, do 
you believe in that theory now? That is all 
we want to know—do you still believe it. 
The Witness: Naturally, what I write. 
The Court: Lots of us do not believe in 
what we write, but do you believe now? 
The Witness: I believe that would be an 
ideal condition, but we can never get it. 
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Q. I am reading this, "In liquidating the affairs 
of the above mentioned bankrupt estate there were 
four creditors, claimants to one and the same in-
voice in a number of cases. The above cited exam-
ples should emphasize the importance of investi-
gating collateral that is forming the basis for 
acceptance under agreement, and more particularly 
the collateral which is released under the terms of 
a trust receipt." You said that, didn't you? Did 
you say it? A. I suppose so. 
Q. Look at page 81 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, the book speaks 
for itself. How long are we going to keep 
this up? 
The Court: I do not know how long it 
will last. 
Mr. Marshall: Not very much longer. 
Mr. Podell: I object to the question. It 
is an attempt to read into the record the 
contents of a written document which is not 
in evidence nor has been offered. 
The Court: Overruled. Just a few min-
utes recess. 
By Mr. Marshall, 
Q. Now, you were the accountant of Ultramares 
in the year 1921, were you not? A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And you are still? A. I still am. 
Q. I mean, independently of your engagement on 
this trial, you have been the auditor of their books? 
A. I have been the auditor of their books. That 
means my assistants do the audit, 
Q. Now, let me ask you whether this is a proper 
practice, in your opinion, a proper statement of 
proper practice: "As an additional precaution 
against the omission of liabilities, a certificate 
1607 
1608 
537 
Christian Djorup—For Plaintiff—Cross. 1609 
should be obtained from the proper officer or mem-
ber of the concern stating that all outstanding lia-
bilities, purchases and expenses have been included 
in the accounts of the period under review or of 
former periods." Is that a correct statement? A. 
It is customary for accountants to obtain certifi-
cates. 
Q. Similar to those in evidence here? A. Similar 
to those that are in evidence. 
Q. Now, let me ask you whether this is, in your 
opinion, a correct statement: "A balance sheet 
audit is generally understood to cover a sufficient 
verification of the financial facts and transactions 
of an individual or of an organization to enable 
the accountant to certify that the completed state-
ment properly represents in his opinion a financial 
condition of the business unit named as of the date 
indicated." Would you say that is a correct state-
ment or an incorrect statement? A. What is that 
question, please? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
The Witness: I would say that is a cor-
rect statement. 
Q. "A balance sheet audit is valuable for many 
reasons. It is not, however, a completely satisfying 
procedure from many viewpoints. It is not broad 
enough in its scope to insure the discovery of de-
falcation or fraud on the part of the organization 
owners or its employees. It is entirely possible 
for such conditions to exist in an organization and 
not be disclosed by balance sheet audits, even 
though these be performed by able accountants. 
This condition may result in unexpected crises to 
the organization, with a possible resultant loss to 
creditors." Would you say that that is a correct 
statement? A. Yes and no. 
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Q. Well, tell us yes first, how far? A. It is pos-
sible that the balance sheet audit will not disclose 
the wasting of assets, but the balance sheet audit 
should show the assets and liabilities as they exist 
as at the date of the examination. A concern may 
be robbed of a million dollars and still be worth 
five million dollars in excess of liabilities at the 
end of the year. The balance sheet audit would 
show that the assets in excess of liabilities are five 
million, but would not show they should have been 
six millions. 
Q. Now, do you disagree with the part that says, 
" I t is not broad enough in its scope to insure the 
discovery of defalcation or fraud on the part of 
the organization owners or employees"? Do you 
agree or disagree with that? A. I agree that there 
may be internal fraud which may not be disclosed 
by the balance sheet audit unless there are some 
instances that call it to the attention of the ac-
countant who makes the balance sheet audit, that 
there are unusual conditions and he ought to look 
closer into it, 
Q. But the balance sheet audit may not disclose 
those even to an able accountant in some instances; 
that is all I am asking. A. In some instances is 
right. 
Q. Now let me ask you whether you agree with 
this statement, "Some business men seem to feel 
that an accountant in order to certify to a balance 
sheet containing an element of accounts receivable 
must have obtained confirmation of the amounts by 
direct communication with the debtor represented 
in the list. Bankers, I am confident, are quite well 
aware that this procedure in the verification of 
accounts receivable is the exception and not the 
rule." Do you agree with that? A. I do for the 
general, broad business, but not for particular lines. 
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Mr. Podell: Your Honor, may it appear 
counsel is reading not from anything writ-
ten by the witness? 
The Witness : No, I did not write that. 
Mr. Marshall: This is the authority. 
Mr. Podell: This is what? 
Mr. Marshall: This is the authority I am 
reading from. 
Mr. Podell: May I also ask that counsel 
state what he is reading from in putting his 
questions? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think that is 
essential. 
Mr. Podell: Then I object to reading into 
the record the contents of a paper which is 
neither offered nor in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: I am asking the man's 
opinion. 
Mr. Podell: He is obviously reading from 
a paper in the presence of the jury. We are 
entitled to know what document he is read-
ing from. 
Mr. Marshall: He says he is agreed. I 
do not think when he agrees I have to say 
what I am reading from. 
The Court: I do not think so either. Ob-
jection overruled. 
Mr. Podell: I except, I ask that the paper 
be marked for identification, the paper coun-
sel is holding in his hand. 
Mr. Marshall: I have two papers in 
hand. 
The Court: Mark them for identification. 
(Marked respectively Defendants' Ex-
hibits L and M for Identification.) 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, you know Mr. George O. May, do you 
not, of Price, Waterhouse? A. By name. 
Q. Do you know of his reputation? A. Yes. 
Q. He is one of the leaders in the field of ac-
countancy, is he not? A. I don't know. 
Q. You do not know? You know Price, Water-
house & Company? A. Yes, I do know Price, Water-
house & Company. 
Q. One of the biggest firms of accountants, are 
they not? A. Right. 
Q. I am reading from something that he said— 
Mr. Podell: I object to that statement. 
Q. Asking you whether you 
Mr. Podell: I object to a statement by 
counsel that he is reading from something 
he said. 
The Court: That is right. Objection sus-
tained. Strike it out. 
Mr. Podell: I ask now that the paper 
counsel is reading from be marked in evi-
dence. That the paper he is going to read 
from be marked in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: He would not let me read. 
The Court: Do not let us argue. Mark 
it in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: I have not read from it 
yet, your Honor. 
The Court: But you are going to read 
from it. 
Mr. Marshall: Can I not test the witness' 
opinion without having the document marked 
in evidence? 
The Court: Any source. But you quoted 
it yourself. 
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Mr. Marshall: I have not quoted it once 
yet, your Honor; and even if I have quoted 
it, I cannot see why it should be marked in 
evidence. 
Mr. Podell: Because reading a snatch 
here and reading a snatch there does not give 
a fair statement. He might have said in half 
a dozen places that certain things are sus-
picious and a man must make a statement 
of it 
The Court: The Court rules it be marked 
in evidence, and an exception given.- Now, 
we will have no more argument, if you 
please, gentlemen. 
Mr. Marshall: I except, because I have 
not read from it. 
The Court: Then you do not need to, if 
you do not want to. 
Mr. Marshall: If it is marked in evidence, 
I certainly shall. 
Mr. Podell: I offer it. It is on my offer. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Certainly. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 85.) 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. How long did you work on the books of Fred 
Stern, Mr. Djorup? A. How long? 
Q. Yes. A. Since January 3rd, 1925. We are 
still working on them. 
Q. How many hours did you and your assistants 
put in on these books? 
The Court: Describe the working hours. 
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A. I happen to have the calendar here for 1925. 
From six to twenty hours a day. I worked for a 
long time. 
Mr. Podell: So that the record will be 
clear, I think it should appear that the wit-
ness did a great many other things besides 
checking up for 1923. 
Mr. Marshall: I understand that. 
The Witness: I went back to 1918. 
Mr. Podell: He checked up from 1918. 
The Witness: Back to 1918, for Romberg 
made a 
Mr. Marshall: I object to this. 
The Court: What do you want? 
Mr. Marshall: I asked him how many 
hours he spent on the books of Stern. 
The Court: Answer that. 
The Witness: For several months from 
six to twenty hours a day, and then I left 
the assistants do most of the work and I 
spent a few hours a day, for I had other 
engagements. 
Q. And what have you been paid for your 
services? 
Mr. Podell: By whom? 
Mr. Marshall: By the trustee in bank-
ruptcy or by Ultramares. 
The Witness: By the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, nothing as yet. By the receiver I 
was paid at the same rate as by other clients, 
at the rate of $15 an hour. 
Q. How much did you get in all, have you any 
idea, so far? A. The bill from the receiver is 
$9,000—the bill rendered was $9,057 and I received 
$9,000. 
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Q. And how much have you received from Ultra-
mares for your testimony—Ultramares, the plain-
tiff? A. A retainer of $250 and a usual charge of 
double the amount for my time spent. In other 
words, $30 an hour for court work. $15 an hour 
for preparatory work, as has been my custom for 
the past ten years. 
Mr. Marshall: That is all, Mr. Djorup. 
I would like to read in evidence parts of 
this document, the exhibit which was 
marked, your Honor. I did not ask the wit-
ness any question on it. 
The Court: All right, sir. 
Mr. Podell: Is this paper in evidence? 
Mr. Marshall: This is the one you offered. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. I would like to have 
the whole of it. 
Mr. Marshall: I understand the whole of 
this article is in evidence, is it not? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. But you are going to 
read parts of it? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. You can read the 
rest, or I will hand it to the jury (reading 
from Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 85). Your wit-
ness. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Djorup, there has been some talk 
here about your book. What is that book? A. It 
is a book on foreign exchange accountings which 
I wrote principally for banks and for foreign de-
partments of banks. 
Q. And you state throughout that book, in those 
passages which have been read and in other pas-
sages, that banks would be safer if they recorded 
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their trust receipts, and whatever other instru-
ments of title they took, that it should be recorded; 
is not that what you urged? A. I didn't say that, 
In my book I said there were two kinds of trust 
receipts, and that the banks segregate their trust 
receipt customers in two classes—those that they 
watch carefully, where the trust receipt has to be 
a legal document, and those where the trust receipt 
is a scrap of paper. That in many cases 
Q. Pardon me. I am referring now to the part 
where you say in your book—spoke of chattel mort-
gages and recording them. Do you remember that 
part that counsel read? A. Right. 
Q. That is what you argued for, is it not? A. 
I am only arguing for that, for those trust receipts 
that are not trust receipts but 
Q. Just scraps of paper? A. Yes, scraps of 
paper. 
Q. Now, do you know that since then the courts 
of the State of New York have held that it is not 
necessary to record them to make them valid? A. 
A trust receipt where the title in the merchandise 
belongs to the bank does not have to be recorded, 
but a trust receipt where the merchandise never 
was in the possession of the bank should be re-
corded. 
Q. That is the practice. Is the practice in all 
the banks—do you know of a single instance where 
any bank makes it its practice 
Mr. Marshall: I object to what the prac-
tice may be. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: I assume this is all offered 
on the theory that we were contributorily 
negligent? 
Mr. Marshall: Certainly. 
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Q. When you talk of trust receipts in the part 
that was read, are you talking of the practice of 
banks or of the practice of factors? Which are 
you talking about? A. I am talking in the book 
what I would like the banks to do. It is my theory 
as against the practice which is never lived up to. 
Q. Yes. But are you talking about what banks 
should do in usual transactions, or what factors 
do? A. I wasn't speaking about factors at all in 
the book. I was only talking about foreign ex-
change departments of banks. 
Q. Of banks? A. Yes. 
Q. You know that in this case accounts were 
assigned, do you not, in connection with these 
papers called trust receipts, additional accounts 
were assigned? You heard the testimony as to 
additional security? A. I know that the trust 
receipts 
The Court: Answer the question. That 
is a simple question. 
The Witness: Yes. 
Q. Do you know also that immediately they were 
assigned to us notice was given to the customer 
who owed on the account? A. Yes. 
Q. You know that? A. Yes, I do. 
Q. That is one of the things that you recommend 
in there, that notice be given when accounts are 
assigned? A. Right. 
Q. Now, in connection with all these articles that 
have been read—of course, I assume that a great 
many articles have been written on auditing, have 
they not? Have they or have they not? A. Yes, 
thousands. 
Q. And on the processes of auditing, have they or 
have they not? A. They have. 
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Q. By a great many writers? A. Right. 
Q. Books have been written on the subject? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Tell me whether it is universally recognized 
that where an accountant going over records finds 
suspicious circumstances, that then it is his busi-
ness before certifying to any statement, whether it 
is a balance sheet audit or any other kind of an 
audit, to investigate those to the end? A. Yes, sir, 
of course. 
Q. Until he finds out what the true facts are? 
A. Of course. 
Q. Before he certifies? A. Right. 
Q. No matter who wrote the article or whoever 
wrote a book on the subject, has that rule been 
universally recognized? A. It has been recognized 
by all accountants, to my knowledge. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You do not mean, do you, that factors should 
use less care in their transactions than banks? You 
did not mean to give that impression, did you? 
A. No. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. But they are different transactions? A. They 
are different transactions altogether. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You mean the advancing of money under trust 
receipts or under documents by a factor is any 
different from the advancing of money under docu-
ments or trust receipts by a bank? A. The factor 
usually relies upon 
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Q. No. 
Mr. Podell: Let him answer. 
The Witness: Yes. 
Q. You do mean there is a difference? A. Yes. 
Q. Between advances on the same kind of se-
curity? A. It is usually not the same kind of 
security. 
Q. If there is the same kind of security 
Mr. Podell: That is begging the question, 
your Honor. It is not the same kind of 
security. That is just the point. 
The Court: Let us not have a great deal 
of discussion on this. 
Mr. Podell: I object to counsel—— 
The Court: You bring it out. 
Mr. Podell: I object to counsel assuming 
a fact which is entirely at variance with the 
facts we have proven. We were not a bank. 
Mr. Marshall: You were a factor. 
Mr. Podell: We were a factor. 
The Court: Question. 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Q. If there is the same kind of security given 
as you described here, should not the same results 
follow? A. The factors usually rely on their as-
signed accounts, and the trust receipt is only a 
transit period until they get their assignments. 
Q. But the same procedure should be followed 
with respect to trust receipts by a factor as is fol-
lowed by a bank, should it not? A. In all the 
factors that I have audited, I never found trust 
receipts. 
Q. In no other case? A. Not that I remember. 
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By Mr. Podell 
Q. They relied on the assigned accounts? A. On 
the assigned accounts. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. But in this case you had trust receipts? A. 
I suppose the reason for that was that the mer-
chandise 
Q. Please. Just a minute. I did not ask you 
for any reason, did I? A. Here there are trust 
receipts, yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. They had in addition to the assigned ac-
counts, did they not? A. Yes. 
(Witness excused.) 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I find that inad-
vertently I omitted to offer the assigned ac-
counts for account No. 104. I offered all 
the others that were subsequent. I would 
like to offer those now, all as one batch. 
The Court: Now, are we ready with that 
statement of other accounts, Mr. Limburg? 
Mr. Limburg: We will come to that in 
just a moment, Judge. 
Mr. Marshall: The same objection as I 
stated to the others, as not being binding on 
us, and an exception. I assume that the 
statement will be added that no claim is 
made under these? 
Mr. Limburg: He has already testified. 
Mr. Marshall: These were all paid? 
Mr, Limburg: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: That is, only subject to the 
come-backs that we had. 
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Mr. Marshall: The come-backs you claim 
you had. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 86.) 
Mr. Podell: I would like to offer a state-
ment that we prepared, your Honor, show-
ing the amounts that were assigned to us by 
Stern & Company on the dates in between 
December 9th and December 16th, 1924. 
The Court: Does that include this $8,000 
which I already admitted in evidence? 
Mr. Limburg: No. This is an assignment 
of accounts merely. This is not collections. 
This is assignment of accounts. 
Mr. Marshall: It is already in in the tabu-
lation you have made. 
Mr. Podell: This is a tabulation to show 
that the amount that we received and kept 
on receiving during the month of December, 
1924, assignments of accounts between the 
9th and the 16th, that is on four dates, De-
cember 12th, 13th, 15th and 16th, we received 
a total of $54,000 of accounts that were as-
signed to us. 
The Court: That is from Stern & Com-
pany? 
Mr. Podell: From Stern & Company. 
After December 16th, 1924—that is, the 18th, 
the 23rd, the 26th, 27th, the 31st—we re-
ceived assignments of an additional $65,000 
of assigned accounts. All as bearing upon 
our reliance and good faith that this man 
was sending us assigned accounts at that 
time. They run in large sums. That is the 
same period your Honor has in mind where 
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he agreed to repay the $100,000 within a 
week. We were getting these assigned ac-
counts. 
The Court: Yes, I follow. 
Mr. Marshall: Now, I will object to this, 
your Honor, unless it shows the date of the 
trust receipt. 
Mr. Limburg: They are all in evidence. 
That is why we put that in evidence just 
now. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibits 87 and 88.) 
Mr. Podell: That shows, as I read it, 
assignments received by Ultramares Corpo-
ration between December 9th and December 
16th, 1924; that is, received assignments of 
accounts on the various trust receipts. "T. 
R," means trust receipt, 104; the date of 
the assignment is given here, the name of the 
account, and the amount. Received assigned 
accounts between the 9th and the 16th aggre-
gating $54,000; and then, after the 16th, con-
tinued receiving assignments of accounts 
from then right to the very last day, Decem-
ber 31st, From the 16th to the 31st the as-
signed accounts were $65,000 additional. 
Now, your Honor, in connection with the 
promise of the payment to be made, of the 
$100,000 by December 16th, I would like to 
offer in evidence a statement of what we 
actually received on these assigned accounts; 
not these identical assigned accounts, be-
cause they, of course, had not been collected 
yet, but on assigned accounts we held, what 
we actually received, between the 9th and 
the 16th of December. Do I make myself 
clear, your Honor? 
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Mr. Marshall: I certainly object to that, 
your Honor. 
The Court: Objection sustained and ex-
ception to counsel for the plaintiff. 
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor bear with 
me just a moment on that? We have not 
done anything different with regard to that 
$100,000, and that is just what I am com-
plaining about, than we have done with re-
gard to other loans we had made. The only 
difference, we took the added precaution of 
asking him to clean up his account by the 
end of the month. 
The Court: But you had no accounts re-
ceivable. 
Mr. Podell: I had. Now, please bear with 
me. Counsel is misleading you, and I said 
that to you before. 
Mr. Marshall: I am not. Will you pro-
duce them? 
Mr. Podell: I will produce them right 
now. 
Mr. Marshall: That is what I am asking. 
Three accounts receivable on loan 107. 
Mr. Podell: Wait a minute, please. Here 
are trust receipts 107, 108 and 109. 
The Court: Right, sir. 
Mr. Podell: We have the trust receipts. 
The Court: You have that. 
Mr. Podell: At the foot of it 
The Court: That is the piece of paper. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. At the foot of it there 
is a statement, "Sold to Detroit Insulated 
Rubber Wire Company, five tons; Whitney 
Blake Company, eighteen tons; Goodyear 
Rubber Insulating Company, seven tons; 
Michelin Tire Company, ten tons." Those 
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were the accounts to whom he claimed to 
have sold what is referred to in these trust 
receipts. Now, take every one of them—— 
The Court: Mark it for identification. 
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 89 and 90 for 
Identification.) 
(Recess until 2.05 o'clock P. M.) 
AFTER RECESS. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I would like to 
offer in evidence these various depositions of 
the accounts receivable, people who were re-
ported as having accounts receivable. I will 
ask permission to read one of them, because 
they are all in the same form. 
The Court: All right, sir. 
Mr. Podell: I will get up a list of what 
they are. Those are filed papers. 
Mr. Limburg: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: So we will consider them 
in evidence. I do not have to mark them. 
The Court: No. 
Mr. Podell: Will the stenographer please 
note the following depositions are offered in 
evidence: Michelin Tire Company, Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Company, Goodrich Company, 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Miller 
Rubber Company, General Tire & Rubber 
Company, Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen 
Manufacturing Company, Pennsylvania Rub-
ber Company, Sprekles-Savage Tire Com-
pany, Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corporation of 
America, A. A. Wire Company, Western 
Electric Company, Endicott-Johnson Cor-
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poration, Hood Rubber Company, Ford 
Motor Company, Garlock Packing Company. 
Mr. Marshall: How many now? 
The Stenographer: Sixteen. 
Mr. Podell: In reading the deposition of 
the Ford Motor Company, with the state-
ment of the questions put, all of the deposi-
tions are the same, and the answers are the 
same; that is, they are all the same—''There 
is no such account." This is the deposition 
of Ned Fuller of the Ford Motor Company. 
The questions and answers were as follows: 
"Q. Please state your full name, age and resi-
dence. A. My name is Ned Fuller. I am forty 
years of age and reside at 746 Collingwood Avenue, 
Detroit, Michigan. 
"Q. Are you at present in the employ of the Ford 
Motor Company? A. I am at present in the employ 
of the Ford Motor Company. 
"Q. Were you in the employ of the Ford Motor 
Company on December 31, 1923? A. I was in the 
employ of the Ford Motor Company on December 
31, 1923. 
"Q. What period of time prior to December 31, 
1923, were you in the employ of the Ford Motor 
Company? A. Prior to December 31, 1923. I had 
been in the employ of Ford Motor Company for a 
period of approximately fifteen years. 
"Q. State the nature of your duties as an em-
ployee of the Ford Motor Company at the present 
time and the nature of your duties as an employee 
on December 31, 1923. A. All disbursements for 
the Ford Motor Company, with the exception of 
payrolls and a few small local purchases at various 
branches in the country, come under my jurisdic-
tion at the present time and did on December 31, 
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1923. My official position is auditor of disburse-
ments. As auditor of disbursements, the custody 
and supervision of invoices covering accounts pay-
able is under my supervision and control after the 
order is placed until the item covered by the in-
voice or order is paid. The files and records and 
the orders and invoices on all merchandise pur-
chased by the Ford Motor Company upon which 
disbursements must be made, with the exception of 
payrolls and small local purchases mentioned, are 
kept by me in the regular course of business. 
"Q. Was there any sale by Fred Stern & Com-
pany, Inc., to Ford Motor Company of the mer-
chandise shown on the photostat of invoice 
annexed hereto and marked Exhibit A?" 
Mr. Marshall: As to this question, I re-
peat the objection that I made at the time 
the deposition was propounded, just to keep 
t"he record straight, your Honor. 
The Court: What was that objection? 
Mr. Marshall: The objection that it calls 
for a conclusion and a comparison of the 
photostatic copy of the document annexed to 
the deposition. 
The Court: Alleged to be an extract from 
the books? 
Mr. Marshall: Alleged to be, yes. 
The Court: And on that original ground? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
The Court: I will give you an exception. 
Mr. Marshall: And also on the ground it 
calls for a conclusion. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. Your Honor, 
I do not repeat this, and may that same ob-
jection be made to any question of that char-
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acter referring to documents or books of 
Stern's? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Or purported copies? 
The Court: Yes, you may have an ex-
ception. 
Mr. Podell: The next, your Honor, is a 
photostatic copy of the invoice of November 
12, 1923, one of those in form as per the 
seventeen invoices that we spoke of on Fri-
day. It is addressed to the Ford Motor 
Company of Detroit, due March 1st. First 
it was down as February 15, 1924, and that 
was stricken out and put down as March 
1st, 1924, of 900 C & S, mold deal red smoke 
sheets as per sample 3257, G-223, 845 1.109, 
44½, U. 22,900½ pounds at 29 cents per 
pound, $64,421.14. 
The witness' answer to that is: 
"There was not any sale by Fred Stern & 
Company, Inc., to Ford Motor Company of 
merchandise shown on photostat annexed to 
written interrogatories and marked Exhibit 
A, so far as I have been able to ascertain 
from the files and records in my possession." 
"Q. Was there any delivery by Fred Stern & 
Company, Inc., to Ford Motor Company of the 
merchandise shown on said photostat of invoice 
marked Exhibit A?" 
"To the Eighth interrogatory he saith: 
"The files and records in my possession covering 
the account of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., do not 
show any delivery by Fred Stern & Company, Inc., 
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to the Ford Motor Company of the merchandise 
shown on the photostat of invoice marked Exhibit 
A attached to written interrogatories. 
"Q. Did the Ford Motor Company on or about 
November 12, 1923, purchase from Fred Stern & 
Company rubber of the purchase price of $64,-
641.14? A. The Ford Motor Company did not on 
or about November 12, 1923, purchase from Fred 
Stern & Company, Inc., rubber of the purchase 
price of $64,641.14, so far as I have been able to 
ascertain from the files and records in my posses-
sion. 
"Q. Did the Fred Stern & Company, Inc., on or 
about November 12, 1923, deliver to the Ford Motor 
Company rubber of the purchase price of $64,-
641.14? A. Fred Stern & Company, Inc., did not 
deliver to the Ford Motor Company on or about 
November 12, 1923, rubber of the purchase price of 
$64,641.14, so far as I am able to ascertain from the 
files and records in my possession. 
"Q. Did the Ford Motor Company at any time 
during the year 1923 purchase rubber from Fred 
Stern & Company, Inc.? A. Ford Motor Company 
did upon several occasions during the year 1923 
purchase rubber from Fred Stern & Company, Inc. 
"Q. If so, state the terms of credit. A. The terms 
of credit upon such purchases were at all times net 
cash, ten days. 
"Q. Did Ford Motor Company purchase any 
merchandise from Fred Stern & Company, Inc., 
upon terms of credit exceeding three months? A. 
I am unable to locate any terms of credit exceeding 
three months. So far as the records in my posses-
sion are disclosed covering all records of purchase 
from Fred Stern & Company, Inc., by the Ford 
Motor Company, all invoices bear terms 'Net Cash, 
Ten days.'" 
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Mr. Podell: That is signed by Ned Fuller 
and sworn to before the notary. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out all 
the testimony in which the witness states 
based upon records and not personal knowl-
edge. 
The Court: Denied. 
Mr. Podell: Now, Mr. Limburg, please 
take the stand. 
Mr. Marshall: You are assuming that 
these depositions are all the same? 
Mr. Podell: I think Endicott-Johnson 
said they had lost their records, and we will 
take them subject to correction. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like to know 
whether they have read over those docu-
ments which I handed them about the Equi-
table Trust of Baltimore suit, which they 
said they were going to read over, and I was 
going to offer them. 
The Court: The summons and pleadings. 
Mr. Marshall: The complaint and answer. 
The Court : Have you gone over those? 
Mr. Podell: I have not gone over them, 
and I assume they are the same, so counsel 
can allow some of them in. 
The Court: Is that the one of which we 
were speaking, the $8,000 payment? 
Mr. Podell: No, that is the $52,000 which 
your Honor and I discussed this morning. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like it to go in 
separately because I offered it myself sepa-
rately and apart from this $52,000. 
Mr. Podell: He can offer them in the first 
part of his case. He can offer all the things 
which he thinks ought to be offered. I will 
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offer the summons and complaint served 
on us. 
Mr. Marshall: I offered it specially to in-
dicate that they had been sworn under oath. 
The Court: As to some witness on the 
stand, yes, the cashier, was it not? 
Mr. Podell: What does he want to do 
now? 
The Court: He wants to introduce that 
in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: What are you offering? 
Mr. Marshall: The summons and com-
plaint and answer. 
Mr. Limburg: Exhibits H and I. 
The Court: They were only offered for 
identification when they went in. They are 
now in evidence. 
(Received in evidence and marked De-
fendants' Exhibits H and I. ) 
Mr. Podell: Now, Mr. Limburg. 
HERBERT R. LIMBURG, called as a witness on be-
half of the plaintiff and having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. What is your address? A. 31 East 72nd 
Street, New York City. 
Q. Mr. Limburg, you are one of the attorneys 
for the plaintiff here? A. I am. 
Q. And you have had charge of this litigation 
right from its beginning? A. I have. 
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Q. You have also represented the Ultramares 
Corporation in other matters that arose out of this 
entire situation? A. I have. 
Q. Now will you state, just naming the claims, 
without stating their character, that were made 
against the Ultramares Corporation on accounts 
that had been assigned by Stern to some one other 
than to the Ultramares? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as not 
binding upon the defendants. 
The Court: It is overruled at this time 
and exception given at this time. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor understands 
I am making my objection in the same spirit 
as your Honor is ruling. 
The Court: Certainly. 
A. There was the Equitable Trust Company of 
Baltimore, which brought a suit against Ultra-
mares, the pleadings in which are now in evidence 
as Exhibits H and I. That suit covered accounts— 
that is, giving the date. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that because 
the documents are in evidence. 
The Court : They speak for themselves. 
Q. Briefly, state what accounts. 
The Court: Yes. I assume the familiarity 
would show the conformity. 
Q. They covered accounts which had been col-
lected by the Ultramares Corporation in November 
and December, 1924, the last date being December 
15, 1924, the earliest date November 20, 19124, and 
aggregating $84,904.67, for which judgment was 
demanded. 
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Q. Now, when had those accounts been assigned 
to Ultramares? Just give us the date of assign-
ment; you haye given the date of collection. A. 
If you will give me that Exhibit No. 76, I can 
probably tell you. I can give you the trust num-
bers, if that will help you. It was under trust 
Nos. 90 and 96. 
Q. We want the dates. A. That will give me the 
date. 
Q. Exhibit 76 is what? 
The Court: It is a long sheet. 
A. Mr. Popkin, if you will give me account No. 
5, I will get it quickest right out of that. (Paper 
handed.) The dates incidentally appear in the 
complaint. 
Q. You understand the date I am asking for is 
the date when the first of those accounts was as-
signed by Stern to Ultramares? A. November 14. 
There is another one assigned November 14th. 
Q. Mr. Limburg, we will save a lot of time if 
you can state without looking at those papers in 
all those accounts— A. One was December 8. 
There were four involved here. 
Q. You are talking now about the Equitable 
Trust Company? A. Correct. 
Q. Can you look at those figures and tell this 
jury what is the earliest one, speaking now of all 
the complaints, what is the earliest one, the earliest, 
assignment of account from Stern to Ultramares, 
that is involved in these claims? 
The Court: That is covering the whole 
set? 
The Witness: No. Not involved in this 
set. 
The Court: All of them? 
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Q. Of various dates? 
The Court: In other words, he wants just 
a concise date. 
A. It was prior to October 31, because one of 
those accounts was collected by us on October 31 
and must have been assigned to us some time 
earlier, and I will find out the date. 
Q. Get us that date. That is the first one. 
The Court: Do you mean the first assign-
ment? 
Mr. Podell: That was the first. The title 
by anybody that he had assigned it. 
A. October 31, the claim was not made until then. 
Mr. Marshall: I have not got that item 
yet. 
Q. The earliest assigned account, the earliest 
date of assignment, the claim was made later, was 
it not? A. Yes. 
Q. It was made after January, 1925? A. Cor-
rect. 
Q. But the first assigned account was in October, 
1924, as to which somebody else claimed he had an 
assignment? A. Correct. 
Q. I think this is 76? A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: I have not got the date 
of that yet. 
Q. Early in October? A. October 31, 1924. 
Q. That is the date it was paid? A. No. I made 
a mistake. That is the date of the assignment to 
us. It was paid afterwards. 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Just a minute. Can you point out on this 
list, because I cannot see it. I do not follow that 
at all. A. I think so. 
Q. Under what trust receipts? A. Under trust 
receipt 93. The date of the account was October 
31st. I see we actually got it November 3. It was 
paid on November 25, 1924. 
Q, The date of the loan was November 3, ac-
cording to this? A. The date of the loan was num-
bered 93, November 3. The assignment was dated 
on the same date, and the account itself was dated 
October 31 and collected by us at the end of Novem-
ber. 
The Court: Have you got that, Mr. Mar-
shall? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know that I have. 
I do not understand where the October 31 
comes in. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Shipment was made October 31 by Stern, who 
sent an invoice on October 31 and assigned that 
to us on November 3, and we made a loan on the 
same date? A. Correct. 
Q. Now, have you totaled the total amount of 
such claims? Just give the amount of the claim on 
all the losses. 
Mr. Marshall: This is Equitable Trust? 
Q. No. All of them. 
The Court: All of them. 
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Q. The total amount of all the claims. 
The Court: Subject to your objection. 
Mr. Marshall: I make a further objection, 
that I would like to see the pleadings in the 
other claims. 
The Witness: They are right here. I 
have given them to you separately. There 
was one Bank Beige. 
Mr. Marshall: May I see the pleadings? 
The Witness: Certainly. 
Mr. Podell: Let us offer all the pleadings, 
for that matter. I offer in evidence all the 
pleadings, your Honor, the complaints and 
the answers. 
Mr. Marshall: At this time I object to 
them as incompetent, irrelevant and imma-
terial, and not binding upon us. If I read 
them I may permit them to go in. 
Mr. Podell: I understood the only thing 
your Honor decided would be excluded 
would be the amount of it in settlement. 
The Court: That is all I am interested in. 
I do not care what kind of pleadings they are 
or what they contain, I do not think the 
amount is admissible here. I want the total 
amount, and the pleadings are subject to any 
further disposition that may be legally made 
of them. 
Mr. Marshall: Is your Honor admitting 
them? 
The Court: No, sir, I am not admitting 
them. 
Mr. Podell: Let them be marked for iden-
tification, and let the record show that we 
made an offer of the pleadings and your 
Honor excluded them. 
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The Court: Yes, sir, and an exception 
was taken. 
(The pleadings were received and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 91 and 92 for Identifica-
tion. ) 
The Witness: We were likewise sued by 
the Bank of London and South America. 
The pleadings are here. 
Mr. Marshall: The same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling and exception. 
Mr. Podell: I offer those. 
The Court: With the exception for coun-
sel for the plaintiff. 
(Received and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 
93 for Identification.) 
The Witness: There was the Federal In-
ternational Banking Corporation, in which 
a claim was made, and it was disposed of 
without suit being filed. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. You have no pleadings in the claim by the 
Federal Banking Corporation? A. The Federal 
International Banking Corporation, no. 
Q. There was a disposition made of that? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling. Just give the 
figures now. I want it on the record as a 
matter of figures and not as an item of 
damage. 
Mr. Marshall: The amount of the claim. 
The Court: Yes, sir. 
The Witness: The amount of the claim 
and the action by the Bank Beige, was $46,-
854.13 plus interest. 
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Q. Does that summarize the claims that were 
made, Mr. Limburg? A. The Federal International 
claim was $23,494.16, and the Bank of London and 
South America—I have not the figure here, but it 
is right in the complaint, so you have it. 
The Court: Can you give us that (indi-
cating)? 
The Witness: $16,124.95. 
Q. Does that summarize all of the claims, Mr. 
Limburg? A. No, there were other claims in which 
nothing has been done, either by way of adjustment 
or by way of suit. 
Q. Now, Mr. Limburg, upon receipt of these com-
plaints, did you investigate the situation; just 
answer yes or no? A. I did. 
Q. Did you investigate the law and the facts 
in each situation? A. I did. 
Q. And as a result of such an investigation, 
could you say from the law, as it stands, or as it 
stood, that there was a definite liability one way 
or the other; just answer that yes or no; can you 
say that? 
Mr. Marshall: I object. 
The Court: I will let him say whether 
he can say it or not. 
Q. Can you say whether there was a definite lia-
bility one way or the other so that you could with 
reasonable certainty state that either you were 
liable or not liable on these claims? A. I can only 
express my own opinion and the action I took upon 
it. There was no adjudication. 
Mr. Marshall: Please don't tell us what 
action you took. 
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Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit me 
to get that on the record? 
The Witness: I only want to state that 
so that if you have any objection-
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit me 
to get this witness' opinion for the purpose 
of laying a proper foundation as to what the 
situation was? 
The Court: No, sir. 
Mr. Podell: Let it appear on the record, 
your Honor, that a question was asked as 
to what his opinion was, and your Honor 
sustained an objection to that and granted 
me an exception. 
The Court: That is right, 
Q. As the result of the conclusion or opinion 
that you reached, did you, yes or no, make any 
adjustment of those cases? 
Mr. Marshall: Objection. 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
Mr. Marshall: I object on the ground it 
cannot be binding on us any way. 
The Court: I will allow the question as 
to whether he did or not. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. I did. 
Q. Will you state—and do not answer. You un-
derstand the Judge's attitude. Will you state what 
was the adjustment that you made? 
Mr. Marshall: Objection. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor allows me an 
exception? 
The Court: Yes. 
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Mr. Podell: And I take it any other ques-
tion seeking to prove the amount paid would 
meet with the same ruling? 
The Court: Yes, sir, and you have an ex-
ception to that. Gentlemen of the jury, 
these figures have been placed before you 
and there is a rule to which your attention 
will be called to the fact that only that tes-
timony which is admitted in evidence will 
be subject to your examination; so therefore 
these figures having come before you and 
having been excluded from evidence, it is 
only just and proper that I should call your 
attention to the fact that you must disre-
gard them, and it is only for the purpose of 
establishing a record that they come before 
you at all. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully submit, your 
Honor, that I think Mr. Podell's suggestion 
and the ruling of your Honor should be on 
the record. 
The Court: No. 
Mr. Podell: I asked a number of leading 
questions, and that is what is on the record. 
Now your statement to the jury would not 
exclude the fact which is in evidence that 
claims were made, and I am particularly 
concerned with showing that those claims 
affected accounts. 
The Court: That is all on the record and 
part of the record, but the result is ex-
cluded. 
Mr. Podell: I understand. 
The Court: Mr. Limburg calls my atten-
tion to the fact that you have not recorded 
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the dates when this litigation was instituted, 
but I cannot see what materiality it would 
have. 
The Witness: As to the first notice to us 
on the subject. 
Mr. Podell: I take it it won't be disputed 
at all, but that those litigations were com-
menced long after—I thought I said long 
after January, 1925. 
The Witness: That covers it; that is the 
fact. 
Mr. Podell: There is no misunderstand-
ing about that. I am sure that was begun 
after the bankruptcy. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Limburg, have you compiled a state-
ment here—I am taking off the item the Court has 
just excluded—of the sums of money that were 
advanced by Ultramares to Fred Stern & Company, 
and when they were collected or repaid from any 
source? A. I have. 
Mr. Marshall: I certainly object to this 
witness' testimony as to that. 
Mr. Podell: It is merely a tabulation of 
damages. 
The Court: It is merely a tabulation. 
Mr. Podell: The facts are in evidence. 
The Witness: Tabulation of interest. 
Q. What date did you calculate that interest 
from? A. I calculated interest in each instance 
from the date of the advance and I gave credit 
of interest in each instance from the date of the 
collection by us. 
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The Court: On any part of it? 
The Witness: On any part of it, and 
then I had these interest calculations checked 
up by the bookkeeper of the Ultramares Cor-
poration, to be sure that I was right. 
Q. That is calculated until to-day (indicating 
statement ). 
Mr. Marshall: When you say "payments" 
you mean collections? 
Q. Yes. A. Payments to us on assigned ac-
counts. No. Those are the ones that were in the 
interpleaders. 
Mr. Marshall: But you have collected 
them, it looks as if you paid them out in that 
statement, and that is my objection. 
The Witness: Pardon me. (Inspecting.) 
It is now complete, Mr. Marshall (correct-
ing accounts). 
Mr. Marshall: Will your Honor allow 
me a minute to compare these with the bill. 
Now, here, your Honor, we come up against 
the same proposition again. Your Honor 
recollects on trust receipt 107 
Mr. Podell: I cannot hear you, Mr. 
Marshall; speak louder. I offer that state-
ment in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Under trust receipt 107, 
as you will recollect, there were three ac-
counts assigned, only part of which was col-
lected. 
The Court: That is right, 
Mr. Podell: We give you credit for that. 
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell, may I finish 
a statement, please, without being inter-
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rupted? Now, as I recollect it, there were 
$8,000 difference between the amount of the 
accounts assigned and the amount of the ac-
counts collected, because of this interpleader 
that has been referred to. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: And I think the statement 
is incorrect because this reduction is in no 
way binding upon us. We ought to get the 
credit of the full amount, the account is as-
signed and actually collected. 
The Court: That would come under the 
same proposition of law that we have made. 
Mr. Podell: I told Mr. Marshall I did 
not hear what he said. 
The Court: In that amount of the three 
accounts of the 107, there was an interplead-
er and an adjustment made some time in 
which I have admitted in evidence some 
$8,000 difference. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: So that let us add on to the 
amounts received by Ultramares this sum 
of $8,000. 
Mr. Podell: That is not in here. 
The Witness: That is not in here. We 
did not receive it. The question I under-
stand your Honor will rule on is whether 
we shall give credit for it even if they did 
not receive it, and if so, that will be deducted 
from the amount. 
Mr. Podell: I think I know what Mr. 
Limburg has in mind. There is a distinc-
tion in the cases. 
Mr. Marshall: We ought to discuss that 
before your Honor at the bar. 
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The Court: That is all right. 
Mr. Podell: When we are collecting an 
account and somebody else makes a claim 
against us for reimbursements to him, as I 
stated to your Honor, the law is very much 
confused. Wherever we received only part 
payment of a certain account, and we have 
never received the full amount, and received 
only part payment, we cannot be compelled 
to give credit for the full amount, if we 
have never received it. In the case where 
we collected the full amount and other peo-
ple made claims against us for part of it, 
in these cases of $8,200 we never collected 
the full amount; all we could ever get was 
the $8,200; is that right? 
The Witness: That is correct. 
Mr. Podell: We made a claim against 
them and were interpleaded and all we ever 
collected out of them was $8,200. 
The Witness: The amounts which are 
about $8,000 less than the principal amount, 
and those amounts were collected as the re-
sults of litigation. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception, we 
cannot be bound by their interpleader action 
any more than any other action before us. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception, and may I call 
attention to the fact that there are three 
other items, collections of the bills which 
are not taken into account. 
Mr. Podell: A little louder, Mr. Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall: There are three other 
items on the bill of particulars which are 
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not included in this account, I believe in 
this summary, an item of $1,215 on February 
3, 1925; one of $2,400 February 9; and one 
of $12,400 of July 14th. 
The Court: That had been collected? 
Mr. Marshall: That was there collected 
in their bill of particulars. 
The Witness: Those were not collected 
on account of any of these loans. They were 
collected on account of other loans as a 
result of which other loans were paid in full. 
Mr. Podell: We give you credit for that. 
The Witness: We give you credit by say-
ing that all the loans up to 106 were paid 
in full, and by saying that we included not 
only everything we collected on account of 
those loans before the bankruptcy, but these 
other additional figures which I have set up 
and which we collected subsequent to the 
bankruptcy. 
The Court: And they are applied to the 
same loan that has been made? 
The Witness: To previous loans, yes; 
and the result of which these previous loans 
are wiped out. 
The Court: I see. 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask Mr. Limburg 
some questions on this point? 
The Court: Certainly. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. To what loans were those applied? A. I will 
see if I have that statement here, will you let me 
have that typewritten sheet, that long sheet there, 
I think I have the details. If your Honor will 
permit me, I probably can locate it right away. 
1714 
1715 
1716 
573 
Herbert R. Limburg—For Plaintiff—Direct. 1717 
The Court: Certainly, go ahead. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like to get your 
Honor's distinction between these two situa-
tions. 
The Court: I would like to get it clear 
myself. 
Mr. Podell: It is just the difference, your 
Honor, between somebody making a claim 
against us, and we settling with them, and 
our making a claim against somebody else. 
The Court: I know your distinction, but 
in law is there any great distinction? How-
ever, I am letting it go as a matter that I 
will not take very much time on. I will 
tell you that frankly. 
The Witness: The two items of $1,215.16 
and $2,435.39, were collected on account of 
loan 105. 
The Court: Or rather applied to loan 
105. 
The Witness: Were applied to it. Those 
were assignments of accounts against loan 
105. The item "collected on July 14, 1926" 
was on account 105. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Do those represent the full amounts of the 
assigned invoices, Mr. Limburg? A. Yes, they do ; 
and in the case of the $12,499.93 they include not 
only the amount of the invoices, but likewise in-
terest and costs because we had to sue and collect 
them, without deduction of any cost of collection. 
Mr. Marshall: My only objection is that 
you are omitting that $8,000 item, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Yes. 
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Mr. Marshall: And I assume we shall 
get a copy of it so that we can check it up. 
Mr. Podell: What about "payments"; 
have you changed it to "collections"? 
Mr. Marshall: Changed it to "collections 
by Ultramares Corporation." 
Mr. Podell: I offer that in evidence. 
(Paper received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No, 94.) 
Mr. Marshall: Please note my exception. 
I wonder if your Honor had not better in-
struct the jury that that is not to be taken 
as proof of anything itself, but merely a 
summary of their claim. 
Mr. Podell: I think his Honor will have 
the chance at the proper time to instruct 
the jury. 
The Court: Really, at this time I do not 
think it is a matter that the jury could 
have the typewritten sheet of that kind, 
which is not a matter of evidence. 
Mr. Podell: I am sorry. The paper was 
in evidence and I did not think your Honor 
would have an objection. What I wanted 
the jury to know I could read the result. 
Mr. Marshall: It should be stated, it is 
your claim. 
The Court: My only thought is this : It 
is a wise procedure for the clarification of 
the conditions of fact, but I do not think 
I would burden the jury with these figures 
at this time, that is what I mean. 
Mr. Podell: The amount of our claim we 
have cut off the item which your Honor ex-
cluded, and as computed, aggregates $187,-
576.32. 
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The Court : That includes interest and 
all? 
Mr. Podell: Everything. 
Mr. Marshall: No cross-examination. 
Mr. Podell: That is our case. 
The Court: The plaintiff rests? 
Mr. Marshall: I believe I have a right 
to read this to the jury, these pleadings, 
before the plaintiff rests. 
The Court: Yes, I will allow that. 
Mr. Podell: Are you going to read the 
complaint and answer? 
Mr. Marshall: I have a right to point 
out 
Mr. Podell: I do not think this is giving 
the jury a fair view of the entire situation. 
I think if he reads any, he ought to read 
the whole. 
The Court: That is what he is going to 
do. 
Mr. Marshall: I was going to read the 
affirmative defense. 
Mr. Podell: But unless the jury knows 
all about it 
The Court: I cannot stop any part that 
is in evidence, but it is your privilege to 
go forward and read the rest of it. 
Mr. Podell : It is unnecessary to read 
that whole complaint to this jury. That is 
what I am trying to avoid. I wish to avoid 
it unless it becomes absolutely necessary. I 
think the jury should know that counsel is 
reading part of the answer and has not read 
the complaint. 
The Court: Yes. 
(Witness excused.) 
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Mr. Marshall: You can read it, all you 
want. I will explain it to the jury. 
Mr. Podell: I object to the explanation. 
The Court: Do it. 
Mr. Marshall: This was an action brought 
by 
Mr. Podell: Objection. 
The Court: Sustained. Read it, not your 
conclusions of it. 
Mr. Marshall: I will save my conclu-
sions until after. 
The Court : All right. 
Mr. Marshall: I am reading from the 
third affirmative defense to the answer which 
they say that Mr. Manning identified as hav-
ing been sworn to by him the other day. 
Mr. Podell: We have stipulated that. We 
have said that is the answer we filed. 
Mr. Marshall (reading) : "Equitable 
Trust Company against Ultramares," That 
is the Ultramares Corporation saying this: 
"The plaintiff (that was Equitable Trust 
Company of Baltimore) entrusted Fred 
Stern & Company as agents to the posses-
sion of the bill of lading and now their docu-
mentary evidence of title" (reading). Now 
the 10th paragraph (reading). That is all 
I care to read. 
Mr. Podell: Gentlemen of the jury, this 
is the complaint of the Trust Company 
against us, which contains a great many 
other things in the statement. I want the 
jury to know I am reading only a part of it, 
"Down to about the 18th and 25th days of 
November, 1924, the bankrupt, Stern & Com-
pany, without the knowledge or consent of 
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the Trust Company"—that is the plaintiff, 
the Equitable Trust Company (reading to 
the jury). 
Your Honor, it is impossible to read any 
more without a summary of what this com-
plaint is to this jury and I won't take the 
time. There are seven defenses in the an-
swer, and it takes twenty-two pages of type-
written matter, and I do not know how many 
causes of action there, and that is stating 
two causes of actions, and there are a num-
ber of exhibits. 
The Court: Now, does the plaintiff rest? 
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell asked the other 
day for a consent to read part of Von Geo-
ben's testimony. 
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon. I asked 
for the consent for the whole, and not part. 
Mr. Marshall: I said you asked for the 
consent to read Von Goeben's testimony. 
We are perfectly ready to have him read 
part of it, between pages 227 to 241 of the 
record. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I happen to 
know that reading that particular part and 
not the rest will give the jury a wholly er-
roneous view of Von Goeben's testimony, so 
that I either offer the whole or no part. 
Mr. Marshall: You may read it all. 
The Court: You may read it all. 
Mr. Podell : Let me have it. 
Mr. Podell (reading) : 
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"Q. Mr. Von Goeben, you were an officer of the 
Ultramares Corporation within the past two years, 
weren't you? A. I was. 
"Q. What office did you hold? A. I was the 
president. 
"Q. And for what period of time, approximately? 
A. From 1919 until the end of 1924. 
"Q. When did you sever your connection with 
the Ultramares Corporation? A. I resigned early 
in November, 1924. 
"Q. To take effect immediately? A. December 
31st. 
"Q. You were a director during that time, too, 
of the Ultramares Corporation? A. I was." 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, may it appear 
that this was an examination conducted on 
behalf of the trustee in bankruptcy, by the 
attorney for the trustee in bankruptcy? 
The Court: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Podell: That all the eminent attor-
neys of New York were present. There 
seems to be a list of about twenty of them 
here. 
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) : 
"Q. And a stockholder? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. What officers or agents of the Ultramares 
Corporation did Mr. Fred Stern deal with on be-
half of the Fred Stern Corporation in the transac-
tions between the bankrupt corporation and the 
Ultramares Corporation? A. I do not quite under-
stand that question. 
"Q. (Question read). A. Until early November, 
all transactions went through my hands. 
"Q. Mr. Von Goeben, will you state, in your own 
way, what the general nature of the transactions 
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between the Ultramares Corporation and Fred 
Stern & Company, Inc. was? A. Mr. Stern asked 
us if we would be willing to finance some rubber 
accounts; that we would be willing to furnish him 
with the money to take up the rubber which he 
had bought from dealers here in New York. 
"Q. And what was the basis on which you would 
finance that? A. He was to assign the accounts to 
us. 
"Q. You do not mean the accounts with those 
people from whom he bought the rubber; you mean 
to whom he sold it? A. To whom he sold the rub-
ber. 
"Q. On what basis did you finance it? What 
did the Ultramares get for financing it? A. We 
got 6 per cent, interest and commission. 
"Q. Was that a flat rate of commission, or did 
it vary? A. The commission varied. 
"Q. Was the commission a half a cent per pound, 
or a one-half per cent. per month? A. No. One-
half a cent per pound. 
"Q. That was the— A. (Interrupting) That 
was the first arrangement we had. 
"Q. And when was that arrangement changed? 
A. I believe it was in May. I have to look up the 
records; I cannot remember the date. 
"Q. Last year? A. Last year. It was reduced." 
Mr. Podell: Can we get a stipulation as 
to when Von Goeben died? 
Mr. Limburg: It was in 1927. 
Mr. Podell: He died in 1927? 
Mr. Limburg: Yes, in 1927. 
Mr. Shamos: This examination was con-
ducted March 2nd, 1925, so when he refers 
to "last year" he means 1924—when the wit-
ness refers to "last year." 
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The Court: This examination was con-
ducted in 1925? 
Mr. Shamos: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Podell: March 2nd, 1925. 
The Court: So his reference was to March, 
1924. 
Mr. Podell: And his reference was to 
1924. 
Mr. Limburg: The date of his death was 
March 22nd, 1927. 
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) : 
"Q. To what amount? A. One per cent. 
"Q. And remained that way until the end of 
December, 1924? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Well, when you say reduced to 1 per cent., 
just how do you calculate that as a reduction? 
A. Half a cent a pound is more than, or was more 
than 1 per cent. 
"Q. You mean 1 per cent. of the advance per 
month commission, instead of the— A. (Inter-
rupting) Not per month. 
"Q. Just flat? A. Flat 1 per cent. 
"Q. Now you stated, Mr. Von Goeben, that these 
advances were made against local purchases of 
rubber? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. What evidence did you have? A. We had 
the contracts between Mr. Stern and the New York 
sellers. 
"Q. Such as Littlejohn, and Meyer & Brown, and 
local dealers? A. Littlejohn; Meyer & Brown; and 
American Trading, and several other concerns. 
"Q. And did you examine the contracts of the 
sellers before you advanced money on each of the 
trust receipts? A. Yes, sir. 
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"Q. Did you ever check any of those contracts 
with the sellers ; communicate with them to verify 
them? A. No. 
"Q. Now, as to any specific transaction, we will 
say trust receipt No. 104, dated November 24th, 
1924, which specifies 75 tons ex 'Perseus'" 
Mr. Podell: That is the name of the 
steamer, I suppose. It is in quotations 
(Continuing reading) : 
"Mr. Stern would come to you and show you 
the contract that he had with the seller, and you 
would, on the basis of that, agree to make the ad-
vance, say, of $50,000, and take his trust receipt 
for that amount? A. November 24th was after I 
had resigned. 
"Q. You had nothing to do with it at that time? 
A. No, sir. 
"Q. Do you happen to know who was handling 
the transactions for the Ultramares at this date 
of November 24th, 1924? A. Either he called me 
up, or he called up Mr. Manning. 
"Q. He still called you up with reference to 
these transaction after the date of your resigna-
tion? A. He did. 
"Q. And did you O. K. the advance of $50,000 
on this trust receipt No. 104 dated November 24th, 
1924? A. If I am not mistaken, with the chairman 
of the board of directors. 
"Q. Were you present at the time? A. I could 
not say." 
Mr. Podell: Chairman of the board, I 
take it will be stipulated at that time was 
Mr. Schlubach? 
Mr. Shamos: He so testified. 
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) : 
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"Q. And trust receipt No. 105 dated the follow-
ing date, November 25th 1924, for $50,000 advance; 
specifies 75 tons ex 'Veen Dyck'; did you discuss 
that matter with Mr. Stern before the loan was 
made? A. (After examining paper) I cannot 
recollect, because, as I said before, after my resig-
nation these things were taken up with the chair-
man of the board. 
"Q. Well, is not it a fact, Mr. Von Goeben, that 
Mr. Stern would first call you about these matters? 
A. When I was in the office. 
"Q. Well, even as late as December 8th 1924, 
on three trust receipts which were executed that 
date, were not they discussed with you before the 
loan was made? A. I was frequently away from 
the office during November and December, two or 
three days a week. 
"Q. You have no recollection of having dis-
cussed or passed upon or approved the advance 
of moneys by the Ultramares Corporation on the 
three trust receipts on December 8th, 1924? A. 
No, sir. 
"Q. You have a recollection of various trust re-
ceipts which Fred Stern & Company gave to the 
Ultramares Corporation for advances up to the time 
that you resigned in November, 1924? A. Yes, 
sir, that is correct. 
"Q. Those were all handled between Mr. Stern 
and you? A. The details were handled by Mr. 
Manning. 
"Q. Well, Mr. Manning, of course, never passed 
on whether or not the loan was to be made and the 
amount of the advance and the security, which 
were matters that you passed on? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Now, who checked up the various accounts 
that were assigned to the Ultramares Corporation 
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as applying against these trust receipts? Or was 
there ever any check made by the Ultramares Cor-
poration of that? A. We received the assigned 
accounts which had to correspond with the trust 
receipt. 
"Q. Well, now, if you have a trust receipt which 
called for rib smoked sheets and you accept an 
assigned account covering sixty-one tons of Peru-
vian tailed rubber, would you consider that it was 
one of the accounts to which you were entitled un-
der that trust receipt? A. It was one of substitu-
tion. 
"Q. There were substitutions from time to time? 
A. From time to time. 
"Q. And who passed upon the substitutions? A. 
In May the first substitution came up and Mr. 
Manning reported to me that he received an as-
signed account which did not correspond with the 
trust receipt. I called up Mr. Stern, and he said 
it could not be avoided, because frequently some 
buyers requested him to delay shipments; some 
buyers occasionally asked him for earlier shipment; 
and also, at times, there were some questions as 
to quality. He asked me whether we would take 
a substitution; and we agreed, provided the sub-
stitution was by a responsible firm, and the 
amounts of the accounts so assigned to us were 
equal to accounts mentioned in the trust receipt. 
"Q. And the first of those substitutions occurred 
in May of 1924? A. Around that time. 
"Q. Now Mr. Von Goeben, will you please just 
state exactly how the transaction was handled be-
tween the bankrupt corporation and the Ultra-
mares Corporation, taking any of the trust re-
ceipts preceding No. 104 of November 24th, 1924. 
You have already stated—I do not want to try to 
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have you repeat it—that Mr. Stern would come 
down to see you, or would communicate with you, 
and then he would show you his contracts for the 
sale of the rubber? A. Contracts from his buyers 
and his sellers. 
"Q. Both? A. Both. 
"Q. And then would he have the trust receipt 
with him at the time, filled out; or would he pre-
pare it— A. That trust receipt was sent up 
when he got the money. The trust receipt was 
to take the place for the time until the rubber was 
weighed and shipped, and the accounts assigned to 
us. 
"Q. Then after Mr. Stern had talked the matter 
over with you, they would send the trust receipt 
down to the Ultramares, and if it was in satisfac-
tory form the Ultramares would then issue its 
check to Stern? A. That is right, 
"Q. The checks were never issued before the 
trust receipt was delivered? A. Not before we 
received the trust receipt. 
"Q. And did the trust receipt specify to whom 
the rubber was sold? A. Always." 
Mr. Podell: So there will be no con-
fusion, your Honor, I think it ought to be 
stated here that the trustee for some rea-
son asked about 104. 104 is one of the 
advances that were fully collected, is that 
right? 
Mr. Limburg: Yes. 
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) : 
"Q. You are not familiar with substitutions that 
took place in the latter part of November on, say, 
trust receipt No. 104, where the Firestone Tire 
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& Rubber Company was specified as the purchaser, 
and twenty different accounts were turned over as 
assigned accounts? A. No, sir. 
"Q. Had you resigned before November 18th, 
1924? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Well, as I understood it, your resignation 
was to take effect at the end of the year, was it? 
A. I resigned early in November, and my resigna-
tion was accepted November 12th, to take effect 
December 31st, But during November and De-
cember I was away two or three days a week. 
"Q. And did Mr. Manning, or some other per-
son there, actually make advances to Fred Stern 
& Company subsequent to the date of your resig-
nation, without consulting you about it at all? A. 
When I was not there Mr. Manning took it up 
with Mr. Schlubach. 
"Q. On trust receipt No. 94, Mr. Von Goeben, 
dated November 1st, 1924, it is stated that the rub-
ber had been sold to the Avon Sole Company. Do 
you have any recollection of that trust receipt, 
for $3,000? A. No. 
"Q. You do not recall whether you handled that 
personally or not? A. I do not recall that, 
"Q. When these substitutions began in May of 
1924, were they on a large scale; did they develop 
on a large scale, or was it only a question of one 
or two invoices? A. In the beginning there were 
very few substitutions. 
"Q. And when did they begin to become more 
frequent? A. From the records, in November. 
"Q. Well, you did not have much to do with it 
at that time, did you? A. No. 
"Q. During the time previous to your resigna-
tion there were very few substitutions? A. I did 
not object to the substitutions, as long as we got 
satisfactory accounts in place of them. 
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"Q. Well, did they take up the substitution with 
you first; or simply hand you an invoice which 
you found was not the one that was specified in 
the trust receipt? A. Sometimes they were taken 
up with Mr. Manning, and he referred to me. 
"Q. And sometimes they were not taken up with 
you at all? A. And sometimes they simply sent 
in the accounts. 
"Q. Do you know of any instance where you 
refused to accept a substitution? A. No, sir. 
"Q. Now, at the time the advances were made, 
what papers, other than the trust receipt, were 
given to the Ultramares by Fred Stern & Com-
pany? A. We received first all the contracts from 
his sellers and contracts from his buyers, which 
were returned to Mr. Stern, and he wrote us a 
letter asking for a certain amount, and with that 
letter he usually sent up the trust receipt against 
which we handed him a check. 
"Q. And when did you get your assigned ac-
counts? A. As soon as the rubber was weighed 
and shipped, or delivered to the buyer. 
"Q. Well, were not there numerous instances 
where the sale of the rubber was subsequent, maybe 
a month or more before delivery should be made? 
A. The sales were always made prior to our ad-
vances. 
"Q. I understand. But the time of delivery? 
A. Sometimes there were delays. 
"Q. Did you make advances against rubber 
which—say in May, which was deliverable in Sep-
tember or October? A. No, sir. 
"Q. Only for rubber that was then delivered? 
A. Always spot rubber. 
"Q. Well, it might be spot rubber, Mr. Von 
Goeben, and not deliverable to Stern's customers 
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until a month or two later. A. We never did any 
such thing. 
"Q. Why did your trust receipts describe the 
rubber as ex a certain ship if you got only rubber 
which Stern had bought from another dealer? A. 
Because he bought rubber to arrive." 
Mr. Podell: I take it that is included in 
the description of spot rubber. (Continuing 
reading) : 
"Q. And under what arrangement was he get-
ting the rubber; did you inquire into that? A. 
He got the rubber against cash payment which 
he made with our money. 
"Q. Cash against documents? A. Yes; cash 
against delivery orders. 
"Q. Cash against delivery orders? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And those purchases that he made were 
always ex dock and not ex warehouse? A. All that 
came, that I saw, were for rubber to be shipped. 
For instance, he bought rubber in February 
for February, March and April shipment, or Feb-
ruary, March and April delivery in New York; 
and when that rubber was tendered to him, with 
our money he paid for it. 
"Q. And all of the contracts that were ever 
shown to you at the time you were passing upon 
them, so far as it concerned sellers of the rubber 
to Fred Stern & Company, were sales cash against 
documents in New York? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. None of them specified any letter of credit 
arrangement? A. Never. 
"Q. And none of them were any open credit 
sales? A. No, sir. 
"Q. Well, had the Ultramares a record of ex-
actly how each of these quantities of rubber that 
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are specified in the respective trust receipts, were 
purchased by Stern? A. We never kept any record 
of that. 
"Q. You never kept any record of that? A. No. 
"Q. You never inspected the rubber or made any 
investigation of the rubber, so far as the quality 
or arrangement, other than to inspect the original 
contracts which Mr. Stern submitted as the ones 
which he had made with his sellers? A. We never 
inspected any rubber. 
"Q. Did you check up as to whether the quan-
tities of rubber specified came in on the ship which 
was mentitoned in your trust receipt? A. The 
quantity had to correspond—the accounts which 
were assigned had to correspond with the quanti-
ties mentioned in the trust receipts. 
"Q. Do you recall any discussion about accept-
ing Peruvian tailed rubber instead of rib smoked 
sheets? A. No, sir. 
"Q. Was there any record kept by the Ultra-
mares Corporation as to whether the rubber which 
is mentioned in the trust receipt as merely so many 
tons ex a certain ship was rib smoked sheets, or 
first ladick or crepe or otherwise? A. No, sir. 
"Q. You made no notation from the contracts 
that were submitted to you from the sellers, as 
showing what the quality of the rubber was, or 
what the grade was? A. Not to my knowledge. 
Mr. Manning might have taken a note of that; 
but 
"Q. If he did, that would be after November 
1st, 1924? A. Either after or previous to that. 
"Q. Even prior to November, 1924, Mr. Manning 
handled the details? A. All the details. 
"Q. Now, was there any general agreement 
signed by Fred Stern & Company with respect to 
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what security you were to have, other than what 
is stated in the trust receipts? A. With the first 
transaction a letter was exchanged, with the stipu-
lation—with the agreement we were to advance 
money against assignment of accounts. 
"Q. That was simply in the form of an exchange 
of letters? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And about what date was that? A. Early 
in April. 
"Q. Of what year, Mr. Von Goeben? A. 1924. 
"Q. The Ultramares had transactions with Stern 
only beginning April, 1924? A. April, 1924, yes, 
sir. 
"Q. You had no transaction prior to April, 1924, 
with the bankrupt corporation? A. He bought 
rubber from us. 
"Q. He bought rubber. But no advance of any 
sort? A. No, sir. 
"Q. When you resigned from the Ultramares 
Corporattion, Mr. Von Goeben, was that with the 
expectation of becoming interested in the Fred 
Stern Company business? A. No, sir. 
"Q. When did you first take up the negotiations 
to acquire an interest of the business, or become 
an employee of the bankrupt corporation? A. In 
the latter part of November. 
"Q. In the latter part. And those negotiations 
had proceeded to the point of actually signing a 
contract of employment with the bankrupt corpo-
ration? A. The contract was signed, yes, sir. 
"Q. And as I understand it, your position is 
that that contract never became of force, never 
became effective as a contract? A. The contract 
was signed, but no election was held. 
Mr. Podell: He was to be elected an 
officer, I assume, and no election was held. 
(Continuing reading) : 
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"Q. What was the beginning of the negotiations? 
Did Mr. Fred Stern approach you, or did you ap-
proach him regarding becoming interested in the 
corporation? A. Mr. Stern approached me years 
ago, as early as '14, '15, '16. 
"Q. Had he approached you again in 1924, prior 
to the time that you resigned, for the same pur-
pose? A. He mentioned to me, in January or Feb-
ruary, 1924, asked me whether I would be willing 
to join him in business. 
"Q. Now, that arrangement that you were nego-
tiating about at the end of 1924 contemplated that 
you and your son both were to become employees 
of Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And was that predicated on any financial 
statement that was made to you, or shown to 
you, of the business? A. Yes, sir. Stern showed 
me, first off, a statement as of December 31st, 1923, 
of Touche-Niven which showed approximately 
$1,070,000 capital and surplus. 
"Q. When did Mr. Stern show you that state-
ment? A. He showed us that statement the last 
week in March, prior to the beginning of the Ultra-
mares advancing money. 
"Q. 1924? A. 1924. 
"Q. Now, was any other statement given to you 
by Mr. Stern as to the financial condition of the 
Stern Corporation? A. No. When I spoke to 
Mr. Stern—or rather, when he had a conference 
I told him I would request a statement for the 
year of 1924. And he then proposed to close the 
books November 30th, so that Touche-Niven would 
have the month of December in making up their 
report. And it was agreed that after the receipt 
of that statement I should join the firm. He told 
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me he had made in 1924, up to November, 
approximately $240,000, bringing the capital up 
to $1,300,000. 
"Q. He did not show you any statement of that 
sort, whether one that he had made up, or Rom-
berg, or anybody else? A. He had the tentative 
statement made up in the office there, up to—-
I do not remember the date. 
"Q. Made up in the latter part of 1924 I pre-
sume? A. Yes. 
"Q. You did not get a copy of that statement, 
did you? Have you got a copy of that statement? 
A. No, sir, I have not." 
(After discussion, off the record.) 
"Q. Do you recall whether the statement that 
you saw, this tentative statement, applied up to the 
date of August 1st, 1924, or was it later? A. My 
recollection is, up to August." 
Mr. Podell: There was some discussion, 
and the witness repeats that answer. 
Mr. Marshall: Will you read Mr. 
Djorup's statement there? 
Mr. Podell: Mr. Coplan, Mr. Rosenberg, 
Mr. Djorup, and seventeen other lawyers 
present. What they said does not appear 
here, because there is a statement here that 
the discussion was off the record. 
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Djorup made a state-
ment on the record. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. Statements 
made by any outsiders do not represent Von 
Goeben's testimony, your Honor. (Con-
tinuing reading) : 
"Q. Now, the papers which were delivered to 
the Ultramares, and kept by the Ultramares, were 
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the exchanges of letters at the beginning of the 
transactions, and the trust receipts which were 
given to the Ultramares from time to time as ad-
vances were made? A. And copies of the accounts. 
"Q. Which were delivered? A. Assigned ac-
counts which were sent out by Ultramares to the 
buyer. 
"Q. When did Mr. Stern begin the practice of 
sending the original assigned account along with 
the copy in an envelope whereby the Ultramares 
could mail out the original invoices? A. That was 
a condition we stipulated when the business was 
started. 
"Q. Was that mentioned in your letter, or was 
it just an understanding, an agreement? In the 
exchange of letters was that mentioned? 
"Mr. Rosenberg: Would not the letter 
be the best evidence of that? 
"Mr. Coplan: I just wanted to know if 
he recollected it. 
"Q. Under the method in which the Ultramares 
carried these transactions in their own books, Mr. 
Von Goeben, when you had collected assigned in-
voices on a specific trust receipt sufficient to pay 
you back your advance, did you cancel that item 
out and account for the surplus, if there was any? 
A. We had a so-called running account. 
"Q. And in the way that those accounts are 
carried on your books, none of these trust receipts 
was ever closed out as a completed transaction? 
A. It is a running account. 
"Q. You charged every advance as a debit, and 
credited all items received as credits, and simply 
show a net result? A. Yes, sir." 
(After discussion, off the record.) 
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"Q. Have you any recollection that any par-
ticular time a number of trust receipts were re-
turned to Mr. Stern as having been closed mat-
ters? A. Yes, sir, I recollect that some trust re-
ceipts were returned. 
"Q. On one or more occasions? Mr. Manning 
would know that? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Do you know what the practice was, Mr. 
Von Goeben, with respect to an assigned account 
if a customer of Stern should send him a trade 
acceptance? Did you ever watch how that was 
being handled with the Ultramares? A. It was 
understood that the trade acceptance was to be dis-
counted, and the proceeds turned over to the Ultra-
mares. 
"Q. And that is the way that that would be 
handled; by a direct payment of the proceeds by 
Stern & Company to the Ultramares Corporation? 
A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Now, in this account that you called a run-
ning account, you would debit all the advances, 
and charge interest, and then you would credit 
the moneys received and credit the interest on 
those, would you? A. Yes, sir. 
"By Mr. Sykes:" 
Mr. Podell: Who is Mr. Sykes? 
Mr. Limburg: He is attorney for the 
Bank of London in South America. 
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) : 
"Q. So all of the assignments of accounts that 
were delivered to you were assignments that you 
received at the same time that you received the 
trust receipt? A. No. 
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"Q. And at the same time that you delivered 
the money? A. No. 
"Q. No? A. Stern applied for advances against 
which he wanted to assign the accounts to us, after 
the rubber was weighed and shipped. In the mean-
time, we held the trust receipt. 
"By Mr. Copland 
Mr. Podell: Mr. Coplan, whom did he 
represent? 
Mr. Limburg: The trustee. 
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) : 
"Q. Let me ask you this: Sometimes, though, it 
was a month or more before you got an assignment 
of an invoice under the trust receipt ? A. I under-
stand it happened once, because of some delay. 
"Q. What explanation was given to the Ultra-
mares Corporation for such delay as a month or 
more? A. The question of quality, or such thing 
as that. 
"Q. But you got an assignment of the account 
immediately on the shipment going forward by 
Stern & Company, didn't you? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. So that a question of controversy about 
quality would not prevent your getting an assign-
ment at the time it was shipped? A. No. 
"Q. Now, did some of those contracts that were 
shown to you show sales by the Crude Rubber 
Brokerage Company to Stern & Company? A. I 
do not recollect. 
"Q. You don't remember. Or were any of the 
sellers Anglo-French Trading Company? A. I 
cannot recollect. I do not remember." 
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Mr. Podell: Subscribed and sworn to the 
— day of March, 1925, before special com-
missioner. 
Mr. Marshall: I think the record should 
show that Mr. Limburg was present at that 
examination. 
Mr. Podell: That Mr. Limburg was what? 
The Court: Was present at that examina-
tion? 
Mr. Podell: Put in all the appearances, 
if you want to. 
Mr. Marshall: That is not necessary, but 
I should think it should show that Mr. Lim-
burg was there and we were not. 
Mr. Podell: I think it should show 
the following were present: Edwards H. 
Childs, Esq., receiver-trustee, in person; 
Messrs. Zalkin & Cohen, attorneys for the 
receiver-trustee, by Nathan Coplan, Esq.; 
Messrs. Hirsch, Sherman & Limburg, attor-
neys for Ultramares Corporation, by Her-
bert R. Limburg, Esq.; James N. Rosenberg, 
Esq., of counsel; Messrs. Sullivan & Crom-
well, representing the Bank of London, by 
Mr. Sykes; Messrs. Root, Clark, Howland 
& Ballantine, representing the Equitable 
Trust Company of Baltimore, by Mr. Hamil-
ton; Messrs. Griggs, Baldwin & Baldwin, 
representing Federal International Banking 
Company, by Mr. Moore; Charles J. Lane, 
Esq., representing Chemical National Bank, 
by Mr. Sheftel; Messrs. McArdle, Djorup & 
McArdle, accountants for the trustee, by 
Christian Djorup, Esq. 
The only ones who were not present were 
Mr. Marshall and myself. We were in the 
same category. 
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Mr. Marshall: Or anybody for Touche-
Niven? 
Mr. Podell: We rest again, your Honor. 
The Court: Plaintiff rests. 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Mr. Marshall: I move, your Honor, to 
dismiss the complaint severally as to each 
cause of action, on the ground that neither 
of them state facts sufficient to state a cause 
of action at law. On the further ground 
as to each cause of action that the plaintiff 
has failed to prove facts sufficient to sus-
tain a cause of action or to make out a 
prima facie case. I further move specifi-
cally on the ground of the utter failure to 
identify the books that were put in evidence 
and testified from as having been in that 
condition at the time we made our audit. 
I move further on the ground of the fail-
ure of the plaintiff to show freedom from 
contributory negligence, and on the ground 
that we have distinctly shown the interven-
ing frauds of Stern, a third party both at 
the time that we made the audit, at the 
time that the first advances were made 
to Ultramares, and with respect to Ultra-
mares, and further frauds with respect to 
Ultramares by Stern, by the making of false 
statements of profit during the year and by 
giving trust receipts which were fake and 
representing that he was going to assign non-
existent accounts receivable, and further-
more by committing larceny by diverting 
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moneys which he was given for the purpose 
of paying for merchandise, to pay off other 
banks, which is a larceny by trick, I believe, 
under the penal law. 
For all these grounds I move that the 
complaint be dismissed. 
The Court: Decision reserved. 
Mr. Marshall: Now, again I move and 
make a specific motion as to the second 
cause of action, on the ground that no in-
tent to defraud has been shown on the part 
of any of the defendants. 
The Court: At this time decision is re-
served. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor will allow me 
an exception to all these rulings? 
The Court: Certainly. 
DEFENDANTS' PROOFS. 
SYDNEY TOWELL, recalled on behalf of the de-
fendant, having been previously duly sworn, fur-
ther testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, will you state as briefly as 
you can what your accounting experience has been? 
A. From November, 1918, until to-day's date, in 
public accounting. 
Q. What experience had you had prior to 1924? 
A. All experience in public accounting from Novem-
ber, 1918. 
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Q. Yes, but will you please tell me; you were a 
chartered accountant? A. I was a chartered ac-
countant. 
Q. And when did you become a chartered ac-
countant? A. In June, 1922. 
Q. And where did you serve as an accountant 
prior to 1923, what firms prior to 1923? A. With 
Ronald Briggs & Company in Winnipeg and Mani-
toba, Canada, and with George A. Touche & Com-
pany in Winnipeg, Canada. 
Q. And you came from George A. Touche & 
Company to Touche, Niven & Co. here, did you? 
A. I did. 
Q. Now, when you got your degree or certificate 
as a chartered accountant, did you at the same 
time win some kind of a prize? A. I did. 
Q. Will you state to the jury just what that 
was? A. I was awarded the 
Q. Now, louder, please? A. I was awarded the 
first prize by the Institute of Manitoba, and their 
war memorial gold medal. 
Q. Is that gold medal given every year or only 
if you obtain a certain degree of proficiency? A. 
Only if you obtain a certain degree of proficiency. 
Q. And you have to rank first, do you not, in the 
examinations that are given for that medal in or-
der to get it? A. Yes. It must be the first time 
of writing, and you must rank first. 
Q. Now, you were the senior accountant that 
made this audit of the books of Stern & Company 
as of December 31st, 1923, were you not? A. I 
was. 
Q. And what were you told to do in connection 
with that audit? 
Mr. Podell: And by whom? 
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Q. And by whom? A. I received instructions 
from Mr. Rea that I had been assigned by the 
office secretary to take charge of the audit of the 
books of Fred Stern & Company, and the prepara-
tion of a balance sheet. 
Q. And what did you do after you received those 
instructions? A. I first examined the previous 
years' working papers. 
Q. Did you go to Stern or Stern's office, or what? 
A. My first examination of the previous years' 
working papers took place in the office of Touche, 
Niven & Co. 
Q. In other words, you examined the working 
papers that had been made on audits of prior years 
of Stern & Company, by Touche, Niven & Co.? A. I 
did. 
Q. Did you examine also the balance sheets of 
the prior years? A. I did. 
The Court: May we inquire here now, if 
he had been in Touche-Niven's prior to this 
1923 audit? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
Q. Had you been with Touche, Niven & Co. 
prior to this 1923 audit? Had you made other 
audits for them? A. I had. 
The Court: I mean, relating to Stern's 
matters. 
Q. Had you ever audited Stern's books before? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, I show you a balance sheet as of 1920 
and balance sheet as of 1921 of Stern & Company, 
and ask you whether those are the balance sheets, 
two of the prior balance sheets that you say you 
refer to (handing to witness)? A. They are. 
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Mr. Marshall: Now I offer those in evi-
dence. I think the other balance sheet of 
1922 had already been offered in evidence. 
The Court: All right. 
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor allow me 
an objection and exception to the admission 
of those documents? 
The Court: That is allowed, and you have 
an exception, Mr. Podell. 
(Received in evidence and marked respec-
tively Defendants' Exhibits J and K.) 
Q. You did some work while you were at Stern's 
office too, did you not? A. I did. 
Q. I am going into that in a minute, but first I 
ask you whether this Exhibit 1 is the balance sheet 
which you prepared after your work at Stern's 
office? 
The Court: That is conceded to be the 
exhibit, yes. 
Q. Now, will you tell us, Mr. Towell, just what 
you did in auditing these books? A. I first of all 
had taken off a trial balance of the journal ledger, 
drawing it up in the form of first the number of 
the account, the name of the account in the general 
ledger, the previous years' balance on that ac-
count 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, what is the 
witness testifying from? 
Mr. Marshall: Work sheets, I believe. 
Mr. Podell: That is what paper he is 
looking at? 
Mr. Marshall: Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, his 
work sheets. 
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Q. Mr. Towell, will you tell us what the gen-
eral ledger is, what kind of a book it is and what 
its purpose is in bookkeeping? 
Mr. Podell: Will you pardon me? Mr. 
Stenographer, will you read the answer as 
far as it has gone? 
(Record repeated.) 
Q. What about the previous year's balance? A. 
The previous year's closing balance. 
Q. What did you do about that? A. I used it 
for the purpose of comparison. 
Q. Now, what is a general ledger? Will you 
just tell the jurors, who are not accountants, what 
the general ledger is, and its general purposes and 
uses? A. The general ledger is a book of record, 
original record, in which are kept all of the accounts 
of a concern. In the form that that ledger had 
in the office of Fred Stern & Company, some of 
what would be in ordinary cases general ledger 
accounts or ledger accounts, in any event were 
kept in subsidiary ledgers. Therefore, in Stern's 
general ledger we had a ledger which is really in 
part a controlling ledger. To illustrate the gen-
eral ledger in a better form, I could say that the 
way the bookkeeping first was brought about was 
to have one ledger, all of the accounts whether 
to have one ledger, all of the accounts, whether 
our customers—or whether accounts payable or 
whether notes payable—all accounts appeared un-
der separate headings in one ledger. That general 
ledger in its original form has been modified and 
to-day's use of it is to subdivide it in order to take 
care of the great volume of work the modern busi-
ness has. Therefore, we have to-day what is called 
a general ledger to distinguish it from other led-
gers only by name. 
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Q. Now, as I understand it, this general ledger 
to-day is supposed to present a summary picture 
of the whole business based on these subsidiary 
books which are too voluminous to give a complete 
picture of the company at any given time, is that 
right? A. In part. 
Q. Now, I would like to get this clear if I can, 
so the jury will understand it even if I do not. A. 
It is a summary ledger in part, certain detailed 
information is to-day in a large business omitted 
from the general ledger and recorded under a 
specific caption, such as the "accounts receivable". 
Q. Stern, for example, had an accounts receiv-
able ledger, is that correct? A. That is correct. 
Q. And that was summarized in the general 
ledger? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you took off then in the first instance 
a trial balance of this general ledger? A. Yes. 
Q. And that was a picture that Stern's general 
ledger gave of his business at that time? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Q. Will you tell us what the trial balance shows 
and what you go on to do from there; what you 
went on to do from there? A. The trial balance 
of the general ledger, taken by itself, is nothing 
more than a list of the balances as shown by the 
books. If the two sides of it, the debits and the 
credits, add up, it merely signifies that it is in 
balance and on the face of it probably means that 
the records have been correctly kept so far as debits 
and credits are concerned. It means nothing more. 
The names of the accounts in the trial balance 
should indicate the nature of the asset or liability 
or profit or loss account shown. The trial bal-
ance of Fred Stern & Company's general ledger 
did so indicate, the nature of each account. 
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Q. Now, will you go on and tell the jury as 
clearly and as briefly as you can what you did? 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, to avoid con-
fusion, I assume there is a trial balance 
there. You have it. 
The Witness: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: If he is telling its contents, 
let it be marked separately in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: It is in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: Let it be marked separately. 
It is in a mass of papers we cannot find. 
I would like to see it. 
The Court: All right. Mark that sepa-
rately. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 15-C.) 
Q. Which is the trial balance, the first page? 
A. The first page, Mr. Marshall, is not the trial 
balance. The rest of it is. That is the trial bal-
ance (indicating). 
Mr. Marshall: Three pages of trial bal-
ance (showing to jury). That is a trial bal-
ance of the books as of December 31st, 1923. 
Q. Is that correct? A. It is. 
Mr. Podell: In the witness' handwriting, 
Mr. Marshall? 
Q. Is it in your handwriting, Mr. Towell? A. 
The columns headed "Balance after adjustment" 
are in my handwriting. Also the columns headed 
"Adjustments." 
Q. In whose handwriting is the balance? A. 
Mr. Siess's handwriting, my assistant. 
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Q. Do you need this to testify, or may I leave 
it with the jury? A. All right, I can go ahead. 
Mr. Podell: May I see it, Mr. Marshall? 
(Handed to counsel.) 
Q. Will you go on, Mr. Towell? A. Upon ex-
amination of the trial balance of the general led-
ger, I found that there were certain ledger accounts 
purporting to represent cash on hand or on de-
posit with bankers. I had already received from 
Mr. Rea letters addressed to Touche, Niven & Co., 
which he had requested from banks and others 
holding money on deposit confirming all of these 
balances. 
Mr. Podell: Are those letters here? 
Mr. Marshall: They are in evidence. 
Q. Will you go on, please? A. I used these let-
ters to effect a reconciliation of the balance of 
money recorded on the books of Fred Stern & 
Company with that reported by the banks in their 
letters; which is to say that I reconcile each and 
every bank account, accounting for all outstand-
ing checks and all deposits in transit. Deposits 
in transit were further verified by reference to 
bank statements and by deposits in transit, I mean 
money held by Fred Stern at December 31st, which 
he had not deposited on December 31st but was 
in transit to a bank or other depositary. Such 
deposits were confirmed by reference to a subse-
quent bank statement. Upon further examination 
of the cash balances I found that certain of the 
cash balances were hypotheticated, that is, they 
were on deposit with banks but they were not sub-
ject to the general use to which Fred Stern & 
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Company might wish to put its funds. They were 
held by banks against obligations to the banks sub-
sequently maturing. 
Q. Explain that a little more simpler, if you 
can? They were held, were they not, as deposits 
against future drafts under letters of credit? A. 
Fred Stern & Company gave acceptances and those 
acceptances, I believe, were in most cases secured 
by invoices. Upon collection of those invoices prior 
to the date of maturity of the acceptance, the cash 
would be held by the bank and they would await 
the maturity of the acceptance before they made 
the offset on their own books. In consequence, we 
had a liability to certain of the banks and we had 
an asset, cash, in their hands at the same time. 
Q. In other words, it was a payment in advance 
really of notes or obligations that were to become 
due at a future day? A. Yes. 
Q. And did you count the cash that Stern had 
on hand? A. Yes, we did. 
Q. And did you reconcile the bank balances? 
Mr. Podell: How much was that cash ? 
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell, may I conduct 
my examination? 
The Court: Do not interrupt, Mr. Podell, 
please, it only disconcerts counsel. 
Mr. Podell: I just want to get that one 
figure. I did not think it was disconcerting, 
your Honor. 
Q. Did you reconcile the bank balances shown 
by the books of the corporation and these letters 
received from the banks? A. We did. 
Q. Did you make any tests of deposits and of 
checks drawn with the bank statements? A. We 
did. 
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Q. Will you just explain what those tests mean, 
what those tests are? A. In order to establish the 
regularity of their manner of keeping track of their 
bank accounts and their cash transactions, it is 
necessary and it is usually done, and I did it in 
this case, examined a number of their recent de-
posits, particularly at the close of the year, to 
see that their money at the end of the year had 
not in any way been manipulated. 
Q. And did you also look at the cash entries in 
the months of January and February, 1924, for 
this purpose? You may refresh your recollection 
from those work sheets there? A. I cannot recall 
at this time that we took it up as a specific item. 
That is, examination of cash transactions of Janu-
ary or February, 1924, to prove the bank balances 
at December 31st. 
Q. What did you do in that connection? 
Mr. Podell: May I see that? 
(Handed to counsel.) 
Mr. Marshall: Perhaps I do not put the 
questions right, not being a technical ac-
countant. 
Q. Will you tell us anything else that you did 
with respect to cash balances? A. I made in-
quiries with regard to the principal outstanding 
checks. That is, checks that had been drawn prior 
to or on December 31st, 1923, but had not been 
cashed by the banks. Those checks in the largest 
items were inquired into as to their regularity. 
Q. Now, whom did you discuss these matters 
with when you inquired? A. Principally with Mr. 
Romberg. 
Q. You understood him to be the cashier or 
head bookkeeper of the concern? A. Yes, the cash-
ier and office manager, as I recall him. 
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Q. Now, will you go on to the next thing that 
was considered? A. The next group of items taken 
up were the notes and trade acceptances receivable. 
Q. What did you do with respect to them? A. 
I, first of all, made a summarizing schedule of 
all accounts representing notes and trade accept-
ances receivable. I determined by examination of 
the trial balance and by inquiring as to their 
method of doing business, that some of the notes 
or trade acceptances were discounted, and I de-
termined also which accounts they were, and on 
the schedule headed a column "discounted," and 
proceeded to make a segregation of the total notes 
and trade acceptances receivable into those dis-
counted and those given as collateral to obliga-
tions of Fred Stern. 
Q. Did you confirm the existence of these pledged 
notes? A. I did. We next made up a schedule 
from the records in Fred Stern's office, which would 
give us the detail of all of the notes and trade ac-
ceptances. My first summary merely showed the 
amount of notes and trade acceptances in the hands 
of the creditor as collateral with each bank under 
discount. My further schedule gave the detail of 
all notes or trade acceptances by their makers. I 
made up that list, showing the maturities, and any 
that were past due, and I check from that to as-
certain which had been confirmed. I further classi-
fied the notes and trade acceptances, to show which 
were supposed to be on hand with Fred Stern, and 
inspected those that were on hand. 
Q. Did you trace into the books entries for notes 
and trade acceptances collected since December 
31st, 1923, up to the time of the audit? A. My 
recollection is not good on that point, but I have 
in my own handwriting on this same schedule 
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proceeds not received until January, 1924, with 
respect to two notes of the India Tire & Rubber 
Company, which while it is not a recollection of 
mine, leads me to believe that I examined the cash 
records with regard to collection of notes. 
Q. Those were true entries which you made at 
that time? A. This was made at the time of the 
examination. 
Mr. Marshall: May we have this marked 
also, your Honor, the sheet the witness has 
been referring to? 
(Marked Exhibit 15-D.) 
The Court: In the examination of this 
particular section, notes and trade accept-
ances receivable, do I understand you to say 
that your examination first separated those 
held by the company and then separated 
those pledged as collateral to acceptances? 
Did I understand you to say that? 
The Witness: Yes. 
By the Court. 
Q. Now, then, after that separation, was there 
a checkup as to the existence of those particular 
notes and trade acceptances? A. Yes. 
Q. How? A. Those that were on hand were in-
spected. Those that were under discount were 
confirmed by correspondence. Those that were 
pledged as collateral but not discounted, were also 
confirmed by correspondence. 
Mr. Marshall: The correspondence is an-
nexed to Exhibit 15-D, is that right? 
The Witness: The correspondence with 
regard to the verification of notes does not 
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all appear under this schedule, because that 
correspondence includes verification of other 
items and is filed in the most convenient 
place. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Where is it, in your working sheets? A. Ref-
erence is made, however, on this schedule to the 
place where the verification will be found, the 
confirmation letter will be found. 
Foreman of Jury: When you say that 
the bank held certain money already for 
security for money advanced, was this on 
the books still shown as an asset? 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Juror: It has already been pledged 
to the bank for security, the bank would 
not give him back the money and no checks 
would be issued until it was paid, and it still 
was kept as an asset on the books? 
The Witness: Are you referring to the 
notes? 
The Juror: You said something before 
that the bank held certain moneys until 
certain securities were paid. 
The Witness: Cash. 
The Juror: Cash, yes. If the man would 
issue a check, the bank would not honor it 
because they held that? 
The Witness: Not on that account. 
Mr. Marshall: You offset that by a lia-
bility, do you not? 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Court: On the other side you will 
find a liability for that. You will find the 
liability on the other side. 
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The Witness: You see, the liability was 
still outstanding and good until discharged, 
until it matured, and the bank also held 
on the other hand cash in part to meet that 
obligation when it would mature. 
The Juror: The notification was sent 
to the bank, not to the other party? The 
bank has advanced money on it? 
The Court: The bank has advanced 
money. They have cash there as security for 
that particular obligation, and when it is 
paid by the obligor, they restore the cash 
back to Mr.—whatever the name of this con-
cern is. 
Mr. Podell: Stern & Company. Your 
Honor, I think your Honor is overlooking, 
if I may suggest, that the witness testified— 
I do not know whether the juror has that in 
mind or not—that there were trade accept-
ances discounted. 
The Court: That is not what the juror 
is referring to. 
The Juror: I am not referring to that. 
Mr. Podell: If you read his answer, 
where he said that the cash was tied up 
by the bank, I think you will find—— 
The Court: I think a few questions by 
counsel will clarify the whole situation. Go 
back to that. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. As I understand that item, Mr. Towell, there 
were acceptances that were to mature in the future 
in favor of the banks, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And there had been accounts receivable or 
something pledged against these acceptances as se-
curity in favor of the bank? A. Right. 
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Q. And some of these accounts receivable had 
been collected by the bank and turned into cash 
before the acceptance became due and payable? A. 
Right. 
Q. And therefore there was at the time, as of 
December 31st, 1923, outstanding on the one side 
an obligation of Stern to the bank, and on the other 
side, cash which had been realized by the bank but 
which it could not credit to the obligation until 
the due date? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think that is right, 
your Honor. 
The Witness: One or two of the banks 
make the offset. 
Mr. Podell: Why not? The juror was 
perfectly right in asking why it should be 
called an asset. 
The Juror: They have held the money as 
security already. The obligation has never 
been sent to the bank yet. 
The Witness: May I read a letter? 
The Juror: I just want to get it clear. 
The Court: Yes, you can clarify it. 
The Witness: I think this will clarify 
it. We addressed a letter to the Chemical 
National Bank, asking for details of all open 
items with their bank, and they replied as 
of that date, December 31st, 1923, "The 
above named company, Fred Stern & Com-
pany, is not indebted to us for any loans or 
discounts. Our foreign department had total 
acceptances outstanding in the amount of 
$281,395.45, and total anticipated in the 
amount of $94,994.65, as of December 31st, 
1923, for this account." 
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There were anticipations, that is, money 
on deposit, with the Chemical National 
Bank, which they intended to use to hold 
for themselves in anticipation of maturity 
of obligations due them from Fred Stern. 
Mr. Marshall: But they had not used it 
yet for that? 
The Witness: No. 
Mr. Podell: Which is it? Where is the 
asset? 
Mr. Marshall: There is a liability off-
setting that. 
Mr. Podell: Let us get it as an asset 
first. What is included in it as an asset? 
Q. What did you include as an asset in there, 
Mr. Podell wants to know? A. The Chemical Na-
tional Bank with regard to the item that they say 
was anticipated and which I repeat again was 
$94,994.65, with regard to that particular item 
there appeared on the general ledger a balance 
of $89,073. That item had to be reconciled, and 
an accounting made of the difference. That was 
done, and it was established that as of December 
31st, 1923, it was correct to state the cash in the 
hands of the Chemical National was $89,073.72, as 
recorded on the books of Fred Stern. 
Q. And against this, did you carry a liability? 
The Court : Of $200,000? 
Q. Of two hundred odd thousand dollars? A. 
Yes. 
The Juror: If a bank has got cash on 
hand, it must honor the check, unless that 
money is taken off already. If it is pledged 
and the bank has taken it off on certain 
pledging, there is no balance there. 
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Mr. Marshall: I do not think this was a 
checking account. 
The Witness: I do not think this was a 
checking account. 
The Court: Is it clarified now? If it is 
not, ask any question you like. 
Mr. Podell: There are a few questions I 
would like to ask about that, your Honor, 
but not at this point. 
The Court: Not at this time. 
The Juror: This is already pledged and 
then it is a liability when it is pledged, and 
until it is cleared off it should not be an 
asset. It is neither an asset nor a liability. 
The Court: As I understand it, slightly 
as I know, there is a difference between the 
cash of $89,000 and two hundred odd thou-
sand, if that cash is deducted from the 
$200,000 there is a liability between the 
$200,000 and the $89,000. 
Mr. Podell: No, your Honor, I am sorry. 
The Court: That is not the fact? 
Mr. Marshall: May I speak, your Honor? 
This is my examination at this time. 
The Court: Go ahead. 
Mr. Marshall: I think what happened, 
your Honor, they held this account in abey-
ance because obviously the Chemical Bank 
could not apply this to the loan 
The Court: For some reason. 
Mr. Marshall: Because the loan was not 
due. If they did that, they would lose in-
terest. 
Mr. Podell: Pardon me. I think coun-
sel is going far beyond argument. He is 
testifying. 
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Mr. Marshall: That was my understand-
ing. 
The Court: Let him tell what that is, if 
he knows. 
Mr. Podell: I will ask that the witness 
tell; that he put questions. Go ahead. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Will you try and explain it to us once more? 
I thought you said that the acceptances were not 
due yet? A. That is my recollection. 
Q. One of the jurors suggest that the steamship 
was not here. Does that suggestion help us any? 
A. No. I can repeat the same remarks I have 
already made; by referring to a further schedule in 
the working papers, acceptances under letters of 
credit dealing with the same item we have spoken 
of, Chemical National Bank, I find that my papers 
show that Fred Stern owed the Chemical National 
Bank on dollar acceptances $249,642.59. 
The Court: If you give us the anticipa-
tions, I think we will get it. 
The Witness: The amount that they held 
after reconciliation—cash in their hands was 
$89,073.72. They would hold that cash and 
continue to hold it until such time as they 
should offset it against acceptances due to 
them. 
The Juror: The acceptances amount to 
how much? 
The Witness : $249,000 worth of accept-
ances. Evidently Fred Stern & Company 
to secure those acceptances had given trust 
receipts, assigned invoices, and some of the 
invoices were collected before the accept-
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ances fell due, and they were holding $89,073 
in their possession to offset against the ac-
ceptances when they did mature. 
The Juror: Trade acceptances? 
The Witness: Trade acceptances, payable 
by Fred Stern. 
Q. And that could not be anticipated any more 
than a note payable, could it? It is like a note pay-
able on a certain date, and an acceptance payable? 
A. I believe that to be so. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, the next item 
is this accounts receivable. 
The Court: Does that clarify that, sir? 
The Juror: That clears it up, yes, sir. 
The Court: Have you got it cleared up in 
your mind? 
The Juror: Yes. 
Seventh Juror: That 204,000 
The Court: Why do you not wait and see 
if the lawyers bring it out or not? 
Mr. Marshall: Is it on this item? We 
are going to leave that now. 
Seventh Juror: He was speaking of those 
liabilities, trade acceptances and cash on 
hand. He states that the Chemical National 
Bank people had 204,000 and some amount 
of money in trade acceptances. Is that the 
way I understand it? 
The Witness: There was owing by Fred 
Stern to the Chemical National Bank 
$249,000. 
Seventh Juror: And how much trade ac-
ceptances did he give them for it? $249,000 
worth of trade acceptances? 
The Witness: Yes. 
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Seventh Juror: And the amount of cash 
the Chemical National people held was only 
$89,000? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Seventh Juror: That is what I want to 
get clear, because I thought the way he ex-
pressed it, that they had $204,000 in cash and 
only $89,000 acceptances, but they were hold-
ing the $89,000 against the $204,000 accept-
ances. That is what I wanted to see, why 
the money couldn't be paid out. 
Mr. Podell: The only difficulty is that 
these acceptances were drafts against letters 
of credit. 
The Court: That can be brought out. 
Mr. Podell: They were not what we ordi-
narily call trade acceptances. I think that 
might be made a little clearer when we get to 
bringing out a few questions. I think that 
may be made a little clearer. 
Mr. Marshall: Now that we have had the 
benediction of Mr. Podell, I suggest, your 
Honor, that we adjourn, because the ac-
counts receivable is the next item, and that 
will be quite a lengthy item. 
The Court: Are you through with these 
notes and trade acceptances? 
Mr. Marshall: I think we are. Are we 
not? 
The Witness: I think we are. 
Mr. Podell: While we are on this, may 
I just ask or suggest, was not the obliga-
tion that Stern was to pay it off at any time 
before the due date? 
The Witness : That was not my under-
standing. 
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Mr. Podell: Well, all right. I had better 
reserve that. Is there any maturity in 
London on those trade drafts? 
The Court : He does not know. 
Mr. Limburg: Yes, he does. 
The Witness: I never heard of any. 
Mr. Marshall: I think we had better wait 
until the cross-examination for these addi-
tional questions. 
The Court: Yes. Do not let us get this 
confused now. Is there any other question 
you want to ask on that, gentlemen? Have 
you got it clarified now? We will take an 
adjournment until to-morrow morning at 10 
o'clock. 
(Whereupon, at 4.30 o'clock P. M., an ad-
journment was taken until to-morrow, April 
9th, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.) 
New York, April 9, 1929, 
10 o'clock A. M. 
Trial continued. 
Same appearances. 
SYDNEY TOWELL, a witness on behalf of the de-
fendant, resumed, further testified as follows: 
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, when we closed yesterday, Mr. Towell, 
I believe we had covered the cash items and the 
note items on the balance sheet? A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, what did you do to determine the 
amount of accounts receivable that Stern had? A. 
I took off a trial balance of the accounts receivable 
ledger, showing the name of each account and the 
amount of each account. 
Q. Did you compare that trial balance of the ac-
counts receivable ledger with the trial balance of 
the 
Mr. Podell: I object to counsel telling 
him what he did. Why cannot the witness 
answer the last question? 
The Court: Yes. I think he would be bet-
ter qualified than any of us, to tell us. 
Mr. Marshall: I think I can shorten it, 
your Honor. 
Q. Had you finished your answer to the last ques-
tion, or do you want to go on? A. I can go on. I 
compared the total of the accounts receivable as 
shown by the trial balance, with the controlling ac-
count in the general ledger. 
Q. And what did you find? A. I found that they 
were in agreement, and that the general ledger con-
trolling account properly stated the total of ac-
counts receivable. 
Q. What else did you do? A. I then had the ac-
counts that were overdue aged under a plan where-
by I discovered which were less than three months 
overdue, those three to six months, and those 
six to twelve months. 
Q. You noted that down, did you, on one of these 
work sheets? A. I noted all of that information on 
these work sheets. 
Q. And that is exhibit— A. That is Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 15-A. 
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Q. These columns are the ones which indicate the 
aging (indicating) ; is that correct? A. Yes. 
(Shown to jury.) 
Q. What was the next step you took in relation 
to that? A. In examining each of the individual 
accounts for the purpose of aging, I had my assist-
ant examine them to see that they were made up as 
specific items and were not old unadjusted bal-
ances. 
Q. What do you mean by that, that the specific 
items were not— A. Definite invoices. 
Q. You mean to see that each account receivable 
represented definite invoices? A. Yes. 
Q. That they were not just claims or unpaid bal-
ances of some kind against the accounts? A. Yes. 
Q. And then what did you do? A. I then took 
the list up with the credit manager of Fred Stern, 
Mr. Pam, and discussed the accounts with him, ac-
count by account, to determine what reserves were 
necessary for those that were overdue. 
Q. Now, just tell me, let me get this straight— 
you took every account on that list up with the 
credit man, is that correct? A. Yes. 
Q. And when you speak of every account, for 
example you— A. I mean each individual item. 
Q. You took up this item, we will say, of Akron 
Seamless Rubber Company (indicating)? A. Yes, 
sir. 
Q. And you discussed that with him? A. Yes. 
Q. For the purpose of finding out what kind of a 
reserve should be placed against that, if any? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And did you do that with every account on 
that list? A. I did. 
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Q. And did that list contain every account on 
the books of the company, every account receivable 
on the books of Stern? A. Except for a few ac-
counts shown in the accounts payable ledger, which 
were really accounts receivable. 
Q. All of these other accounts receivable except-
ing those which we will take up later, you did take 
up in this audit? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what else did you do? Let me ask you— 
did you believe Mr. Pam, the credit manager, to be 
an honest man? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, will you go on and tell us the next step 
that you took? A. Certain of the accounts Mr. Pam 
was unable to pass on, and those I took up to-
gether with the recommendations and suggestions 
made by Mr. Pam with Mr. Stern himself, and too 
with Mr. Romberg. 
Q. So that you discussed the list, this complete 
list of accounts, with Mr. Stern and Mr. Romberg? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they also helped you decide what 
Mr. Podell: I object to that, what they 
helped him to do. Let him tell us. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. Withdrawn. 
Mr. Podell: Are you talking about over-
due accounts? 
Mr. Marshall: I am talking about the 
whole list of accounts receivable which he 
discussed with Mr. Stern and with Mr. Pam 
and with Mr. Romberg. 
Q. Now, did you at that time believe that Mr. 
Stern was an honest man? A. I did. 
Q. And did you believe that Mr. Romberg was 
an honest man? A. I did. 
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Q. Now, did you take those accounts up with 
any one else? A. I took the list in part up with a 
Mr. Hayworth. 
Q. And who was he? A. He was the sales man-
ager. 
Q. And you discussed some of the accounts with 
the sales manager? A. Yes. 
Q. And did you believe him to be an honest man? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did any of them at any time suggest to you 
that there were any fake accounts in that list? A. 
They did not. 
Q. Now, what other steps did you take with re-
spect to these accounts receivable? A. I had the 
cash books examined to see whether any of the ac-
counts had been paid in January, particularly those 
that were overdue, January or the part of Febru-
ary of 1924 that I was in there. I then removed 
from the accounts receivable those accounts which 
upon investigation were shown to be in the nature 
of investments in plants, such as the investment in 
the Batavia Rubber Company's plant, at Batavia, 
New York. 
Q. And where did you put that? A. I put that, 
under the head of investments. 
Q. That appears later in the balance sheet? A. 
It appears later in the balance sheets, but it was 
an account in this ledger when I first saw it. 
Q. What did you then do? Did you take— A. 
Then, from their general business I knew that some 
of their accounts were assigned, and I secured from 
Mr. Romberg his record of assignment of accounts 
and had noted on the trial balance those accounts 
which were assigned. 
Q. Now, some mention was made of some letters 
which you had received from the banks. Had all 
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the banks that were written to replied, stating just 
what accounts receivable had been assigned to 
them? A. They had not. 
Q. Had the Chemical National Bank replied, 
stating what accounts receivable had been assigned 
to it? A. No, they had not. 
Q. Now, will you tell us what your object was in 
noting the accounts assigned? A. When I had com-
pleted the examination of accounts receivable, I 
had determined that there was a total of $2,224,-
872.63 of accounts receivable. I knew that part of 
them were pledged, and I wished to show on the 
balance sheets the total amount of accounts that 
were pledged. Examining the lists from the banks, 
some banks did not reply, some did not give the de-
tail of their accounts, some did give the detail. That 
detail, where given, did not check with the records 
in many cases, and it was impossible to make a com-
plete follow-through on the whole thing, and I came 
to the conclusion that the record given me by Mr. 
Romberg, which was a day to day record used for 
operating purposes was a complete record and cor-
rectly described the total amount of accounts re-
ceivable assigned. 
Q. Now, was this record which Romberg gave 
you—did that state accounts receivable assigned in 
a greater or a lesser sum than that shown by the 
returns by the banks which you had received? A. 
Mr. Romberg's total showed a greater amount than 
that reported by banks. 
Q. And you took the greater sum of pledged ac-
counts rather than the lesser sum? A. I did. 
Q. And that showed a lesser sum of free assets 
available to general creditors than it would have 
shown if you had taken the lesser figures shown by 
the banks? A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, you regarded that, or did you regard 
that as the correct thing to do under the circum-
stances? A. I did. 
Q. And the more conservative thing to do? A. 
I did. 
Q. And did you make that application in good 
faith and in the best exercise of your judgment? A. 
I did. 
Q. Now, did you take any other steps than those 
that you have named to satisfy yourself as to the 
regularity and genuineness of the accounts receiv-
able? A. I made tests of invoices to the accounts 
receivable. I made tests of returns 
Q. What do you mean by tests of invoices to ac-
counts receivable? A. Checking invoices, duplicate 
copies of invoices on file, to the accounts receivable, 
and from the accounts receivable back to the in-
voices. I checked in both directions. 
Q. About how many invoices, if you have any 
idea, did you take up in that way? A. I would say 
not less than 200. 
Q. Now, what did you do besides checking from 
the accounts to the invoices? A. I checked from 
the invoices back to the record of rubber received 
by Fred Stern and proved that that same rubber 
had been purchased by Fred Stern and a liability 
raised therefor or payment made therefor. 
Q. Now, what book did you use in connection 
with that? A. I used a record of lots. I call it the 
lot record. 
Q. A lot record? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Have you such a book 
here? 
Q. Now, let us see if I get that clearly: You 
went then from the invoices to the lot record book, 
1868 
1869 
624 
1870 Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Direct. 
to test whether merchandise had been received and 
delivered against invoices, is that correct? A. To 
test whether they ever purchased the rubber, yes. 
Q. And about how many instances of that kind, 
how many tests of that kind, did you make? A. I 
am a little afraid to mention the number. I worked 
the greater part of two days, rapid work, from one 
record to the other. 
Q. If you cannot remember the number after 
all these years, I do not want to ask you to guess. 
A. No. I could not estimate at this time the num-
ber that I checked. 
Q. Now, did you pick these invoices that you 
checked at random, or did you have a particular 
system? A. Just at random. 
Q. And is that the customary way of making 
tests? A. It is satisfactory. 
Q. Now, is there anything else that you did in 
connection with the accounts receivable? A. On 
the accounts receivable I found certain balances 
which were completely reserved against. That is. 
there was an asset account which with the adjust-
ments made after my investigation of the value of 
the account was equal to the amount of the account, 
and therefore, instead of showing an amount of ac-
counts receivable on the balance sheet and a re-
serve to offset it of just as great an amount, I had a 
transfer made offsetting the two, so that they 
showed in neither one place nor the other. That 
was in order to eliminate accounts which had been 
completely reserved against. 
Q. Now, you did set up a reserve, did you not? 
A. Yes. The reserve set up comes under another 
caption of the working papers, the reserve for 
doubtful accounts. Shall I come to it now? 
The Court: Yes. It is the next in line. 
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Q. I think you had better. A. The reserve for 
doubtful accounts as finally adjusted after by in-
vestigation, totaled $660,000. 
Q. That was the reserve that was built up after 
this conversation with these four men, is that cor-
rect? A. It was. After offsetting the accounts, I 
just spoke of, amounting to $172,000, we reduced 
the reserve finally to $427,000. 
Q. That reserve is really a deduction from the 
assets, is it not, from those accounts receivable? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did you consider at all the necessity of 
confirming these accounts receivable by correspond-
ence with customers? A. I did not consider it be-
cause the matter had been already mentioned to me 
by Mr. Rea before I proceeded with my work. 
Q. And what did he say? A. He told me that it 
had been decided not to. 
Q. And did you find, in the course of your exami-
nation, anything to make you feel that you should 
correspond with customers? A. No, I did not. 
Q. Now, is there anything more you want to say 
under the heading of accounts receivable, to explain 
what you did? A. No. 
Q. What is the next item? A. These are—the ac-
counts we have just spoken of are the trade ac-
counts receivable. There are some other accounts 
receivable other than trade. 
Q. What did you do about them? A. I made a 
general inquiry as to their nature, and decided they 
were proper assets and properly stated as other ac-
counts receivable. 
Q. And in general, what was their nature? A. 
Claims for shortages and losses and a few minor 
advances and accounts with employees and officers 
of Fred Stern, the whole total of which was $27,-
693. 
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Q. And did you make checks of some kind against 
them? A. I inquired as to their nature at the time, 
and satisfied myself that they were properly stated. 
Q. Now, there has been some mention made of a 
United Baltic account, Sterling deposit. I do not 
know if this is the proper place to take that up, 
but if it is, will you tell us what you did about 
that? 
The Court: That is the large item, is it 
not, of $703,000? 
Mr. Marshall: No, your Honor. 
The Witness: It is $113,000. That comes 
under the caption of accounts payable. The 
trial balance of the accounts payable ledger 
was taken off, and it disclosed the fact that 
the greater part of the so-called accounts 
payable were in fact accounts receivable or 
their equivalent. That is, they were not 
credit balances, not liabilities in the aggre-
gate, but in the aggregate debit balances. 
That is, whereas you usually expect to find a 
credit balance in the controlling account of 
accounts payable, in this case, in the case of 
Fred Stern & Company, there was actually 
a debit balance. It is quite customary, and 
I did so in this case 
Q. Now, a debit balance to accounts payable is 
really a credit balance to Stern, is that correct? A. 
Debit balance to accounts payable is an asset of 
Stern's. 
Q. An asset of Stern's. Now, will you explain 
what you did to investigate that item? A. I had my 
assistant go over the ledger and note for me the 
nature of all of the debit balances. I then removed 
the debit balances from the accounts payable, be-
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cause if I had left them there they would have re-
duced the liabilities of Fred Stern, but I removed 
them from accounts payable and transferred them 
to the asset side of the balance sheet. Among the 
items was the item just referred to, the United Bal-
tic Corporation. That was the largest item among 
the accounts payable debit balances, and amounted 
to $113,199.60. I inquired into that item, I looked 
at the United Baltic account and 
Q. In what ledger? A. In the accounts payable 
ledger; and I took the matter up with the credit 
manager. 
Q. That is Mr. Pam? A. Mr. Pam, and with 
Mr. Stern, and discussed it with Mr. Romberg. 
Q. And what was the explanation that they gave 
you? A. That the United Baltic had insisted on 
them raising sterling deposits on their account; 
they desired in their future business dealings to 
have cash on their hands for the future purchases. 
Q. In other words, the United Baltic, before it 
would deal with Stern any more, wanted a cash 
deposit in advance? A. Yes. And it had it. I 
determined that the transactions raising the debit 
balance were transactions involving cash; that cash 
had gone to the United Baltic. I examined what 
was available as the United Baltic file to see what 
purchases had been made in January, whether any 
of them were in liquidation of that amount, and 
I found none. 
Q. Was the explanation that was given to you 
confirmed by the checking which you did? A. Yes. 
Q. And did you believe the explanation that was 
given to you at that time? A. I did. 
Q. Now, have you concluded everything you did 
under accounts receivable? A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. Now, will you tell us what you did with re-
spect to the inventory? A. I requested that the 
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original sheets covering the inventory be handed 
to me, and I received them from Mr. Romberg. 
They were not made up by Mr. Romberg, but by 
two individuals outside of his department. 
Q. That is, employees of Stern? A. Employees 
of Fred Stern & Company. 
Q. Is it customary to receive the inventory from 
some employee of the person whose accounts you 
are auditing? A. It is. 
Q. Now, what did you do to check up on this 
inventory? A. I went down each of the items of 
rubber in stock and checked to the purchase in-
voice register to see that it had been set up as 
a liability. I then checked through the record 
shown in the lot register to see as of what time 
the rubber in the inventory had been sold, and 
I corrected errors found in that examination. 
Q. Now, did any of these errors cause you to 
suspect that the inventory had been dishonestly 
made up? A. No. 
Q. Go ahead and tell us what else you did. A. 
I discovered that the two sheets of the inventory 
as handed to me by Fred Stern & Company con-
tained a great many errors for the size of the 
inventory, and, of course, I immediately made in-
quiry as to how such a thing could happen. I 
was informed by Mr. Romberg that the principal 
reason was that being behind with his records on 
the general ledger he had not had opportunity 
to check the inventory that had been made up 
outside of his own department. It seemed a rea-
sonable explanation to me, and I investigated in 
the outside department, and the main reason for 
the errors seemed to be that they had sickness in 
the office and one man was trying to do another 
man's work, and there seemed every reason why 
and how errors could come into these sheets. All 
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errors were corrected quite readily when I pointed 
them out, and since the inventory was not large, 
I checked the whole thing through myself instead 
of handing back to them and telling them to check 
it on their own account. 
Q. Now, what books, if any, did you use in 
checking this inventory back? A. I used the ac-
counts receivable ledger, the record of acceptances 
on the letters of credit, probably the accounts pay-
able ledger. 
Q. Did you use the lot book? A. And the lot 
record as the principal record. 
Q. Now, did you take steps to prove that any 
part of the inventory had been sold? A. I did. 
Q. And have you told us yet what you did in 
that connection? A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Did you ascertain whether the rubber was 
free or was pledged? A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you determine in that connection? 
A. In my own writing I noted the fact that all 
of the inventory was pledged under trust receipts. 
Q. That is the whole inventory of merchandise 
that Stern had was pledged under trust receipts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did you make any comparison with the 
inventory of previous years to see whether there 
was any discrepancy? A. I did. I compared it 
with the previous year's inventory to see whether 
it seemed a reasonable amount for an inventory, 
and speaking from memory, I think I found that 
there was a reduction of about $430,000 in the 
inventory. 
Q. So that there was a considerably smaller in-
ventory in 1923 as against 1922? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, was there anything else that you did 
with respect to inventory? A. Yes. I obtained 
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market quotations as at December 31, 1923, from 
newspapers, and I priced out the whole of the 
inventory to see how it checked up with the market 
prices at the date of our balance sheet, and I found 
that where I had a total inventory of $131,423.81, 
the market value was $130,233, and I concluded 
that the inventory had therefore been reasonably 
priced. 
Q. What else did you do with respect to the 
inventory, if anything? A. Nothing recurs to me 
at the moment, except that the inventory was kept 
in mind when going through the commitment record 
to see that commitments of December 31st were 
not outstanding. 
Q. You mean, to find out whether there were any 
unclosed contracts? A. Yes. 
Q:. Of Stem outstanding? A. Yes. 
Q. And you had that in mind also when you 
went through the inventory? A. I had the inven-
tory in mind when I went through the commitment 
record. 
Q. When you searched the commitment record? 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Mr. Towell, will you now tell us just as briefly 
as you can what you did under the investment item? 
A. I obtained a list of the investments and a de-
scription of their nature, and those that were held 
in the office of Fred Stern were examined by me 
and those that were pledged as collateral were con-
firmed by correspondence. 
Q. Is that all that you did under that? A. I 
secured, in so far as was possible, quotations on— 
or I attempted to secure—quotations on two of the 
investments, but could obtain none. In one case I 
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valued the security at the price at which the bank 
holding it valued it for its purposes. 
Q. You finally fixed a value at which to carry 
all of these? A. Yes. On the investments com-
prising participation in syndicates, I took them up 
with Mr. Stern and made from what he thought 
and that seemed to me reasonable reserves against 
it. 
Q. Now, will you come to the item of furniture 
and fixtures? That item apparently you depre-
ciated for the full book value, or had Stern done 
that? A. Yes. 
Q. And prepaid credit insurance was the only 
prepayment insurance that you found? A. Yes, 
that was all. 
Q. That item is noted in your balance sheet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, will you turn to liabilities? What 
classes of liabilities did you find on the books? A. 
Acceptances, trade accounts payable, and other 
accounts, accounts payable. 
Q. And what did you do with respect to those 
items? A. The acceptances were confirmed by cor-
respondence and reconciliations made with state-
ments received. 
Q. Did you make a list of the liabilities? A. 
I did. 
Q. And did you include in that list every lia-
bility that you found an entry of? A. I did. 
Q. Is that the— A. These are all of the accept-
ances on the letters of credit. 
Q. Now, what other liabilities were there? A. 
Trade accounts payable—— 
Q. And how much did they amount to? A. And 
they amounted to $67,244. 
Q. What other items of accounts payable were 
there, or liabilities? A. There was a liability to 
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Fred Stern, the president of the company, and to 
another employee. 
Q. Now, were there any other liabilities? A. No. 
Q. Did you make inquiry as to the nature of the 
liabilities that were recorded? A. I did. 
Q. And what 
Mr. Podell: Make inquiries of whom? 
Q. Well, of whom, and how? What inquiries did 
you make? A. On my own account through the rec-
ords that were available through Mr. Romberg. 
Q. Yes. A. Through Mr. Stern. 
Q. Did you make any attempt to see whether a 
liability had been set up for all the goods that had 
been purchased? A. I did. 
Q. What did you do in that connection? A. I 
examined their lot record showing the merchandise 
that had been received by them. I examined 
Q. And did you make tests against that? A. I 
had made tests against that. 
Q. And did you make tests or compare that at 
all with the ledger showing the accounts payable? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What else did you do to test these accounts 
payable? A. I examined their invoice files, their 
invoice register and their invoice files—that is, in-
voices coming from outsiders, charging them with 
rubber purchases—to see that none of them should 
have been set up by the end of December, 1923. 
Q. Did you inquire whether there were any ac-
ceptances or any accounts not entered in the record, 
or any unentered invoices? A. I did. 
Q. And in that connection did you get these let-
ters, or one of these letters, that is in evidence— 
have you got it there? A. Yes, I did (handing to 
counsel). 
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Q. I refer to Exhibit 27. A. Yes, I secured that 
letter. 
Mr. Marshall: That letter has been read 
to the jury once before, your Honor. It is 
the letter which Stern and Romberg signed, 
stating that there were no liabilities or con-
tingent liabilities unentered on the books. 
The Court: Yes. You recall that letter, 
gentlemen. 
(Letter handed to jury.) 
Q. Now, do you remember how that letter was 
obtained or when? A. I have no distinct recol-
lection about it. There was nothing to remember 
about it. I wanted the letter. I asked for the 
letter. I believe I indicated what I wanted. I 
wanted them to give me a letter stating that to 
their knowledge, their present knowledge, not a 
letter signed by the corporation—I remember I 
asked them not to sign it by the corporation, but 
to give me their personal assurances that there 
were no undisclosed liabilities. There was no par-
ticular significance to it at the time. There was 
nothing to remember. 
Q. That was the usual thing in an office routine, 
in the routine of auditing at that time, was it? A. 
Yes. 
Q. There was some testimony by Mr. Romberg 
that Mr. Rea asked him for these letters? A. That 
is not true. 
Q. Do you happen to know whether Mr. Rea was 
there at that time? A. Mr. Rea could never have 
seen those letters until I showed them to him at 
the office of Touche, Niven & Co. in 80 Maiden Lane. 
Q. Now, did you in connection with liabilities, 
and also in connection with inventory, obtain this 
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letter at the same time, signed by Romberg and 
Stern (handing to witness)? A. I did. 
Mr. Marshall: Referring to Exhibit 28. 
Q. When these two letters, Exhibits 27 and 28, 
were obtained by you, did you believe them to be 
true? A. I did. 
Q. Did you have any qualms or doubts of any 
kind when you obtained these letters from Stern 
or Romberg? A. None whatever. 
Q. Did you obtain this other letter, Exhibit 28, 
because it was part of your routine examination at 
that time? A. I did. 
Q. Now, is there anything else you did with re-
spect to liabilities? A. Not that I recall now. 
Q. Did you examine the letters from the banks 
and check all liabilities? A. I did. 
Q. Which may have mentioned their accounts 
against Stern? A. I did. 
Q. Now, what did you do with respect to capital 
and surplus ? A. On the preferred stock I examined 
the certificate book to see what certificates had been 
issued and for how many shares the certificates 
were. I examined the common stock certificate 
book and went through the same procedure. 
Q. Did you determine whether any changes in 
capital had been made during the year? A. I am 
just refreshing my memory on that point. 
Q. By referring to one of your working papers 
here? A. By referring to a schedule on preferred 
capital stock. I found that during the year 1923 
a further 850 shares of preferred stock had been 
issued to Fred Stern. I investigated the reason for 
that and found that it was an issue of preferred 
stock in satisfaction of a contract entered into 
when the company of Fred Stern & Company was 
formed. 
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Q. That was when the partnership was dissolved 
and it was turned into a corporation? A. I be-
lieve so. 
Q. Now, did you do anything else in respect to 
the capital and surplus? A. I recorded the amount 
of surplus at acquisition of Fred Stern & Company, 
noted that the value of the 850 shares of preferred 
stock issued to Fred Stern during the year had been 
deducted from paid in surplus, or surplus at acqui-
sition, rather. I carried forward the balance of 
the surplus from the previous year and added to 
it the profits shown by the records for the current 
year. 
Q. Now, did you take up the question of con-
tingent liabilities—before I come to that, how many 
stockholders did Stern & Company have, and will 
you state who they were? A. There were four. 
Fred Stern holding—do you want the number of 
shares ? 
Q. Yes. A. Holding fifty-one shares; Eric A. 
Pam, holding twelve shares; Lawrence O. Hayward, 
twelve shares; Paul Abogen, twenty-five shares; 
a total of 100 shares. 
Q. The preferred stock was held by whom? A. 
All by Fred Stern. 
Q. Will you tell me what you did in the item 
of contingent liabilities? A. The contingent lia-
bilities consisted of trade acceptances discounted, 
commitments for sterling and a contingent liability 
in connection with borrowed securities. The trade 
acceptances discounted were confirmed by corre-
spondence with the banks that did the discounting, 
and proved to be in order. The commitments for 
sterling were confirmed by correspondence and ad-
justments were made for losses sustained by Fred 
Stern which had not been taken on to his of De-
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cember 31, 1923. That in cases where he had pur-
chased sterling for December delivery, as I remem-
ber it, but had paid to extend the option, payments 
were made in January, and my examination dis-
closed several of them, and we thereupon made an 
adjustment as of December 31, 1923. 
Q. Now, is that all you did in connection with 
the contengent liabilities, as you recall? A. To 
ascertain that there was no contingent liability 
under commitments, I made a complete analysis 
of all of the contracts entered into for the future 
purchase or sale of rubber, which contains a great 
many sheets; but the final result of it was that, 
offsetting purchases against sales for future de-
livery, Fred Stern proved to have a short position 
of about nine tons of rubber, which is practically 
of no consequence. It was also determined in that 
examination that, upon scrutiny of the prices at 
which these contracts were entered into, there were 
a great many of them, the average profit would be 
between one-half and one cent per pound on all of 
the rubber purchased—to be purchased. 
Q. But actually not carried as an asset? A. That 
was not shown by our balance sheet in any way 
at all. 
Q. Because it was still an open contract? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Is that all you have got to say on the ques-
tion of contingent liabilities? A. On the matter 
of borrowed securities, we substantially verified the 
values at which the people holding the borrowed 
securities as collateral were carrying them, and we 
stated on our balance sheets the amount of those 
borrowed securities. 
Q. Now, as a result of your audit, did you pre-
pare this balance sheet, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1? 
A. I did. 
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Q. And did you then discuss it with anybody? 
A. I did. 
Q. With whom? A. I discussed it with Mr. Rea. 
Q. The staff manager of Touche, Niven & Co.? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you explain to him how you made out 
the various items? A. Where necessary. 
Q. And did you throughout this investigation 
and preparation of this balance sheet in every in-
stance use the best judgment that you had? A. I 
did. 
Q. Did you at any time distrust the honesty of 
Mr. Stern? A. No. 
Q. Or Mr. Romberg? A. No. 
Q. Or Mr. Pam, the credit man? A. No. 
Q. Or of the sales manager? A. No. 
Q. Now, did you make in connection with your 
audit, or cause to be made, all the adjustments in 
the books of Stern which you believed to be neces-
sary? A. I did. 
Q. And did the making of those adjustments 
make you suspect the honesty of Stern, or his con-
cern, in any respect? A. No. 
Q. Did you believe that after the adjustments 
were made your balance sheet showed the true posi-
tion of Stern? A. I did. 
Q. And that it properly reflected the books of 
Stern? A. Yes. 
Q. And did you believe that the balance sheet 
was in accordance with the books of Stern for the 
year ended December 31, 1923, and with the infor-
mation and explanations which had been given to 
you? A. I did. 
Q. And did you believe that, subject to provision 
of Federal taxes on income, the statement presented 
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a true and correct view of the financial condition 
of Fred Stern & Company as at December 31, 1923? 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Have you had occasion since that date to 
change 
Mr. Marshall: I have forgotten to ask one 
question. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. How many audits have you made since; the 
books of how many companies have you been over 
since you made this audit? A. They have run into 
several hundred. I could not give you any better 
estimate than to say more than 250. 
Q. And have you any definite recollection of the 
books of Stern & Company as they looked at that-
time, the entries on them? A. No, I have not. 
Q. And your testimony which you have given 
to-day is the result of refreshing your recollection 
from the work sheets? A. Yes. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Would it not be a very simple matter to check 
back all that mass of figures in all these papers 
and books and see whether the books contained 
those figures, would it not? A. Not a very simple 
matter. 
Q. It could be done in this testing method that 
you participated on, taking items at random. You 
said it was so certain, taking items at random and 
seeing whether or not they are still there. Could 
it not be done that way? A. No. 
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Q. That is not a sure way of doing it? A. Not 
under those circumstances. 
Q. Under what circumstances? A. The circum-
stance of my being here and being questioned as 
to the accuracy of those figures. I could not now 
take a set of books that I do not recognize—— 
Q. I am not asking you— A. And verify them 
by testing them. 
Q. You do not recognize those books? A. No, I 
do not. 
Q. All these books you have looked at, they are 
totally strange to you, Mr. Towell? A. Yes, they 
are. 
Q. Every one of them? A. Yes. 
Q. Not even your working sheets help you to 
recognize any of those books? A. No. 
Q. You did not find the items that you had on 
your working sheets contained in any of those 
books, did you? A. Yes. I found 
Mr. Marshall: Let him finish his answer. 
Mr. Podell: He answered it. 
Q. When the lawyers handed those books to you 
and asked you to look at their contents and compare 
them with your working sheets, did you find that 
the items were contained in those books? A. Yes, 
I found a number of accounts so far as I went 
that had the same name and the same balance. 
Q. But the books are totally strange to you now? 
A. They are. 
Q. Did anyone suggest to you that the matter 
of identifying these books was a matter that was 
involved in this case? A. Nobody. 
Q. Did anybody talk with you about the fact that 
the plaintiff here must show that these books were 
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in the same condition that they were at the time 
that you looked them over? Did anybody talk that 
over with you? A. They did not. 
Q. But you still maintain that, despite the tes-
timony that you have given here and the check-ups 
you have made in the presence of Court and jury, 
that these books are totally strange to you? A. 
I do. 
Q. Tell me, you have been sitting here every day 
during this trial, have you not? A. No. 
Q. Were there any days when you were not here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you heard the bulk of the testimony that 
has been given? A. I do not know what happened 
while I was away. 
Q. Did you hear Mr. Levy's testimony? A. Yes. 
Q. All of it? A. Part of it. 
Q. What part of it did you miss? A. I do not 
know. He was on the stand when I came in. 
Q. When did you come in? A. I came in at noon; 
noon on Thursday or Friday, I do not recall. 
Q. Don't you remember that when Mr. Levy took 
the witness stand you moved your chair right be-
hind Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Marshall: That is not so. 
Mr. Podell: I have asked that question. 
Mr. Marshall: That is an inaccurate state-
ment. 
Q. Do you remember that? A. I do not recall 
that, I know I moved up. No, I do not deny any-
thing. 
Q. Did not you take the testimony of Mr. Levy 
home with you over the week-end? A. No. 
Q. Did you look at it at any time? A. Yes. 
Q. When? A. I do not recall just the exact time 
I looked at it. I looked at it Saturday, I remember. 
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Q. When you certified to that balance sheet, you 
stated and just testified that you believed it to be 
an honest statement of the account? A. Yes. 
Q. Has anything happened since then to change 
your mind, or are you still of the same belief? A. 
Well, I am doubtful, certainly, after all the investi-
gation that is going on now, and knowing, or at 
least assuming, that Fred Stern & Company are 
bankrupt. 
Q. Now you are doubtful? A. I feel quite sure 
there must be something wrong somewhere. 
Q. You are quite certain? A. Yes. 
Q. And the thing that makes you certain is Mr. 
Stern's bankruptcy? A. No, no. Everything that 
has gone on since then. 
Mr. Marshall: I insist the witness has the 
right to finish his question. 
Mr. Podell: I am entitled to an answer 
yes or no. 
The Court: Let him finish. 
Mr. Podell: My question is, the thing that 
made you certain is Mr. Stern's bankruptcy? 
And he said no. 
The Court: Let him finish his question 
and have the answer, and it may be stricken 
out. 
Q. What else is there? A. Everything that went 
on at the hearings before the representative of the 
trustee. We all 
Q. These hearings were examinations of yourself 
and your associates, were they not? A. Yes; but 
statements were made there, statements were made 
there—— 
Q. By whom? A. By the representative of the 
trustee, in the form of questions to me. 
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Q. He just asked you questions? A. Yes. 
Q. And you gave your answers? A. Yes. 
Q. Is there anything which you told him that 
indicated that you knew that these books were dis-
honest? A. No. 
Q. Cannot you point to some specific instances 
of dishonesty that you have found out since? A. 
No. 
Q. You cannot? A. No. 
Q. You do not know one? A. No. 
Q. And it is not because you are not familiar 
with the situation? A. I am not familiar with 
the claims that are made. I have not seen the 
books since 1924—January of 1924. I have referred 
to my working papers only on two or three occa-
sions, and since then 
Q. I see. A. And I am 
Q, The answer that you have just given—I beg 
your pardon—finish. 
Mr. Podell: I submit, your Honor, "It 
is not because you are not familiar," a state-
ment, should be answered yes or no, and I 
am not to be bound down to allow this wit-
ness, every time I ask him a question, to go 
off and make a speech. That destroys every 
purpose of cross-examination. 
The Court: No, he is not bound to do that. 
He is bound to be given a reasonable oppor-
tunity to give an answer. 
Mr. Podell: Does your Honor consider— 
The Court: I do, sir. 
Mr. Podell: I respectfully except to your 
Honor's direction to this witness to volunteer 
all sorts of information in justification of 
himself when it is not called for. 
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The Court: Now, the question, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: I suppose he has not finished 
his answer, and I have got to stand by and 
wait until he finishes. Will you read me the 
last answer, please? 
(Record repeated as recorded.) 
Q. Go ahead and finish. A. What I know of 
Stern & Company since January of 1924 has been 
hearsay from a number of individuals, and what 
I have heard in this court room. 
Q. Were you here yesterday all day? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you hear me read the deposition of the 
Ford Motor Company, that they had never bought 
merchandise from Stern? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you hear me offer 
Mr. Marshall: I think that is an incor-
rect statement, Mr. Podell. It was not that 
he never had, but that he had not bought 
certain merchandise. 
Mr. Podell: That a certain account was 
fictitious. 
Q. Did you hear that read? A. I heard you read 
the deposition, yes. 
Q. Did you hear me refer to other depositions? 
A. Yes, I heard you. 
Q. From people who claimed that they had never 
bought merchandise that was listed as having been 
sold to them? A. I do not know from whom they 
were. 
Q. How? A. I do not know from whom they 
were. 
Q. Did not you hear me read their names into this 
record? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you know that Stern is bankrupt, or was 
bankrupt in 1925? A. I assumed that he is. 
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Q. And from all that you have heard and all that 
you know, you do not know yet that these books 
were dishonest? A. No, I do not know of my own 
knowledge. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
think this has been pursued far enough, this 
line. The question at issue is not what be 
believes the books are now, but what he be-
lieved them to be at that time. 
Mr. Podell: The question has been an-
swered. There is nothing pending before 
your Honor to make a speech about. 
The Court: Nothing that I know of. 
Mr. Marshall: Do not lose your temper, 
David. 
Mr. Podell: Please address the Court and 
we will get along better. I have not lost my 
temper at all. 
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, did you examine these 
sheets or statements prepared by Mr. Levy and 
offered in evidence here, those typewritten sched-
ules? A. I saw some in the hands of counsel. I 
did not examine them. 
Q. Just to hold them, and you observed them; 
you did not look at them. Did you examine them? 
A. I looked at one or two of them, but not very 
carefully. 
Q. Not very carefully? A. No. 
Q. You did not know their contents? A. No. I 
could not say that I do. 
Q. Let me have them—the ones that went in 
evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: What exhibit number? 
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Q. Of course, you had, Mr. Towell, implicit faith 
in the honesty of Stern & Company right from the 
start and throughout? A. Yes. 
Q. You did not suspect that they were going to 
manipulate anything? A. No, I did not. 
Q. Either at the beginning of the year, the middle 
of the year, or at the end of the year? A. At no 
time. 
Q. At no time? A. No. 
Q. Of course, if there were to be any manipula-
tions of any kind, they would mostly center around 
the end of the year? That has been your experi-
ence, has it not? A. I would not say that. 
Q. Well, you had no suspicions about manipula-
tions at the end of the year? A. No. 
Q. Of either merchandise or cash or anything 
else? A. Not of anything. 
Q. I am going to read you something, and I want 
you to tell the jury whether you recall who testified 
to it, Mr. Towell. 
Mr. Marshall: What page? 
Q. Page 922 (reading) : "In order to establish 
the regularity of their manner of keeping track of 
their bank accounts and their cash transactions, it 
is necessary and it is usually done, and I did it in 
this case—examine a number of recent deposits, 
particularly at the close of the year, to see that 
their money at the end of the year had not been 
in any way manipulated." Who testified to that? 
A. I did. I did. 
Q. Were you looking for any manipulations 
there? A. No. 
Q. Did not you say that you were examining to 
see that it had not been manipulated? A. I was 
not looking for that. I was carrying out the usual 
duties of the auditor. 
1934 
1935 
1936 
646 
Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Cross. 
Q. Did not you testify, if I remember right, that 
you were examining to see whether there had been 
manipulations? 
Mr. Marshall: I appeal to your Honor 
and Mr. Podell. There is no necessity for 
him to roar. There are none of us deaf. He 
can do it in a quiet manner. 
The Court: He can emphasize it if he 
likes. 
A. I testified as you have read. 
Q. And you were not looking for any manipu-
lations? A. No, not particularly. That is the 
language that I would use. 
Q. Were you looking for them generally, not 
particularly? Were you looking for them gen-
erally? A. I always have that in mind. 
Q, Looking for manipulations? A. Always. 
Q. Manipulations of cash? A. Anything; every-
thing. 
Q. In this instance you were talking about 
manipulations of cash particularly at the close of 
the year? A. Yes, 
Q. Why particularly at the close of the year? 
A. Because the cash manipulations during the year 
would not interest me when I was preparing that 
balance sheet at the end of the year. 
Q. Do you mean that if anybody had purloined 
and manipulated all sorts of cash transactions in 
the middle of the year you would not be interested 
in that? A. I was not making a detailed audit. I 
was preparing a balance sheet of December 31 and 
determining the cash on hand. 
Q. Were you examining the books for the year 
1923? A. We describe it as such. 
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Q. Not what you describe. I asked you whether 
you were examining the books for the year 1923. 
A. Yes. 
Q, Would not that involve any cash manipula-
tions in the middle of the year? A. If it affected 
the balance sheet, 
Q. Would not an examination of the books for 
the year 1923 involve cash manipulations in the 
middle of the year 1923? A. If there were cash 
manipulations, yes. 
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, were you examining 
the books for the year 1923? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you examine the books for the year 1923? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then you were not merely concerned with the 
condition as at the end of the year, were you? A. 
Absolutely, I was. 
Q. Not alone that, were you? A. Not alone, but 
for the final point alone 
Mr. Marshall: Let him finish, please, Mr. 
Podell. 
Q. Not alone the condition at the end of the year, 
but what else? A. In order to determine the posi-
tion at the end of the year, I used some or all of 
the period during the year. No result follows from 
the use of the records during the year. The only 
use is of the point of time, the end of the year, 
December 31. 
Mr. Podell: I move to strike that answer 
out as not responsive, as purely gratuitious, 
and not called for by my question. 
The Court: I allow it. 
Mr. Podell: And I except. Will you be 
good enough to repeat my question? I in-
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sist, your Honor, upon an answer to my 
question. 
(Record repeated as recorded.) 
Q. Were you interested only in the condition at 
the end of the year? A. No. 
Q. What else were you interested in? A. I was 
interested in anything that would give me a better 
picture of that position at the end of the year. 
Q. Did you make an examination of the books 
and records for the entire year 1923? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being 
improper and misleading. This certificate 
does not show that we did it for the entire 
year. The word "entire" is not used. 
The Court: I allow it. 
A. No. 
Q. Did you state in your certificate that you had 
examined the books for the year 1923? A. I could 
not answer that yes or no without qualification. 
Q. You cannot answer that yes or no. Did you 
state in your certificate—I read from the begin-
ning: "We have examined the accounts of Fred 
Stern & Company, Inc., for the year ended Decem-
ber 31, 1923." 
Mr. Marshall: The word "entire" is not 
in there, is it? 
Mr. Podell: May I put my question, your 
Honor, without interruption from counsel? 
The Court: Yes, you may. 
Q. What is your answer? A. That is in the cer-
tificate. 
Q. Now, when you made that statement did you 
mean that some of the books for that or some parts 
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of the year had not been examined by you? A. That 
is generally understood. 
Q. That is generally understood? A. Yes. 
Q. That when you say that you have examined 
the books for the year 1923, for the year ended 1923, 
that in truth you have not examined all the books 
for that year. Is that what you want this jury 
to understand? A. Substantially so. 
Q. Substantially what I say. You want the jury 
to understand that? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make any qualifications of that char-
acter in this statement? A. That is understood. 
Q. Without any qualifications? A. I think so. 
Q. Then when you have examined them for the 
year 1923, you have not really examined them all 
for the year 1923? A. Not at all, not at all. 
Mr. Podell: We will let that stand for 
the present. 
Q. Now, then, we were interested in your search-
ing for manipulations. How could cash be manipu-
lated, particularly at the close of the year? A. They 
could have received cash in the month of January 
and recorded it as being on hand at the end of 
December. 
Q. That would have been deliberately dishonest, 
would it not? A. It would be a deliberate manipu-
lation. 
Q. Would it have been deliberately dishonest? 
A. I cannot say. 
Q. You do not consider it dishonest when a per-
son receives cash in January and records it as hav-
ing been received in December preceding—you do 
not consider that a dishonest act? A. I have seen 
it done by the best companies. 
Q. What? A. I have seen it done by the best 
companies, when I did not consider it dishonest. 
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Q. You overlooked that sort of thing. You did 
not regard it as an indication of dishonesty when 
that happens? A. I do not overlook anything. If 
it came to my attention, I would decide for myself 
whether there was dishonesty or whether there was 
not. 
Q. But, on the pure facts, where a man deliber-
ately manipulates—you said it was deliberate 
manipulation—deliberately manipulates, when he 
receives cash which he received in January but 
claims to have received it in December in making 
up his final statement. Now, knowing all those 
facts, would you consider that that is a dishonest 
act? A. If he had no reason at all other than the 
manipulation, I would say it is dishonest. 
Q. It is dishonest? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, of course, whether he receives it in cash 
or whether he receives it in merchandise would not 
make much difference; it would be just as dishonest, 
would it not? A. It is about the same thing. 
Q. Now, of course, a thing like that might well 
happen by mistake, might it not? A. It could hap-
pen by mistake. 
Q. And if it happens once or twice you might 
consider that a mistake, an error? A. Not from 
that point of view alone. If it merely happened 
once or twice, that would have nothing to do with 
it. If it happened once, it might still not be an 
error, but a deliberate misstatement. 
Q. I see. Supposing you saw that very thing 
happening, not once, but ten times in ten separate 
instances, would not that be pretty conclusive evi-
dence to you that the man was manipulating de-
liberately? A. It all depends who is doing the 
work. 
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Mr. Marshall: I cannot hear that. 
The Witness: It all depends who is doing 
the work. 
Q. And what is your answer to my question, that 
you would not or that you would consider it de-
liberate manipulation? A. I cannot answer yes or 
no to it. 
Q. Do you know what I am driving at, Mr. 
Towell? A. I do. I know your question, that is. 
Q. And you do not know what reference my ques-
tion has to this case? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being 
immaterial. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: I except. 
Q. Now, assuming that they received cash in 
January and show it on hand as having been on 
hand in December, but show absolutely no credit 
in December to the person from whom that cash 
was received, and show it not once, but several 
times, would you infer that that is a dishonest 
manipulation? A. It would sound so to me from 
your description. 
Q. Now, you were given a certain inventory sheet, 
were you not, when you came to make your audit 
of the books of Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you turn to that, please? What was the 
amount of the inventory that was told to you by 
that sheet that was given to you? A. There are 
two sheets. The total amount of the two sheets 
as it was handed to me by Fred Stern & Company 
was $347,219.08, 
Q. Now, then, you made a pretty close examina-
tion of that, didn't you? A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, what did you find with regard to an 
item No. 5 on your work sheet, aggregating the 
sum of $8,426.30? 
Mr. Marshall: I think you are referring 
to a different sheet, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: He knows what I am refer-
ring to. 
A. I see no such item here. 
Q. Look at your journal sheets, your work sheets; 
look at page 161, where the items relating to your 
inventory are very carefully detailed by yourself. 
First you included that item as part of the inven-
tory? A. Did you refer to the figure of $8,426.30? 
Q. Yes. A. Or $8,513.75? 
Q. No, $8,426.30—both items. They are both in 
the same? A. You asked me if they were in the 
inventory? 
Q. What was it that was in the inventory, Mr. 
Towell? A. Part of the figure of $8,513.75 is in 
the inventory. 
Q. How much? A. $87.45. 
Q. What about the balance? A. That is not in 
the inventory. 
Q. Well, now, will you explain what happened 
there to that item? What did you do? What did 
you find concerning $8,513.75? A. On a letter 
received from J. B. Moores & Company, they 
showed that as of December 31, 1923, there was an 
acceptance due to them, or acceptances due to them. 
I do not know which that is, one or the other, of 
$8,513.75. I traced the rubber that was received 
for that acceptance into the lot record, and I traced 
the sale of that same rubber into the accounts 
receivable. 
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Q. What did you find, in plain English, had been 
done with respect to this item on the records of 
Fred Stern & Company? You can explain it to us. 
A. It had not been entered. 
Q. Had not what? A. It had not been entered. 
Q. What does that mean? A. It meant that I 
had to correct it. 
Q. Well, was it that it had not been entered, or 
that it had been omitted from the statement of 
accounts and inventory furnished to you? A. It 
had been omitted on all sides. 
Q. And what happened in connection with it? 
A. I do not recall whether anything happened. 
Q. Did you take it off—now, we will just let 
that item rest for a moment, Mr. Towell, and see 
if we cannot refresh your recollection. What is 
your explanation of that? A. My reference in the 
journal entry shows me that the rubber concerned 
with this $8,513.75 was recorded on Fred Stern's 
books in the lot record, because I have a folio of 
the lot record here and the number of the lot. I 
have no explanation to-day as to why it was that 
it had not been entered or not been recorded as 
a liability as of December 31, 1923. Evidently it 
had been entered on the books in some way, but 
I cannot recall now what it was and what the full 
explanation under it was. 
Q. It should have been entered as a liability to 
show a correct statement, but somehow or other, 
without inability on your part to explain it, it had 
been omitted? A. Not without any inability on my 
part to explain it. I did have an explanation. 
Q. How? A. In January and February of 1924. 
Q. Now, at this moment, did not you say just a 
moment ago that you did not know why it had 
been entered into some lot record? A. I say I do 
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not recall now why it was that it was in the lot 
record and that I had to make an adjustment. 
Those journal entries show that I made the ad-
justment. 
Q. Now, we will let that rest for a moment, if 
you will just keep it in mind. 
Mr. Marshall: I think he ought to go 
right through and finish it now. 
Q. I will ask you to look at the item journal 
entry No. 6, with regard to nineteen "thousand dol-
lars odd, and tell us what you found about that with 
relation to your inventory, and if you found any 
manipulation, tell us what was the manipulation. 
A. That $19,000 that you refer to was entered in 
the inventory twice. It is a clerk's error, a clerk 
of minor importance in Fred Stern's office, whose 
work should have been checked. 
Q. An error in favor of whom? A. It was not 
in favor of anybody. It did not go that far. 
Q. Whom did it favor? A. It did not favor any-
body. 
Q. Prior to your auditing it and adjusting it, 
whom did it favor? Did it boost the inventory by 
$19,000? A. Oh, yes. 
Q. No doubt about that in your mind? A. No 
doubt about it at all. 
Q. Was it one item, or in twice? A. Four items 
were put in the rubber afloat sheet and also put 
in the rubber on hand, at different prices. 
Q. Now, give us those four items. A. What detail 
do you want? 
Q. Just what those respective four items were. 
A. The four shipments, comprising 133 cases—66 
cases, 125 cases, and 50 cases, of rubber—the total 
value of which in sterling was £4,381-7-9. 
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Q. Tell me, Mr. Towell, in this matter of inven-
tory, when had all those four shipments been 
received? A. I could not tell you from my papers. 
Q. Did you find that in the books of account 
those items had been entered twice? A. I assume 
that I did, because I made an adjustment. 
Q. I did not ask you anything about any adjust-
ment. I asked you simply whether you found that 
those items in the books had been entered twice. 
A. I assume that I did. 
Q. You assume that you did? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, then, take your item of No. 8— four-
teen thousand eight hundred odd. What can you 
tell us happened in that connection with relation 
to your inventory? Also tell us whether there was 
any sign, to your mind, of any manipulation, and 
what it was. A. That was the lot that I discovered 
had been sold to the Boston Woven Hose & Rubber 
Company in December, 1923, but a clerk in Stern's 
office had recorded it as being on hand and in the 
inventory. I took it out. 
Q. In other words, when it had been sold it had 
been set up as an account receivable, had it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when they made up their inventory they 
had included it as merchandise in their possession? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Of course, you took it for granted that it was 
purely a mistake? A. I did not take anything for 
granted. 
Q. You did not take anything for granted? A. 
No. 
Q. Did you consider at all whether that had been 
done by way of deliberate manipulation to boost the 
inventory? A. Yes. 
Q. You did consider that? A. Yes. 
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Q. The effect of it would have been, if you had 
not taken that item out, that it would have boosted 
that inventory by $14,000, would it not? A. Yes. 
Q. Now will you be good enough to turn to the 
item No. 9, for $18,728, and tell us what did you 
find about that in Stern's statement of inventory? 
A. That is made up of several items. In sterling 
I found that £96-10-0 worth of rubber had been 
sold in December and recorded as part of this 
inventory. 
Q. Recorded in two ways, as accounts receivable 
and also as merchandise in hand. You found that 
to be the fact, didn't you? A. Yes. 
Q. How many items are there comprised in this 
$18,728? A. Three. 
Q. Was the manipulation the same in each in-
stance? A. There was no manipulation. 
Q. Was the condition the same in each instance? 
A. No. 
Q. Did not you have it noted that as to the three 
instances, they presented instances where merchan-
dise had been practically twice included, in that it 
was included as an account receivable, and sec-
ondly, as merchandise on hand; didn't you find 
that? A. I found that in one place. 
Q. Was not your note with regard to that "to 
eliminate the following lots from inventory, same 
having been sold in December, 1923"? Is not that 
your own note? A. That is part of my note. 
Q. Have you got something else there? A. I 
have not something else here, but it was always 
here. 
Q. Tell us about the second and third item con-
tained in that $18,000. 
Mr. Marshall: Let him read the whole 
thing as long as counsel has asked him about 
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it. I think we are entitled to have the whole 
thing. 
Mr. Podell: If Mr. Marshall will write 
out the questions I should ask, I will follow 
that faithfully. That is what I am here for— 
just to ask questions that Mr. Marshall 
wants and none others. 
Mr. Marshall: I am very sorry, I have a 
right to object. 
Mr. Podell: I put my question. 
Mr. Marshall: I have a right to ask that 
we get the full statement, and Mr. Podell 
was trying to keep him off from giving the 
full statement. 
The Court: You may make a memoran-
dum accordingly, Mr. Marshall, and have 
the question. 
Mr. Marshall: I except. 
Mr. Podell: I will reframe that. 
Q. Did you want to answer the last question? 
A. Yes, I will answer it. The second and third 
items in that entry are adjustments to reduce the 
value at which rubber was stated in the inventory. 
It was not rubber that had been sold. It was rub-
ber that had not been set down at the correct value. 
Why that was, I do not know. 
Q. You mean that they had under-estimated the 
value? A. Over-estimated it; overstated the value 
of the rubber. 
Q. Now, just let us see, and follow these items. 
Lot No. 7,519— A. Yes. 
Q. They had sold? A. Yes. 
Q. And they included it both as account receiv-
able and as merchandise on hand? A. Yes. 
Q. That amounted to how much? A. £96-10. 
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Q, That is about $500 in round figures? A. Yes. 
Q. And the other small item is $25 item of over-
statement of valuation? A. Right. 
Q. Then the next lot they overstated how much? 
A. £4209-8-0. 
Q. Is that pounds or dollars? A. That is pounds. 
Q. £4,290 would make about $20,000, would it 
not? A. Approximately, sterling. 
Q. Didn't it strike you as being rather a sizable 
over-statement? A. Yes, it did. 
Q. It did not arouse your suspicion that such an 
over-statement might have been made deliberately? 
A. No. 
Q. You had no suspicions about any of these 
items that we have just been talking about? A. 
No. 
Q. None of them aroused your suspicion that 
they were all in favor of Stern? A. No. 
Q. And boosting his inventory, is that right? A. 
Yes, they did. 
Q. Do you happen to know how much of the 
purchase that was upon which there was an over-
statement of $20,000 of valuation? A. There were 
18,533 pounds of rubber, so far as my record shows. 
Q. Do you happen to know the purchase price? 
A. No. I know the total. The total price should 
be £1139. 
Q. Now, then, these items $19,000 and $14,000 
and $18,000 which you found they had increased 
their inventory and you had to reduce them in the 
way that you have indicated, those are the smaller 
items, are they not, in which they did that? A. 
They are not small in individual amount. They 
are not the greater part of the adjustments taken 
together, though. 
Q. Was there $178,000 worth in addition to those 
that I have spoken of? A. Yes. 
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Q. Which boosted the inventory? A. $178,000 
would reduce the inventory, according to my 
papers. 
Q. No. What I am talking about is that inven-
tory that they gave you in addition to those that 
they have mentioned they had increased. A. They 
did not increase it. They gave it to me. They gave 
me the inventory. 
Q. Yes. Don't you consider when a man enters 
an item of $10,000 both as an account receivable 
and considers that the very same merchandise is on 
his hands in inventory for that amount, that he is 
increasing his inventory by $10,000? Don't you 
consider that? A. Yes, as a general proposition. 
Q. Well, as a specific proposition. Now, the 
proposition to guide— A. Not in this case. 
Q. Because you reduced it? A. Because I know 
the circumstances under which these original sheets 
were made up. 
Q. I see. We will come to those circumstances 
in a minute, Mr. Towell. First let us get clear 
about this $178,000. Tell the jury what happened 
in that connection and how many items were there? 
A. I have already described, I believe, three or four 
journal entries at adjustments of the inventory. In 
1924, when I made the examination, I decided at 
that time to check every item in the inventory, and 
therefore, in the next 
Q. Will you answer my question? 
Mr. Marshall: I think he has. 
The Court: That is going beyond the 
limits of counsel's questions. Let us get an 
answer right directly to that question. 
Q. What did you find with regard to those items 
aggregating $178,000 that you have been talking 
of? 
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Mr. Marshall: Now he is trying to tell 
your Honor I insist that he has to have some 
leeway in describing them. 
The Court: No, describe them. 
Mr. Podell: I reframe it and will make 
my question a little more specific. 
Q. Have you a memorandum which you made 
on your own working sheets at that time with that 
figure No. 10 to eliminate 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his reading what 
that memorandum is. He should either ask 
him what memorandum he made, or the 
memorandum is in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: This is cross-examination. 
The Court: Unless you read it in full. 
Mr. Podell: Certainly. Why should your 
Honor assume I would not? 
Mr. Marshall: No. 9, you did not read 
before. 
The Court: There might be some par-
ticular part which would require the whole 
thing to be re-read. 
Mr. Podell: I will read the whole, your 
Honor. 
The Court: That is what I mean, and not 
part. 
Mr. Podell: I do not know why counsel 
is interrupting in the middle of a question. 
Mr. Marshall: I guess I learned the bad 
habit from you. 
Mr. Podell: Try and learn good habits 
and don't take up the bad ones I have. 
Q. No. 10 "to eliminate items taken into inven-
tory which were not received till January and 
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drafts of which are not reported by banks as hav-
ing been accepted in December, 1923, and to set 
up as liability, other items in the inventory which 
were not put through books until January, the 
drafts for which were accepted by Huth & Company 
in December." And then you have a lot of figures 
after that, have you not? A. Yes. 
Q. That is in your own handwriting, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does that first part mean—"to elimi-
nate items taken into inventory which were not 
received until January"? A. It means that they 
were in the inventory sheets that I had received 
and they should not have been. 
Q. And they should not have been because your 
inventory they knew perfectly well was to be of 
December 31, 1923, was it not? A. Yes. 
Q. And that they had no right to include mer-
chandise that was not received until January? A. 
That is right. 
Q. Had that merchandise been entered up as 
an account payable to anybody? A. I think not, 
Q. Did not that convince you that it was a de-
liberate manipulation? A. No. 
Q. Are you convinced now at this moment that 
it was a deliberate manipulation? A. I am not. 
Mr. Marshall: I object. That is an im-
pression; what his personal conviction may 
be is immaterial. 
The Court: I will let the answer stand, 
Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Neither that item nor all of those other items 
that we have been talking about even as much as 
aroused suspicion in your mind? A. No. 
Q. Let us see. We will go on with the rest of 
your note, "Drafts for which are not reported by 
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banks as having been accepted in December, 1923." 
That meant that they had set up no liability or 
there had been created no liability for that mer-
chandise prior to the date of your inventory? A. 
Yes. 
Q, That is what it meant? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, all that I have read relates to the $178,-
000 that I have spoken about. The rest of your 
memorandum that I have read relates to other 
items, does it not? A. Yes, 
Q. How many items were in that $178,000, I 
want you to tell the jury whether it was just one 
item or many items in which that identical thing 
was done—embraced in that $178,000? A. There 
were fifteen items. 
Q. Now, just what were those fifteen items? Did 
it give the names of fifteen different people from 
whom that merchandise had been received? A. I 
cannot tell that from this entry. I may be able 
to find it in the papers. 
Q. The only question in your mind with regard 
to that would be possibly two or three shipments 
came from the same source, possibly one of those 
shipments came from the same source; otherwise 
you would say that they were separate transac-
tions? A. Oh, yes. 
Q. These fifteen items that you speak of were 
fifteen separate transactions? A. Yes. 
Q. It was you that grouped them into one and 
totalled them to be $178,000? A. Yes, I did the 
grouping. 
Q. But so far as the books and the business trans-
actions of Stern & Company, Stern did just that 
thing in the course of each of fifteen separate in-
stances, didn't he? A. Yes. 
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Q. And each of those fifteen instances had the 
effect of increasing his inventory by just that 
amount? A. Yes. 
Q. It was not one mistake, if it was a mistake at 
all, now, was it? A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Just one mistake? A. Yes. 
Q. For all of those fifteen items? A. Yes. 
Q. And even though it involved fifteen separate 
transactions? A. Yes, it was one grand mistake. 
Q. When you say it was one mistake, do you 
mean that it was a mistake that was made under 
exactly the same way in all instances? A. Yes. 
Q. Nothing there that I have spoken of aroused 
your suspicion of any possible manipulation or 
wrongdoing? A. Nothing that you have spoken of. 
Q. Nothing at all. And that nothing you have 
spoken to me so far about these items totalled, 
aroused your suspicion as to the honesty of these 
people? A. No. The things that I knew of allayed 
any suspicion. 
The Court : We will take five minutes' 
adjournment. 
(After a short recess.) 
Q. Now, that was not the only way that the in-
ventory was increased by them, was it? 
Mr. Marshall: What? 
Q. The method that you have described with 
regard to this $178,000 item? A. (No reply.) 
Q. Now, let us take the rest of journal entry No. 
10. You have written "to set up as liability other 
items in the inventory which were not put through 
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books until January, but drafts for which were 
accepted by Huth & Company in December"? A. 
Yes. 
Q. That related to something other than the 
1178,000? A. Yes. 
Q. How much did that aggregate? A. It aggre-
gated $47,361.94. 
Q. How many items? A. Five items, part of 
the fifteen already mentioned. 
Q. And as to those five items, what did you find 
had been done? A. I found that the drafts which 
had been accepted by Huth & Company were not 
recorded in the books in December, but in Jan-
uary. 
Q. Did you not gather from that that there was 
a manipulation both ways, that is to say, that goods 
which had been received in January had been sub-
stantially entered as having been received in De-
cember, and liabilities that were due in December 
had been entered as due in January? A. No, that is 
not so. 
Q. Well, state it in your own way. A. The lia-
bilities were not due in December. They should 
have been recorded in December. They were due 
at some subsequent time. 
Q. Those which should have been recorded in 
December were recorded in January? A. Yes. And 
as to whether the rubber represented in those lia-
bilities was received in December, I cannot say. 
It may have been afloat. 
Q. It should have been recorded in December? 
A. Yes, it should have been recorded in Decem-
ber. 
Q. It should have been recorded rather in Jan-
uary—was recorded as an asset in December? A. 
No. The draft was recorded in January and should 
have been recorded in December. 
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Q. You are talking now about the draft which 
is a liability? A. Yes. 
Q. What I am talking about now is this: That 
they increased this inventory by adding to assets— 
Mr. Marshall: That is not a question. 
That is a statement, 
Mr. Podell: This is my question: 
Q. Did they increase their inventory by adding 
to the assets and by reducing their liabilities? A. 
No, that is not so. 
Q. Now, let us see if it is not so. You will admit 
that the $178,000 added to the assets—were they 
not? A. Yes, 
Q. Made their assets look bigger than they really 
were? A. Yes. 
Q. And will you admit the $74,000 reduced their 
liabilities? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the fact that in both directions the ef-
fect of what they did was to increase their inven-
tory, to increase their assets, that did not arouse 
any suspicion in your mind, either? A. No. 
Q. Tell me what about the item of $6,439.64 that 
you had made a note of, item No. 11—no, I beg 
your pardon—item No. 29. Have you a note to this 
effect under the head of 
Mr. Marshall: I submit the witness 
should be given a chance to answer the ques-
tion that is standing. 
Mr. Podell: I am continuing my question. 
Mr. Marshall: Then, I ask that the ques-
tion be withdrawn. 
Mr. Podell: No. It is part of the ques-
tion I have already put, 
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Q. Purchase inventory #18,006—what is that 
number? A. I think it is invoice. 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute, now. Your 
Honor sees, the question is now in an all 
mixed-up state. I think he ought to state 
his question anew and withdraw the previ-
ous question. 
The Court: I think it is clear enough. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like to hear the 
whole question read, then, your Honor. 
Q. Invoice 18006, sold in December, 1923, pur-
chase not charged to the rubber purchases until 
January, payment on proforma invoice of $6300 
was charged to accounts receivable until finally re-
ceived in January, purchase invoice No. 5245, H. 
Muchlestein & Co., Inc. Note this was charged to 
Mitsui & Company in December in error, trans-
ferred to Muchlestein in January. Now, will you 
explain that note that you have with regard to that 
item, just what its meaning is? 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, the 
record will show an unanswered question, 
and I think we ought to have the question 
that was unanswered stricken out. 
The Court: Yes, strike out the other ques-
tion and let us come to this question now, 
the explanation of that note. In other words, 
there were three or four 
Mr. Podell: All right, your Honor, if it 
will help to make it clearer, let us do it that 
way. 
Q. Will you explain the meaning? A. It means 
that some rubber that was sold in December, 1923, 
had not been charged to purchases until January. 
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* 
Q. Well, of course, if rubber 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Has he 
finished? 
Q. All right. Finish your explanation. A. Evi-
dently from the note, the rubber had been paid for 
on a proforma invoice in the amount of $6300, and 
for some reason the charge of the proforma invoice 
went to accounts receivable pending the receipt of 
a final invoice, which was received in January, 
1924. 
Q. Would you tell what that means in popular 
language, so that we will all be sure to understand 
it? Let me see if I cannot assist you to put it in 
plain language. Now, let us see if this is what 
happened: Merchandise had been purchased in 
December? A. Yes. 
Q. That, of course, created a liability to pay for 
that merchandise? A. Yes. 
Q. But that liability was not entered on their 
books in December? A. The payment of the lia-
bility was entered. 
Q. Wait a moment. Was the liability entered 
on the books as of December? A. It evidently was. 
Q. It was? A. From this note, it would appear 
so. 
Q. "Payment on proforma invoice of $6300 was 
charged to accounts receivable." Is not that what 
your note says? A. Yes. That is payment for the 
rubber was entered on their books. They had ac-
tually paid for it. They put it in the wrong place. 
They charged it to accounts receivable when they 
should have charged their rubber purchases. 
Q. Well, did the net effect of what they did 
increase their assets by $6400? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what did they do to charging to that 
accounts receivable; what do you mean by a pro-
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forma invoice? A. As far as my recollection goes, 
I think that when they purchased rubber, the 
vendor of the rubber, that is the person selling the 
rubber, sends them a proforma invoice, which is 
an invoice subject to correction as to weights, and 
follows it up later with a corrected invoice, giving 
the true weights after the rubber has been received 
and weighed. 
Q. And, of course, they can do that, there is 
nothing irregular about waiting for a final in-
voice? A. No, nothing at all. 
Q. Nothing irregular about charging up the en-
try when the final invoice comes? A. No. 
Q. Nothing? A. No. 
Q. But is it honest to include it as an asset with-
out entering up the liability? A. It is a mistake 
to do so. 
Q. It is either a mistake or it is dishonest? A. 
One or the other. 
Q. One or the other. Did you attach any sig-
nificance to the fact that it was charged to Mitsui 
& Company in December in error, and transferred 
to Muchelstein in January? A. No. 
Q. That would not tend to cover up the trans-
action at all, would it? A. I don't think so. 
Q. You do not think so? A. No. 
Q. Well, now, then, take the item No. 30 for 
$14,000. Have you a note with respect to that? 
"Purchases accounts receivable to adjust the fol-
lowing accounts for invoices (at cost) paid for in 
December and charged to accounts but invoices not 
credited to creditors' accounts. All this merchan-
dise was sold in December"; and then a series of 
figures? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you tell us in your own language what 
that meant? A. My understanding of it is that 
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Fred Stern & Company had purchased rubber and 
paid for it and charged the payments to the ac-
counts of the corporations they had purchased from, 
but had not charged the purchases and credited 
those accounts. That is, they carried on the books 
an account with these individuals when the account 
should have been cleared and charged to purchases. 
Q. Do you happen to know what really happened 
in the United Baltic transaction? A. No. 
Q. Have you heard it testified to here in court? 
A. I think I heard part of the testimony. 
Q. Did you hear it stated yesterday that verifi-
cation showed that United Baltic was a creditor 
of Stern in the sum of three hundred thousand odd 
dollars at the time when Stern claimed to be a 
creditor of the United Baltic for $113,000? A. 
Yes, I think I heard that, 
Q. Would you not say that the same manipula-
tion was evidenced by this very transaction? A. 
No, I would not. 
Q. Was it not a case where a vendor had sent 
merchandise, there was money due him, and it was 
not entered on the books as due him? A. Would 
you repeat that, please? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Q. Is not that what happened here? A. Not 
exactly that. 
Q. Did you not say that they had bought mer-
chandise, that the merchandise had been shipped, 
that they had received the merchandise, that they 
had even sold the merchandise and had created an 
account receivable out of the sale? A. Yes. 
Q. Is not that right? A. Yes. 
Q. And had not entered that they owed for the 
merchandise? A. They had paid for it and en-
tered it. 
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Q. Well, wherein was there any increase of as-
sets in such a transaction? A. Well, they should 
have recorded another entry, transferred that pay-
ment to the purchase account, made the payments 
and charged them to certain accounts, payments 
for the rubber, and in the ordinary course of 
events 
Q. What accounts did they charge them to? A. 
Mitsui & Company and Jaeger & Company and 
Desmond & Company. 
Q. Of whom had they bought the merchandise? 
A. From my journal entry, I understand those three 
people, those three firms. 
Q. If they bought the merchandise and paid for 
it and thereafter sold it and created an account 
receivable, there is nothing wrong in that, is there? 
A. No. 
Q. What is that you found you had to correct 
about this item? A. I just described it, that they 
paid for it and charged those accounts. That they 
should have set up an entry charging their pur-
chases and crediting those accounts; that is, trans-
ferring the payment from the account of Mitsui, 
Jaeger and Desmond to purchases. 
Q. In other words, they claimed they had a credit 
to that account ; that is to say they claimed they 
had certain moneys due from that account, but 
had failed to indicate the moneys that they owed 
on that account? A. That is the way it was. 
Q. Is not that what you understand to have 
happened in the case of the United Baltic account? 
A. From the testimony given here, yes. 
Q. Well, now, Mr. Towell, you told us that when 
they handed you that inventory statement, it 
showed an inventory of three hundred and forty-
seven odd thousand dollars? A. Yes. 
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Q. When you make all these deductions that we 
have been talking about, how much does it show 
that inventory to be? A. $131,423.81. 
Q. That is only a deduction with regard to actual 
inventory. As a matter of fact, even that $131,000 
is subject to certain deductions that you have indi-
cated to be made in other accounts, is it not? A. 
No. I believe the figure of $131,000 quoted you 
is a final inventory. 
Q. Let us see if we understand each other. What 
is the total of all the items where they had re-
ceived merchandise prior to the 1st of January and 
had not entered up liabilities therefor? A. I don't 
know that without making a calculation. 
Q. Will you look at tabulation No. 2 and see if 
that will help you to get the total? 
Mr. Marshall: Exhibit 80? 
Q. Plaintiff's Exhibit 80 (handing to witness). 
Now, you just take down those figures. I will ask 
you to— A. Do you want me to check this thing? 
Q. You have got all of these items, have you 
not? A. I am checking them off now. 
Q. See if we cannot get at it in a little quicker 
way, Mr. Towell. When you say that you reduced 
the inventory down to $131,000, does that include 
all of the reductions that you made as a result— 
all of the reductions in the assets of the concern 
that you made as a result of your adjustments of 
the inventory? Just answer that yes or no, if you 
understand my question? A. No. 
Q. It does not? A. No. 
Q. You had to make other reductions in the 
assets of the concern in your adjustments of that 
inventory? A. I believe so. 
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Q. Now, take off $131,000 from $347,000, and 
tell us what that figure is? I mean in round num-
bers. That would be about $215,000 or $216,000? 
A. About $216,000. 
Q. Now, then, what were the other reductions in 
assets of the concern which you had to make in 
your adjustment of the original inventory that they 
gave you, of $347,000; you increase the accounts 
payable by how much? A. I cannot tell that from 
my papers. 
Q. You gave us four items? A. I don't know 
whether they are all the items in these journal 
entries, if this is a summary that you handed to 
me, this Exhibit 80. 
Q. I have asked you about each one of those 
items, have I not, and you have testified about 
them? A. I didn't check this off. 
Q. No. The first item you spoke of was $8,513. 
Do you remember my questioning you about that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Fifty-four hundred odd dollars was the next 
one? A. The next is an item of $19,000. 
Q. That goes into the inventory reduction? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. You eliminate that. I am talking now about 
your increasing the accounts payable and in that 
way further reducing the assets of the concern? 
A. Further increasing the liabilities. 
Q. And further increasing the liabilities? A. 
Yes. 
Q. The next item was $5,473, was it not? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And there is an item of forty-seven thousand 
odd dollars? A. Yes. 
Q. I am giving round numbers? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the last item under that head of $6200? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, then, if you add these up, do you not 
find as a result of your examination of that inven-
tory, you not only reduce the inventory by about 
$215,000, but you add to and increase the accounts 
that were payable, that were due to other people, 
by about $67,000? A. Not as a result of examina-
tion of the inventory only, but in conjunction with 
the other examinations of other assets. That is 
true. 
Q. Well, now, wait a moment, Let us get that 
entirely clear. You were given a statement show-
ing an inventory of $347,000? A. Right. 
Q. You find in it first that merchandise was 
included which should not have been included? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. You find in it, second, that they had merchan-
dise for which they had not made an entry that 
they owed money? A. Yes. 
Q. Well, now, that did not involve reducing the 
inventory, did it? A. No. 
Q. Because the merchandise was properly there. 
In order to make a proper entry of that, you would 
have to increase the accounts payable? A. Right, 
Q. Is it not true that you had to in these in-
stances therefore increase the accounts payable by 
$67,000? A. Yes, that is true. 
Q. Now, then, in addition to that, you found 
that they had included accounts receivable, that is, 
money due them from other people which they 
should not have included? A. Yes. 
Q. And that aggregated how much? A. Using 
this summary, which I have not checked, $20,465. 
Q. Now, will you tell us, please, what those three 
totals aggregate in round numbers, the $215,000 
that you spoke of, the $67,000, that makes $280,000 
approximately, and $20,000? A. About $300,000. 
Q. About $300,000? A. Yes. 
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Q. And is it not true that you found from your 
examination that in connection with the inventory 
of $347,000, they had boosted their assets by $300,-
000? A. It is true that I had to make adjustments 
of that amount. 
Q. Well, that is not answering my question. My 
question is whether you did not find and make a 
record that in connection with the inventory that 
they gave you of $347,000, they had boosted their 
assets, their net worth by $300,000? A. Cannot my 
answer stand? 
Q. It is not answering my question, Mr. Towell. 
You said that you had to make adjustments. Ad-
justments you sometimes make by adding assets. 
In this case, you reduced assets. What I am asking 
you is a very simple question: Whether you did 
not find in connection with the inventory that they 
gave you, where they claimed an inventory of $347,-
000, that they had boosted the assets, the net worth 
of that concern, by $300,000? A. They had made 
mistakes to that amount. 
Q. Whether you call it a mistake or whether it 
was dishonest, had they boosted their assets by 
$300,000? A. I don't call it boosting their assets. 
Q. Had they increased their assets by $300,000? 
A. They had overstated them. 
Q. Overstated their assets by $300,000? A. Yes. 
Q, And that did not in anywise arouse your sus-
picion at all? A. No. May I amend that answer 
to say that they—the effect was an overstatement 
of assets of $300,000. In fact, it was partly an 
understatement of liabilities of $67,000. You see, 
we have added the three figures together. 
Q. I have added the three figures together? A. 
Yes. 
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Q. And by understating liabilities you know, as 
an accountant, that they overstate net assets? A. 
Net assets, yes. 
Q. If I make that net assets, will you admit that 
they had overstated their net assets through the 
medium of this inventory by $300,000? A. Not 
through the medium of the inventory, either. Re-
lating to the inventory. 
Q. In relation to this inventory? A. Yes, re-
lating to the inventory items. 
Q. Now, in your examination you made adjust-
ments, the effect of which adjustments was to re-
duce the net worth, the net assets by $300,000? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Now, you told us at the beginning of this ex-
amination that if a man enters up as cash received 
in December when as a matter of fact it was not 
received until January, that that would be at least 
a strong ground for suspicion that it was manipu-
lation of cash? A. I did not say that. 
Q. You did not say that? A. I feel quite sure 
that I did not. 
Q. Would you regard it as a manipulation of 
cash, if he does it, not in one instance, but in 
twenty-five instances? A. It would depend on the 
circumstances of the whole case. 
Q. The circumstances of the whole case? A. 
Yes, 
Q. What general conclusion would you, as an 
experienced accountant—I believe you stated that 
you took a prize, did you not, a gold medal prize? 
A. They awarded it to me, yes. 
Q. You received it? A. Yes, I received it. 
Q. So that you do not claim ignorance of these 
tilings, do you? A. I do not. 
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Q. And from all these documents and papers 
and work that you did, you claim that you made a 
very thorough examination, do you not? A. I think 
I made a sufficient examination. 
Q. I mean, you got a mass of figures there, have 
you not, that took days and days and days to work 
up, did you not? A. It took two weeks, yes. 
Q. What would you, as an accountant, say of 
any merchant who hands you an inventory that 
overstates the assets of that concern by $300,000, 
on an inventory of $347,000? A. I would say lie 
was very lax in his methods, if I knew nothing 
more about him than just the statement that you 
make. 
Q. That is what you would say, and that is all 
that you would say, very lax? A. Yes. If I knew 
nothing more about him. 
Q. Very lax in his methods? A. Yes, very lax. 
Q. In this statement that you furnished to the 
creditors and certified to, did you say anything 
about his being lax in his methods? A. No. 
Q. Well, is this the only instance, the inven-
tory, where you found irregularities, Mr. Towell? 
Mr. Marshall: He has not testified he 
found irregularities. 
Q. Do you not describe these as irregularities, 
Mr. Towell? A. I describe them as ordinary errors. 
Q. Ordinary errors? A. Yes. 
Q. Can you name a single other concern whose 
books you have audited where you found errors 
aggregating $300,000 in the overstatement of net 
worth in the inventory alone? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
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Q. Can you name a single one? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, I think 
it is improper. 
The Witness: I cannot name it, but I 
have—— 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. I think 
it is improper to ask an accountant to 
name 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: Does the accountant refuse 
to disclose the name? 
The Court: No. He wants to disclose it, 
but counsel objects to it. 
Mr. Podell: On the contrary, he said, 
your Honor, he cannot state the name. That 
was his answer. 
The Court: He said he cannot? 
Mr. Podell: He cannot. 
The Court: Cannot or will not? 
The Witness : Will not. 
Mr. Podell: He cannot. What is his an-
swer? Will you read his answer? 
The Court: He said he will not. I asked 
him what he meant by cannot, whether it 
was cannot or will not, and I think he said 
will not. Do I understand right, Mr. 
Towell? 
The Witness: Yes. I mean that I cannot 
because I am bound by 
Q. Is that what you mean to say now, that you 
know the name of someone, but you do not want to 
name them? A. Yes. 
Q. I see. 
Mr. Marshall: I think, your Honor 
2030 
2031 
678 
Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Cross. 
Mr. Podell: Now, may I have his previous 
answer read? 
(Record repeated.) 
Q. Now, your answer is that you had. Was it 
quite a usual occurrence with a concern whose net 
worth is about a million dollars, that in an inven-
tory alone it should overstate its assets by one-
third of its net worth? A. No, I wouldn't say that 
was usual. 
Q. At least, that was unusual to you, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you familiar with the principle of ac-
counting that where you find unusual circum-
stances that it is your duty to be exceedingly cau-
tious and make a very close examination? A. Yes, 
sir. 
Q. Tell me, did Mr. Stern ever tell you that he 
did not want you to communicate with his debtors 
to find out if they owed him? A. No. 
Q. Did he ever ask you not to communicate with 
them? A. No. 
Q. Did you communicate with them? A. No. 
Q. In the inventory, the inventory is not the 
only item in which you found these errors, as you 
call them instead of irregularities? 
The Court: Cannot we save time if you 
specifically refer to them, Mr. Podell? 
Mr. Podell: I am going into a new item, 
your Honor, and I thought since we are close 
to recess, we might take the adjournment, 
unless we can go on for ten or fifteen min-
utes. It does not make any difference to me 
at all. We are going on another item. 
The Court: We might as well go on. 
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Mr. Podell: I understood your Honor's 
question and tried to answer it by reframing 
the question. 
Q. Did you understand my question, sir? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Where else did you find these errors, if you 
please? A. I would have to refresh myself by look-
ing through these corrections I made. 
Q. I cannot help you out on that, so we will get 
along. You have stated that you first looked at 
the general ledger in your audit? A. Yes. 
Q. And that you examined all of the accounts 
contained in the general ledger? A. Yes. 
Q. Any kind of an audit would have required 
that, would it not? A. Yes. You would have to 
see every account. 
Q. May I interrupt here, just divert your mind 
a moment, to ask you one more question about in-
ventory. This inventory business that we have been 
talking about was all in your knowledge before 
that statement was certified? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, come on along to this ledger. Did you 
look at the rubber sales account? A. I don't re-
call it. 
Q. Did not you just tell us you examined every 
account in the general ledger? A. Yes, I saw every 
account. I don't recall specifically that I looked 
at the rubber sales account. 
Q. Did you not just tell us—please answer that 
question—that you examined every account in the 
general ledger? A. Yes. 
Q. Is there any particular reason why you should 
want this jury to think that you did not look at 
the rubber sales account? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think he even 
made the suggestion, your Honor. 
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Q. Can you state, please, whether you did or did 
not examine the rubber sales account? A. I did 
not make an examination of the sales account. I 
saw the account. 
Q. You have told this jury that in a number of 
instances you went to invoices and examined in-
voices, did you not? A. Yes, that is true. 
Q. That when you examined the accounts pay-
able, you looked at the invoices and checked them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And made a detailed examination? A. No. 
Q. Of the invoices? A. No. 
Q. Is the examination of invoices in the ordinary 
course of an examination, or is that a detailed ex-
amination? A. It comes in the ordinary course of 
examination, but it is not a detailed examination. 
Q. In the ordinary course of your examination 
of the rubber sales account, did you look at the 
invoices? A. I don't recall any particular detailed 
examination on the rubber sales account. 
Q. Did I ask you anything about a detailed ex-
amination? Did you not just tell this jury that 
looking at invoices was not a detailed examina-
tion, but that it was an ordinary examination? Did 
you not just say that? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I ask you whether—without any de-
tailed examination in the ordinary examination of 
that rubber sales account, did you look at invoices? 
A. No, I think not. 
Q. Did you examine the account as it appears 
in the ledger? 
Mr. Marshall: That is a double question, 
your Honor, as it appears in the ledger. 
Mr. Podell : In the general ledger. 
The Court: In the general ledger. He 
specifies it. 
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Q. I don't recall it. 
Mr. Marshall: As it appeared. I am ob-
jecting to the word "appears," as it appears. 
The Court: Yes, did you examine the 
account as it appears in the ledger? 
Mr. Podell: That is my question, in the 
general ledger. 
Mr. Marshall: That is immaterial. I 
move to strike it out. 
The Court: I do not think that is a proper 
question, as it appears in the ledger. 
Mr. Podell: In the general ledger. 
The Court: Do you mean by that, did he 
make a detailed account of that particular 
item as it appeared in the ledger? Because 
there are two questions there, one of the 
general examination and one of a detailed 
examination made. 
Mr. Marshall: There is also the question 
of 
Mr. Podell: I fail to understand, your 
Honor, the necessity of this explanation to 
the witness, and I fail to understand coun-
sel's objection. There is an account in the 
general ledger which is headed "rubber 
sales." 
The Court: Right. 
Mr. Podell: And all I am asking him— 
he has stated here in the presence of Court 
and jury that he has examined every account 
in this ledger, and in connection with that 
I am asking him whether he looked at this 
account, did he examine it, that is all. 
Mr. Marshall: I am further objecting, 
your Honor, to any question of an account 
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as it appears now rather than as it appeared 
at that time. 
Mr. Podell: I submit, your Honor, this is 
nothing but an effort to post this witness in 
advance of what he is going to be questioned 
about on cross-examination. 
Mr. Marshall: I submit it is not, and I 
submit it is very curious whenever Mr. 
Podell feels nipped, he makes statements 
like that, and I object to it. 
The Court: You mean on your general 
objection? Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Have we a question here 
now? 
The Court: Yes, we have a question, the 
question originally put. 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that not only 
on that ground but as immaterial whether 
he examined it as it appears. The question 
is as it appeared at that time. That does 
not have relation to this particular book 
now, but a question of the materiality of 
that question. He was not supposed to ex-
amine-
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: I will change "appears" to 
"appeared." 
The Court: All right, sir; that is quite 
different. 
Q. Now, will you answer that question, Mr. 
Towell—did you examine that rubber sales ac-
count? Is there anything about that question that 
I am asking you now, Mr. Towell, that you do not 
understand? 
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Mr. Marshall: I again object, your Honor. 
The Court : Objection sustained. 
The Witness: Yes, I did. 
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit the 
answer to stand, because I understand the 
witness must have understood the question 
as I put it. 
The Court: Go ahead. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q, You look at that account, rubber sales ac-
count, and see if you can tell 
Mr. Podell: I am going to cover what is 
in your Honor's mind. I think I know what 
it is. 
Q. You tell the jury whether there is any dif-
ference in that account as it appears now and as 
you saw it when you looked at it? A. I cannot tell 
you now that I ever saw it. 
Q. You cannot say that you ever saw it? A. 
Not this account, 
Q. Is your handwriting on it, is Siess' hand-
writing on it? A. I don't know. 
Q. That is one of the accounts in the general 
ledger, is it not? A. If this is the general ledger, 
yes. 
Q. Can you not tell us whether this is the gen-
eral ledger ? A. No. 
Q. Did you not tell Mr. Marshall that that was 
the general ledger that you looked at? A. I did 
not. 
Q. Will you examine the book now and tell us 
whether it is the general ledger that you looked 
at? A. Do you want me to make another exami-
nation? 
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Q. Yes. Look it over and compare it with any 
work sheet or any paper that you have there on 
which figures were taken from the general ledger. 
Tell us whether that is the general ledger that you 
took those figures from. Perhaps you had better 
do that at lunch time, but before we adjourn, Mr. 
Towell 
Mr. Podell: Perhaps this may be a good 
time to adjourn, your Honor. 
Q. You know that that rubber sales account con-
tains $706,000 worth of fictitious accounts, do you 
not? You know that now? A. I have heard testi-
mony to that effect. 
Q. That is the only way you know it, you have 
heard testimony? A. That is the only way I know. 
Q. That is in that rubber sales account? A. I 
don't know. 
Q. And you do not recognize it by looking at it, 
can you? A. No. 
Q. And you cannot even recognize the book by 
looking at it? A. No. 
Q. You want an opportunity to check up on the 
work sheets with the book, to make sure that is 
the book that you looked at, is that it? A. No, I 
don't want any opportunity. 
Q. Is there any way that you can make sure 
whether that is the book you looked at? A. No. 
Q. You mean to tell this jury that no matter 
how you compare the figures on the work sheets 
The Court: The book itself, not its en-
tries. The book itself you are referring to? 
Q. The book and the entries. No matter how 
you compare your work sheets with the entries 
contained in that book, you will be in no position 
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to tell this jury whether that is the general ledger 
you worked from, is that so? A. Yes. 
Q. You mean that? A. Yes, I mean that. 
Mr. Podell: All right. We will pursue 
it further. 
(Recess until 2 o'clock P. M.) 
AFTER RECESS. 
SYDNEY TOWELL resumed the stand. 
Cross-examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, have you made any further 
effort to compare or examine this general ledger 
so that you can tell us whether it is the book that 
you looked over? A. No, I have not. 
Q. You have not? A. No. 
Q. Is there some way in which you can help us 
out by examining it or examining your papers and 
tell us whether that is the book? A. I do not 
think so. 
Q. Do you know or do you not know; we cannot 
make any progress in examining you as to these 
contents until we have identified this book; do 
you know that? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being 
immaterial. 
The Court: Sustained. 
A . No. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, this is cross-
examination. 
The Court: I understand that, Mr. Podell. 
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Mr. Podell: I question the good faith of 
the statement of the witness. I want to 
show that that is the reason for taking that 
position. Have I not the right to show, if 
he knows, it is important to us to have him 
identify the book? 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: I except. 
Q. Will you turn to your work sheet, page 1 of 
your work sheet; is that your trial balance, is it? 
Mr. Marshall: Page 1 of your work sheet. 
Q. Yes, trial balance of the general ledger. A. 
Yes. 
Q. Whose handwriting is the first page? A. Re-
ferring to the classification sheet? 
Q. How? A. Referring to the classification 
sheet? 
Q. Yes, the classification sheet? A. That is my 
handwriting. 
Q. All of it? A. With one or two minor excep-
tions. 
Q. What are the exceptions? A. Under the col-
umn headed with a letter C. 
Q. Yes. A. There are two figures, $6,439, $14,-
025, and the total $2,224,872, they are not in my 
handwriting. 
Q. Where is that—up at the top? A. No. At 
the bottom of the column headed C. 
Q. Yes. I see. Those three items are in whose 
handwriting? A. Mr. Siess' handwriting, I believe. 
Q, Now, what about the next page? 
Mr. Podell (to the jury) : The witness 
has pointed out all these three items on this 
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page. $6,439.64, $14,025.39, and $2,224,-
872.63. 
Q. Everything else is in your handwriting? A. 
Yes, 
Q. But those three items are in Siess' handwrit-
ing? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I just want to show to the 
jury the three items that he says (to the 
jury). Everything else is in the witness' 
handwriting except those three items, these 
three (indicating). 
Q. How about the next page? A. The next three 
pages are all in Mr. Siess' handwriting, with the 
exception of the last four columns on the right, 
Q. The next three pages; those three pages are 
all in Mr. Siess' handwriting? A. Yes. 
Q. None of yours on it at all? A. With the ex-
ception of the last four columns on the right. 
Q. None of yours on this next page? 
The Court: Is there a page number to 
that? 
Q. You have three pages; these are the three 
pages; which of them is in your handwriting, all 
but the four columns on the last page; is that 
right, to the right? A. All but the four columns 
on each of the pages. 
Q. I see. On each of the three pages? A. Yes. 
Q. So that the first few columns are in the hand-
writing of Mr. Seiss? A. Yes. 
Q. And only four columns to the right of these 
pages are in your handwriting? A. Yes. 
Q. And that applies to the three pages? A. Yes. 
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Mr. Marshall: May we have the headings 
of those columns? 
Mr. Podell: The headings of these col-
umns I see them here, is, first, the name of 
the account, the balance after closing Jan-
uary 1, 1923, and then a lot of figures, "Bal-
ance before closing December 31, 1923," and 
to the right "Adjustments." "Debtor and 
credit balance after adjustment." And 
then the figures underneath these various 
columns. 
Mr. Marshall: May we identify the head-
ings of the columns to which the witness 
referred? 
Mr. Podell: Please let me go along with 
the examination. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please 
Mr. Podell: Identify what? It has been 
sufficiently identified. What is it you want 
me to identify now? 
Mr. Marshall: I think we ought to say 
what the heads of those are. 
Mr. Podell: I have answered. 
The Court: He has read them. 
Mr. Marshall: He has not read all the 
heads on the page. 
Q. The last four I have read are the columns un-
der which Mr. Towell wrote; is that right? A. 
Not the last. The last two that you read. I mean 
the two columns under each heading. 
Q. Now, just open that ledger. 
The Court: Where? 
Q. Open up to the rubber sales account. Do you 
get the first page of the rubber sales account? A. 
It is an account headed "Rubber Sales," yes. 
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Q. Will you tell us what part of that is in Mr. 
Seiss' handwriting? A. No, I cannot. 
Q. You did not have any difficulty in recognizing 
Mr. Siess' handwriting on your work sheets, did 
you? A. No. 
Q. Will you look through any part of that ledger 
and tell us if you can find anywhere the hand-
writing of Mr. Siess? 
The Court: You mean outside of that 
account, Mr. Podell? 
Mr. Podell: Any account. 
A. I see only the figures in this account. I am 
afraid I cannot identify them. 
Q. Did not you identify Mr. Siess' figures here 
to this jury? A. Yes. 
Q. A moment ago? A. Yes. 
Q. Are you not familiar with his handwriting 
and figures? A. Not particularly. 
Q. How many years have you worked with Siess? 
A. Only for two weeks that I remember. 
Q. Two weeks on this audit? A. He was not 
there the whole of the time. It would only prob-
ably be about—perhaps less than a week. 
Q. Didn't you know, as the senior accountant, 
or whatever your position was there, that Mr. Siess 
wrote up the general ledger from March on, in 
1923, didn't you know that? A. I understand that 
he did. 
Q. Not what you understand. Did you know 
it at that time? A. I was told that he did. 
Q. By whom? A. Mr. Rea. 
Q. You did not see him write it? A. No. 
Q. Is that the usual thing for an accountant to 
do when he is making an audit, to post up the 
general ledger for a period from March until the 
end of the year? 
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Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
object to that question, because there is noth-
ing to show that that was done as part of 
the audit. It was done, as the evidence 
shows, before the audit commenced; so the 
facts upon which Mr. Podell's questions are 
based are improper. 
The Court: Yes, that is true; it was done 
before the audit commenced. 
Q. Did your concern have any work to do for 
Mr. Stern, outside of the audit? Was your con-
cern in the capacity of keeping books, of supplying 
bookkeepers to Mr. Stern? A. I believe they did 
do so. 
Q. Supplied his bookkeepers; is that it? A. Not 
a bookkeeper. They supplied an assistant for 
Stern's bookkeeper. 
Q. Was not that done in connection with the 
audit that was had? A. No. 
Q. Could you have made an audit unless that 
ledger was written up? A. No. 
Q. Didn't you have to have a ledger that was 
posted for the purpose of making an audit? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And that as part of your effort to make the 
right kind of audit did not you have to have the 
ledger posted up? A. Yes. 
Q. And who did that? A. I was told that Mr. 
Siess helped to do it. 
Q. Didn't you know that he has testified that 
he wrote in that rubber sales account, and that 
that was his handwriting from May 7, all of the 
items, except the last? A. I believe he did so 
testify. 
Q. You don't doubt Mr. Siess' statement, do you? 
A. I do not. 
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Q. Now, then, does that help to refresh your 
recollection that this rubber sales account, at least 
in so far as that sheet is concerned, is the same 
sheet that you saw when you audited that book? 
A. It shows me that it probably is. 
Q. Probably? A. Yes. 
Q. Is there a doubt about Siess' statement? A. 
I do not know. 
Q. That he wrote that very account, all but the 
last item; is that why you say "probably" ? A. That 
is why I say "probably." 
Q. Because there is a doubt in your mind about 
Siess' statement that he wrote those items? A. 
No, I just do not know. 
Q. You do not know? A. No. 
Q. Now, will you be good enough, Mr. Towell 
Mr. Podell (to the jury) : I think, gen-
tlemen, if I may be permitted, your Honor, 
Mr. Siess testified that he wrote everything 
beginning with 5/7 here down to the bot-
tom of this page, and continued the account, 
all but this last item that is Siess' hand-
writing anyway, from 5/7. Here every item 
in ink Siess testified was his handwriting, 
and every item in here, except this last item, 
$706,000. The writing appears—let the rec-
ord show on all of these days of the same 
page. 
Q. Now, will you be good enough to look at your 
work sheet and tell us whether your work sheet 
shows the total of sales for the year 1923 on the 
rubber sales account? A. I have an item, "Rubber 
Sales $10,492,387." 
Q. And how many cents? A. 64 cents. 
Q. Now, will you just repeat that item, $10,-
492,387.64; is that right? A. Yes. 
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Q. Where did you get that figure from? A. From 
the general ledger of Fred Stern & Company. 
Q. Is that figure in your work sheets in your 
handwriting? A. Once in Siess' handwriting, once 
in mine. 
Q. That figure appears twice, does it? A. Yes. 
Q. And which one is yours and which one is 
Siess'? A. The original record is Siess'. 
Q. The one at the head of the page, is that Siess' 
handwriting? A. Yes. 
Q. At the head of the column? A. Yes. 
Q. And the one below it at the foot is yours? 
A. No. The one on the left is mine—the one on 
the left is Siess', and the one on the right is mine. 
Those are the two items (indicating). 
Mr. Marshall: Under what columns? 
The Witness: Under the column headed, 
"Balance before closing, December 31, 1923." 
That is Siess' handwriting, and this is in 
my handwriting, copying his figure out bal-
ance after adjustment. 
Q. Have you any further tabulation of this item 
anywhere in your work sheet referring to the $10,-
000,000 item? A. No. 
Q. Is that the only tabulation that appears any-
where in your work sheet with regard to this $10,-
000,000 item? A. I believe so. 
Q. Now, do I understand you correctly that when 
you copied that item in your handwriting, you 
copied it out of the general ledger of Stern & Com-
pany? A. No. 
Q. Where did you copy it from? A. The item 
in my handwriting is copied from the figure by 
Siess. 
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Q. Did you go over and check up on that item 
at all? A. I do not believe so. 
Q. You mean you took it for granted that that 
item of $10,000,000 of sales for the year 1923 was 
accurate without any check up? A. No, I would 
not say that. 
Q. Now, then, what did you do? A. I took off 
the entire list of all credit balances which were 
credits to the profits and loss account and all debit 
balances, and concluded finally that the balance, the 
credit balance remaining of $115,940.37 was a 
proper credit to the surplus account. 
Q. That would not check up your sales, would 
it? A. No. 
Q. What I am interested in having is, here was 
a statement to you of over $10,000,000 worth of 
actual sales. You knew that the sales created ac-
counts receivable. You knew that the accounts re-
ceivable were included among the assets; did you 
do anything to check up to see whether those assets 
were there? A. Yes, to see that the assets were 
there. 
Q. What did you look at? A. I made tests of 
the accounts receivable to the invoices. 
Q. You did look at the invoices? A. Yes, some 
of them. 
Q. Did you look at the ledger? A. Yes, I looked 
at the accounts receivable. 
Q. Did you look at the general ledger? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, in your examination of invoices, did 
you come across any peculiarities or unusual items 
at all? A. No, 
Q. Nothing that struck you as unusual? A. Ex-
cept any invoices that are in the adjustments al-
ready referred to in testimony this morning. 
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Q. Well, now, so that we won't misunderstand 
each other, Mr. Towell, did you ever see an invoice 
like this (indicating)? 
Mr. Marshall: Why don't you let him 
see it instead of holding it a mile away? 
Q. (Handing.) A. I cannot say. 
Q. Do you recall seeing any invoice that was 
different from the ordinary regular invoice? A. 
No. 
Mr. Podell: Let me have the invoices. 
Q. I think you have told us that you were par-
ticularly interested in any manipulations that 
came at the close of the year; do you recall saying 
that? A. No, I do not think I said that. 
Q. Do you recall using the phrase "particularly 
at the close of the year"? A. I believe I did use 
that phrase, yes. 
Q. Well, you know as an experienced accountant, 
that what happened in relation to inventory on 
December 31, 1923, is so close to January of 1924, 
that items are apt even inadvertently to overlap; 
don't you know that? A. That happens sometimes. 
Q. And so that is why you use the phrase "par-
ticularly at the close of the year," is it not? A. 
Yes, because of our balance sheet being at a point 
of time. 
Q. Point of time, December 31. Now, then, did 
you by any chance, look at any of the invoices that 
appeared in the invoice book toward the close of 
the year, Mr. Towell, did you? A. Yes. 
Q. You did? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you be good enough to look at some 
pages with me? Now, the very first invoice 
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Mr. Marshall: What exhibit are you re-
ferring to, please? 
Mr. Podell: December 7, 1923. 
Mr. Marshall: What exhibit are you re-
ferring to, please? 
Mr. Podell: Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3. 
Q. Did you notice it? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I make my same objection, 
your Honor, as to any questions with respect 
to book. 
Mr. Podell: I object to any statement to 
destroy the purpose of this cross-examina-
tion. 
The Court: This is the original objection 
which counsel has made continually through-
out the trial. 
Mr. Podell: I have no objection to that. 
Mr. Marshall: I have a right to state the 
grounds of my objection. 
The Court: Yes, 
Mr. Marshall: And I have a right to state 
further that Mr. Podell is assuming even if 
this were 
Mr. Podell: I object to that statement as 
intended to post this witness, and destroy 
the rights of the cross-examination. 
Mr. Marshall: I object. It is not. I have 
not made that break yet. I insist that I 
have a right to state my objection. 
Mr. Podell: I object to any statement as 
to what the purpose of this is as an attempt 
to post the witness in the midst of a crucial 
point in the cross-examination. 
Mr. Marshall: We will let the witness go 
out of the room, if you want; but I insist 
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that I have a right to put my objection on 
the record. 
Mr. Podell: If it is a general objection, 
has he not stated it on the record 117 times? 
The Court: Is it tending towards the ad-
missibility because of lack of connection? 
Mr. Marshall: Not only because of the 
lack of connection of the book itself, but to 
the order of the book, that is, assuming that 
even if this book did exist at the time 
Mr. Podell: What is the use of cross-exam-
ining him? He is telling him now that the 
book did not exist; and I say it is highly im-
proper to make that statement. 
Mr. Marshall: Do not lose your temper. 
You know I have made that part of my ob-
jection consistently throughout the trial, and 
the witness has heard that before, so that 
remark is uncalled for. I am adding the 
further objection that the question of Mr. 
Podell is based on the assumption that this 
book was in the same order as now. 
Mr. Podell: I have a perfect right to ask 
the question in that form in cross-examina-
tion. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: I except. 
Q. After that statement has been made by your 
counsel, will you tell us then whether you recall 
the book at all? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the remark and 
the question in that form. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q. Do you recall that book, Mr. Towell? A. 
No. I am afraid not, 
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Q. No. Of course, you heard counsel say that 
you didn't know or he does not know whether the 
book existed at all at that time—you heard him 
say that? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, because 
I did not make that remark. 
Q. Did you hear him make a statement to that 
effect? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: Wait a minute, please. I 
made a remark, your Honor, as to the nature 
of the proof up to this time. I made no 
remark as to my own knowledge of the mat-
ter at all, and Mr. Podell has consistently 
misquoted me, and I ask your Honor to 
make a ruling. 
The Court: I do not think, Mr. Podell, 
there is any necessity whatever for the quo-
tation, because counsel has consistently from 
the start of this trial, objected to all entries 
made in these books, placing the burden 
upon you for the establishment of their iden-
tification, and he has consistently objected 
right from the very start of the trial, on 
that theory. 
Mr. Podell: I have not objected to that, 
but objected to his deliberate statement in 
the midst of the inquiry, wherein he said 
the book did not exist at that time. That is 
what I objected to. 
The Court: I do not know that he said 
that. 
Mr. Podell: Let us read it and see if he 
did or not. 
The Court : Let us see whether he did. 
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Mr. Podell: His purpose is apparent by 
the last answer of the witness. Read the 
record. 
The Court: Read the record. 
(Here the preceding part of the record 
was repeated as recorded.) 
The Court: There was no question; the 
only thing I remember was—look at this 
book and follow me on it; which he apparent-
ly attempted to do. 
Mr. Podell: "If it did not exist"—he did 
not volunteer any such statement, It was 
put sight into his mouth and head. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully ask your 
Honor to state that I have a right to make 
my objection. 
The Court: I have ruled accordingly. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, you look at the last invoice for the year 
1923, in this book that I show you now, and tell 
me whether you saw any of those? A. I cannot 
say that I did. 
Q. You cannot say that you did? A. No. 
Q. Have you got any of these invoices listed on 
any of your work sheets? A. I do not know that. 
Q. Can you look it up for us, please, and make 
sure? Will you take any of those last invoices in 
the month of December at the end of the year, and 
will you examine particularly and closely? 
The Court: Was that established or not 
established as a fact in the plaintiff's case 
that there was no such entry on the work 
sheet? 
Mr. Podell: Who said that? 
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The Court: Was that or was it not so? 
Mr. Podell: Oh, no. 
The Court: I do not know. I am asking 
whether there was or not to refresh my recol-
lection. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not like to help your 
Honor by a remark, as I dare not do it be-
cause Mr. Podell will object, 
Mr. Podell: What is that? 
Mr. Marshall: I might make a suggestion 
which will help your Honor at this point, 
except that Mr. Podell will roar out that I 
am posting the witness. 
The Court: We will take the question. 
Q. Mr. Towell, can you say to this jury whether 
each one of those accounts respectively listed on 
those invoices that you have looked at were in-
cluded in the accounts receivable on your work 
sheets? A. I cannot say that. I have recognized 
some of the names here. 
Q. Look at your customers' ledger and see if 
that will help you out. Do you want to look at 
the customers' ledger? A. I will look at anything 
that you want me to look at. 
Q. Mr. Towell, is it your position that you do 
not recognize any of those books at all? A. Well, 
I cannot—I do not recall. 
Q. Is that your position? A. Yes, that is my 
position. 
Q. Did you say that once to the lawyer that was 
questioning you, when he questioned you and you 
looked at the books time and again? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the statement. 
He did not look at the books time and again. 
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Mr. Podell: We will let the jury decide 
whether or not counsel handed up books and 
used the books in connection with the work 
sheets. 
Q. Did you look at any books when Mr. Marshall 
questioned you? A. No, not that I recall. 
Q. You just testified from work sheets? A. Yes. 
Q. Don't you remember Mr. Marshall handing 
you the general ledger? 
Mr. Marshall: You point out where I did, 
the general ledger. 
Q. Do you remember that? A. No, I do not 
remember. 
Q. You do not remember that. Will you say he 
did not hand you the general ledger? A. I do not 
recall that. 
Q. Do you remember the discussion that arose 
with regard to trade acceptances and withholding 
cash by the banks? A. Yes, I remember that. 
Q. Do you remember in that connection you were 
looking into any of the books? 
Mr. Marshall: Point out the place in the 
record, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: I am not taking orders from 
you, Mr. Marshall. 
A. I do not remember. 
Q. Do you remember in that connection looking 
at any books? A. I do not. 
Q. You don't remember looking at a certain 
book throughout the examination by Mr. Marshall? 
A. Not that I now recall. 
Q. Well, now, do I understand you correctly that 
your present position now is that after all this 
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work, and after all this figuring that you have got 
there, over two weeks, and all these work sheets, 
that you could not, no matter how long or how hard 
you study these books, recognize a single one of 
them? A. That is right. 
Q. Now, then, we will assume that you did not 
recognize them for the moment. Look at the rubber 
sales account in the general ledger—I withdraw 
that question. I want you to examine this invoice 
that I show you now and compare it with any of 
the other invoices in this book of the month pre-
ceding November, 1923. Do you understand my 
question? Look at this invoice and the one next 
to it, and others next to it for December, 1923, 
and compare it with any of the invoices that are 
in this book prior to November, 1923? 
Mr. Marshall: The same general objec-
tion, your Honor. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: And now may I enter that 
now to any books handed to this witness? 
The Court: You may have a general ex-
ception. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. Of course, we 
have been over all this before, I think. 
The Court: With this witness? 
Mr. Marshall: Not with this witness. 
Q. Have you got one of the regular invoices, any 
one of them preceding October, preceding Novem-
ber, 1923, have you got one there? A. Preceding 
November? 
Q. Yes, any one of the preceding November? A. 
Yes, I have. 
Q. Now, compare the last invoices in that book 
with that invoice preceding November; did you 
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notice any difference? A. Yes, there is some dif-
ference. 
Q. Now, tell us what that "some difference" con-
sists of? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as not be-
ing the best evidence. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Court: You mean the papers speak 
for themselves? 
Mr. Marshall: Certainly. 
Mr. Podell: I am going to ask for cer-
tain conclusions of the witness in connection 
with them. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Q. Will you compare it with the invoices that 
you selected, Mr. Towell, please; what is the dif-
ference? A. The difference between the invoice you 
asked me to look at, dated November 16, 1923, and 
the one I first looked at dated October 26, 1923, is 
one of the purpose of the thing more than the dif-
ference in the invoice, so I shall have to turn to 
another one. 
Q. Let me see. Is this the sales invoice? A. I 
feel sure that it is an adjustment of some kind, 
so I will turn to another invoice. 
Q. Well, then, take a sales invoice. Will you 
tell this jury what is the difference between any 
one of these last invoices—you will notice they are 
more or less in the same form, and the invoice of 
October, 1923? A. The invoice of November 16 
merely is the statement of the number of cases; 
the type of rubber and the description of its trade 
name, and some reference figures as to weight and 
the price per pound and an extension of the total 
price. 
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Q. Do you see the word "weight" mentioned 
there on the invoice of November 16? A. No. 
Q. Do you notice the date on the invoice of No-
vember 16? 
Mr. Marshall: When its due date is? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When is it? A. March 1, 1924. 
Q. The invoice dated November 16th, due March 
1, 1924? A. Yes. 
Q. What is the due date of this, October 23? A. 
Cash thirty days from date of invoice. 
Q. You have audited the account books of rub-
ber concerns, have you not, before? A. No. 
Q. Well, from this audit of the account books 
of this rubber concern, did you become familiar 
with the usual terms of dating? A. Yes, I made 
inquiry along those lines. 
Q. And what did you find to be the regular 
terms? A. I do not recall that. 
Q. Did you not find them to be more than thirty 
days? A. I could not say now. 
Q. But you knew it at that time? A. I believe 
I did. 
Q. You did? A. I believe I did. 
Mr. Marshall: A little louder, Mr. Podell. 
Q. What else did you find on this invoice of 
October, 1923, which you do not find on the in-
voice of November 16; do you find any reference 
to a rubber association fee on the invoice of Novem-
ber 16th? A. No. 
Q. Is there a reference to such a fee on the in-
voice of October, 1923? A. There is. 
Q. Do you happen to know, and can you tell 
this jury, what those two typewritten numbers 
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mean on the invoice of October, 1923, in the upper 
right-hand corner? A. They are serial numbers of 
some kind. 
Q. Serial numbers of what? A. Serial numbers 
of the invoices, probably. 
Q. Do you find two typewritten numbers in the 
upper right-hand corner of this invoice, November 
16th? A. No. 
Q. Do you find any reference—do you find on 
the invoice of October, 1923, "weight slip herewith, 
bill of lading herewith"? Do you find any such 
thing on the invoice of November 16? A. No. 
Q. Do you recall having observed these things 
at all when you made your audit? A. I recall no 
such differences in any invoices I ever saw there. 
Q. You looked at how many invoices? A. I think 
I said probably 200. 
Q. 200 invoices. Now, assuming that you had 
come across invoices such as I have pointed out 
here, would that have aroused your suspicion? A. 
I t would have been cause for inquiry. 
Q. Would it have aroused your suspicions as to 
the genuineness of those last invoices coming in 
the last part of the year? A. Not by itself. 
Q. It would have occasioned inquiry on your 
part? A. Yes. 
Q. And the ground for inquiry would have been 
that you would have thought that there was a pos-
sibility that this is not a genuine invoice, referring 
to the one of November 16? A. No. 
Q. That is not a reason for your inquiry? A. 
No. 
Q. What would have been reason for your in-
quiry? A. I would have wondered why it was that 
they departed from what evidently was their prac-
tice. 
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Q. Just a matter of curiosity, I assume? A. At 
that point. 
Q. I f you found a number of such invoices in 
that from, toward the end of the year, all of them 
in the wrong position in the file, in very large 
amount, larger than usual, would that have aroused 
your suspicion? A. Not by itself. 
Q. Would it have occasioned cause for inquiry 
on your part? A. Yes. 
Q. And why? A. Because it would be a de-
parture from their routine, or at least, I believe it 
would. 
Q. Something unusual in their routine, would it 
not? A. I would so think. 
Q. Then, I assume, you would ask Mr. Stern for 
an explanation; is that right? A. Probably not 
Mr. Stern. 
Q. Probably Mr. Romberg? A. Yes. 
Q. I see. Mr. Romberg was the man who had 
charge of that very thing? A. Yes. 
Q. And you knew that these things could not 
have been done unless Mr. Romberg knew of them? 
Mr. Marshall: What things? I think we 
ought to have it a little more definite. 
Q. If these invoices were not genuine, that they 
could not have been done without the knowledge 
of Mr. Romberg? A. They could not. 
Q. And you were going to take an explanation 
from that gentleman, is that it? A. I saw nothing 
irregular about the invoices. 
Q. So you saw something you said was unusual? 
Mr. Marshall: No, he did not say that. 
A. I did not say that. 
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Q. You said you saw something that would have 
occasioned inquiry? A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did not you say that? A. No. 
Q. Did not you find an invoice, a number of them, 
in that form in large amount different from the 
routine, the departure from the routine that you 
say could not have been done without the knowl-
edge of Mr. Romberg, you would have gone to Mr. 
Romberg to get an explanation? 
The Court: "If" or "did not"—if or did 
not? 
Mr. Podell: If he found that. 
The Court: If he found it. I will allow 
the question—if he found it. 
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the question 
repeated, then. 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Q. Your Honor, the question has just been re-
peated. Does the witness want it to be repeated? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: "If" 
(The question was repeated as recorded: 
"If you found an invoice, a number of them 
in that form in large amount different from 
the routine, the departure from the routine 
that you say could not have been done with-
out the knowledge of Mr. Romberg, you 
would have gone to Mr. Romberg to get an 
explanation?") 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you would have accepted any explana-
tion that he gave you that seemed satisfactory? A. 
Not necessarily. 
Q. What else could you have done to verify 
Romberg's statement? A. It would all depend on 
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the circumstance of my questions and his answers, 
as to what conclusion I came to, after hearing his 
explanations, 
Q. Would not your inquiry be to make certain 
that this last invoice was a genuine invoice? A. 
Yes, 
Q, And is not there a very simple way of finding 
that out? A. I could not tell you now. 
Q. Did not you do it when you were checking up 
on accounts payable? 
Mr. Marshall: What? 
Q. Didn't you tell this jury that when you were 
checking up on accounts payable you communicated 
with the creditors? 
Mr. Marshall: The creditors? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It never occurred to you that you might com-
municate with the debtors to find out whether cer-
tain invoices were right? A. Yes, it did. 
Q. It did occur to you? A. Yes. 
Q. In all this audit did you communicate with 
any debtor? A. Not trade debtors—other debtors. 
Q. You left the trade debtors alone? A. Yes, 
Q. The accounts receivable, you left them alone? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just what did you do to find out whether those 
sales had actually been made? 
Mr. Marshall: What sales? 
Q. Sales listed in the accounts receivable. A. I 
tested the accounts receivable to the invoices to an 
extent that I thought was sufficient. 
Q. Did you give particular attention to the end 
of the year? A. Not particularly. 
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Q. Was not that one of the instances which called 
for particular attention in December? A. No, I do 
not think so. 
Q. Did you mean it when you told this jury that 
a general ledger is a book of original entry? A. I 
do not think that I so stated. 
Q. If you did state it—did you state to this jury 
that it was a book of original record? A. I may 
have done. 
Q. Now, just what is your distinction there? 
Would you call a general ledger a book of original 
record? A. No. 
Q. You would not? A. No. 
Q. Now, sir, in checking up on accounts payable 
to find out whether Stern really owed all the money 
that he said he owed, you went to the supporting 
books, didn't you? A. Yes. 
Q. You went to the accounts payable ledger? A. 
Yes. 
Q. You went to the invoices received? A. To 
which? 
Q. Invoices received by Stem & Company. Did 
not you testify that you checked up the invoices 
that had been sent in by the creditors? A. We 
tested them, yes. 
Q. And didn't you also look at the shipments 
received record? A. Yes. 
Q. And then, after taking all that precaution, 
you communicated with the creditors? A. Yes. 
Q. And you felt that you could not verify the 
entries contained in the general ledger and make 
certain that all the liabilities were listed until you 
had done just that? A. No. That is not so. 
Q. You did not do it for the purpose of idle 
ceremony, did you? A. No. 
Q. You did not do it because any suspicions were 
aroused in your mind? A. No. 
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Q. You did it in the ordinary course of your 
audit? A. Yes. 
Q. Now tell me, in the ordinary course of your 
audit of accounts receivable, the sales ledger, did 
you look at the books, the supporting books? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Did you look at any sales journal? A. I do 
not recall that. 
Q. You just told us that you did look at the sup-
porting books? A. I looked at the supporting rec-
ords. I think you were using the word to mean 
books or records. 
Q. Well, what is it that you mean to distinguish 
here? You did not look at the sales journal? A. 
Not necessarily. 
Q. Now, which is it ; are you in doubt in your 
mind as to whether you looked into it, or don't you 
remember whether you looked into it? A. No, I do 
not remember, not necessarily. 
Q. Or do you want to say that you did look into 
it? "Not necessarily" does not mean anything. A. 
I do not remember whether I did look or not. 
Q. You mean you don't remember? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think you might recognize that sales 
journal if I showed it to you? A. I do not think so. 
Q. Do you think you might recognize what was 
called the debit memo book if I showed it to you ? 
A. I do not think so. 
Q. Did you ever hear of that book, the debit 
memo book? A. I do not recall it to-day. 
Q. Have you got any entries on your work sheet 
relating to the debit memo book? A. I do not 
think so. 
Q. Now, did you look at the shipping records as 
you did on the accounts payable? A. A record of 
shipments, yes. 
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Q. What do you call a record of shipments? A. 
The record in which all purchases were made also 
recorded the sale of the same merchandise, and I 
did look at that. 
Q. Do you know that there were two sets of rec-
ords there, one of them for shipments received, 
which also gave the record of what was done with 
those shipments, and another one for shipments 
sent out? A. No, I do not recall that. 
Q. You do not recall it? A. No. 
Q. Where were the shipping records of the con-
cern which was the basis of the accounts receivable? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. Have you got any list there in your work 
sheets which would show the books that you ex-
amined in this audit? A. No. 
Q. Is it in your time sheets? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: He already went over that, 
your Honor, when he first went on the stand. 
Mr. Podell: May I have the production of 
those? 
Mr. Marshall: You have had those before. 
The time sheets are produced. I have no 
objection to giving these to the attorneys, 
but I do not think another accountant ought 
to have them. 
The Court: What is that? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think another ac-
countant ought to go over our list of clients. 
1 am quite willing to give them to Mr. Lim-
burg. 
Mr. Podell: It is purely accountants' 
figures. I ask permission for Mr. Levy, who 
was the accountant, an attorney assisting 
me in the conduct of this trial, to give him 
permission to look at that document. 
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Mr. Marshall: Why should our customers 
be shown to another accountant? 
Mr. Podell: It is an exhibit in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Not the part with other 
accountants. 
Mr. Podell: I am entitled to look at what 
is in evidence and I am entitled to look at 
it with the eyes of an accountant. 
The Court: I allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: I except to having another 
accountant look at our customers, other cus-
tomers on that list. 
The Court: You know what the rule is, 
Mr. Podell. The Court has not got that 
discrimination if it has other customers. 
Mr. Podell: But this document is in evi-
dence. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: And if counsel does not want 
these other customers to be looked at, what 
does that mean? It means that we cannot 
look at it at all? 
The Court: No; that counsel and this jury 
may look at it, but there is no reason why 
another accountant should have the occasion 
to find out what their business is or who their 
customers are. 
Mr. Podell: We are not looking at any 
other items but those in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Only part was in evidence, 
and the accountant is an attorney. 
Mr. Podell: Why should you assume the 
accountant was an attorney in this case? 
How do you assume that he will violate your 
rules? 
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The Court: I do not, but I think counsel 
is within the line of propriety in objecting 
to exposing this particular thing to another 
accountant. 
Mr. Podell: He is not doing it. I am 
doing it. 
The Court: You cannot give it to him 
either. 
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor instruct Mr. 
Marshall, who said at the time when he of-
fered this document in evidence that he was 
going to take out from these sheets the ex-
tracts, to let us have an extract of this 
exhibit? 
The Court: I think he did. 
Mr. Podell: He has not done it, and it 
seems to me he is the one that ought to take 
the penalty of having failed to do what he 
promised. Why should I be barred from ex-
amining this document and now taking up 
the time of the Court and the jury? 
The Court: I say you may examine that 
document and show this to your accountant, 
relative to this particular account. 
Mr. Podell: I will give the accountant the 
instructions that the only matter of fact is 
that this sheet contains no entries except 
Fred Stern & Company. 
The Court: Give him that sheet, 
Mr. Podell: That is the one (handing 
paper to Mr. Levy). There is nothing mys-
terious about these other accounts. They do 
not say a blessed thing about them. There 
is nothing here at all. 
The Court: Do not say that. 
Mr. Podell: There is nothing but a name 
on them. 
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The Court: That is just what he does not 
want him to know. 
Mr. Marshall: Even though he is an at-
torney in this ease, he is also an accountant. 
Mr. Podell: Let us have that copy which 
he promised to give us. Now, what is my 
last question? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, can you explain to this jury 
at all why it is that you are so certain, absolutely 
certain and sure, that in checking up on the ac-
counts payable you looked at the accounts payable 
ledger, you looked at the supporting books, the 
shipping records, you communicated with the cus-
tomers to verify them, and in checking up on ac-
counts receivable you do not know whether you 
looked at the invoices, the sales journal, and cer-
tainly did not communicate with the customer. 
Why is that? 
Mr. Marshall: I object. That is not a 
proper statement of the witness' statement. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: What is the objection? 
The Court: You said he did not look at 
the invoices. 
Mr. Podell: He said he looked at 200 
invoices. 
The Court: He said he did not look at 
these. 
Mr. Marshall: And could not say which 
of the 200. 
Q. I am asking why it is in connection with 
the accounts payable he looked at all those things 
and then communicated with the creditors, and why 
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it is in regard to the accounts receivable you did 
not look at the sales accounts and you did not look 
at the shipping records and you did not communi-
cate with the debtors? A. Because I thought that 
what I had done in connection with the accounts 
receivable was as much as I could do under the 
circumstances, and was equivalent to what had been 
done in connection with the accounts payable. 
Q. Was it as much as you could do that you did 
not look at the sales journal? A. That was left 
entirely to my judgment, and I did not say that 
I did not look at it. 
Q. I am asking you not what was left entirely 
to your judgment at that time, but the sales jour-
nal was available there, was it not? A. I sup-
pose so. 
Q. Don't you know? A. I do not remember the 
book. 
Q. Was there a single book that you asked for 
that those people did not produce? A. I do not 
think there was. 
Q. Then you know that the sales journal must 
have been there? A. I do not recall the book. 
Q. Now, I ask you again whether there was a 
single book that you asked for that was not pro-
duced? A. No, I don't think there was. 
Q. Do you mean to sit there, an accountant, and 
tell this jury that you made an audit entailing all 
this work and that you cannot even say to this 
jury whether they had a complete set of books? A. 
They had a complete set, 
Q. I f they had a complete set of books, then you 
know, do you not, that there must have been a 
sales journal? A. There would be a record of some 
sort. 
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Q. Is a sales journal a record of some sort? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Would that have satisfied you, any kind of a 
record or a sales journal? A. It didn't necessarily 
have to be in any particular form, Mr. Podell. 
Q. You mean to say that if there was no sales 
journal at all, but if they kept a lot of loose invoices 
around the office somewhere, that that would have 
satisfied you? A. It might have been a book. They 
could have made a summary sheet of the sales. I t 
would serve the same purpose. 
Q. A summary sheet in the way of a book of 
original entry? A. It might not have been a book 
at all. They could have summarized their invoices. 
Q. You would have been satisfied with a sum-
mary sheet of their invoices instead of a sales jour-
nal in a situation such as this, would you? 
Mr. Marshall: Just a second. I think this 
is going a little far afield, your Honor. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Would you? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you find any such? A. I don't recall the 
form of their sales summary. 
Q. Would you recall it if you saw it? A. I am 
afraid not now. 
Q. Could you check it up with your working 
sheets and identify it if you saw it? A. I think not. 
Q. Let me have it, so we will dispel any doubt in 
your mind and make certain that you cannot recall 
it. Now, look at it and examine it (handing book 
to witness). Tell us now definitely—not what you 
think, but tell us definitely, do you recall it—re-
ferring to Exhibit 5. A. No, I don't recall it. 
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Q. You do not recall it. Now, you are sure about 
it, now? I mean, it is not that you do not think 
you recall it, but you are sure you do not recall it? 
A. I am quite sure I do not. 
Q. Now, then, Mr. Towell, will you tell this jury, 
please, what would have been your conclusion if 
you had asked for the sales journal and you had 
found that these invoices, which are a departure 
from the usual invoices as you have described it, 
was not at all entered as sales and were not con-
tained in the sales journal. What would have been 
your conclusion as an accountant? A. I would have 
concluded that such a state of affairs was a subject 
for further inquiry. 
Q. If you find a number of them, all in large 
amounts, entered on an invoice that was a depart-
ure in many essentials from the regular invoice, and 
no sign of them anywhere in the sales journal, what 
would have been your inference? A. I would have— 
what would have been my inference? 
Q. Your inference, yes. A. I cannot say what it 
would have been. 
Q. Your mind would be a blank, or is it a blank 
on that subject? I mean, you draw no inference 
at all? Suppose I add to that that these invoices 
were all towards the end of the year? A. I would 
have inferred first of all that they departed from 
their regular practice. What the final inference 
would have been I cannot say. 
Q. There would not have been any suspicion at 
all in your mind? A. I don't think at that point 
it would have been suspicion. 
Q. Even if there was no entry in the regular 
course in the sales journal, the book that should 
have contained an entry, you would not have been 
suspicious at all? A. Not through that alone. 
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Q. Well, now, assume then that you knew all 
about this inventory with which you had to reduce 
the net assets of the concern by $300,000, that you 
had seen that form of invoice and that it was all 
toward the end of the year, in December; would 
that have made any difference to you? Would that 
have occasioned you any suspicion at all? A. Not 
immediately. It would have occasioned inquiry. 
Q. Whether immediately or at any other time, 
would it have occasioned suspicion after you had 
given it thought? A. It might have been the cause 
of later suspicion. 
Q. I see. Well, now, of course, you as an ac-
countant will admit that finding such a condition 
of affairs with regard to the sales journal, with re-
gard to the invoices, it was your duty then to look 
at the shipping records to see whether the goods 
had actually been shipped? Do you not admit that, 
that if you find such a condition, that that would 
have been your duty? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to this line of 
questioning. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: It is assuming facts which 
have not been proven. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. What is your answer? A. I did not get what 
you added to that question. 
Q. I will repeat it. Finding that accounts re-
ceivable entered in the ledger find no support in 
the sales journal, and that the invoices coming at 
the end of the year are a departure from the usual 
invoice in the form which you have stated, the dif-
ferences between that invoice and the regular in-
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voice—now, finding that condition, assuming that 
you find such a condition, would it have been your 
duty to look at the shipping records to see whether 
the goods were shipped? A. Not necessarily. 
Q. You mean that if Mr. Romberg in this case, or 
Mr. Stern, gave you an explanation of some kind, 
you would not even have bothered looking at the 
shipping records? A. I mean no such thing. 
Q. You do not mean that? A. No. 
Q. Would you have communicated with the peo-
ple to whom that invoice was made out? A. No. 
Q. How would you pursue your further inquiry? 
You said it would create cause for inquiry. How 
could you pursue your further inquiry? A. I can-
not recall now how I would have pursued it. 
Q. I am not asking you now about what you did 
at that time, because you cannot even remember the 
book you looked at. I am asking you now, take 
these facts and assume these facts that you find 
such a condition; tell me as an accountant would 
not you have regarded it as your bounden duty to 
look to see whether those shipments had been made? 
A. I think I might have gone to that step. 
Q. Well, what else could you have done to satisfy 
that inquiry that you said you had cause for? A. 
I do not know. 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. He did not 
say he had cause for inquiry. It is based on 
a hypothetical question. 
The Court: On an assumed state of facts. 
Mr. Podell: I am assuming now, we all 
understand it. We know that this witness 
is not testifying now to what his frame of 
mind was. I am giving certain hypothesis 
to him. 
The Court: I understand. 
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Q. You assume these things in making the audit: 
That you find the accounts receivable is not sup-
ported by a sales journal, and you find the invoices 
are a departure from the usual thing, and it is to-
ward the end of the year, and you have said, I think, 
it would give you cause for inquiry. Now, what 
else could you have done in the way of inquiry 
other than one of two things—either communicate 
with the debtor or look to the shipping records to 
see whether the goods had been shipped, or both? 
A. Nothing else occurs to me at the moment than 
that. 
Q. Well, now, Mr. Towell, will you be good 
enough to tell this jury why it is that you did all 
these things with regard to the accounts payable 
and that now you do not know whether you did 
them with regard to the accounts receivable? A. 
I did not say I did not know whether I had done 
them. 
Q. Do you say now that you looked at the ship-
ping records at any time? A. No, I don't say that. 
Q. Of the accounts receivable now, goods shipped 
out? A. No, I do not say I did, except in the form 
that there was a record of shipment in the—what 
I now call the lot record. I traced invoices from 
the file of invoices. 
Q. Is a lot record a shipping record? A. It is 
a record of shipments. 
Q. Certain shipments? A. I understand in Fred 
Stern's office to be all shipments. 
Q. All shipments? A. Yes. 
Q. All right, Now, in this lot record did you find 
any of the shipments for those invoices that ap-
peared toward the end of the year? A. Not that 
I have any recollection of. 
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Q. You mean by that that you do not remember 
whether you find them there or not? A. I mean 
that I have no specific recollection of different in-
voices being checked. 
Mr. Marshall: That record book is not 
in evidence. I think, your Honor, the record 
should show. 
Q. Is there any possible chance, Mr. Towell, of 
your examining these three books as closely as you 
like and comparing them with any of your work 
sheets or any data or information you have? You 
notice these are not loose leaf books. The three 
books I hand you are the books I—that you have 
just referred to, the shipping record of shipments 
received on purchases 
Mr. Marshall: May we have the books 
identified? 
Mr. Podell: They may be identified. 
Mr. Marshall: What exhibit numbers? 
The Court: Are they in evidence? 
Mr. Podell: I do not think so. 
Mr. Limburg: I think they are. 
The Court: They do not appear to be in 
evidence. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think they have been 
marked. 
Q. Well, can you identify them for us? 
Mr. Marshall: Is the next book also not 
marked? 
The Witness: There is no mark on it. 
Q. Do you need to take all of this time, Mr. 
Towell? 
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Mr. Marshall: Your Honor asked him to 
identify them. Let him try. 
Mr. Podell: All right. 
The Witness: There is nothing here that 
I recognize so far. 
Q. You do not recognize it? A. No. 
Q. They are in the same position that all the 
other books are, they are totally strange to you, you 
do not recognize them at all, is that right? A. 
That is right. 
Q. Now, let us assume, Mr. Towell, that you 
could not find in these books that we are talking 
about, these shipping records, both in books relat-
ing to shipments received any books relating to 
shipments made to customers, that you could not 
find any trace of those shipments that had this in-
voice that was a departure and that was not re-
ferred to in the sales journal; now, would you then 
have had any suspicion about that account, all of 
it at the end of the year when you examined things 
particularly closely? Do you understand my ques-
tion? A. Yes, I think I do. 
Q. You understand it? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what is your answer? A. I think it 
would have been a subject for inquiry. 
Q. You would still not be suspicious? A. Not 
on that basis alone. 
Q. If you found a number of such instances ag-
gregating large amounts, would you have been sus-
picious? A. I can not say. 
Q. You could not say? A. No. 
Q. If the Ford Motor Company, to whom you 
wrote on one of those accounts, and the Goodyear 
Rubber Company, and the Goodrich Rubber & Tire 
Company, and other large companies wrote you 
over their signatures that those accounts are ficti-
tious, would you then have been suspicious? 
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that, because 
there is no basis in the evidence for that 
hypothesis. 
The Court: There is no basis for that 
hypothesis. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, if he had asked 
for them, there is not the slightest doubt 
those are the answers he would have gotten, 
because that is their deposition. 
The Court: I understand. 
Mr. Podell: I have the right to ask the 
hypothetical question. I am assuming, 
purely hypothetically. This man is an ac-
countant and has attempted to give certain 
opinions and conclusions. 
Mr. Marshall: You can not rest an hypo-
thesis on an hypothesis. 
Mr. Podell: He has given a blanket state-
ment here. He believed in the honesty of 
this concern. Why cannot I test what he 
would have regarded as suspicious? 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: I except. 
Q. Now, if Mr. Stern told you in explanation 
that these accounts were fictitious, would you then 
have been suspicious? A. More than that. 
Q. More than suspicious? A. I would have been 
on my way home. 
Q. That is the time you would have reached the 
suspicious frame of mind? A. I would not have 
been suspicious. I would have been on my way 
home. 
Q. You would? A. Yes. 
Q. Did anything of those things that I asked you, 
the absence, or assuming you could not find it in the 
sales journal, assuming you could not find it in a 
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regular invoice, and assuming that you could not 
find in the shipping records, because of these things 
—none of these things nor all of those things taken 
together would have made you suspicious of that 
account? A. I don't know about all of these things 
taken together. 
Q. Well, what is your statement with regard to 
all of the things taken together? A. I don't know 
what you meant by all of the things taken together. 
Q. All of the three things taken together that I 
have just mentioned? A. I think it would have a 
cause for inquiry. 
Q. It would have been a cause for inquiry? A. 
Perhaps leading to suspicion. 
Q. I believe you have already stated that you did 
not communicate with any of the debtors at all? 
A. Not of the accounts receivable debtors, no. 
Q. Now, supposing in addition to all that I have 
stated you found a situation such as appears on 
this rubber sales account in the general ledger; just 
let us assume you found in addition to what I have 
stated 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the form of the 
question. 
The Court: I will allow it, 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. That in the rubber sales account, there is one 
summary of the sales for the month, as to all 
months of 1923 and all months of 1922, just one 
summary for that month. Now, assume that is 
what you find in the rubber sales account, and then 
in the month of December there are two summaries, 
both for over six and seven hundred thousand 
dollars respectively, would that have created any 
suspicion in your mind? 
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Mr. Marshall: Of course, my objection to 
the books applies also, I assume, to these 
hypothetical questions? 
The Court: Yes. Your general objection 
is there. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. Not by itself. 
Q. But taken together with the other things I 
have spoken of, the fact that the very last item for 
$706,000, the second item for the month of Decem-
ber, 1923, finds no support in the sales journal, and 
is made up of these invoices that are a departure 
from the usual invoice, and finds no support in the 
shipping record, that it is not in the same handwrit-
ing as the previous entries in that general ledger, 
would all of those things have created a suspicion 
in your mind as to the genuineness of those ac-
counts receivable? 
Mr. Marshall: This is a hypothetical ques-
tion, is it? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Based on a supposed or as-
sumed state of facts. 
Mr. Podell: On a supposed state of facts. 
Q. What do you say, Mr. Towell? A. That they 
would not have occasioned suspicion in themselves. 
Q. Even all of those items taken together? A. 
No. 
Q. I take it from what you say, Mr. Towell, that 
you are not of a suspecting nature? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being 
unfair and improper. 
A. I do not think you should say that. 
Q. You say you are not? 
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Mr. Marshall: Wait a moment, I object 
to that question. 
Mr. Podell: Have not I a right, your 
Honor 
The Court: No, sir, because I do not think 
that the law requires that an accountant be 
of a suspecting nature, as I understand it. 
Mr. Podell: Then I have the right to ask 
the question. 
The Court: You may get his general dis-
position. 
Mr. Podell: That is what I am trying to 
get. 
The Court: But as a legal proposition it 
is quite a different thing. 
Mr. Podell: Have I said, your Honor, that 
the law requires him to have it? 
The Court: No, you have not. 
Mr. Podell: But he has said himself that 
where there are unusual circumstances the 
accountant's rules require him to take un-
usual precautions. 
The Court: That is quite true. 
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, is it due to the fact, do 
you regard yourself as a credulous or gullible per-
son? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, your 
Honor, because it is immaterial, under your 
Honor's own statement of the law. 
The Court: I think under my statement 
of the law it is immaterial. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, if they put some 
one in there that cannot be aroused to any 
suspicion until he finds the thief, we have a 
right to show that. 
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The Court: What is it that Lord Lopez 
says? " I think he is supposed to be a watch 
dog but not a blood hound." 
Mr. Marshall: Correct. 
Mr. Podell: And what does that mean, 
your Honor, in this case? 
The Court: As to whether or not an ac-
countant is bound to be suspicious. 
Mr. Podell: Who has said, your Honor, 
that an accountant is bound to be suspic-
ious? 
The Court: Nobody. 
Mr. Podell: Why should your Honor 
begin to lecture on that subject, along those 
lines, now? 
The Court: For this reason, that I do not 
see now the materiality of it. That is the 
reason why. Under the objection made by 
counsel. 
Mr. Podell: I have asked him the ques-
tion as to whether he regarded himself as a 
gullible person. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: Does your Honor think that 
is material or immaterial? 
The Court: I do not think it is material 
and I will so rule. 
Mr. Podell: All right. Then I will take 
an exception. 
The Court: Certainly, sir. 
Mr. Podell: I submit your Honor's re-
marks with regard to Lord Lopez and what 
he had to say on the subject are decidedly 
prejudicial and I respectfully except to them. 
The Court: If they are 
Mr. Podell: Because it implies to the 
minds of the jury that I require that this 
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man should be not a watch dog but a blood 
hound. I have made no such requirement. 
The Court: I do not think you did, and 
if they are, I would very gladly recall them. 
Mr. Podell: I do not expect any account-
ant or any man to be a blood hound. I do 
expect him to use ordinary common sense. 
The Court: And common care and ordin-
ary care. 
Mr. Podell: And that is all the law re-
quires. 
The Court: Yes, whether he is suspicious 
or not does not make a particle of difference, 
and the Court so rules and stands on that 
ruling. 
Mr. Podell: All right, sir. I think we 
have reached the stage where I feel com-
pelled to ask your Honor to withdraw a 
juror. 
The Court: I decline to do so. 
Mr. Podell: I think your Honor's last 
remark is decidedly prejudicial. 
The Court: I decline to do so. 
Mr. Podell: I respectfully except, 
Mr. Marshall: I think that Mr. Podell's 
remarks to your Honor are exceedingly 
prejudicial, also. 
The Court: Proceed. 
Mr. Marshall: I take exception to Mr. 
Podell's lecturing the Court. 
Mr. Podell : Do you want to withdraw a 
juror? 
Mr. Marshall: No. I take an exception. 
The Court: Do you join in that request? 
Mr. Marshall: No, your Honor. I took 
an exception to Mr. Podell's statements to 
your Honor, because I thought that they 
were improper statements. 
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The Court: Now, his Honor will take care 
of himself, don't you let that worry you. 
I will take care of myself and I will take 
care of my record. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor does not mean to 
require this or any other man to be a watch 
dog and not a blood hound? 
The Court: I do not, and if you feel it is 
prejudicial the Court willingly withdraws it. 
By Mr. Podell, 
Q. Now, Mr. Towell 
Mr. Podell: Coming back to the same 
question, does your Honor exclude my ques-
tion relating to his gullibility? 
The Court: Yes, sir. I have already done 
so. 
Q. Mr. Towell, did you check up on the assigned 
accounts? A. I determined the total amount of the 
assigned accounts. 
Q. Is that all that you did? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you communicate to check up as to as-
signed notes which were pledged as collateral? A. 
Not specifically for that purpose. 
Q. I did not ask you for any purpose. I asked 
you whether you communicated with the holders 
of notes that had been assigned as collateral, notes 
receivable? A. Yes, I believe we did. 
Q. Every one of them? A. Every one that we 
had a record of, I believe. 
Q. Did you communicate with the people to whom 
accounts receivable had been assigned as collateral? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you receive answer from them? A. From 
some of them. 
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Q. You have stated that the accounts receivable 
ledger did not contain any entries showing to whom 
those accounts had been assigned? A. I don't re-
member so stating. 
Q. Well, is that a fact? A. I don't know whether 
it is or not. 
Q. As you recall that ledger, that accounts re-
ceivable ledger, did it or did it not contain any 
entry showing to whom those accounts have been 
assigned? A. I don't recall that. 
Q. I do not suppose it will be any help to you, 
Mr. Towell, if I show you the accounts receivable 
ledger? Would it? A. Probably not. 
Q. You could not recognize that either, could 
you? A. I don't think so. 
Q. You do not think so? A. No. 
Q. Do you remember comparing the accounts re-
ceivable ledger that was produced with your work-
ing sheets and find that eighty of those accounts 
were exactly the same on your working sheets and 
on the accounts receivable ledger? A. I recall 
making a check here on the stand of certain names 
and balances of accounts to about that number. 
Q. "We found"—I am reading from page 1279 
of Mr. Towell's testimony under 21-A: "We found 
that the accounts receivable themselves as I re-
member now, contained no record of assignments." 
Do you recall making that statement? A. The rec-
ord shows I made it. 
Q. Do you recall making that statement? A. No, 
not distinctly. 
Mr. Podell: Will it be stipulated that he 
made that statement? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
2186 
2187 
730 
2188 Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Cross. 
Q. Well now, do you say now whether that state-
ment was true or not? A. Yes, I believe it was true. 
Q. You believe it was true? A. Yes. 
Q. Do your work sheets contain any records of 
assignments—— 
Mr. Marshall: I think we ought to have 
the full sentence though, Mr. Podell, do you 
not think so? 
Mr. Podell: That is in the accounts re-
ceivable ledger. That is what I am talking 
about. I will give you the full sentence. 
"We found that the accounts receivables 
themselves as I remember now contained no 
record of assignments. That is in the ac-
counts receivable ledger." 
Q. Now, in your work sheets does that purport 
to be a record of assignments of accounts which 
was taken from the accounts receivable ledger? A. 
No. 
Q. Have you got that particular working sheet? 
Mr. Marshall: I did not realize what the 
next question was going to be. I think it is 
only fair then for Mr. Podell to read the 
next sentence of the witness' testimony in 
that other matter. 
The Court: You may read it, Mr. Mar-
shall, when the time comes. This is his cross-
examination. 
Mr. Marshall: Excepting that I think, in 
all fairness he should not read part of a 
statement to the witness and cross-examine 
him on it where the rest explains the former 
part. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr, Marshall: Exception. 
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Q. Now, the sheet that you produced is what, Mr. 
Towell? A. The list of accounts receivable of Fred 
Stern & Company as at December 31st, 1923. 
Mr. Marshall: I think it is marked in evi-
dence, fifteen something or other. 
The Witness: 15-A. 
Q. You understand the things that are contained 
in these papers, do you not? A. Yes. 
Q. They are part of your working sheets in this 
audit? A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell this jury what this No. 8 in 
parenthesis is? A. The No. 8 is to indicate the 
Metropolitan Trust Company, I believe. 
Q. The "8" in parenthesis indicates it stands for 
the Metropolitan Trust Company? A. Yes. 
Q. And how do you arrive at that, how do you 
know that No. 8 represents the Metropolitan Trust 
Company? A. Because there is an index of the 
numbers used. 
Q. And that index is at the top of the page? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And opposite that No. 8 is the word "Metro-
politan Trust Company"? A. Yes. 
Q. And opposite the particular account of $12,-
476.97 is the No. 8? A. Yes. 
Q. And that leads you to infer that that account 
was assigned to the Metropolitan Trust Company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, that is right, is it? A. Yes. 
Q. You have got other numbers in this index that 
we speak of. 7 stands for the Chemical National 
Bank, does it not? A. Yes. 
Q. 4 stands for Huth & Company, does it not? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. 9 stands for the Central Trust Company? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And 14 stands for J. B. Moores? A. Yes. 
Q. And 16 stands for Bank of New York? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And along these accounts receivable you have 
got respective numbers 8, 16, 8, 16 and 7? A. Yes. 
Q. Opposite the different accounts? A. Yes. 
Q. Notice that some of them have several num-
bers? A. Yes. 
Q. That did not mean that the same account had 
been assigned to several different parties, did it? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. What did it mean? A. I don't know. 
The Court: A little louder, Mr. Witness. 
I cannot hear you. 
The Witness: I don't know. 
Q. You do not know what it means? A. No. 
Q. Did you not tell this jury a moment ago that 
you understood everything on these sheets? A. I 
didn't mean that literally with regard to every ab-
breviation, every reference mark and everything 
put down here as the result of my thought on the 
subject five years ago. 
Q. I see. In other words— A. I understand 
Q. When it comes to an account which according 
to that number which seemed to indicate that it 
was assigned to four different parties, then of 
course you cannot understand it? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a con-
clusion that does not follow. That is not a 
question but a statement. 
Q. Can you? 
2195 
2196 
733 
Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Cross. 2197 
The Court: Is that a question, Mr. Podell? 
Mr. Podell: I think it is a fair question, 
your Honor. I have asked him as to whether 
that number opposite the account indicates 
an assignment to a particular party which 
has that number. Now he has an account 
here with four different numbers, and I am 
asking him whether that would not indicate 
to him that there were four different assign-
ments of the same account. 
The Court: I will allow it in the form 
that you have just asked it. 
Mr. Podell: I will reframe it. 
Mr. Marshall: I have no objection in the 
form you have asked it now. 
Q. Would that indicate that to you or are you 
in a frame of mind where you do not understand it? 
The Court: I beg your pardon? 
Mr. Podell: In the alternative. I am add-
ing to the question, with your Honor's per-
mission. 
Q. Would that mean that it has been assigned to 
four different parties or are you in a frame of mind 
where you do not understand that item? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the frame of 
mind. If he wants to see if he does not un-
derstand it, all right. 
Mr. Podell: All right, I will cut out the 
frame of mind and say, or don't you under-
stand it? 
The Witness: I do not understand it, the 
significance of the four numbers to-day. 
Q. Opposite the same account? A. Yes. 
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Q. All right, now, we will find out something 
about it. By the way, those numbers are in your 
own handwriting, are they not, Mr. Towell? A. No. 
Q. In whose handwriting are they? A. In Mr. 
Siess'. 
Q. Is it on a sheet that contains your handwrit-
ing, is it not? A. Yes. 
Q. Pardon me just one moment, I want to be 
sure that I have got the right book. I want to show 
you, Mr. Towell—I do not suppose you recall this 
book that I am going to show you now at all, do 
you (handing to witness)? You have no recollec-
tion of this book? A. No. 
Mr. Podell: We are speaking of Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 4 in evidence, which purports 
to be—you will admit that this purports to 
be the accounts receivable ledger, is that 
right ? It seems to be an accounts receivable 
ledger? 
The Witness: Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, we talked about No. 8 at the top of your 
work sheets. Do you see that No. 8 in the same 
kind of a circle or parenthesis in the accounts re-
ceivable ledger? A. I see the No. 8 there, yes. 
Q. Now, we talked about a No. 16, 14 and 16. Do 
you see it opposite certain accounts here, 14 and 
16? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall these numbers at all opposite 
these accounts in the accounts receivable ledger? 
A. No. 
Q. Where was this key gotten from? This is a 
key, is it not, of the numbers and opposite the num-
bers the names of bank assignees? A. Yes, 
Q, Where was it gotten from? A. From Mr. 
Romberg. 
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Q. From his mind? A. No. From a record that 
he kept in his office, in Fred Stern's office. 
Q. Well now, won't yon be good enough to look 
through as many of these accounts receivable as 
you please, and tell this jury whether it is not true 
that every one of them—I am speaking now not of 
every account but every one of the general accounts, 
not of every item in the account—contains paren-
thesis with numbers opposite to them which are 
similar to the key numbers? Just look it through 
and see if that is not so? A. Here is an account 
that does not seem to have key numbers in paren-
thesis (indicating). 
Q. Whose account is that? A. E. G. Curry & 
Company. 
Q. E. G. Curry & Company. We will make a 
note of that. How about the others? I want to 
be sure that you have not overlooked some of these 
parentheses. Turn to the Ceylon Produce Manu-
facturing Company and you have the numbers in 
parenthesis in a number of these items? A. On a 
number of items but not on all of them. Cordux 
Company, that does not appear 
Q. Wait a moment. A. That does not appear to 
have any numbers in parenthesis. 
Q. Do you happen to know what "C D " and " P 
R " and "C R"—what they mean? A. They are 
reference marks probably to other books. 
Q. Now, you take the account of Cooper Corpo-
ration, and you find numbers 7, 9, 4, 8 all along the 
line? A. Cooper Company; some of them are desig-
nated with a number in parenthesis. Some of them 
are not. 
Q. Wi l l you turn to the account of International 
Shoe Company, and you will find a number of ac-
counts with these small key numbers opposite them? 
A. And some without. 
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Q. And some without. You say a number with-
out, Mr. Towell. Just analyze that for a moment. 
Here is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15 with numbers 
opposite them? A. Yes. 
Q. And 1, 2—that is also one? A. Yes. 
Q. 1, 2, 3—three without numbers? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, have we gone far enough so 
you could tell this jury whether you have any rec-
ollection at all of seeing these numbers in the ac-
counts receivable ledger at the time and using them 
in connection with your work sheets? A. I have no 
recollection of so doing. 
Q. It has gone out of your mind altogether? A. 
I don't think that I did that. 
Q. Well, whether you personally did it or not, 
have you any recollection of having discussed it 
with anybody at any time? 
Mr. Marshall: Discussed what? 
Q. Have you discussed this matter of having 
numbers opposite the accounts that were key num-
bers to whom the accounts had been assigned? A. 
No. 
Q. Did Mr. Siess tell you anything about that? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, what book was it that you made up your 
statement of accounts receivable from? A. From 
the accounts receivable ledger. 
Q. Look at this book and tell us—I know you 
cannot identify it as the particular accounts re-
ceivable ledger, but just look at it and tell us 
whether it purports to be an accounts receivable 
ledger for the year 1923? A. It appears to be an 
accounts receivable ledger for more than the year 
1923. 
Q. That is, at least it includes at least the year 
1923? A. It seems to. 
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Q. And is not that the book in connection with 
which you identified every one of your accounts, 
found them in that book, found them in the order 
in which you have them; do you remember that, at 
the beginning of the trial? A. No, I don't remember 
identifying the accounts. 
Q. We do not want to keep the Judge and jury 
waiting while you are doing it, but will you please, 
between now and to-morrow morning, check up that 
book and answer us whether you can find—and tell 
us where your sheets contain exactly the accounts 
receivable as they are set forth in this accounts re-
ceivable ledger, and in the order in which they are 
set forth in the accounts receivable ledger? Will 
you make a note of that and do that for us between 
now and to-morrow morning, please, Mr. Towell? 
You know what I want? A. I did about 50 per cent. 
of the accounts receivable for you. 
Q. And did you find from the 50 per cent. that 
you did, that it tallied exactly, that is, the order 
was exactly the same? A. The order and the bal-
ance. 
Q. And the name of the balance and the amounts, 
the amounts? A. The balance. 
Q. The balance of each account? A. Yes. The 
balance of each account. 
Q. That is what I call amounts, the balance of 
each account? A. Yes. 
Q. Tallied exactly with this book? A. Yes. 
Q. But you have no recollection of those numbers 
opposite the accounts? A. No. 
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, I want you to tell the Judge 
and the jury, please—I am going to put the question 
just as plainly as I can—did you find in your in-
vestigation that a number of accounts receivable 
had been assigned, the same account, as of a speci-
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fled date, had been assigned to different people? A. 
I saw a number of cases where that had occurred. 
Q. Now, is that a usual thing? A. I would not 
say so. 
Q. Is it an honest thing for a creditor who has 
somebody owing him money to assign that account 
to several people at the same time? A. I don't 
know that they did do that. 
Q. But assuming now that you find that state of 
affairs that you have described, and assuming that 
they did it, would you consider it an honest thing? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, have you taken the position previously 
that you cannot explain that situation as you found 
it? A. I don't think that I have. 
Q. Don't you know that your superior took that 
position? A. No, I do not. 
Q. I will read from pages 1392 and 1393 of the 
testimony of Mr. Rea, in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing 
Mr. Marshall: I object to reading what 
Mr. Rea may have known or may not have 
known, as immaterial. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Mr. Rea was your superior in this audit, was 
he not? A. Yes, he was. 
Q. "The fact that we have a letter from Bingham 
& Company stating that the accounts assigned to 
them and no statement on our work sheets that 
Frederick Stern & Company had reported accounts 
as having been assigned to them, would call for 
some memorandum at least as to what was the rea-
son for that. There is none there. I cannot ex-
plain it." Did you know that Mr. Rea had made 
such a statement as that? 
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being 
immaterial, what Mr. Rea may have known. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. What is your answer? A. I don't recall that 
he made the statement. I don't remember whether 
I was present or not. 
Q. I read you the exact part of it as it appears 
in this book: "Well" 
Mr. Marshall: What page? 
Mr. Podell: Page 1392, examination of 
Mr. Rea. 
Mr. Marshall: He has already read it, 
your Honor. He is going to read it over 
again. 
Mr. Podell: I want to read it right from 
the book, your Honor, and ask this witness 
whether he knew of the existence of this 
statement by his superior. 
Mr. Marshall: But he has already asked 
him that. 
The Court: Is that different from the ex-
tract you were reading from? 
Mr. Podell: It may be a little different, 
because I think my extract was condensed. 
It omitted the question. I only had the an-
swer. 
The 'Court: Would that make the answer 
any different now, Mr. Podell? 
Mr. Podell: No. If your Honor thinks 
I ought not to read it again, I will not read 
it. 
The Court: He has answered it. 
Q. Now, do you agree with this, Mr. Towell: "If 
more than one account had been assigned doubly, 
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the more they found the worse it would have looked. 
It would be his, the accountant's duty to go into 
it to the fullest extent and find out what the real 
facts are." Do you agree with that statement? A. 
Yes, substantially. 
Q. Do you know that statement was made by 
your superior, Mr. Rea? A. No, I do not know that. 
Q. Page 1391 of the record. 
Mr. Marshall: This record or the bank-
ruptcy record? 
Mr. Podell: The bankruptcy record. 
Mr. Marshall: What page was that, 
please? 
Mr. Podell: 1391. I may have done the 
same thing, Mr. Marshall, and that is why 
I prefer to read from the record itself. I 
may have omitted or briefed some parts of 
it, 
Mr. Marshall: If you give us the page 
number so we can follow, it will be all right. 
Mr. Podell: The top of the page: 
"Q. Suppose, Mr. Rea, that your examination 
discovered that there had been one account so as-
signed to two or three different banks, what would 
have been the ordinary result or what effect would 
that have had on you? A. Why, a single account 
would not necessarily have meant anything. We 
would have inquired about it and the probable an-
swer would have been, 'Well, that is a mistake; in 
listing that account for the bank we got this to the 
other bank; that should have been to somebody 
else.' I am answering now if there had been only 
one account. 
"Q. Well, if there had been more than one ac-
count? A. The more they had found, the worse it 
would have looked. 
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"Q. What would the accountant do in such a 
situation? A. I t would be his duty to go into it 
to the fullest extent and find out what the real facts 
are." 
Q. Now, you agree with that, do you? A. Sub-
stantially, yes. 
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, you told this jury 
that you were quite satisfied with the explanation 
that Romberg gave. Is not that what you said to 
this jury, that you were satisfied with the explana-
tion that Romberg gave? A. I don't remember so 
stating. 
Q. With reference to the assigned accounts? A. 
With reference to the assigned accounts? 
Q. Yes. A. I don't recall the explanation re-
ferred to. 
Q. Did you not testify that Mr. Romberg kept a 
private memorandum, that he gave you his list 
of assigned accounts, that it was larger than any 
other list you could find, and that you thought it 
was the fair thing to take his list because it was 
the largest; did you not say that? A. Not all of 
that. 
Q. Well, what part of it did you not say? A. 
Substantially all of it, but not that he Kept a 
private account. 
Q. Was that one of the regular books of account 
that Mr. Romberg had in that connection? A. It 
was a book kept by him as an employee of the cor-
poration. 
Q. Was it one of the regular books of account? 
A. I would say so. 
Q. What would you call it? Was it a journal 
or a ledger, or anything that had a scientific name, 
an accountant's name? A. No. It was in the nature 
of a memorandum record. 
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Q. A little black book of his own, is what you 
called it, is it not? A. No. 
Q. A little private book of his own? A. No, it 
was not of his own. 
Q. Is not that how you characterized it? A. No. 
Q. Did you find that out in the examination? Of 
course, the inquiries that you made did not satisfy 
you, did it? A. Yes. 
Q. You did write inquiries to the banks and 
other concerns, to find out whether they held any 
of these accounts as collateral? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you not tell this jury that the responses 
that you got satisfied you? A. No. 
Q. Your answer is that they were anything but 
satisfying, is not that right? A. It did not dis-
close what we thought they might disclose had they 
all replied. 
Q. Without using a general phrase, did those re-
sponses give you a satisfactory explanation as to 
why single accounts should be assigned to different 
people at a certain specified time? A. No. 
Q. They did not, As a matter of fact, did they 
not all the more arouse your suspicion of something 
dishonest? A. No. 
Q. Well, the transaction itself, I believe, you 
have stated is a dishonest one, that is, for a creditor 
to assign the same account as collateral to different 
people at the same time; that is a dishonest thing, 
is it not? A. Yes, if that is a fact, it is dishonest. 
Q. So we will all understand each other, is it 
not one of the primary functions of an accountant 
when he audits a set of books and examines them 
for a year, to determine whether he is dealing with 
an honest set of books or a crooked set of books; 
is not that one of the prime functions that an ac-
countant performs? A. It is not a prime function. 
It is something that he would in the natural course 
of events decide for himself, not primarily. 
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Q. Well, I am not now—I am not now saying 
what in the course of time he might decide. You 
know how easy it is to be deceived, do you not? 
You know how easy it is to be deceived, do you not, 
in figures at times, with reference to specific items? 
Do you not know how easy it is at times to be de-
ceived with reference to specific items? A. No. 
Q. You do not know? A. No, I don't know how 
easy it is. 
Q. You do not know how easy it is to be de-
ceived? A. No. 
Q. In any event, in the performance of your duty 
as an accountant, do you not regard it as one of 
the main objects of your job, when you are auditing, 
to find out whether you are dealing with an honest 
man, that is, in the keeping of the books, an honest 
man or a dishonest man? A. That is not the main 
object of auditing. 
Q. I did not say it was the main object. Is it 
not one of the main objects? A. It is not one of 
the objects. 
Q. Is it not one of the main functions then, is it 
not one of the main considerations, if you want it 
that way? A. Yes, a main consideration, I would 
say. 
Q. You would not certify to the honesty of a 
financial statement .as of a certain time if you be-
lieved that the man and his books were dishonest, 
would you? A. I would not, 
Q. You would not give such a certification where 
you had a strong suspicion as to his honesty? A. 
No. 
Q. Or any suspicion reasonably founded as to the 
man's honesty, would you? A. No. 
Q. An accountant should not do those things, 
should he? A. I don't think so. 
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Q. Now, then, do tell us, please, whether if it is 
true that in the very letters that were written to 
Touche, Niven & Co., by Huth & Company and 
Bingham & Company, there was not in writing, 
direct evidence to you, that Stern & Company was 
keeping a dishonest set of books at least in the as-
signment of accounts? A. I don't think that there 
was. 
Q. Do you recall on many accounts appears from 
those two letters when you compare them with the 
black book or the little book or whatever memoran-
dum book that you call it, that you believed in 
from Mr. Romberg—how many of those accounts 
appeared to be assigned to more than one concern 
at the same time? A. I don't know that. 
Q. You never checked it? A. No. 
Q. You did know that there were a number? 
A. I knew that several differences cropped up 
either between the letters or the list of assigned 
accounts that I obtained. 
Q. Some of the banks that you made inquiry of 
wrote you that they would not give you the informa-
tion, but if you will give them a list of the assigned 
accounts, purporting to be assigned to that bank, 
they would check it up for you; do you remember 
that? A. I haven't the recollection of it. It may 
be in the working papers. 
Q. Well, do you not remember that? Who else 
besides Huth & Company and Bingham & Company 
answered, giving a list of the accounts that had 
been assigned to them? A. I don't know, not off-
hand. That is shown by the working papers. 
Q. Now, you saw the letter of Bingham & Com-
pany, did you not? You saw that letter, did you 
not? A. Yes, if it is one of the letters on my 
papers here. 
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Q. Will you be good enough to take that letter 
and look over your list on your working sheets and 
tell us whether a single account that Bingham & 
Company claim to have assigned to them as of De-
cember 31st, appears in your working sheets as be-
longing to Bingham & Company, a single one? Now, 
to facilitate you, Mr. Towell—it is getting a little 
late and we want to get through—I am going to 
read you from the letter of Bingham & Company. 
The Court: He has it there in the work-
ing sheets, has he not? 
Mr. Podell: I am going to read from a 
copy. 
Q. Mr. Towell, perhaps that will help us get at 
the fact a little quicker. Letter of January 12th, 
from Bingham & Company, says: "In accordance 
with your letter of the 3rd inst., we enclose here-
with"—this is a letter addressed to Touche-Niven 
—"statement of account of Messrs. Fred Stern & 
Company of New York and Messrs. William 
Brandt's Sons & Company, of London, as of De-
cember 31, 1923. Very truly yours, Bingham & 
Company." 
Bingham & Company, your Honor, were the 
agents here for Brandt & Sons. Now, first, we will 
take the collateral account, in the middle of the 
page. Have you got that before you? A. Yes, I 
have. 
Q. Now, will you turn to your work sheets, the 
first one that they claimed belonged to them was an 
item of $3,255.71, an account receivable from the 
Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Company, for fifty 
cases of rubber, November 20, 1923. Have you got 
that on your work sheets, and tell us, if you have 
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it, to whom is that account assigned according to 
your work sheets? A. I don't see the account on 
my work sheets. 
Q. As a matter of fact, there is a credit balance 
to that account of $8.99. Does that help you any? 
A. No. 
Q. As a matter of fact, is that very first account 
contained in the accounts receivable ledger at all, 
do you know, or was it? A. Not from what I see 
here. 
Q. So that your statement is that you could not 
find the account in the books at all, according to 
your work sheet. Now, will you look at your work 
sheet, page 64, fourth item, under "S", Safety In-
sulating Wire & Cable Company, 114 Liberty 
Street. Have you got that? A. Page 104? 
Q. Page 64 of your work sheets, Mr. Towell, 
please. A. Yes. 
Q. Do you notice the Safety Insulating Wire & 
Cable Company? A. Yes. 
Q. Did Stern owe them money or do they owe 
Stern money, which, according to your work sheets? 
A. According to my work sheets, Stern owed the 
Safety Insulating Wire & Cable Company $8.99. 
Q. As of December 31st? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, this is the very first item in Bingham's 
letter, and Bingham's claim is that he held an ac-
count that had been assigned to him, where the 
Safety Insulating Wire & Cable Company owed 
Stern $3,255.71. You notice that, do you not? A. 
Yes. 
Q. You could find no such account in Stern's 
books, could you? A. I don't know. 
Q. What do your work sheets show? A. My 
work sheets show what you have recited, that 
Bingham & Company reported that they held an 
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invoice $3,255.71; they give the name of the ac-
count as the Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Com-
pany. I have no such item in the trial balance of 
accounts receivable. 
Q. In fact, the only item that there was in the 
trial balance was that Stern owed $8.99 to this 
Safety Company? A. Yes. 
Q. Have you any explanation to furnish for that, 
Mr. Towell? A. Only that possibly Bingham & 
Company are not right. 
Q. Possibly Bingham & Company? A. Yes. 
Q. Romberg is right? A. No, I don't say that he 
was. 
Q. But Romberg told you, did he not—what did 
you do to investigate? A. I was trying to find out 
what the total amount of accounts receivable as-
signed was, and he indicated the total accounts that 
were assigned. 
Q. Pardon me, but you did more than that—you 
asked for a detailed statement from Bingham & 
Company of the accounts they were holding? A. I 
thought they would report the total. 
Q. But your inquiry, your letter—you read your 
letter? A. Yes. 
Q. Your letter called for a detailed statement of 
the accounts assigned, did it not? A. Yes. 
Q. And you got what you asked for? A. In that 
case, yes. 
Q. Did you communicate with Bingham & Com-
pany and tell them that they were not right in mak-
ing that statement? A. No. 
Q. Did you put into the financial statement that 
you issued a note or qualification that claims were 
being made by people as holding accounts receiv-
able as collateral, and that those claims were not 
well founded? A. No. 
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Q. Did you put any qualifying statement in your 
financial statement? A. I think the certificate 
speaks for itself. 
Q. Of that character? A. No, not of that char-
acter. 
Q. Now, of course, we will always assume that if 
you find one instance that is not regular or does 
not accord with the books, which might be a mis-
take— A. No, I don't agree with that. 
Q. Well, you said that here, as in this instance, 
Bingham & Company were not right? A. Yes. 
Q. And it may be that Bingham & Company had 
made a mistake? A. It may be. 
Q. Sure. Well now, here you take that next 
item, Guttapercha & Rubber Manufacturing Com-
pany account for $1,857.23, that Bingham & Com-
pany claim; now, what did your work sheets taken 
from Romberg's little black book, show on that? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not see why Mr. 
Podell should limit the size of that black 
book. 
Mr. Podell: That is what he called it in 
his examination under 21-A and I will show 
that to him. 
Q. What is your answer? A. That the account 
was assigned. 
Q. To whom? A, Using the reference marks as 
they are recorded here, it was assigned to the 
Chemical National. 
Q. Well, using Romberg's book? 
The Court: Using Romberg's book, what? 
Q. Using Romberg's book, whom would it appear 
to have been assigned to, that Guttapercha and 
Mfg. Company account? A. The Chemical National, 
I believe. 
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Q. The Chemical National. Now here you found 
a situation—by the way, do you know Bingham & 
Company? A. No. 
Q. Do you know Brandt & Sons? A. No. 
Q. Did you look up the invoice, a copy invoice 
of that assigned account? A. No. 
Q. You know, did you not, that the usual practice 
and procedure is that when an account is assigned 
that you send a copy of that assigned account with 
an assignment endorsed on the face thereof, to the 
person to whom you are assigning the account; you 
knew that, did you not? A. I believe they sent both 
that and the original invoice to the person that re-
ceived the assigned account. 
Q. Now, here was a situation where Bingham & 
Company was claiming that it was the holder of the 
account as collateral $1,857.23. Your records or 
Romberg's records or the little key number showed 
it belonged to the Chemical National Bank? A. 
No, they do not. 
Q. Don't they? A. No, they show there is an 
assignment, which I cannot tell from here, of an 
account totalling $4,249. The assignment you are 
speaking of to the Guttapercha Rubber Company's 
invoice of $1,857 is to Bingham & Company. 
Q. Is not that included in the $4,249.22? A. 
Yes, but I don't know whether it was possible for 
there to have been a division of the two items. The 
two items are not the same. 
Q. Now, my dear sir, you were in there to find 
out. You were there at that time to find out, were 
you not? A. No, I was not there to find that out. 
Q. To find out if any of these items that you say 
appeared to have been assigned to two different 
people, would be evidence of dishonesty—can you 
not tell this jury whether the $1857 is included in 
the $4249? A. Yes, it Avas included in it, 
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Q. It was included? A. Yes, no doubt. 
Q. In other words, all that the Guttapercha Rub-
ber Manufacturing Company owed for this was, a 
genuine account of $4,249.22? A. Yes. 
Q. And yet you stated, have you not, that your 
records, your work sheets, show that it had all been 
assigned as collateral to the Chemical National 
Bank? A. No, they don't show that the whole 
amount had been assigned to the Chemical National 
at all. The key merely indicates that the account 
or part of it is assigned. 
Q. Part of it is assigned? A. The account or part 
of it is assigned to the Chemical National. Wheth-
er there are any errors in taking off this key, I 
brought no particular examination on to that point, 
knowing at the start off that it was impossible for 
me to check out assigned accounts. 
Q. Now, let us go along and get the information 
first, and then you can make these arguments, but 
will you please turn 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his qualifying 
the witness' statements as arguments when 
he just answers a question Mr. Podell puts. 
Mr. Podell: All I ask him was a simple 
question. I asked him whether it is not so, 
that the full account had been assigned to 
the Chemical National and he said 
Q. And your answer was that it is not so but only 
a part had been assigned? A. That is not my an-
swer at all. 
Q. What is your answer, that you do not know? 
A. My answer is that you cannot tell from this 
sheet whether all of it or part of it was assigned to 
the Chemical National but you can tell that all of 
the account was assigned to somebody. 
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Q. Yes. Now, will you turn over to the very next 
page of your work sheet and tell us whether it is 
not true that where one account is partly assigned 
to one institution and partly to another, that your 
work sheets have so indicated? Will you look at 
the item of an account of $128,789 that you have 
there split up into two parts, having two separate 
numbers opposite those parts, Mishawaka Rubber 
Manufacturing Company, the first item under "M"? 
A. Yes, I have it. 
Q. You have it separated there, have you not? 
A. Out of a total of the account of $167,000. 
Q. Part was assigned to one and part to another, 
and the rest did not appear to be assigned, and have 
you so indicated on there? A. Yes, I have indicated 
that. 
Q. Now, have you got anything on your work 
sheets that shows that this Guttapercha Rubber ac-
count for at least $1,857 of it had been assigned to 
Bingham? Is there anything on your work sheets 
that indicates that? A. Only the letter that we have 
been referring to, which is part of the work sheets. 
Q. I am not talking about the letters. The let-
ter is the thing that came from Bingham, that made 
the claim of that assignment to Bingham? A. Yes. 
Q. I am talking now about the work sheets that 
you have, where there is a list of assigned accounts? 
A. No. I have nothing other than the letter, which 
is part of the work sheets. 
Q. Now, according to that letter, and according 
to your work sheet records, the two are inconsis-
tent, are they not? A. I cannot say that. 
Q. You mean to say that part of that $4200 
might have been assigned to Bingham without there 
being any record of it on your work sheets? A. It 
may have. 
Q. It still may have? A. I think so. 
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Q. Then your work sheets would not be correct, 
would they? A. Not if that were the case. 
Q. If that were the case then your work sheets 
would not be correct? Then either Bingham was 
wrong again or your work sheets were wrong? A. 
One or the other. 
Q. One or the other? A. Yes. 
Q. And you concluded Bingham was wrong, did 
you not? A. No. I didn't conclude anything. 
Q. You came to no conclusion at all on the sub-
ject? A. No, except I couldn't check them up. 
Q. Could not check them up, is that the state-
ment? A. The total. 
Q. You have frequently said that you tried to 
check them up in total. Do your work sheets indi-
cate any efforts on your part to check them up in 
total? Just point it out if it does. A. The attempt 
was not recorded on the working papers. The de-
cision was recorded on the working papers. 
Q. The what? A. The decision of what to do is 
recorded on the working papers, and shows on the 
sheets we have been discussing. 
Q. What was Romberg's total? A. I beg your 
pardon? 
Q. What was Romberg's total of assigned ac-
counts? A. This $903,285. 
Q. What was the banks' total? A. I don't re-
member that figure. 
Q. Have you got it anywhere on your working 
sheets? A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. You told this jury that Romberg's total ex-
ceeded the banks' total? A. Yes. 
Q. And that is why you took Romberg's figure; 
is that right; is that what you said? A. That is not 
the only reason, just because it exceeded. 
Q. That was one of the reasons? A. Yes. 
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Q. You have got nothing among your work sheets 
to show that you ever computed the banks' totals, 
have you? A. I don't think so. 
Q. And your work sheets are supposed to be com-
plete, are they not? A. Oh, no, not by any means. 
Q. Have you destroyed any of them? A. No, I 
have not, I would destroy any scraps of paper I 
might make a calculation on during the progress 
of the work. I do not record everything on the 
work sheets. 
Q. Then is it your intention to have the jury un-
derstand that you did make a calculation of the 
banks' claims? A. Yes, I would like them to under-
stand that. 
Q. You knew at the same time that a number of 
the banks did not give you the information? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And you did not have the figures supplied by, 
the banks? A. I didn't have all of them. The cal-
culation 
Q. Let me read you one letter that a bank wrote, 
and ask you a question about that, Do you remem-
ber the response from the Central Trust & Savings 
Company, January 11th, saying: "Yours of the 
3rd received and at the close of business as of De-
cember 31, 1923, Fred Stern & Company owed us 
$165,714.72, secured by customers' acceptances and 
assigned accounts for us, valued at $209,246.17. It 
is rather difficult for us to give you the details of 
this obligation, and if you will make up a list of 
the acceptances and accounts, we will endeavor to 
check them on our books and certify to the correct-
ness of the same. Yours very truly," signed by the 
vice-president. You know this is not an unusual 
letter to get from a bank in that connection, is it? 
A. It is unusual in my experience. 
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Q. Do you not know that banks very frequently 
give you totals and refuse you—or rather ask you 
to submit details ? Do you not know that happens 
very often in this connection? A. It is not frequent. 
Q. But it does happen? A. It does happen, yes. 
Q. Now, ordinary courtesy requires that an an-
swer be sent on to this bank, does it not? 
Mr. Marshall: Is Mr. Podell posing as an, 
expert on courtesy now? 
Mr. Podell: I am assuming that your 
client is, Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Do you not think, just as a matter of courtesy, 
even, that you should have written to that bank, giv-
ing them a detailed statement, as you had it? A. 
I don't think on the basis of courtesy they should 
have had a reply. 
Q. On what basis? On what basis should you 
have done it? A. On no basis that I know of. 
Q. You mean you should not have done it at all, 
is that it? A. That is it. 
Q. In spite of the fact that in this Bingham let-
ter you find a number of items claimed by Bingham 
which even according to Romberg's records were 
not right, conflicting claims to the same account; in 
spite of that fact, you still think that you were not 
at all required to respond to this letter of the bank 
and give them the details? A. Yes, I think that is 
so. 
Q. You think that? A. Yes. 
Q. The fact of the matter is that you never re-
sponded; is not that so? 
The Court: To the bank. 
Q. That you never did respond to this letter of 
the bank asking for a detailed statement, did you? 
A. I don't recall responding. 
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Q. You would have a copy of such a letter, would 
you not, in your files? A. I wouldn't have it with 
the working papers. At least I think not. 
Mr. Marshall: There was no response. 
Mr. Podell: It is stipulated there was no 
response? Is that right? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. This witness has been 
on the stand five and a half hours to-day 
The Court: We will be finished in a little 
while. 
Q. Did you not say this morning that there was 
no way you could follow up this inquiry further? 
A. I didn't get one of those words. 
Q. Did you not state this morning there was no 
way you could follow up these inquiries as to as-
signed accounts any further? A. Any further than 
I did. 
Q. Any further than you did? A. Than I did. 
Q. Here was an invitation by the bank, to let 
them have a detailed statement of the accounts that 
had been assigned. They stated they will certify 
to the correctness of it; written by the Vice Presi-
dent of the Central Trust & Savings Company. 
Why did you not regard this as a further oppor-
tunity to check up on the accounts assigned? A. 
Because I didn't think at the time that it was 
necessary. 
Q. You believed in Romberg? A. And in all the 
records that were kept by him. 
Q. And all the records that you found? A. Yes. 
Q. Including the records of inventory that you 
had found? A. Yes, 
Q. Now then, just so that we might save time, 
can you say to this jury whether a single one of 
these numerous accounts that Bingham & Company 
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claimed as collateral, appear on your working 
sheets as having been assigned to Brandt & Sons 
or Bingham? The number are twenty-one of ac-
counts receivable, invoices, assigned invoices of 
merchandise. Can you state whether there is a 
single one of them that appears in your working 
sheets to have been assigned either to Brandt or to 
Bingham? A. I cannot say that offhand. I would 
have to check through. 
Mr. Podell: That is something, I take it, 
your Honor, we will do over night. I do not 
know how long your Honor intends to sit. 
The Court: Do I remember that other re-
quest you made regarding those other items? 
Mr. Podell: I think, your Honor 
The Court: Because it is understood that 
he examined fifty per cent. Was that suffi-
cient for you? 
Mr. Podell: I think the witness said he 
checked up on fifty per cent. and that was 
sufficient for my purposes. As an added pre-
caution, I will ask him to check up on the 
other fifty per cent, I am glad your Honor 
suggested it. Mr. Towell, will you be good 
enough to check up the other fifty per cent.? 
Mr. Marshall: I think the witness would 
like a little time to do his work. 
The Court: Was the answer he gave as 
to the fifty per cent, satisfactory to you? 
Mr. Podell: I t was satisfactory to me, 
but I think undoubtedly it would be more 
satisfactory if he checked up as to the other 
fifty per cent. 
Mr. Marshall: The witness has to attend 
to some business, I believe, some time during 
the day. 
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Mr. Podell: If they will take our state-
ment for these, we will be glad to check it 
up ourselves and save him that. We have 
no desire to annoy this witness. 
The Court: I just want to have that 
clarified, so when you meet the situation in 
the morning, we will know where we stand. 
I do not care whether he checks it up or not, 
and neither do you, Mr. Podell, I suppose, 
but I just want the situation clarified so he 
understands what we are about, 
Mr. Podell: Mr. Towell, if you will do 
. that? Can you do it between now and to-
morrow morning? You said you checked up 
fifty per cent, for me. Will you check up 
the other fifty per cent. and make it 100 
per cent. I will offer in that connection 
to do it either myself or by an accountant, 
if they will accept my statement that they 
tally. 
Mr. Marshall: If you do it yourself, I 
will accept it. 
Mr. Podell: That is a statement, that you 
are going to accept my word for it. 
Mr. Marshall: If you do it yourself. 
The Court: Tomorrow morning, gentle-
men, at 10 o'clock. 
(Whereupon at 4:30 o'clock P. M., ad-
journment was taken until tomorrow, Wed-
nesday, April 10, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.) 
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New York, April 10, 1929, 
10 o'clock A. M. 
EIGHTH DAY. 
Trial Continued. Same appearances. 
SYDNEY TOWELL, witness on behalf of the defend-
ant, resumed, further testified as follows: 
Cross-examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Have you been able to check those things, 
Mr. Towell? I mean the letter from Bingham? A. 
I have looked over the items you asked me to, 
yesterday. 
Q. How many are there altogether under col-
lateral, in the way of accounts receivable that Bing-
ham claimed that were assigned to Brandt? A. 
Their letter gives a list of twenty-one invoices. 
Q. On your working sheets, did you give Bing-
ham or Brandt credit for a single one of those in-
voices? Do you note on your work sheets that they 
were the owners or held as collateral a single one 
of those invoices? A. No, I do not. 
Q. NOW, there appears at the head of the letter 
from Bingham a list of notes or acceptances as-
signed to them, is that right? Have you the letter 
or did I keep it, Mr. Towell? A. Yes, I have the 
letter. 
Q. You have the original? A. Yes, that is right; 
there is a list of drafts due them, stated in Sterling. 
Q. Just what were they, just so that the jury and 
his Honor will understand, Mr. Towell, in the 
schedule of collateral that you received from Bing-
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ham & Company there are two sections; one section 
deals with these twenty-one accounts that you 
speak of? A. Yes. 
Q. That they claimed was assigned to them as 
collateral? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the other section deals with what? 
Gives a list of what? A. A list of amounts owing 
by Fred Stern to William Brandt Sons & Company. 
Q. Was that merely the list of advances made by 
Brandt Sons to Stern & Company on Letters of 
Credit? A. Yes. 
Q. And it is not a list of collateral of any kind? 
A. No. 
Q. The first is the draft account, is not that 
right? A. Yes. 
Q. And the second is the collateral account? A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Podell (to the jury) : This is a photo-
stat. Here is the letter that Bingham & 
Company wrote, saying that, "In accordance 
with your letter of the third we enclose here-
with statement of account of Messrs. Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., New York, to Messrs. 
Brandt & Sons of London as of December 
31, 1923." This is the schedule enclosed. 
At the head is draft account, giving a list 
of the drafts, and underneath is the state-
ment of accounts with the amounts that they 
claim to have assigned. The witness says 
there are twenty-one of these. 
Q. Now, we will just try and cover briefly, Mr. 
Towell, if you will help us a little—the letter re-
ceived from Huth & Company. Have you got that? 
Two letters I am told, from Huth & Company. A. 
Do you know the pages? 
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Q. Pages 6 to 11 inclusive, Mr. Towell. Have 
you located it? A. Yes, I have it. 
Q. Do they also give a list of accounts receiv-
able, pledged with them by Stern & Company or as-
signed to them as collateral? A. Yes, they do. 
Q. Now, under Schedule No. 3, Mr. Towell—— 
Mr. Podell: I am asking this question 
with your Honor's permission, to save a 
little time if we can, rather than go through 
twenty-two separate items under this. 
Q. Under Schedule 3, Exhibit 84, we have 
checked the collateral accounts that Huth & Com-
pany claimed, and we find there are twenty-two of 
them, and we find after checking the accounts re-
ceivable that Huth & Company claims were assigned 
to him, with your working sheets, that out of 
the twenty-two, three out of the twenty-two, were 
on your working sheets as having been assigned to 
Huth & Company, and the balance of nineteen ap-
pear, according to your own working sheets, to have 
been assigned to some other institutions. Now, 
do you deny that statement? A. Not entirely, but 
I do say 
Q. Do you want to correct it? A. Yes; I do say 
this 
Q. Just let us have any correction or explana-
tion that you want to make of it? A. This work-
ing sheet is not necessarily an assignment of in-
voices. This indicates, although it is headed "As-
signed," this is a working sheet. 
Q. Yes. 
Q. And it indicates that the account was payable 
according to the ways these notations were made. 
That is, it does not preclude the possibility of an 
invoice being assigned in one of these accounts and 
at the direction of the person to whom it was as-
signed being payable to one of these banks. 
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Q. I am not sure that I follow. 
The Court: That is a little confusing. 
Mr. Podell: I do not suppose we under-
stood that. 
Q. I want you to be perfectly clear about it, Mr. 
Towell; if I am doing you any injustice in this, I 
want you to explain it. You have on your working 
sheets, numbers, little checks and numbers? A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think the jury or 
your Honor has seen it, I think it would be 
perhaps well if you did (showing). 
Q. At the head of the working sheet you have 
certain numbers in parentheses and opposite each 
number you state the name of the particular bank 
or concern, a particular bank or a concern? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Is not that a statement of a key to the num-
ber? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: May I just show it to your 
Honor. It is just at the head. These are 
the numbers and the names I am speaking of 
up above there (indicating). 
The Court: And the numbers are the key 
which represents the particular bank? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: I see. 
Q. Now, on the working sheet proper, opposite 
certain accounts, you have these numbers in paren-
theses, have you not? Do you know what I mean? 
A. Yes. 
Q. These numbers being pratically the same num-
bers as you have up above in the key? A. Yes. 
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Q. And you understood, did you not, or rather 
it is correct to say that wherever you have a number 
in parentheses opposite any account, that that 
means that it has been assigned to the particular in-
stitution that is named opposite the number in the 
key? A. No. It means the account has been as-
signed; it is payable to that bank. 
Q. That is what I mean. A. Yes, but I don't 
know whether it is assigned to that bank for their 
interest. 
Q. You do not know whether it is assigned to 
that bank for their interest ? A. Or for one of their 
customers. 
Q. Oh, I see. You think that it is possible that 
the bank may have acted in behalf of some custom-
er? A. Yes. 
Q. Well, did you not look into that? Did you 
not know that all of these institutions were them-
selves creditors of Stern? A. I recognize the names 
of most of them to-day. My recollection does not 
go back so clearly as that on the subject, 
Q. Naturally, I do not expect you to remember 
every detail, but you do remember, or you would 
have as an accountant—you would have known 
whether these institutions were creditors? A. Yes. 
Q. Now then, assuming at least now for the pur-
pose of my question, that these banks that are 
listed in these key numbers were themselves credi-
tors? A. Yes. 
Q. And that these assignments were to them. 
Then by comparing the claims of Huth & Company 
with your records on your working sheets, you will 
not deny—I am doing this to save time—that only 
three of the Huth & Company accounts claimed by 
Huth & Company appear to be assigned to them, on 
your working sheet? A. On that assumption I will 
not deny that. 
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Q. The assumption being that these banks that 
are listed in key numbers are themselves creditors 
and are not acting for other people? A. No. The 
assumption being that the numeral designating the 
bank means that the account is assigned to that 
bank for its own account. 
Q. For its own account, That is what I mean. 
A. For its own account, yes. 
Q. And that it was not assigned to the bank for 
somebody else's account? A. Yes. 
Q. As far as your working sheets show, however, 
the head of the column has the word "assigned"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And your working sheets, looking at them now 
and reading them now as they appear, would indi-
cate that those accounts were assigned to those par-
ticular banks; in other words, there is nothing— 
A. I wouldn't say that. 
Q. There is nothing on the face of your working 
sheets that would indicate that those banks held 
them for anybody else? A. No, that is true. 
Q. Now, you do not mean to imply that Huth & 
Company might have been represented by any one 
of these banks, do you? A. No, I am not implying 
anything at all. 
Q. And your inquiries, such as they were, did not 
lead you to find any such situation, that the banks 
did not hold it as creditors but held it as trustees 
for somebody else? A. I don't recall at this time. 
Q. Well, you have nothing that would indicate 
that, have you, in the way of any working sheets or 
papers of any kind? A. No. The only indication 
I have is that I was satisfied. 
Q. You were satisfied? A. Yes. 
Q. You said that before? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you observe that in making comparison 
between the Huth & Company letter and the Bing-
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ham letter, there were at least two accounts that 
were being claimed by both Huth and Bingham, two 
invoices? A. I did not make that comparison. 
Q. Who did? A. Until I saw your sheet, I didn't 
know that it had ever been made. 
Q. Nobody compared these two letters? A. Not 
to my present knowledge. 
Q. You testified you did make such a comparison 
on the assignments of notes receivable, did you not? 
A. I do not think so. 
Q. Look at your record B, page 51. Do you see 
on page 51 that you have separate columns, relating 
to these notes receivable headed "Huth," then comes 
a list of them; three or four of them; Berger or 
Praeger, and another list; Central Trust, a list; 
and Mechanics—no, nothing under Mechanics— 
confirmed; and then over above at the head of the 
column you have "confirmed except $28,836.03," and 
then you have got Berger confirmed. A. That is 
something written in there by somebody else. 
Q. Which? A. That word "confirmed." 
Q. Who did the confirming? A. I received let-
ters. I didn't write that on the sheet though. 
Q. Well, that was written by somebody in your 
employ, in the employ of Touche-Niven, but not by 
us. Those are your work sheets? A. I don't iden-
tify the handwriting. 
Q. You do not claim, Mr. Towell, that we ever 
had possession of your original work sheets so that 
we wrote on them? A. No, I claim nothing. 
Q. You do not claim that? A. No, I don't. I 
don't identify the handwriting. That is all. 
Q. You just do not identify it, but the prospects 
are at least that it was written by someone that 
was working on these things with you or in your 
office, Touche, Niven & Co.? A. It might have been 
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in the office. Somebody else can probably tell you. 
Q. That would merely involve a comparison of 
certain documents, would it not, certain letters re-
ceived, confirmations received? A. Yes. 
Q. And if two merchants claimed the same notes 
receivable as assigned to them, this comparison 
would immediately disclose it, would it not? A. 
Yes. 
Q. That was not done with respect to accounts 
receivable, was it? A. No. 
Q. Now, if you will look at your Exhibit 1, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, that is the certificate, you will 
observe that in your statement of assets, you have 
the item "Pledged as collateral to acceptances $ 155,-
914.53"? A. Yes. 
Q. "Notes and trade acceptances receivable held 
by the company $52,818.38, pledged as collateral to 
acceptances $155,944.53"? A. Yes. 
Q. Now then, you have "Trade accounts receiv-
able and sundry debtors held by the company $1,-
349,280.43. Pledged as collateral to acceptances 
$903,285.83." Do you observe those two items? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Now, your statement is that while your firm 
confirmed and compared the matter of the assign-
ments of the $155,000 item, your firm did not make 
such comparison and confirmation with regard to 
the item of $903,285 pledged as collateral, is that 
right? A. By comparison do you mean comparing 
one account with another, classifying all of the in-
voices? 
Q. Comparing all of the matter that I have just 
indicated to the jury, separate accounts which each 
creditor claims were assigned to him to see whether 
or not they overlap? A. No. We did not do that 
specific thing. 
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Q. Now, just a question or two and we will be 
through, Mr. Towell. Do you know Mr. Couchman, 
the author of a work on accountancy? A. I know 
of him. 
Q. Generally recognized as an authority? A. I 
believe he is. 
Q. Now, do you question this statement 
Mr. Marshall: Where are you reading 
from? 
Mr. Podell: I am reading from "Certifica-
tion of balance sheet," page 235 of Couch-
man's work. 
2297 
Q. "Sometimes the accountant does not fully 
verify all the items in the balance sheet, and he 
must qualify his certificate accordingly." Is that 
correct? A. I do not subscribe to that. 
Q. You do not subscribe to that? A. No. 
Q. "Any item of vital importance in the balance 
sheet which for any reason has not been investi-
gated to the satisfaction of the accountant, must be 
mentioned in a qualifying phrase and statement." 
Do you question or dispute that? A. I do not. 
Q. You say you admit that? A. Yes, I agree with 
it. 
Q. "Inventories and accounts receivable are typi-
2298 items of this kind." 
Mr. Marshall: What is the date of this 
book, Mr. Podell? 
Mr. Podell: 1924. Just about the time 
the work was being done. 
Q. The latest book on the subject, apparently, at 
the time when you were preparing this audit? 
Mr, Marshall: He is expressing hopes like 
Mr. Djorup, I suppose. 
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Q. Page 236: "If his test discloses discrepan-
cies" 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his reading 
from this book, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: I am asking a question on it. 
I am asking the same way as Mr. Marshall 
did, that Mr. Marshall set the example for. 
Mr. Marshall: I was not permitted to do 
it that way, Mr. Podell. 
The Court: Yes, you were permitted to 
do it. 
Mr. Marshall: I had to put it in evidence, 
I think. 
- Mr. Podell: Your Honor permitted it. 
Mr. Marshall: I had to put it in evidence 
though. 
The Court: Put what in evidence? 
Mr. Marshall: The book. 
The Court: The book? 
Mr. Marshall: The thing I was reading 
from, upon objection. 
Mr. Podell: There was an article that he 
read and he refused to tell me who wrote it 
and I insisted, and your Honor said he must 
put it in evidence. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. See if you agree with this: "If his test dis-
closes discrepanies a more thorough investigation 
must be made, and if any evidence of fraud or in-
tentional misstatement is found, the accountant 
must not sign even a qualifying certificate until he 
has made a complete verification and is satisfied of 
the accuracy of every amount and classification." 
Do you question that? A. Would you give me the 
first phrase again—if his test? 
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Q. "If his test discloses discrepanies a more 
thorough investigation must be made." A. I agree 
with the statement. 
Q. You do agree with that entire statement? A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have that book? 
Mr. Podell: Yes (handing to counsel). 
Q. I want to ask you, and this too in the interest 
of time saving, but if there is any correction you 
have to make, make it, please, as I read you your 
testimony. We were talking and you were being 
questioned about this item 
Mr. Marshall: Where are you reading 
from? 
Mr. Podell: (Page 3223). The $113,000 
stood as a debit balance in accounts payable, 
did it not? First, you remember you told 
this jury that you were very careful to check 
up thoroughly on the accounts payable; do 
you remember that? 
The Witness: I don't remember making a 
specific point of the care I took over accounts 
payable. 
Q. Well now, did you not tell this jury that in 
the case of accounts payable, you communicated 
with the creditors; did you not say that? A. No. 
Q. And did you not say that in the case of the 
accounts payable you looked into the supporting 
records; you looked at the ledger, you looked at 
the accounts payable ledger and you looked at the 
invoices and you looked at the shipments that were 
received ; do you not remember saying that to the 
jury yesterday? A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you not also say that you communicated 
with the creditors? A. I did with regard to ac-
ceptances payable. Perhaps you refer to that. 
Q. They were acceptances payable, not all ac-
counts payable? A. No, not all accounts payable. 
Acceptances. 
Q. Now, is this true: "Q. When you found this 
particular item of $113,199.60, what did you do, 
step by step?" That was the question. "A. Well, 
in the first place I would have scrutinized this 
schedule which I believed to have been prepared 
by my assistant. I would have scrutinized it and 
I would have noticed particularly that there was an 
item of as much as $113,000 which I would see 
even now is larger than any other item on the 
sheet. I would have noted that it was a debit bal-
ance. I would also have noted mentally at that 
time that it was an item into which I must inquire. 
Just exactly the nature of my inquiry I cannot say 
at this time. I would have asked questions in the 
first place. I would possibly have asked the ac-
countant. I might have inquired from the credit 
man, or I might have had conversations with Mr. 
Stern. I might have asked him whether he was go-
ing to make any arrangements in connection with 
purchasing rubber through the United Baltic or 
just exactly what was the nature of his present 
dealings with them." Now, was that a true state-
ment as you made it at that time? A. I agree with 
it to-day. 
Q. Yes. That is, at the time you were being ques-
tioned, which was in 1925? 
Mr. Shamos: 1926. 
Mr. Podell: Was it 1926? 
Mr. Shamos : March 23rd. 
2306 
2307 
770 
2308 Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Cross. 
Q. March 23, 1926. You stated "just exactly the 
nature of my inquiry I cannot say at this time." 
That was within a year after you had made the 
audit? 
Mr. Marshall: Two years. 
Mr. Podell: 1926. 
Mr. Marshall: Two years. 
Q. Two years after you had made the audit? A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Over two years. Two and 
a half years. 
Mr. Podell: Two and a half years. I 
stand corrected. 
Q. Where you could not recall the nature of your 
inquiry at the time? A. No more than I can to-day. 
Q. Well, you know that you recalled it very clear-
ly yesterday in answer to your counsel? A. Not 
very clearly. I have the note in my working papers, 
and I read from my working papers, with very little 
elaboration of it. 
Q. Do your working papers on that item show 
any explanations by either Stern or Romberg? A. 
They show that I wrote in my own hand that 
Q. No. Please answer the question and then I 
will let you tell what they show. Do they show any 
explanations by either Romberg or Stern? A. They 
don't mention the names. They show explanations. 
Q. Now, let us see how much explanations they 
do show. Let us have that working sheet that deals 
with the United Baltic account. 
The Court: The question is what explana-
tions do they show. 
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Q. Is this your statement, "They show" a line 
written by you, "Sterling deposits for future pur-
chases"? A. Yes. 
Q. That is the only explanation that this paper 
shows? A. Yes. 
Q. Now before that you had when you came to 
the account, "Sterling deposits for future pur-
chases," you had on page 171, "United Baltic 
debtor"; what is the rest of that—balance? A. 
"Balce"—balance "in accounts payable." 
Q. Question mark, is that it? A. Yes. 
Q. And what happened was that you after haying 
had this occasion for inquiry and having had cause, 
as you testified, for scrutinizing it very closely, you 
asked either Mr. Romberg or Mr. Stern, and they 
told you that it was sterling deposits for future 
purchases, advance deposits for future purchases, 
is that it? A. I don't know whether it is or not, 
I don't think that is entirely it. I would not mere-
ly take the statement of Fred Stern or Romberg 
that they were sterling deposits for future pur-
chases without some confirmatory information. 
Q. Then we agree 
Mr. Marshall: Let him finish his answer. 
Mr. Podell: Certainly, I want him to fin-
ish. I did not mean to interrupt him. 
Q. Then we agree—did you finish, Mr. Towell? 
You would not have taken the statement of Rom-
berg and Stern that this was sterling deposit for 
future advances? Do we agree to this extent; that 
a careful accountant should not under the circum-
stances have been satisfied with the mere explana-
tion of Romberg and Stern of such a large item in 
the debit balance as against an account payable? 
A. Not of that, no. He shouldn't have been satis-
fied with such an explanation of this item. 
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Q. Now, can you tell this jury what independent 
source you went to to satisfy yourself about this 
item ? A. The ledger account in all probability, but 
my recollection is not clear as to what other infor-
mation I received. 
Q. My dear sir, the ledger account would show 
you nothing more than what you knew, and that 
was that in the ledger account there was an entry 
under "accounts payable" that the creditor—rather 
the account owed Stern $113,000; that is all that 
would show? A. That is not all that would show. 
Q. What else would that show? A. From that 
account I would be able to discover whether that 
debit balance arose from cash or whether it did not 
arise from cash. 
Q. Would you have done that without going to 
supporting books? A. I don't know. I think the 
ledger account would show of itself whether it was 
cash, but I may have gone to supporting books. I 
cannot recall that. Or I may have gone to support-
ing data. 
Q. With all you know now, you said you would 
not have been satisfied with Romberg's statement; 
you would not have been satisfied, you should not 
have been satisfied with Stern's statement. Did 
you not know that Romberg was the man under 
whose supervision these entries in the ledger ac-
count were being made; did you not know that ? A. 
Under his supervision, yes. 
Q. And you wanted some independent outside 
verification, did you not? A. Do you mean outside 
of Romberg's department? 
Q. You wanted something outside of Romberg? 
A. I wanted more than his word. 
Q. More than his word? A. Yes. 
Q. It was nothing new to you to communicate 
with creditors even as to accounts that were not 
2315 
2316 
773 
Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Cross. 2317 
suspicious or that gave no occasion for scrutiny, 
you had done that with reference to notes and ac-
ceptances? A. This was not a creditor. 
Q. With reference to acceptances. He was in the 
accounts payable ledger, was he not? A. He was 
one of many that were in the accounts payable 
ledger with debit balances. 
Q. You never looked very closely into some of 
the other debit balances, had you? A. Yes, sir, I 
had investigation of all of them. 
Q. You had? A. I had investigation of all of 
them. 
Q. Can you tell the jury whether it is not true 
that as to a number besides United Baltic instead 
of having debit balances there should have been 
credit balances? A. To my knowledge that is not 
true of any of the debit balances. 
Q. Is it not true of United Baltic? A. Not to 
my knowledge. 
Q. You are not satisfied with that yet. A. No-
body has offered satisfaction to me on the point. 
Q. You do not know that invoices for ship-
ments that were sent on here were never entered in 
December, in the United Baltic account for which 
moneys were due? A. No, I do not know that. 
Q. That would be something to you in an exam-
ination of these books, would it not? You did not 
find that to be the case in a number of instances in 
an examination of the inventory, for instance? A. 
It would be something new to me. 
Q. You did not find that to be true in the exam-
ination of the adjustments made on that? 
Mr. Marshall: Can we find out what is 
true? 
The Court: He has laid a basis right 
straight along for the question. 
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Mr. Podell: I think the witness under-
stands. 
The Court: He has come down from a 
long line of questions. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except. 
Q. If there is anything in my question that you 
do not understand, say so, and do not be reluctant 
about it? A. When you switch from accounts pay-
able debit balances to inventory and you say you 
did not find it to be true with regard to the inven-
tory, I do not quite understand. 
Q. You are not clear about the question? A. No. 
Q. I thought we covered that very fully yester-
day, but I will take only a minute with you on 
that, so that we will get that entirely clear. Do you 
remember in my question to you about the inven-
tory, I asked you on one occasion whether that was 
not exactly an instance similar to the United Baltic 
instance, do you remember that, or have you for-
gotten that for the moment? A. I have forgotten 
for the moment, 
Q. In discussing inventory you say that you 
found in these books that merchandise which should 
have been entered in December, that is the liability 
therefor, the money that was due therefor, was not 
entered prior to December, was not entered at all, 
whereas the accounts receivable from the sale of 
that merchandise, were entered as an asset? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And the cash really paid for that merchandise 
was carried as an asset, the cash received, cash paid 
by these customers were carried by these custom-
ers? A. Yes, I believe so. 
Q. Don't you know at this moment that that is 
exactly what happened in the United Baltic ac-
count? A. No, I do not know it. 
2321 
775 
Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Cross. 
Q. At least if that is what happened, the in-
stance would not be new to you, it had happened 
before in inventory? A. Not in that way. 
Q. Not in what way? A. Not in the way of hav-
ing a debit balance on the accounts payable with 
no record whatever of purchases that should also 
have been in that account. 
Q. Did you really believe at that time that this 
concern pledged as it was on almost everything, 
having given collateral to almost every bank, with 
a good many creditors, was really taking money 
and putting $113,000 as an advance payment for 
merchandise to be purchased in the future, did you 
believe that at that time? A. I did believe it. 
Q. You knew that the United Baltic was abroad, 
you knew that that was a foreign institution? A. 
I believed they—that seems to me my recollection 
that they are a foreign concern. 
Q. You testified on your direct examination that 
the United Baltic had demanded in November that 
Stern make payment to them; do you remember 
such testimony? A. No. 
Q. Did you not say that the explanation fur-
nished to you by Stern and Romberg was that they 
made these advance payments because United Bal-
tic had demanded it, was not that your explana-
tion? A. Not in the sense that you put it. It was 
not a demand in that sense. 
Q. They asked for it; it was a request? A. It 
was an arrangement made between the two parties, 
Q. Would not that necessarily have to be in writ-
ing if the United Baltic was abroad, and you knew 
it to be abroad and Stern was here, would not that 
have to be in the form of a letter? A. It might have 
been an understanding with their agent. 
Q. Whose agent? A. The United Baltic, if they 
had one. 
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Q. Who is their agent? A. I do not know. 
Q. Was there an agent here, do you mean, so 
that we did not have to write from aboard; is that 
what you mean? A. I do not know that. 
Q. What put the idea of an agent in your mind? 
Did you know at that time that the United Baltic 
had an agency here in New York? A. I cannot re-
call. 
Q. Did you inquire whether it had or not? A. I 
do not remember that. 
Q. Don't you know that just a two cent stamp 
with a letter of inquiry to the agent or the United 
Baltic would have gotten you independent reliable 
creditors information of the kind that you sought 
with regard to notes receivable, did you know that? 
On this very item which you say you should have 
scrutinized closely? A. Yes, I know the power of 
a two cent stamp. 
Q. I asked you if it is not true that an inquiry 
sent to them by way of a letter would have gotten 
you independent and reliable information at least 
as to what the creditor claimed on that item of the 
account which you say you should have scrutinized 
closely; did you know that? A. I knew that it could 
be done. 
Q. Did you do it? A. No. 
Q. I will ask you whether you agree with this: 
By the way, do you regard Mr. Montgomery as a 
reliable authority in matters of accountancy? A. 
I do. 
Q. Is he not generally referred to and his book 
generally referred to as the Bible of Accountants? 
A. I do not recall ever using the expression or hear-
ing it. 
Q. You have heard it used? A. Perhaps it 
amounts to that. 
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Q. I am reading from page 81 of balance sheet 
audit: "One important point to be kept in mind 
in the balance sheet audit is that an entry on the 
books which purports to record an asset is nothing 
more than a book record and there could be no good 
excuse for accepting such an entry as final. The 
data supporting the entry may be in order, but it 
is the auditor's duty to verify independently as far 
as possible the fact that the asset still exists or did 
exist at the date of the balance sheet, and that it is 
valued correctly." Do you agree with that? A. 
Yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Under the heading, page 119, fictitious ac-
counts receivable: "In many balance sheets ac-
counts receivable from customers are mingled with 
other debit balances. The latter may include ad-
vances to salesmen and others, overdrafts of offi-
cers, claims against railroads, creditors, or the 
government for alleged overcharge of duties, pre-
payments on purchase contracts, guarantees, etc. 
Not infrequently considerable amounts which rep-
resent charges to vendors for goods returned are 
included. Such balances are rarely settled in cash. 
Where the open items consist of cash debits"—in 
the vendor's account, in this United Baltic account, 
that was a cash debit, was it not? A. I believe so. 
Q. It was claimed that that was a cash debit? A. 
I believe so. 
Q. —"I t may be assumed that purchase invoices 
exist which have not yet been credited to the ac-
count." Do you question that? A. I do not ques-
tion that it could be assumed, no. 
Q. You do not question that there may be as-
sumed that purchase invoices, "Where the open 
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items consist of cash debits," and you have a cash 
debit of an open item against the vendor, "It may 
be assumed that purchase invoices exist and which 
have not yet been credited to the account. The 
distinction to be drawn here is that instead of deal-
ing with the accounts in groups, each individual ac-
count must be scrutinized and valued on its merits." 
Do you question or dispute that? A. I do not ques-
tion it at all. 
Q. And that is, as a matter of fact, why you said 
that you should have scrutinized that particular 
account? A. That is why I say I did. 
Q. You say in your examination, " I would have 
scrutinized this schedule, I would have scrutinized 
it and I would have noticed particularly that there 
was an item of as much as $113,000 which I see 
even now is larger than any other item on the sheet, 
and I would have noted that it was a debit balance." 
That is the statement you say is correct? A. Yes. 
Q. "Irregular items." I will read you another 
part of Mr. Montgomery: "The open accounts on 
the ledger should be compared with the schedule of 
accounts payable and it should be ascertained that 
the balances represent specific and recent items 
only " 
Mr. Marshall: Where are you reading 
from now? 
Mr. Podell: Page 268. 
Q. "If not the auditor should find out why not. 
If any account does not look regular in every 
way, the creditor's statement should be procured," 
Do you question that? A. No, I do not question 
that. 
Q. You certainly did not procure any creditor's 
statement from the United Baltic? A. They were 
not creditors. 
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Q. Did you communicate with the United Baltic 
at all? A. No. 
Q. And they were in the list of accounts payable, 
were they not? A. Technically, yes. 
Q. Were not they people from whom he had 
always bought merchandise to your knowledge? A. 
I believe to my knowledge at that time. 
Q. That they had sold merchandise to Stern, did 
you not know that from the very fact that they were 
in the accounts payable ledger? A. I believe that 
is so. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. I have spoken 
with Mr. Marshall and I do not intend to say 
that in any spirit of criticism of the steno-
grapher, but there are some stenographic 
errors all through this record. They are not 
really substantial, but I think that we ought 
to make a note of it, Mr. Marshall and I 
will get together and check them up. They 
do not amount to anything particularly. 
Mr. Marshall: There are some dates 
wrong in a couple of places. 
Mr. Podell: I am having a list made up 
of the items and we will pass on them to-
gether. 
Mr. Marshall: We have not read the record 
over word for word but we have come across 
quite a number of such errors. 
The Court: You may agree upon that be-
tween yourselves and it will be perfectly 
agreeable to me. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Who prepared, as far as you know, the inven-
tory that was handed to you when you came to 
Stern's office? A. Two of the employees in a de-
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partment that took care of the records covering 
inventories of all descriptions. 
Q. And when you discovered these various things 
in connection with the inventory which you thought 
should be adjusted, what explanations were given 
to you to explain these apparent discrepancies? 
A. The first error in the inventory coming to my 
attention caused me to take the matter up with 
Mr. Romberg. The first question I asked was 
whether Romberg had checked the inventory or 
had any of his employees check it. He told me that 
he had been too busy to do it and at the moment 
I was rather annoyed to find that the inventory 
had been handed to me without being checked. I 
made personal inquiry as to who did make the in-
ventory up and personally spoke to the two em-
ployees responsible for making it up. I found that 
their work had not been co-ordinated, that they had 
merely taken a record off of a book without check-
ing back to verify it, and while under ordinary cir-
cumstances I would have turned the inventory back 
to their hands to be checked, the inventory was not 
so large and I decided to do it myself. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Why did you not examine and make tests of 
the sales vouchers in connection with the rubber 
sales account which Mr. Podell asked you about 
yesterday? A. Because I was not interested in the 
profit and loss account. 
Q. That was one of the profit and loss accounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you find that the profit and loss accounts 
were in balance sheet? A. Yes. 
Q. In connection with what accounts did you 
make tests against invoices? A. In connection with 
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the inventory, the accounts receivable. I believe 
that is all. 
Q. And you made no statement and there was no 
statement made in your balance sheet or in the 
certificate that there was a profit and loss account 
accompanying it, was there? A. No. 
Q. Mr. Podell made some point yesterday about 
your recognizing Mr. Siess's handwriting in work 
sheets which are pages 1 to 4 and not recognizing 
it in the general ledger. How does it happen that 
you recognize Siess's handwriting in your work 
sheets? A. Because I only had one assistant, and 
he was Mr. Siess. 
Q. So that you know that the only other man 
who wrote in those work sheets was Mr. Siess be-
sides yourself? A. On these particular sheets, yes. 
Q. You had said that your decision with respect 
to the assigned accounts receivable was shown in 
the work sheets. What decision were you referring 
to there, do you remember that? I think there was 
some question about it. I think it was with respect 
to the bank letters. Those letters written to the 
bank by Touche-Niven were sent out before the 
audit commenced? A. Yes. 
Q. That is the usual course? A. Yes. 
Q. What decision did you make with respect to 
checking up these letters that came in in answer to 
your letters? A. I decided that what I wanted to 
do was to obtain the total amount of the accounts 
assigned in order that I could put that collateral 
information, supplementary information on the 
balance sheet we were to produce. I decided that 
the method of doing this was to take the company's 
record and no other record, giving me a figure that 
would indicate what the total assigned accounts 
would be. 
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Q. Did you consider this as a necessary item in 
the balance sheet, the item of accounts assigned? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. What was your purpose in putting in an item 
of accounts assigned at all? A. I thought it added 
supplementary information of interest to anybody 
looking at the balance sheet. 
Q. You were inclined to check up on the validity 
of the security which was held by the banks, were 
you? A. Not in any way. 
Q. All you wanted to do was to show 
Mr. Podell: Let us have the witness tes-
tify instead of your telling him what he 
wanted to do. 
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw the ques-
tion. 
Q. You knew, did you not, that Stern made a 
practice of substituting accounts from time to time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the nature and purpose, so far as 
you understood it of this book that Romberg had 
which you said gave you the figures of the accounts 
pledged among other things. What was its purpose 
so far as you know? A. Its purpose was to keep a 
running record showing current maturities on in-
voices which would be paid to Stern and obliga-
tions owing by Stern; also to keep track of his po-
sition on letters of credit and all current working 
information of that character; that is, of a char-
acter dealing with the happenings from day to day 
and matters which he had to take care of having 
to do with finance or things of that sort. 
Q. Did it also include information about the ac-
counts that were assigned? A. Yes. 
2345 
2346 
783 
Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Redirect. 2347 
Q. And could you describe that book fairly as 
the book which Romberg used in keeping track of 
the financial condition of the company from day to 
day? 
Mr. Podell: Counsel is still describing 
things for the witness. Why can it not be 
asked how he would describe the book. 
Mr. Marshall: I am trying to shorten it. 
Mr. Podell: It does not describe it. 
The Court: How he would describe this 
book would be a better question. 
Mr. Marshall : I am glad to take your 
Honor's suggestion. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q, How would you describe this book further as 
to its purpose or uses? A. That is its full purpose, 
to keep track of the current happenings, current 
financial happenings of the company and to provide 
a ready reference as to those things that were sup-
posed to happen the next day, and so on, so that 
without looking through all of the individual ac-
counts in the accounts receivable ledger he could 
tell whot invoices were to be collected the next day 
and each day and to whom they had to be paid. 
Q. How many books of account have you dealt 
with as an accountant in the last year, roughly? 
A. I would say over 150 sets of books. 
Q. Does that mean over 150 different concerns? 
A. 150 different corporations or enterprises of 
some character. 
Q. And can you carry in mind now the picture 
of any book or pages in books that you audited as 
much as a year ago? A. I am afraid not, 
Q. Before Stern's bankruptcy, was there any-
thing about this particular audit to cause you to 
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place any particular emphasis on it or to remember 
it as different from the general run of audits? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. The ques-
tion is one of conclusion for the Court and 
jury to draw upon all the evidence. There 
are a great many things there that he admit-
ted there were occasions for special inquiry. 
Mr. Marshall: Whether this made any 
special impression on his mind at that time, 
I think I have a right to ask. 
The Court: I will allow that. 
A. No. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. In almost every audit are there not things 
that arise that require special inquiry of one kind 
or another? A. On every audit. 
Q. And what the particular inquiry required may 
be depends on the particular circumstances of that 
particular audit; is that so? 
Mr. Podell: I submit that counsel has 
been testifying all morning. 
The Court: I will sustain the objection 
to that because his mental attitude on that 
does not strike the Court as being a subject 
that would be applicable here because you 
now have laid your basis for showing 100 or 
200 books that he examined and the fact that 
there is nothing particular in this one that 
made an impression on his mind to enable 
him to identify these sheets. I think that is 
sufficient. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except. That 
is all. 
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Re-cross-examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Towell, you say you examined 150 differ-
ent sets of books in 200 working days of the year? 
Mr. Marshall: How does he get 200 work-
ing days? 
Mr. Podell: Does he work Sundays, too? 
The Witness: I am afraid I have worked 
a great many. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. We will call it 365 days, if you want to. You 
have examined then on an average of a set of books 
every two days? A. No, Mr. Podell. You have re-
stated the question. You stated that I examined 
the books. I think the question said dealt with the 
books as an accountant, 
Q. Dealt with them as an accountant? A. Yes. 
I am answerable for the condition of affairs of 150 
different enterprises. 
Q. You do not seriously mean to say that you 
could not by looking at your work sheets and mak-
ing tests and comparisons with books at any time 
identify the books you worked on? A. There may 
be a few of the books of these 150 different organi-
zations that I have touched upon in the past year 
and there may be a few books that I would recog-
nize. 
Q. I am not asking you to describe the color or 
shape or anything else. I am asking you when you 
take all of these working sheets, here is an instance 
where you work for two weeks, you take all of these 
work sheets with all that mass of figures and you 
find that every figure that you have on your work-
ing sheets, checks up with the contents of those 
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books; would not that satisfy you that that is the 
set of books that you worked on? A. No. 
Q. It would not? A. No. 
Q. I just want to ask you whether you agree with 
just this: Page 111, under the head of balance 
sheet audit. You have stated to this jury that all 
you were concerned with was to get the total of the 
accounts assigned? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you agree with this, talking about a bal-
ance sheet audit, "The auditor must ascertain what 
accounts are pledged or assigned as is frequently 
done without any record appearing in the books"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You said that the auditor was not obliged to 
do that and that was purely a supplementary check-
up on your part, this matter of accounts assigned? 
A. I did not say that. 
Q. You did not say that? A. No. 
Q. You agree that the auditor must ascertain 
what accounts are pledged or assigned in a balance 
sheet audit? A. Is that a complete statement? 
Q. The rest of it is just as I have read it; "As is 
frequently done without any record appearing in 
the books." That means by independent investiga-
tion, does it not? A. I do not know what it means. 
Q. Look at it here, and read the sentence before 
it and the sentence after it, and any other part that 
you like, and tell us if that does not mean exactly 
what it says, that you must ascertain as part of 
your balance sheet audit, what accounts have been 
assigned? A. Understanding that "what accounts" 
means what total of accounts, how much of the ac-
counts are assigned, I agree with the statement. 
Q. Did you not say that it did not have to be 
done, and that it was purely supplementary on your 
part? A. I did not say that. I said that it was 
supplementary information in the balance sheet. 
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Q. You did state yesterday, I think, and I do 
not want to go over anything that we have covered, 
that if you found that the same account had been 
assigned twice, or several times, and you found sev-
eral instances of such character, that that would be 
evidence of dishonesty, did you say that? A. I do 
not think so. 
Q. You do not think so? A. No. I think your 
question on that subject was framed as a hypotheti-
cal question. 
Q. I am asking the same hypothetical question 
now, if you find that a merchant in the conduct of 
his business makes it a habit to assign a number 
of accounts several times to several different peo-
ple, would not that be an evidence of dishonesty to 
you? A. Assuming that he had done so, yes. 
Q. Certainly; and one of the main considerations 
was to determine whether you are dealing with an 
honest merchant is if he keeps an honest set of 
books, and that you have never denied. You were 
the one that used the word "consideration," and 
said that one of the main considerations in an 
audit was to determine whether a man is an honest 
merchant and keeping an honest set of books? A. 
I do not think I said that at all. 
Q. You do not agree with that? 
The Court: Are you not repeating just 
what we had. 
Mr. Podell: I think the record is complete 
on that. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Just one more question, Mr. Towell. You 
said you were told that two clerks had gotten over-
careless in this inventory and that they had not 
been checked up and that Romberg told you that 
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as an explanation of the inventory. A. He said he 
did not check it up or had anybody else do it be-
cause of overburden of other work. 
Q. Do you not know that the trouble with the 
major part of that inventory was that the books 
themselves were wrong? A. No, I do not know 
that. 
Q. You do not know that? A. No. 
Q. Did you not make journal entries correcting 
the books themselves? A. I understood you to be 
referring to something other than the inventory. I 
corrected the inventory. We have it all in the 
record. 
Q. Please do not try to confuse me. I am not 
talking about correcting the inventory. I am talk-
ing now about your making corrections in the books 
themselves, making journal entries to correct false 
and improper entries in the books? A. I made no 
such entries in the books. 
Q. Did you instruct or did you on your work 
sheets indicate that entries must be made in cor-
rection of the books in order to adjust that inven-
tory? A. No, I believe on my work sheets I copied 
the entries that were made in the book. 
Q. I know you did that. A. I gave the informa-
tion and that is probably true. 
Q. You have the information? A. I gave the in-
formation of an error. 
Q. To do what? A. I gave the information which 
would form the basis of a correction. 
Q. Correction of what? A. The correction of the 
inventory. 
Q. As it appeared where? A. As it appeared in 
the general ledger. 
Q. In the general ledger? A. Yes. 
Q. How about supporting books? A. I think 
some of the journal entries that I made and that 
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I recorded in my papers, concerned supporting 
ledgers. 
Q. In other words, in instances where entries 
had not been made in the books showing that there 
was money due for merchandise in December, you 
directed that appropriate entries in the books 
should be made showing that there was liability for 
merchandise as of December. 31, did you not? A. 
I did not get all of that one. 
(The last question repeated as recorded.) 
Q. In other words, is it not true if there was an 
error 
Mr. Marshall: I think we have been all 
over this. 
Q. Answer the question if you understand the 
question. Do you understand the question? A. 
No. 
Q. I wanted to explain it, but your counsel ob-
jected. 
Mr. Marshall: I was objecting on the 
ground that we have been all over this. 
The Court: He said he does not under-
stand the question. 
Mr. Marshall: We had all this yesterday. 
The Court: I thought so. What is the 
object of repetition? 
Mr. Podell: Simply what I told your 
Honor that counsel began the repetition in 
his redirect examination and I wanted to go 
into it. I did not invite this. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: The last question is with-
drawn. The witness said he did not under-
stand it, 
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By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Is it not true that the errors that you dis-
covered, if we call them errors, were not the errors 
of the clerks who had made the inventory, but were 
errors that were right in the books of account, 
errors and omissions in the books of account them-
selves? A. Resulting from the clerk's incorrect 
compilation of the inventory. 
Q. Only that? A. Only that. 
Q. How about the omissions of liabilities for 
merchandise from the books and records; did that 
happen after the clerks had made their inventory or 
before? A. That is hard to say. The corrections 
were made after the inventory was set on the books. 
Q. Corrections were made? A. The corrections 
disclosed by checking the inventory. May I clear 
that up? 
Q. I would be very happy to have you do that. 
What I am asking is this 
Mr. Marshall: Do you want him to clear 
it up? 
Q. So that I can clear it up, what I am asking 
is this, before these clerks ever began making up 
an inventory, were those books correct with regard 
to liabilities and with regard to assets which would 
go into that inventory, yes or no; can you answer 
that ? A. No, I cannot answer that. 
Q. Do you want to explain that; just explain any-
thing you want with regard to that? A. I thought 
there was a little misunderstanding as to how the 
inventory came to be on the books. The inventory 
came to be on the books as a result of taking the 
sheets already made up by the two clerks outside 
of Romberg's office. Romberg used their figures 
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to enter on his books. The error in that figure was 
the direct result of the clerk's making up the in-
ventory sheets. 
Q. Where did the clerks make the inventory 
sheets from? This was not an inventory of mer-
chandise in the premises, was it, or in storage ware-
house; was it an inventory which required looking 
at merchandise at all? A. I think not. 
Q. It was an inventory of book entries, was it 
not? It was an inventory of records? A. I believe 
so. 
Q. The clerks in making up their sheets, did they 
have to go to the books? A. Their own books, 
yes. 
Q. Don't you find that the books to which they 
went were wrong when they went to them to make 
up their sheets, in that they had a number of omis-
sions of liabilities? A. The books that they worked 
on did not record any liabilities at all for anything 
at any time. They are records of inventories. 
Q. I am not saying that the books they worked 
on had anything to do; I am asking you now when 
they made up those sheets that you speak of from 
those books, did they not then have to list liabili-
ties for merchandise? A. Have we departed now 
from the persons making up the inventory? 
Q. I am talking now about the clerks who were 
making up this inventory? A. They did not have 
to do that. They had nothing to do with it, 
Q. What did they make up their sheet from? A. 
From their records of inventory. 
Q. What records? A. I referred to the record 
yesterday. 
Q. What are they? A. I called it a record of lots 
received. 
Q. Is that the only book they used? A. The only 
ones that I knew of. 
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Q. Were you there when they did it? A. Not in 
their presence. 
Q. Were you there when they did it? A. I do 
not know. 
Q. You did not see them do it? A. No. 
Q. You do not know how they did it? A. Yes. 
Q. By what Romberg told you? A. No, by what 
the men told me that made up those sheets. 
Q. And they had nothing to do with making up 
those sheets with the liabilities? A. No, they had 
nothing to do with it. 
Q. Then if there was any error in liabilities, if 
certain liabilities were omitted, it was not their 
error? A. No. 
Q. It was the error of some one who omitted 
them from the books? A. Yes, I would consider it 
so. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. It was their error in including it in inventory 
when it should not have been included in inven-
tory? A. Yes. 
(Witness excused.) 
The Court: Call your next witness. 
HENRY E. MENDES, of 24 Glen Eagles Drive, 
Larchmont, New York, was called as a witness on 
behalf of the defendants and being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Mr. Mendes, you are one of the defendants in 
this action, are you not? A. I am. 
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Q. A partner of Touche, Niven & Co.? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you state briefly what your accounting 
experience has been? A. I have been engaged in 
Public Accounting since the beginning of 1910 and 
I have been in all that time continually associated 
with Touche, Niven & Co., and for the past ten 
years a member of the firm. 
Q. You hold some office with the Board of Re-
gents with respect to accountancy? A. I do, yes. 
Q. What is that office? A. I am a member of the 
State Board of Certified Public Accountant Exam-
iners. 
Q. And that Board prepares the examinations 
for Certified Public Accountants? A. It does. 
Q. You signed, I believe, the first twenty-four 
copies of this balance sheet, Exhibit 1? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make some investigation before you 
signed it to see that the audit had been made prop-
erly? A. I did. 
Q. Did you believe at that time that the balance 
sheet was correct? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
The Court: Allowed. 
Mr. Podell: I respectfully except. May 
I in that connection call your Honor's atten-
tion to the proposition that the mere fact 
that some—I would rather talk before your 
Honor. 
The Court: Come up. 
Mr. Podell: If you want me to talk out 
loud, I will. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
Five minute recess. 
(After a short recess.) 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
A. Yes. 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Did you believe that your firm had examined 
the accounts of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., for 
the year ending December 31, 1923? A. Yes. 
Q. And did you believe that the balance sheet 
that was annexed to your certificate was in accord-
ance with the accounts of Fred Stern for the year 
ending December 31, 1923, and with the informa-
tion and explanations given to your representa-
tives ? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you believe at that time that subject to 
provision for Federal Taxes on Income, the state-
ment annexed to your certificate represented a true 
and correct view of the financial condition of Fred 
Stern & Company as of December 31, 1923? A. Yes. 
Q, That was your opinion? A. That was our 
opinion. 
Q. Did you believe that Mr. Siess was a compe-
tent junior accountant? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you believe that Mr. Towell was a compe-
tent senior accountant? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you believe that Mr. Rea was competent 
as staff manager to supervise the work of Mr. 
Towell? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you believe that Stern was honest? A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: That is all. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. And of course believing in these men, you, as 
a member of the firm, were perfectly willing to as-
sume responsibility for their work? A. Yes, after 
asking them whether they covered the work prop-
erly. 
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Q. And I suppose they did not tell you about any 
irregularities that they had found, did they? A. 
No, they did not. 
Q. Tell me, have you found, and I want to read 
to you some of the testimony which you gave, and 
see if you want to change any part of it, and if you 
recall having given it? 
Mr. Marshall: Will you give me the page, 
please. 
Mr. Podell: Page 1607. 
Q. "You may assume that Mr. Towell testified 
at page 61 which is before you, and the following 
pages contain an account"—and you were shown 
certain papers—"contain an account and the list 
of accounts receivable, some of which at least had 
been assigned, and that he got the information as 
to the banks to which the particular accounts had 
been assigned from a memorandum book kept by 
Romberg. You may assume that and you may as-
sume also that a letter that your firm received from 
Brandt Sons, indicating that at least one account 
had been assigned to them whereas Romberg's 
memorandum book indicated that the same account 
had been assigned to J. B. Moores & Company. 
Well, I would say, generally speaking, that that 
would indicate to me that the memorandum book 
from this schedule had been prepared was not cor-
rect. There were errors in it. As to what extent 
it would be incorrect, I do not know. I am not 
able to tell from this information, from this sched-
ule." Is that a statement that you made at that 
time? A. Yes. 
Q. And you do not want to change it. You would 
assume that? A. Yes. 
Q. "Q. Having found that there was at least one 
error in it, what would you do as an auditor in 
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passing on a situation of this kind? Would you 
for example just mark it down as an error and let 
it go at that? A. No. If I found errors of that 
character in this record, I would be inclined to 
ignore that memorandum record altogether as be-
ing of any value." Do you remember that? A. Yes. 
Q. You knew, of course, you were referring to a 
memorandum record kept by Romberg upon which 
your accountant relied? A. Yes. 
Q. You do not want to change any part of that 
answer? A. No. 
Q. You do not agree with Mr. Rea in the state-
ment you heard me read where he said that the 
more of these accounts that he found assigned to 
several people, the worse it would look? 
Mr. Marshall: Is this proper cross-exami-
nation? I do not believe so. 
The Court: I think we are somewhat out 
of the pale of cross-examination, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: If you limit me to the direct 
questions asked, perhaps I am going a little 
beyond it, but I do believe, he being a mem-
ber of the firm, that I ought to be given a 
little more latitude. 
The Court: For all purposes I think I 
will allow it. Yes, I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Do you understand my question? A. No, I 
do not exactly. 
Q. Then I will read you some more of your tes-
timony here and see whether you want to change 
any part of i t : "Q. A half dozen errors? A. Why. 
I do not think that would be material in my de-
cision in the matter although it might indicate to 
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me that we should perhaps look into the balance of 
the items. Q. And if you found half a dozen errors, 
you mean to say that you still would be willing to 
accept the memorandum of Romberg? A. No, I 
would not accept the memorandum of Romberg. I 
would take the letters from the banks as being the 
information which would guide me in my determi-
nation or in my decision." You do not wish to 
change any part of that? A. No, I do not. 
Q. Did you make this statement, Mr. Mendes, I 
am reading from page 1610: "If an account had 
even been assigned a half dozen times, it would not 
affect at all the total of the accounts receivable or 
whatever choses in action would be disclosed in the 
balance sheet. Q. So do you say you would or 
would not pay any attention to that? A. I would 
not pay any attention to that figuring that we 
would be interested in the balance sheet or direct-
ing attention in the balance sheet to the fact that 
certain accounts had been assigned. Q. You mean 
assigned to more than one bank? A. No, it would 
make no difference in my judgment as to whether 
it had been assigned to half a dozen banks." Do 
you mean that? A. Yes. 
Q. That would mean nothing to you when a man 
assigns the same accounts to a half a dozen different 
banks? A. It might indicate something to me. 
Q. Is not that, if it becomes a habit and it is not 
merely a mistake, and you see it is a habit on the 
part of the merchant, is not that a dishonest act? 
A. Not necessarily. 
Q. You mean it might be a mistake? A. There 
may be some explanation for it. 
Q. Do you know of any explanation for it in 
this case? 
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Mr. Marshall: I think this is going far 
afield. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: The witness has said that he 
made some investigation and I have a right 
to inquire as to the extent of his investiga-
tion. 
The Court: I will permit you to do that, 
Mr. Podell: I t is on that line. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think so. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Is it not indicative to you that a man must 
be in financial extremes if he resorts to that 
method? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: He has answeerd. 
Q. You were asked, "Don't you think it would 
make considerable difference to the banks if they 
know that your customer was assigning the same 
account to two or three different banks," and your 
answer was, " I do not know. I would have to leave 
the banks answer that." Don't you know whether 
that would make a difference to the banks? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. Your Honor, if 
I may be permitted, this man says that he 
considered the audit, and believed it to be 
honest, and is it not proper for me to show 
that he accepted the situation such as I have 
just described as honest, as to what his no-
tion of honesty is. He was asked directly, 
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"Did you believe it to be an honest audit," 
and if he accepts a situation like that as 
honest, have I not the right to point it out 
to a jury of merchants? That is the purport 
of my inquiry. 
The Court: What is disturbing me is the 
sphere of the cross-examination. 
Mr. Podell: I think it is within that 
sphere because you will remember, your 
Honor, that counsel asked him did he be-
lieve it to be honest. 
The Court: I do. 
Mr. Podell: That opens up the avenue to 
inquire what his notions and what his stand-
ards of honesty are. 
The Court: Yes, I am inclined to think 
it does, based on the fact that these answers 
are given familiar with the examination that 
was previously made. 
Mr. Podell: Certainly. 
The Court: I will allow that, 
Mr. Marshall: I do not understand the 
last part of your Honor's statement. 
The Court: These answers are based on 
familiarity with the examination which here-
tofore took place, considering his answers 
to-day; in other words, as being read from 
the record. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor understands 
that we had no chance to cross-examine him 
on that point or to bring out any points 
which might explain any answers which the 
witness there made. 
The Court: I appreciate that. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think that is quite 
an accurate statement, Mr. Marshall, if you 
will pardon my correcting you. 
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The Court: I will allow the question. 
Mr. Marshall: We had no opportunity 
because the law does not allow that, and as 
a matter of fact 
Mr. Podell: I am surprised to hear a good 
lawyer like you say that. Under 21-A you 
have every right to ask questions. 
Mr. Marshall: Under 21-A I have not and 
I was threatened to be put out. 
Mr. Podell: You threatened to put them 
out and you went before the Judge before 
you allowed them to answer. You refused 
to let them answer. 
Mr. Marshall: And we were overruled and 
when we made objections subsequently we 
were threatened to be put out. 
Mr. Podell: There is no such thing in 
this record. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. I think Mr. 
Podell should not make statements like that. 
Mr. Podell: You began by making them. 
The Court: Both of you stop or there 
will be more. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Mendes, to boil it all down to one ques-
tion, do you really believe that where a merchant 
makes it a habit in a number of instances to assign 
the identical accounts to many different people, 
knowingly, and you see a number of such instances 
that he is doing an honest thing? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. I do not know what you mean by habit. 
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Q. If you see a number of such instances? 
The Court: Assuming them. 
Mr. Podell: Assuming that there are a 
series of such instances. 
A. Unless there were some reasons that could 
be reasonably brought forth to explain the circum-
stances, I would have to conclude it was dishonest. 
Q. You are assuming, in answering my question, 
that these are assignments as of the same date; not 
of substitutions but as of the same date, say as of 
December 31st, 1923, there were assignments to a 
number of different individuals of the same ac-
counts; you are assuming that in answering? A. 
Yes, I am assuming that. 
Q. Would you not also as accountant, draw the 
inference that the man must bave been in financial 
stress, in the absence of some satisfactory explana-
tion as to why that was done? A. That would be 
a reasonable conclusion. 
Q. Because if he had ample good assets, he is 
not going to do that sort of thing, would he? A. 
I hardly think so. 
Mr. Podell: I think that is all. 
The Court: All right, sir. That is all. 
(Witness excused.) 
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L e s l i e M . S i e s s , recalled on behalf of the defend-
ants, haying been heretofore duly sworn, further 
testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. I think when you were here before I asked you 
almost all the questions I want to ask you. Did 
you at the time you made this audit, assisted rather 
Towell in making this audit, believe Mr. Stern to 
be honest? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you believe Mr. Romberg to be honest? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: That is all. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, what I am going to ask you, Mr. Siess, 
if you are in doubt about it as to recollection, I 
want you to tell us, because I would like to know 
it. I want you to answer it yes or no or, if you do 
not remember and are doubtful, say so, please. Is 
this item in your handwriting (indicating) ? A. 
No. 
Q. Now, there is no doubt about that in your 
mind? A. No. 
Q. None? A. No doubt. 
The Court: Is that the $706,000 item? 
Mr. Podell: $706,843.07. 
Mr. Marshall: I think the witness testi-
fied to that the last time. 
Mr. Podell: Now, please. 
The Court: Yes, he did. 
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Q. The items immediately above that and run-
ning along here on this account until 5-7 are in 
your handwriting? A. Yes, they appear to be mine. 
Q. Are you in doubt? A. Yes, they are. 
Q. They are. You are definitely certain about 
that? A. Beginning with 6-10 to 12-8. 
Q. Is this 12-28 in your handwriting? A. No. 
Q. Are these two 12's in your handwriting? A. 
Just this one here (indicating). 
Q. Which one? A. 12-8. 
Q. And how about 12-29? A. No. 
Q. And how about 3061.92? A. No. 
The Court: All of this referring to page 
what, Mr. Podell? 
Mr. Podell: Referring to the figures, the 
items under the rubber sales account. 
The Court: Is that an exhibit ? 
Mr. Podell: In Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, re-
ferred to as the general ledger. 
Q. Now, after—— 
Mr. Limburg: Is that page marked sepa-
rately? 
Mr. Podell: I would like to have it 
marked separately. 
Mr. Marshall: Mark it for identification. 
Mr. Podell: Yes, mark it separately. It 
is in evidence, but it is a separate exhibit 
for identification. 
The Court: That is in evidence, is it not? 
Mr. Podell: It is in evidence, but the 
particular page I would like to have identi-
fied. 
Mr. Marshall: My only point was, I have 
no objection if it is marked for identifica-
tion, but I register my former objection if 
it is marked in evidence. 
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The Court: You may have an exception 
based on the broad general principle. 
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-A.) 
Q. Now, Mr. Seiss 
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit him 
to step around and watch me as I point out 
the items as I question him? 
The Court: Yes. You may step around. 
Q. You state to this jury that this 12 is your 
handwriting (indicating)? A. Yes. 
Q. And this 12 is not in your handwriting? A. 
No. 
Q. 12-8 is yours? A. Yes. 
Q. 12-29 is not yours? A. No. 
Q. That this 12 is yours? A. Yes. 
Q. That 12 is not? A. No. 
Q. And all of those figures are yours but this 
figure is not, the last figure $706,843.07, is not? A. 
No. 
Mr. Marshall: That has been testified to 
before. I do not know 
Mr. Podell: I know it has. Now, will you 
take the stand a moment, please? 
Q. Mr. Siess, it is rather important, there is not 
any item of doubt in your mind as to what you 
have just testified to, is there? A. No, I don't think 
so. 
Q. You do not want to change or correct it? 
You say " I don't think so". I am asking you 
whether it is merely an item of doubt or recollec-
tion or whether you are certain of it. You may 
look at those items again and if there is anything 
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you want to change about your answer, change it 
now, please? A. No. I am quite certain I posted 
them. 
Q. You are quite certain about that? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you looked at this total after it was en-
tered, did you not? A total of $10,492,387.64. You 
looked at it after it was entered, did you not? 
Mr. Marshall: Can I have an objection 
that this is not proper cross-examination? 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. What is your answer? A. I imagine I did. 
Q. You imagine that you did. Do you not know 
that you did? 
The Court: Counsel predicated his ques-
tion on the fact that if you do not remember, 
to say so, or to say yes or no, whichever it 
is. Do not let us waste so much time, please. 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You have no recollection of having looked at 
that total? A. No. 
Q. Do you think you could recognize your own 
handwriting? A. Yes. 
Q. You have done it as to all these items, have 
you not? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In whose handwriting is this figure (indi-
cating) ? A. That is mine. 
Q. No doubt about that, is there? A. No, sir. 
Q. Read this figure? A. 10,492,387.64. 
Q. Now, read this total? A. 10,492,387.64. 
Q. Where did you copy this figure from? A. 
The general ledger. 
Q. And is this figure in the general ledger? A. 
Yes. 
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Q. So now are you certain that you saw it? A. 
Yes. 
Q. All right. We have got that much. Now, you 
are the man who wrote up that general ledger for 
each of the months April, May, June, July, August, 
September, October, November and December—or 
rather, I beg your pardon, I am wrong. You wrote 
up from 6-10, did you not? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: June 10th. 
Q. That is July 10th? 
Mr. Limburg: June. 
Q. June 10th. You wrote up this very general 
ledger, did you not? 
Q. Now, what did you write it up from? A. 
If I can recall correctly, journal vouchers. 
Q. And what does each of those figures repre-
sent? You notice that you have one each month, 
have you not? A. Yes. 
Q. You have one for the sixth, and you have one 
for the seventh month and one for the eighth month 
and one for the ninth month and one for the tenth 
month, have you not? A. Yes. 
Q. Just one total, is not that right? A. Yes. 
Q. And what does that total represent? A. Sales. 
Q. Does it represent the total of sales for that 
month? A. Yes, with the credit against it. 
Q. You have got some credit against it or debit 
against it? A. Debit against it. 
Q. We are not concerned with those debits right 
now. What you mean by debits are that when you 
got the total of sales, then you put down the 
record of returns on those sales showing a debit 
against it or adjustments of those sales showing a 
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debit against it, is that right? A. That appears 
to me to be what the account shows now here. 
Q. Is there any doubt about it in your mind? 
A. No. 
Q. No doubt. Now, you did that also for the 
eleventh month, did you not? A. Yes. 
Q. And you did it for the twelfth month, did 
you not? A. Yes. 
Q. And that figure for the twelfth month that 
you found was $644,758 plus some cents? A. Yes. 
Q. And that represented the total of sales for 
the month of December? A. Apparently so. 
Q. Any doubt about that in your mind? Let me 
ask you, before I ask you that question, when did 
you do this posting? Was it after December? A. 
I thought it was during December, but my time 
sheets that were shown to be before said it was 
sometime in January. 
Q. You know perfectly well from your own time 
sheets that it was sometime in February, as a mat-
ter of fact? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not see why Mr. Po-
dell should speak to him that way. He said 
he thought so but corrected it after looking 
at his time sheets. 
Mr. Podell: I did not ask him What he 
thought. He has probably had a great many 
thoughts. I am asking for specific things. 
Mr. Marshall: I submit, your Honor, that 
is improper language. 
The Witness: In January. 
Q. What time in January? A. January 26th. 
Q. Well, all the sales for the month of December 
had certainly been made by January 26th, had they 
not? A. Can I correct my statement? 
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Q. Certainly. Correct any statement you like. 
Correct any statement you have made. A. 28th. 
Q. 28th of January? A. Instead of 26th. 
Q. Well, now, by the 28th of January, surely all 
the sales for the month of December had already 
been made, had they not? A. Yes. 
Q. Yes. And so when you got the total of 
$644,000 and entered it up, you knew that that was 
an entry of all of the sales for the month of De-
cember, did you not? 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
object to the question as not being proper 
cross-examination. 
The Court: I do not know if it is proper 
cross-examination, Mr. Podell, but under the 
same sphere that I permitted in the first in-
stance, as an adverse witness, I will allow 
this to go on just for the purpose of getting 
the full scope of the inquiry. 
Mr. Marshall He is not a defendant and 
not in our employ even. 
The Court: I know he is not, but he was 
one connected at the time. I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Mr. Podell: Will you read my question, 
please? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that question. 
The witness has not been shown to be in a 
proper position to know any such thing. 
The Court: Let him say so if he is not. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. No, I didn't know. 
Q. Now, when you came to take that total off, 
did you not know that there was this item for 
$706,000 added there? 
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Mr. Marshall: May my objection be en-
tered to all of these questions as improper 
cross-examination, and furthermore as an at-
tempt to discredit a man, his own witness? 
The Court: You may have an exception. 
Mr. Podell: He was not my witness. 
Mr. Marshall: You called him in the first 
instance. 
Mr. Podell: It is very sad when I have 
to call an accountant who is in your employ 
to make him my witness in a case of this 
character. 
Mr. Marshall: You might consider it sad. 
Mr. Podell: He called him now. I did 
not call him now. 
The Witness: What I did, is to take off 
the trial balance. I didn't notice what was 
in each account. 
Q. You did not pay any attention to each ac-
count, is that it? A. I paid attention to it, but 
I wasn't auditing it at the time. 
Q. If you had paid attention to it could you help 
noticing an item of $706,000 added right after your 
final figure? 
The Court: Which is it now? It is so or 
it is not so or you do not know. We have 
to get along. A. I don't know. 
Mr. Podell: That is quite enough. 
Mr. Marshall: Are you finished? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I have no questions. That 
is all. 
(Witness excused.) 
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FRANCIS J . CLOWES, one of the defendants, called 
as a witness on behalf of the defendants, being 
first duly sworn and stating his address to be 
104 East 40th Street, New York City, testified as 
follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Mr. Clowes, you are one of the defendants 
in this action, are you not? A. I am. 
Q. A member of the firm of Touche, Niven & Co.? 
A. I am. 
Q. Now, will you talk up so these gentlemen 
can hear you? Will you tell us something about 
your accounting experience? A. Well, I am a certi-
fied public accountant of the State of New York 
and twenty-two other states. I am a chartered ac-
countant of the Institute of—chartered accountant 
of Ontario. I am a member of the New York State 
Society of Certified Public Accountants. 
Q. A little louder. A. And of the American In-
stitute of Accountants. The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Ontario and the Dominion Asso-
ciation Chartered Accountants. 
Q. And what experience have you had as an ac-
countant? A. I have been with Touche, Niven & 
Co. for nearly fourteen years, the last ten of which 
I have been a member of the firm. Before that I 
was for three and a half years head of the account-
ing department of Hart, Schaffner & Marx, the 
largest manufacturers of men's clothing in the Uni-
ted States. I had charge of all branches of the 
accounting there. 
Q. You will have to talk a little louder. A. I 
am surprised to find that my voice does not carry. 
I thought I was talking pretty loudly. I have 
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charge of all branches of the accounting, various 
sub-departments with several hundred people, di-
rectly or indirectly under my control. Before that 
I was for about four years a senior accountant with 
Price, Waterhouse & Co., public accountants, in 
Chicago. Before that I was about four years with 
a firm of chartered accountants in Toronto, Canada. 
Before that I was about three years in the Can-
adian Bank of Commerce. I have had one or two 
—two or three minor positions, but I have been 
dealing with accounts and accounting in one form 
or another since about 1898. 
Q. Now, when did you first know Mr. Romberg? 
A. In 1917, shortly after I came to New York. 
Q. Under what circumstances did you happen to 
come in contact with him, and what happened at 
that time? A. I had been asked to install certain 
factory methods in a clothing factory outside of 
the city. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, that goes way 
back to 
The Court: What is the materiality of 
that, Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Marshall: I want to show, your 
Honor, that these people had known Rom-
berg, for example, for some time; Romberg 
had every reason to be faithful to these peo-
ple ; that he was the man who then brought 
them into the Stern audit the first time, and 
that consequently they had a right to be-
lieve that he would not bite the hand that 
fed him. 
The Court: Let us go right into the fact 
then, that he was. 
Mr. Podell: It opens up their relations 
for the year 1920, for the year 1921, for the 
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year 1922; and we have been talking all this 
time about 1923. Are we going to begin to 
try 1921 and 1922 and 1920? 
The Court: No. The introductory facts 
are all right, but I would not go back to the 
original history. If Mr. Romberg was a 
friend and personal associate, all right, bring 
that out; but not the historical facts. 
Mr. Podell: I would be very much inter-
ested to know about that, your Honor. That 
is all right, if that is the purpose of the in-
quiry, I will withdraw the objection. 
Q. Will you please answer the question? A. I 
placed Romberg in a position in 1917 when he 
was out of work, looking for a job. He had been 
recommended to me by a former member of our 
firm, as a very smart young man. 
Q. And you found him to be reliable at that 
time? A. So far as I was able to ascertain, I 
heard nothing to the contrary. 
Q. The first audit I think you said of the books 
of Stern was as of December 31st, 1920? A. 1920. 
Q. And who called you in to make that audit? 
A. Romberg called me by telephone, and I asked 
him about the business, the nature of the business, 
and he told me something about it, and I arranged 
for Mr. Rea to go up and see him and complete 
the arrangements about the audit. 
Q. Now, what kind of an audit did you make 
during those years 1920 on, for Stern; balance 
sheet audit or what? A. Each of our audits was a 
balance sheet audit. 
Q. And what is the nature of a balance sheet 
audit as compared to a detailed audit? A. A bal-
ance sheet audit is a verification of the general fi-
nancial condition, showing the assets and liabilities 
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properly classified, and the net worth of the con-
cern. A detailed audit—it is rather an elastic 
term and it may 
Q. A balance sheet audit is as of a definite date 
though? A. Yes. It is always as of a date, a fixed 
date. The detailed audit may be to any extent. It 
may include detailed analysis of profit and loss, 
statistical information and examination of vouch-
ers, the checking up of whether the employees are 
doing their duties properly, and all that kind. 
Q. Now, the usual practice in making a balance 
sheet audit is to do it by tests and samples, is it 
not? A. Yes, that is the recognized method. 
Q. And will you explain what the method of test-
ing and sampling it—and talk to the jury so that 
they can hear you, please, Mr. Clowes? A. Well, 
you begin by drawing off a list of the general ledger 
accounts and then by analyzing them, to see what 
their contents are and verifying them by such meth-
ods as you may find appropriate. The tests are— 
I do not know that I can describe them in a few 
words. They are variable, depending upon the con-
ditions, the kind of audit, the kind of concern. 
Q. You do not go through every item in the books 
by that method, do you? A. No. It is recognized 
that you do not. 
Q. Now, why is this method of testing and sam-
pling used by accountants? A. It is recognized 
quite impossible in modern business with the scale 
that it now has, to conduct every audit in a de-
tailed way. You have got to get the general pic-
ture more quickly and less expensively than would 
be done if you tried to go into every detail. 
Q. Now, has your general experience shown that 
this method of auditing by testing and sampling 
is effective? A. It is effective and successful. It 
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is the best method of auditing for the purpose for 
which it is intended. 
Q. You have prepared, I believe, this statement 
of the balance sheets prepared by Touche, Niven 
& Co. for the years 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1923, of 
Fred Stern? A. This is a condensed 
Mr. Podell: I object to it, your Honor. 
I am not prepared to go into these. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have it marked for 
identification, please, and I take an excep-
tion. 
The Court: Certainly. 
(Marked Defendants' Exhibit N for Iden-
tification.) 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, have you compared the balance sheet 
for the years 1922 and 1923? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you state what the net worth of the con-
cern of Stern & Company was as shown by the bal-
ance sheet of 1922? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that, your Honor. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
A. $974,304.89. 
Q. And what was the net worth as of 1923? 
A. $1,070,715.26. 
Q. That shows an increase in net worth of ap-
proximately how much? A. Of about $100,000. 
Q. Now, did you also prepare a tabulation of 
interest, commissions and the rate of return on 
advances made by Ultramares to Stern? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I offer that in evidence. 
Your Honor said I might prepare some kind 
of a chart, and I have prepared it. 
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Mr. Podell: Let me see it, please. 
(Handed to counsel.) Chart of what? 
Mr. Marshall: Of interest and commis-
sion charges made by Ultramares to Stern. 
Mr. Podell: I object to this, your Honor. 
All you need to do is to look at it to see 
the purpose of it—intended to prejudice the 
jury. 
Mr. Marshall: It states the fact graphi-
cally. I did not intend to prejudice anybody. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Podell: I except. 
A Juror: Are these charges legal or il-
legal? 
Mr. Marshall: We are making no claim 
that the charges are illegal. 
Mr. Podell: That is just exactly the dan-
ger of offering such charge. The jurors are 
apt to get a notion there is something wrong. 
I am glad the juror asked that question, and 
I ask your Honor to instruct this jury there 
is nothing illegal about the charges as 
proven. 
The Court: No, there is not, not one scin-
tilla of evidence which shows it is illegal. 
Mr. Marshall: Nor is there any claim 
on our part; nor is there any claim on the 
defendants' part it is illegal. 
Mr. Podell: What is the purpose of it? 
Mr. Marshall: To show that Ultramares 
Corporation had a very great interest in 
making these loans, because it was a very 
profitable affair that they were getting. 
Mr. Podell: Certainly, but do you seri-
ously claim if the man told him he was broke, 
we would have made them for 25 or 75 per 
cent? 
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Mr. Marshall: No. If we thought these 
people were broke, we would never have 
made any balance sheet at all. 
Mr. Podell: That is for the jury to say. 
Q. Mr. Clowes, you signed eight of these copies 
of original balance sheets? A. I think it was six. 
It may have been eight. 
Q. And did you at that time believe that Stern 
was honest? A. I did. 
Q. And did you believe that Romberg was hon-
est? A. I did. 
Q. And did you believe that Mr. Towell was a 
competent and honest senior accountant? A. Ab-
solutely. 
Q. And that Mr. Siess was a competent and hon-
est junior accountant? A. Yes. 
Q. And that Mr. Rea was a competent and honest 
staff manager? A. Yes. I felt sure of all of them. 
Q. And before your concern employs any one, 
they make some investigation, do they not, as to 
their prior experience? A. Oh, yes. 
Q. And honesty? A. Oh, yes. 
Q. And you satisfy yourselves on those points 
before engaging them? A. Oh, yes, certainly. 
Q. When you signed that balance sheet, did you 
believe that your agents had examined the accounts 
of Fred Stern & Company for the year ended De-
cember 31st, 1923? A. I did. 
Q. Did you believe that the balance sheet an-
nexed to your certificate was in accordance with 
the accounts of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., for the 
year ended December 31st, 1923, and with the in-
formation and explanations given to you? A. I 
did. 
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Q. Did you believe that subject to provision for 
federal taxes and income, the balance sheet annexed 
to the certificates presented a true and correct view 
of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Com-
pany, Inc., as at December 31st, 1923? A. I did. 
Mr. Podell: That is all subject to my 
general objection and exception to this line 
of testimony? 
The Court: Yes. 
Q. And did that represent your opinion? A. 
It did. 
Q. Now, had you ever been told that any bank 
or other concern was under contract to lend money 
to Stern if the balance sheet was satisfactory? A. 
No, I had not been so told. 
Q. Had you ever been told that Stern had any 
agreement with any bank upon which a bank would 
lend money to Stern upon receipt of your balance 
sheet? A. No. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, that is assum-
ing facts, which are not in evidence. Your 
Honor excluded just such a condition earlier 
in the case. That is not in issue here. No-
body claims there was an outstanding agree-
ment with Stern to lend him money if he 
furnished a satisfactory statement. 
The Court: I will allow it on the ques-
tion of knowledge. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. 
The Court: And on the question of negli-
gence, as to whether or not there was a duty 
owing; on both issues. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor allows me an 
exception? 
The Court: Certainly. 
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Mr. Podell: Your Honor understands 
the point of my objection? 
The Court: I do, sir. 
Q. By the way, you knew Mr. Von Goeben, did 
you not, for some time? A. Yes. I knew him 
as president of the Ultramares Corporation. 
Q. And you had been at his office? A. Yes. We 
used to be auditors for Ultramares Corporation. 
I knew him in that connection. 
Mr. Podell: Just state the dates, please, 
will you state that. 
The Witness: The dates of our 
Mr. Podell: Of your audit of Ultramares. 
The Witness: We were auditors from the 
time the corporation was organized, about 
June 30th, 1919, until the close of 1922. 
Q. And how many audits did you make for them? 
A. We made four annual audits and one semi-
annual audit at June 30th, 1920. Four annual 
audits at December 31st, each year, and one in the 
middle of the year. 
Q. And you did not discontinue to be account-
ants because they were not satisfied? 
Mr. Podell: On the contrary, we were 
very well satisfied, if you want that stipu-
lation, with Touche-Niven. We had every-
confidence in them. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. That suits me 
perfectly. 
Q. Now, what was the compensation of Touche-
Niven for this audit? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that as imma-
terial to these issues. It cannot change 
the rule as to reasonable care. 
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The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Podell: If your Honor allows it, I 
must ask your Honor to instruct the jury 
that in so far as—regardless of what the com-
pensation was, they were bound to use the 
reasonable care. 
Mr. Marshall: I will ask your Honor to 
reserve your instructions to the jury. 
Mr. Podell: At this time. 
The Court: If the question is presented 
as a fact to the jury, then it will be abso-
lutely immaterial what the compensation is, 
as to the duty that is owing, arising out of 
the relationship. I will allow the evidence 
based on other considerations which come 
in as a matter that I am not going to dis-
cuss now, but which I will discuss when the 
proper time arrives. 
Mr. Marshall: I have no objection to that, 
of course. 
The Court: Yes. At least I think I will 
be able to discuss it, 
A Juror: What kind of audit did Touche, 
Niven & Co. make for Ultramares Corpora-
tion? Was it a balance sheet audit? What 
kind of audit did you make for the Ultra-
mares Corporation? 
The Witness: It was a balance sheet 
audit supplemented by an analysis of the 
profits and a report on the conditions we 
found resulting from the audit. 
Q. You accompanied it with a profit and loss 
statement? A. We gave them a certified balance 
sheet as we did to Stern. We also gave them later 
supplementary, a report consisting of several pages 
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of comments with detailed accounts including not 
only the balance sheet but profit and loss accounts 
and so on. 
Q. Did not the balance sheet also contain a 
profit and loss account? A. I think it usually con-
tained a condensed profit and loss account. It was 
more extensive than the audit of Stern & Com-
pany. 
Q. The difference was you did not give Stern a 
profit and loss statement? A. No. Our audit of 
Ultramares was more extensive by arrangement 
with Mr. Von Goeben and Mr. Deetjen, when we 
first made the arrangements. 
The Court: Let us see if the juror has 
what he wants. Is that what you want, sir? 
The Juror : Yes. 
The Court: All right. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. NOW, will you tell us what you received for 
the audit, as compensation for your audit for 1923 ? 
A. Of Fred Stern & Company? 
Q. Yes? A. $1138. 
Mr. Podell: That is taken subject to my 
exception. 
Q. That included your disbursements, I suppose? 
A. If there were any, yes. 
Q. And how many hours of work was done on 
the audit? A. My recollection is that it was about 
300 hours. 
Q. That included not only the work of Siess, 
Towell and Rea, Mendes and yourself, but of the 
stenographers and typists? A. The stenographers 
and typists, writing the balance sheets and so 
on, everything. 
2459 
2460 
821 
Francis J. Clowes—For Defendants—Direct. 2461 
Q. It it usual to find that substantial adjust-
ments are made in balance sheet audits? A. It 
is quite usual. We make adjustments in prac-
tically every audit. It would be unusual if we did 
not. If an accountant came back to me with a 
finished audit and no adjustments, I would want 
to know what was the matter. 
Q. Now, what is the importance of the assigned 
accounts receivable item in the balance sheet as 
far as you understand it, and how can it be ex-
pressed ? 
Mr. Podell: What is that question? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Mr. Podell: I do not understand that 
question. 
Mr. Marshall: It is really two questions. 
I will reframe it. 
Q. What is the significance of the item of ac-
counts receivable assigned, which appears in the 
balance sheet? A. The object of showing assigned 
accounts receivable in the balance sheet is to indi-
cate that not all of the assets are available for gen-
eral creditors; that some of them are pledged for 
specific liabilities, and we usually show in some 
way the extent—indicate the extent to which those 
accounts are pledged. 
Q. Now, can you express it in a different way 
than is expressed in that balance sheet? A. There 
are different ways of expressing it. We have ex-
pressed it in different ways in the balance sheets, 
in the successive balance sheets of Fred Stern & 
Company. 
Q. Can you point out as an example another way 
of expressing it as expressed in the Stern balance 
sheet? A. In the 1920 balance sheet 
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Q. What exhibit number is that, please? A. It 
is Defendants' Exhibit J. In the 1920 balance 
sheet we showed an item of notes, acceptances and 
accounts receivable, and then as a notation under 
that caption in parenthesis we stated, "the ma-
jority of which are pledged to secure bank loans 
and foreign credits". That was all we did in the 
way of indicating the assigned accounts on the 
assets side of the balance sheet. On the liabilities 
side, we show under bank loans as a notation, 
"secured by assigned notes and accounts receivable 
and stock of crude rubber"; and under the accept-
ances payable on sterling credits we show, "se-
cured by assigned notes and accounts receivable 
and stock of crude rubber." That is one way of 
showing it. 
Q. In other words, without giving the actual fig-
ure? A. Yes. 
Q. Of the amount assigned at all? A. But that 
form of expression does carry out what we are 
trying to express, what we are trying to do when 
we deal with assigned accounts in the balance 
sheet. 
The Court: Did I understand you to say 
that that was the 1922 report? 
The Witness: 1920. 
Mr. Marshall: That was the 1920 report. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I must move to 
strike out these 1920, 1921 and 1922 reports 
as tending to confuse the issue and having 
no relevancy or materiality to this case. We 
have not had an opportunity to test them, 
we have had no opportunity to look through 
those records of that period. They are not 
involved in this case and they are only con-
fusing. 
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The Court: That I will decline at this 
time. 
Mr. Podell: And I respectfully except. 
Are you through? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Why did you not, Mr. Clowes, put the same 
form regarding the assigned accounts into the 1923 
report? A. I don't know. I don't remember. I 
don't remember that I had anything to do with 
deciding 
Q. All you state in that report that is before 
the jury is that the majority of these acounts had 
been assigned? A. Yes. 
Q. Did not that tend to put the person that 
read it on notice so he would make inquiry as to 
the amount assigned if he wanted to? A. If he 
wanted to, yes. 
Q. And then he could determine what free assets 
there were? A. Yes. 
Q. Whereas in the present report there is a very 
definite statement of how much has been pledged, 
is there not? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you would expect, would you not, Mr. 
Clowes, that having known your firm and having 
engaged your firm, that if such a statement were 
presented to Stern, that he would all the more 
rely on it—to Ultramares? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, because 
there is nothing to show that they ever had 
any idea that Ultramares was in the picture. 
Mr. Podell: I am asking him now. As-
suming such a statement. 
The Court: Assume it. 
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The Witness: I hope that the Ultramares 
Corporation continued to have confidence in 
us. 
Q. Now, it stands to reason with you, does it 
not, that if you were the accountant for a certain 
concern for a few years, and had made extensive 
audits for them, and they were quite satisfied with 
it, that any statement that your concern would 
make would all the more be relied on, just because 
they knew you? You would expect that, would you 
not? A. I don't know that I would. I hope that 
they would continue to confide—to have confidence 
in us. 
Q. You had no friction with Ultramares at any 
time? A. Not at all. 
Q. When you audited their accounts, you did a 
thorough job for them, did you not? A. We did. 
Q. And they were satisfied and believed you to 
be reliable accountants? A. They expressed great 
satisfaction with our work. 
Q. At that time? A. Yes. 
Q. So at least from those things you would ex-
pect that your statement, your certification, would 
receive more added weight than if it came from a 
strange firm? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Q. What is your answer? 
The Court: No. Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. 
Q. Now, you talked about taking accountings by 
tests and samples 
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The Court: I think before you start on 
that we had better adjourn for lunch. 
(Recess until 2 o'clock.) 
AFTER RECESS, 
FRANCIS J. CLOWES, resumed. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. You spoke of certain auditing by tests. You 
described what you meant by tests and samples. 
Do you recall that part of your testimony? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And you also spoke of what is embraced by 
a balance sheet audit. First, as to the tests, is it 
not the purpose of these tests to discover whether 
there are any irregularities or errors or omissions 
or dishonest acts? A. Substantially that would be 
true. The tests are for the purpose of satisfying 
the auditor that the books of original entry are 
being regularly kept, 
Q. If these tests indicate irregularities, is it not 
the duty of the auditor then to follow those things 
through and investigate them until he is satisfied? 
A. If he finds what he believes to be irregularities, 
it is. 
Q. And that regardless of the kind of an audit 
he is making? A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Quite regardless of that? A. Oh, yes. If the 
auditor finds what he knows or believes to be ir-
regularities he should go further. 
Q. If there is a test made, for instance, on the 
sales account and it is found that there is no record 
in the books of original entry of any such sales, 
and that that happens in a number of instances, 
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would it not be his duty then to pursue the inquiry 
until he is satisfied of such a condition? A. If that 
were definitely found the inquiry should be pur-
sued, yes. 
Q. And that quite regardless of the kind of an 
audit that is being made? A. That is true. 
Q. With regard to assigned accounts did I un-
derstand you correctly that it did not make any 
difference how many were assigned in proportion 
to the total or did it make a difference? A. I have 
not been asked a question on that point. 
Q. Does it make a difference as to just what pro-
portion of the total accounts receivable have been 
assigned? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that on the 
ground that it is not part of the proper 
cross-examination. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. It does make a difference. That is just what 
we are trying to show, what proportion of the 
accounts are assigned. That is why we show it or 
make a notation and express it in some form. 
Q. That difference would indicate the extent of 
free assets available? A. Yes. 
Q. And the extent of assets that are tied up? 
A. That is the object of making such notations. 
Q. It is of extreme importance to an unsecured 
creditor, is it not ? A. Yes. 
Q. Because it would follow that he can only have 
claims asserted, if anything happened to that con-
cern, against free assets? A. Yes. That is what 
we had in mind in touching upon assigned ac-
counts 
Q. Where you have a situation like this, quite 
aside from the honesty or dishonesty, where you 
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have a situation where several accounts are as-
signed at the same time, or appear to have been 
assigned at the same time to several people, if those 
books were regular, and if the conduct of the busi-
ness were honest, and if those books were properly 
adjusted in an honest way, it would tie up a great 
deal more of the assets, would it not; do you un-
derstand what I mean? A. The more accounts 
there were assigned, of course the less there would 
be free. 
Q. For instance, on receiving a letter from a 
bank claiming that it held certain accounts aggre-
gating $50,000 and the accountant discovers that 
these identical accounts have been assigned to 
somebody else, on a readjustment, if that bank were 
given other collateral in the place of what it has, 
in the way of accounts receivable, that would re-
duce the free assets by just that amount? A. Yes. 
Q. What would you say of a situation where 
the auditor discovers, and it is presented to his 
notice, that many of the accounts receivable have 
been assigned to several people for the same period 
at the same time, what would you say of a situation 
like that, is it an indication of honesty or dishon-
esty? 
Mr. Marshall: Is that a hypothetical 
question? 
The Court: I suppose it is intended as 
a hypothetical question. 
Mr. Podell: Oh, yes, certainly, that is the 
way I put it. 
The Court: Assuming that to be the fact. 
Mr. Marshall: I think it is improper as 
not being based upon facts of evidence in this 
case. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
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A. The question was a little long and I would 
like to have it read. 
(Last question repeated as recorded.) 
A. It need not necessarily indicate either hon-
esty or dishonesty. It might be clerical error or 
confusion in the records. If the auditor had be-
come aware that this condition was being carried 
on in such a way that he believed there was dis-
honesty, of course he should go further. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. In the absence of any explanation, would that 
be regarded as a dishonest state of affairs by you? 
A. It would depend a good deal on the circum-
stances. 
Q. Do you mean if a man could not satisfactorily 
explain it to you as to why he did that, and if it 
was not the result of error, but if it was numerous, 
a number of them, even then you would not con-
sider it a dishonest act? A. If inquiry had been 
made from the man and his explanations were 
evasive or unsatisfactory, I do not think that would 
be a situation that the auditor would accept with-
out going further. 
Q. Until you were satisfied whether or not there 
was a general condition of inaccuracy—perhaps in 
fairness to you I shall tell you that I am reading 
from your own testimony at page 1599, and see if 
you have any occasion to change this—and you 
were discussing this very same question: "Q. At 
what point, Mr. Clowes, would you have deemed 
it necessary to have made a more searching ex-
amination? A. I can only answer that in general 
terms and say until I was satisfied whether or not 
there was a general condition of inaccuracy and 
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unreliabilities and if I had found the latter condi-
tion I would probably have had everything con-
firmed, everything possible confirmed by corre-
spondence." A. I stand on that answer. 
Q. "Q. And unless it was satisfactorily con-
firmed, of course you would have not certified the 
account? A. Oh, no. That almost goes without 
saying, I hope." That is right? A. Yes, I give 
the same answer now. 
Q. You, too, would have preferred letters from 
bankers where you had a statement from the bank-
ers saying that they claimed certain accounts had 
been assigned to them and you had the book of 
Romberg showing a different condition, you would 
have preferred to rely on the letters from the bank-
ers, would you not? A. If I had them complete 
and believed their information was more reliable 
than Romberg's—did you use Romberg's name. 
Q. Yes. A. I think this is a hypothetical ques-
tion. 
Q. I am talking about the distinct question about 
Mr. Romberg. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that because 
it was not part of this witness's duty to use 
his discretion in that matter. 
Mr. Podell: All right, I will reframe it. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Assume that you were auditing this account 
in person and that there were presented to you 
letters from a concern such as Bingham and Ruth 
& Company, who made claim to certain accounts 
as having been assigned to them, and on the other 
hand, Romberg and his memorandum book showed 
those accounts to have been assigned to somebody 
else as of a certain time, which would you have 
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relied upon? A. That would depend upon whether 
I was trying to check up the details of the assigned 
accounts or not. Whereas if I was checking them 
up only in total and did not have replies from all 
the banks, I think it might be very reasonable to 
use a record of the company. 
Q. You did not have any doubts about that ques-
tion when you were asked it in your examination 
in 21-A, did you? A. I do not remember every-
thing that was asked me, I do not remember being 
asked just that question. 
Q. You have heard Mr. Towell's explanation on 
the witness stand; you were here when he testified? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Page 1598: "Q. In other words, you would 
have accepted the statement of the banker in pref-
erence to Romberg's memorandum book? A. Yes. 
"Q. Is that all you would have done? A. On 
the strength of the information as it has been 
brought out here, I think that is probably all I 
would have done. 
"Q. Now, suppose there was more than one ac-
count receivable which on the face of the returns 
was claimed by two banks. Would you have done 
anything more than that ? A. Possibly, but I can-
not say definitely. 
"Q. Assume that it was the situation where you 
would have determined to do something more, what 
would you have done? A. I probably would have 
asked Romberg to explain the discrepancy and 
would have followed it up by any leads that might 
have resulted from that inquiry if it showed need 
of further search. 
"Q. And if there were half a dozen items, what 
course would you have pursued ? A. If they seemed 
to be just inadvertent errors in the record, it would 
not have caused any serious extension of the in-
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quiries. If that showed a general condition of in-
accuracy and unreliabilities, I would have undoubt-
edly caused a more searching audit to be made." 
Q. Would you change any part of those answers? 
A. I do not think so. I think that is right. 
Q. Now, reading from page 1596: "Q. If such 
a situation is discovered by an accountant, what 
should he do with regard to it?" I am more con-
cerned with the answer: "A. I think that would 
depend altogether upon the circumstances of the 
case, what work he had done, how satisfied he was 
with the results of his audit and the whole atmos-
phere of the audit," A. I cannot improve upon 
that statement now. 
Q. In other words, before there is a certification 
to a statement, a financial statement, the account-
ant must take into account the whole atmosphere 
of the audit? A. That is right, 
Q. If the atmosphere is not a healthy one, he 
should not certify it? A. That is true. 
Q. Mr. Clowes, you stated here that you believed 
that statement to be honest; that is your testimony? 
A. I believed it. 
Q. And you say that you had good men working 
there? A. Yes. 
Q. Of course, your firm chose those men to work 
on that job? A. Yes. 
Q. You knew them well? A. Yes, all of them. 
Q. And at the time when you sent them there, 
and at the time when you certified the statement, 
you were perfectly willing to assume full responsi-
bility for whatever they did? A. Yes. 
Q. And you still claim that you will be fully 
responsible or are fully responsible for whatever 
they have done? A. We stand back of anything 
they have done. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. 
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Redirect examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. As I understand it, Mr. Clowes, you still be-
lieve that the essential thing for the auditor to do 
is to satisfy himself on the correctness of the bal-
ance sheet which he is preparing? A. That is right. 
He must be satisfied in his own mind. 
Q. And the mere fact that you made substantial 
corrections in the books or find errors, does not 
of itself indicate necessarily that there is fraudu-
lent bookkeeping? 
Mr. Podell: I object. 
A. Not in the least. 
The Court: I think we have been going 
over that. I think that is conceded by coun-
sel for the plaintiff. 
Mr. Marshall: If it is conceded—— 
Mr. Podell: I do not know what counsel 
implies by his general statement and I am 
not quite willing to concede it, but I think 
it has been fully covered. 
The Court: I think so. 
Mr. Marshall: If Mr. Podell does not cop-
cede now 
Mr. Podell: I am not obligated to con-
cede. 
The Court: Of course not, not because 
I say so. 
Mr. Podell: I always am happy to take 
a suggestion from your Honor, but I do not 
feel this statement is sufficiently definite. 
The Court: I think we have covered the 
subject and I think every witness consist-
ently has. 
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Mr. Marshall: If I have an answer, I 
will not pursue that further. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You were asked whether your audit of the 
books of the Ultramares Corporation was found to 
be acceptable by them? 
Mr. Podell: I could not put it any strong-
er than I did on the direct examination. I 
submit he is opening the same thing all over 
again, and it will only necessitate fur ther 
examination. 
The Court: I do not know what the ques-
tion will be yet. 
(Last question repeated as recorded.) 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Did you in the course of your audits of their 
books, make considerable corrections and changes 
in their accounts? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I merely want to show 
your Honor that these people know that cor-
rections are very often made. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. If counsel 
wants to produce a statement of the adjust-
ments, I will have no objections. Let us 
have your statement of the adjustments. 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Will you produce them, Mr. Clowes? 
The Court: That will open up the door 
which will be very wide, Mr. Marshall. 
Mr. Podell: If he shows that we reduced 
inventory six-sevenths of what we gave him, 
I am quite willing to have the jury know it, 
Mr. Marshall: We cannot show that same 
percentage, but we can show a large reduc-
tion. 
The Court: That opens up the contents 
of the other companies. 
Mr. Podell: Counsel is doing it and I 
am not. 
The Court: What is the question again? 
(Last question repeated as recorded.) 
The Court: Objection sustained. That is 
a broad question. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Have you with you your work sheets show-
ing the corrections if any or adjustments made by 
you in the audit of the Ultramares Corporation 
for the six months ending December 31, 1920? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I am merely asking him 
if he has the documents. 
The Court: I do not think it is material 
whether he has or not. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Will you state whether in the course of your 
audit of Ultramares Corporation you had occasion 
to reduce the inventory of Ultramares Corporation? 
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Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
The Court: I will allow that. 
A. We did. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Did you supervise the audit of those books? 
A. I supervised this audit directly with the senior 
accountant and reviewed all his papers and passed 
on all of his adjustments and passed on the state-
ments we rendered to them on the report. 
Q. That is, to Ultramares? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you state what inventory adjustments 
you made for the six months ended December 31, 
1920? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that unless the 
work sheets are produced. 
Q. Have you got the work sheets showing the 
adjustments? A. I have the principal working pa-
pers here, the working papers which show the ad-
justing entries we made and the trial balance sheet 
and the connection of those papers with the bal-
ance sheet we rendered. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Will you tell us what adjustment you made 
for the six months ended December 31, 1920? 
Mr. Podell: You are going back to 1920 
now. 
A. Is the question what adjustments were made 
in inventory or what adjustments were made? 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Begin with inventory or any order that you 
want? A. We reduced the inventory at December 
31, 1920, by $210,116.33. 
Q. From what figure? A. The final inventory 
as set up in the balance sheet for goods on stock 
and on consignment held for sale was $206,461.26. 
That was after the reduction of $210,116.33. 
Q. What was it before? 
Mr. Podell: That is only goods on hand. 
A. It would have been the total of those two, 
or about $416,000. 
Mr. Podell: What was the total inven-
tory? 
Mr. Marshall: That is what he is coming 
to. 
Mr. Podell: He is giving me the goods on 
hand. What about goods in transit and 
goods elsewhere and under contract? 
Mr. Marshall: May I conduct this ex-
amination? 
The Court: I think it would be fair to 
have the total amount of the inventory. 
Mr. Marshall: That is what I am asking 
the witness and he is trying to give it and 
Mr. Podell injects an objection every five 
seconds and it is disconcerting to the wit-
ness. 
The Witness: The final inventory 
The Court: The total before correction 
is what we want on the sheet originally given 
before it was reduced. 
The Witness: It was not given in that 
form. I have to insert it that way. I know 
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what the final inventory was and what the 
reduction was and therefore what it should 
have been. 
Mr. Podell: There is no evidence that we 
gave them any inventory. There is no evi-
dence before the Court that we gave that 
inventory. 
The Court: I assume that, but I do not 
know whether that is so or not. 
Mr. Podell: The witness has not testified 
that we ever gave him any. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Did you have an inventory from either the 
books or given to you by Ultramares? A. I did 
not see it personally. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, these were re-
ductions in market value of merchandise in 
existence after the war when prices fell and 
this man instead of taking them at book 
value as they were entered at cost, reduced 
the inventory and he knows that is what 
they did. 
Mr. Marshall: They took them at a higher 
value—— 
Mr. Podell: We had not taken them at 
all. 
Mr. Marshall: They are on your books. 
Mr. Podell: Of course, and we took a 
loss, and that is what they came to, and he 
knows it better than anybody else. He will 
tell you that that is what it is. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Did you go into the question of the nature 
of inventory reductions? A. These inventories 
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which were reduced were on the books in two forms, 
part of it in accounts representing inventory, and 
part of it in accounts representing accounts re-
ceivable. I use that term in a broad sense. They 
were accounts current with foreign correspondence. 
Mr. Podell: He is talking now about ac-
counts and not inventory. 
The Court: That is what he is making 
up the inventory from. 
Mr. Podell: He does not say yet that we 
gave him any inventory of merchandise. 
The Court: He said he does not know that 
of his own knowledge. 
Mr. Podell: Does he know it of anybody 
else's knowledge? 
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the adjust-
ments that were acceptable to you. 
The Witness: We found that the accounts 
current included a considerable amount 
Mr. Podell: I object to this general state-
ment. This is entirely misleading and con-
fusing and does not lead us anywhere. 
The Court: Objection sustained: I have 
no objection, Mr. Marshall, to the general 
proposition of the adjustment of accounts. 
If we can get that, get a figure, then we may 
have what it is based on. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Will you state what total adjustment of ac-
counts for the six months ended December 31, 
1920, were, from what the books showed and the 
amount you reduced them by, and what the result 
was? A. The total adjustments we made on De-
cember 31, 1920, in the nature of assets of Ultra-
mares Corporation, were $253,059.17. 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. And what did the books show as profits of 
the company before you made the adjustments for 
this six months period? A. Before making those 
adjustments the books would have shown a profit 
of $119,000. 
Q. Did they show that before the adjustments 
were made? 
Mr. Podell: Nobody figured it on that 
that basis. It was not closed. 
A. They would have shown that if the books had 
been closed. That was the condition- of the books 
as they were submitted to us. 
Q. And was there a profit or a loss after the 
adjustments were made? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: That is a mere calcula-
tion. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Recross eamination. by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Clowes, can you tell the Court and jury 
that you found on the books of the Ultramares at 
any time that they had assigned their accounts to 
more than one person at the same time? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think that is 
proper. 
Mr. Podell: What can be the value 
of all these? Our claim is that it is not what 
you reduce as it is in the nature of the thing 
that you find. If you find that a man has 
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included in inventory twice the same mer-
chandise, then that is either a mistake or a 
dishonest thing. If you find that the total 
assets had to be reduced 
Mr. Marshall: There is no occasion for 
Mr. Podell's summing up now. 
The Court: I asked the question. 
Mr. Podell: It all depends on the nature 
of the thing that he corrects. He can go on 
and correct errors of assignments of ac-
counts and they would not show any dis-
honesty; but if he takes a series of accounts 
and sees that they have been assigned to dif-
ferent people at the same time 
The Court: That is assuming that he 
does. 
Mr. Podell: Yes, then that is an item 
that would mean something, but the mere in-
crease or reduction, unless it is exceptionally 
high, would not mean anything. For in-
stance, you had a great fall in the market; 
during that period 1920 was one of the worst 
years we had. Here are books that we put 
down the purchases and the price. Our books 
were not closed and we had not made up 
inventory. He does not claim that there was 
even an inventory account in those books. 
All he says is that had he figured up those 
costs on that merchandise as they stood in 
the books, we would have shown, had we 
closed the books, a certain worth. What he 
did, and probably did it at our instance and 
upon conferring and consulting with us, and 
upon our suggestion that he 
Mr. Marshall: You are going into fiction 
now. 
2518 
2519 
2520 
841 
Francis J. Clowes—For Defendants—Recross. 2521 
Mr. Podell: What does every merchant 
do when he pays income taxes? What will 
he do as a prudent man? What has he got 
to do in fairness to himself? Must he not 
write off his loss? 
Mr. Marshall: Here we have a situation 
of the books showing a profit for the year 
of 
Mr. Podell: Just let me ask one more 
question. 
The Court: Just what is your object in 
this testimony? 
Mr. Marshall: My object is to show that 
large corrections of various kinds may be 
made in the books of a concern and the audi-
tor may still believe that the concern is a 
perfectly honest, upright concern. The 
next point is that Ultramares themselves 
know that large corrections can be made in 
the books of an honorable concern without 
in the least bit suggesting or requiring the 
conclusion that the concern is dishonest. 
The Court: I do not see any complaint 
in that at all. 
Mr. Podell: If you take that subject to 
the proposition that it depends entirely on 
the nature of what he finds and the char-
acter of these things. 
The Court: Yes, you will have to find out 
whether the same thing is applicable. 
Mr. Podell: Then the amount becomes 
very important. 
The Court: Then I say, is there any ob-
jection on the part of counsel for the plain-
tiff for saying that in the history of ac-
countancy and in accounting, that these 
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large reductions sometimes are made and 
sometimes are not made, depending entirely 
upon the particular situation as it presents 
itself at that particular time? 
Mr. Podell: Certainly. 
The Court: If that be conceded as a fact, 
that that may take place in the ordinary 
work of accountancy, what is the object of 
this testimony? 
Mr. Podell: I will concede it gladly, but 
I want permission from your Honor now 
that this whole question has been touched 
upon and you are investigating Ultramares 
instead of Stern & Company. I want per-
mission to ask just three or four questions, 
and I assure your Honor will consider them 
fair. 
The Court: Under that concession, does 
that mean the object that you have in mind? 
Mr. Marshall: If he also concedes that 
they knew that large corrections were 
made 
The Court: It would be a natural thing 
that in their business, if they had any fa-
miliarity with it, that its officers must have 
known if it is changed from one account 
and it was reduced, it must be to their knowl-
edge. I cannot see how you could avoid such 
an admission. That is admitted. What else 
is the question? 
Mr. Marshall: I think it should also be 
admitted that it does not necessarily spell 
dishonesty of the concern. 
The Court: That I cannot ask him to do. 
Nor does his statement or conclusions, as far 
as this trial is concerned, certify to the fact 
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that it was dishonest. That is for the twelve 
gentlemen over here to decide. We are 
agreed on that, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: Certainly. 
Mr. Marshall: Then I will not take up 
any more time of the Court. 
Mr. Podell: Just a couple of questions. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Clowes, do you want to say to this jury 
that in your examination of these Ultramares books 
you found that they had included in their inven-
tory merchandise as of December which had not 
come in until January? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know whether 
it is proper to ask this question 
The Court: What do you do? 
Mr. Marshall: I object, 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Did you find any such thing in our books? 
Did you have to make corrections that we included 
merchandise that we did not have at all? A. Not 
merchandise, but accounts receivable. 
Q. That we did not have? A. That were not 
accounts receivable. 
Q. What do you mean, they were not accounts 
receivable? A. I mean that they were charged to 
their customers or correspondents and were carried 
as amounts due by them to the Ultramares Corpo-
ration when as a matter of fact the customers had 
refused to take the merchandise, and, instead of 
being carried in the accounts receivable at a profit. 
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they should have been carried as second-hand mer-
chandise. 
Q. But they did not do both, they did not carry 
them both as accounts receivable and as merchan-
dise? A. They did not. 
Q. You mean there was a dispute between the 
company and the customer rejecting the merchan-
dise, and instead of carrying it as merchandise, we 
carried it as an account receivable? A. At a profit, 
instead of at a loss. 
Q. Then you took that out? A. Yes, we corrected 
that. 
Q. You are not prepared to say whether that 
merchant who refused it was quite right in refus-
ing it? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q. Are you prepared to pass judgment on that? 
The Court: The objection was sustained. 
Q. Did you find that we had fake invoices of 
any kind? 
Mr. Marshall: Objection. 
The Court: Allowed. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. No, I did not find anything fake about the 
Ultramares Corporation accounts. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. 
(Witness excused.) 
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CARL J. VON GOEBEN, of 138 Cordonhurst Ave -
nue, Upper Montclair, New Jersey, was called as 
a witness on behalf of the defendants and, being 
first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Where do you reside? A. 138 Cordonhurst 
Avenue, Upper Montclair, New Jersey. 
Q. Mr. Von Goeben, you are the son of Alex-
ander Von Goeben, who was formerly the president 
of the Ultramares Corporation? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were also employed by the Ultramares 
Corporation, were you not? A. I was. 
Q. In what capacity? A. Secretary and sales-
man. 
Q. Did you know whether your father's desk 
was—whether he had a desk in a room alone, or 
was there anybody else in the room with him? A. 
There was somebody else in the room with him. 
Q. Who was that? A. Mr. Deetjen. 
Q, Do you know how often Mr. Stern used to 
come into the office of the Ultramares Corporation 
during the year 1924? A. It would be pretty hard 
to say. I should say about two or three times, 
or four times, a month. 
Q. Did he talk to your father on those occasions? 
A. I believe he did, yes, sir. 
Q. You and your father resigned from Ultra-
mares some time in the fall of 1924, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Podell: Do not get this confused, if 
the resignations at that time to take effect 
when? 
Q. About when did you give your resignations? 
A. 12th or 13th of November, 1924. 
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Q. Your resignations? A. Yes. 
Q. And when were they to take effect? A. De-
cember 31, 1924. 
Q. Did you thereafter, you and your father, 
discuss with Stern the question of entering into 
his employ? A. Yes, sir, we did. 
Q. And when was that? A. The latter part of 
November. 
Q. 1924? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was there subsequently a written agree-
ment entered into between you and your father 
and Stern? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you looked for that agreement? A. I 
have. 
Q. Have you found that agreement, or a copy 
of it? A. I have found a copy of it. 
Q. Will you produce it? A. Do you want mine 
or my father's? 
Q. Your father's, please. A. Here it is. 
Mr. Marshall: May we mark it for iden-
tification at this time? 
(The same was thereupon marked Defend-
ants' Exhibit P for Identification.) 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Do you know when the agreement was signed? 
A. The agreement was signed December 31, 1924. 
Q. Had there been any previous discussion be-
tween your father and Mr. Stern with respect to 
your father entering the business of Mr. Stern? 
A. Do you mean prior to 
Q. Prior to November, 1924. A. Yes. 
Q. When was that? A. I could not give you the 
exact date. 
Q. Approximately. A. Early in 1924. 
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Q. Would you say about January and February? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had your father been invited by Stern to 
enter his business prior to that even? A. I under-
stood he had, yes. 
Q. How long had your father known Mr. Stern? 
A. I should say since 1915. 
Q. And he had at one time been associated with 
him in business, had he not? A. With Mr. Stern? 
Q. Yes. A. No, sir. 
Q. He had done business with him before? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. That was before Stern had organized Fred 
Stern & Company? A. That I could not say. 
Q. It was around 1915 that he began doing busi-
ness with him? A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. When Stern came into the office of Ultra-
mares, did he discuss with you or your father the 
business he was doing in 1924, whether it was good 
or bad? 
Mr. Podell: Who is this? 
Mr. Marshall: Stern. 
Mr. Podell: Does he know anything 
about it? 
A. He did not discuss it with me. 
Q. Did he discuss it with your father in your 
presence at any time? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did he say with respect to it? A. That 
he was doing a good business and had made money. 
Q. Do you remember whether he used words such 
as his business was a wonder or a world-beater? 
A. That I could not say. 
Q;. When you and your fathehr discussed with 
Stern in November the question of joining him in 
his business after December 31, 1924, did your 
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father say anything in your presence to Stern with 
respect to a balance sheet? A. Do you mean in 
connection with our going into the firm? 
Q. Yes. A. Yes, he did. 
Q. What did he say in that respect? A. I will 
have to answer that in my own way, Mr. Marshall. 
Q. That is all right. A. I cannot answer that 
by yes or no. 
Q. Answer it at length. A. After my father re-
signed from the Ultramares, he was made a propo-
sition by Stern. In negotiating in connection with 
that proposition, my father insisted upon Stern 
giving him a statement as of November 30. 
Q. 1924? A. 1924. 
Mr. Podell: Statement by whom? 
The Witness: Statement of Fred Stern; 
that is, the condition of Fred Stern as of 
November 30, 1924. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. And it was to be an audit made by Touche-
Niven? A. So I understood, yes, sir. 
Q. And he said that before he would go into 
business with Stern he wanted such an audit, is 
that correct? A. That is right. 
Q. Can you tell us what kind of a man Stern 
was, if you recollect, how he looked, how old a 
man was he? 
Mr. Podell: I never met the gentleman. 
What do you say his age was? 
A. Describe Mr. Stern? 
The Court: How old a man was he? What 
is the object of that? 
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Mr. Marshall: I just wanted to show that 
he was apparently a man of substance and 
had been in business a long while. 
Mr. Podell: How can you prove it that 
way, by what he thinks what kind of a 
man he was? 
The Court: If he was dressed well, it 
would not say he was a good business man. 
Mr. Marshall: I have not inquired about 
his dress. I want to know how old he was. 
Mr. Podell: That is objected to as im-
material. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Do you know whether he was a married man? 
The Court: I see what you mean now. 
I will allow that. 
Mr. Podell: If counsel will tell me whether 
he was married or single, I will stipulate 
to it. 
The Court: You know what is in your 
mind, and I am supposed to consume them 
in a second. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Do you know whether Stern was a married 
man? A. I understood he was. 
Q. And he had two children? A. I believe he 
did. 
Q. And how old was he? A. Mr. Stern? 
Q. Yes. A. I do not know. I should imagine 
Mr. Stern was about fifty-five, or something like 
that. 
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Q. Have you got your contract with Stern? A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I offer in evidence first the 
contract of Alexander Von Goeben, and also 
the contract of Carl Von Goeben. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Your contract was also signed on the 31st of 
December, 1924? A. Yes, sir, it was. 
Mr. Podell: There is no objection. 
(The same were received in evidence and 
respectively marked Defendants' Exhibit P 
and Q, and they were read to the jury.) 
Q. As I understand it, Mr. Von Goeben, you 
actually were in the employ of Stern just one day? 
A. Not exactly. While the contracts were signed 
about 5.30 or 6 o'clock Wednesday, December 31, 
1924, we were both to have a meeting which would 
take us in. The directors, in other words, of the 
company were to pass on the contracts. The first 
action was the signing of the actual contracts. My 
father at that particular time 
Mr. Podell: You say directors of the com-
pany. What company? 
The Witness: Of Stern & Company. 
Mr. Podell: Ultramares had nothing to 
do with this. 
The Witness: Oh, no. The directors of 
the Fred Stern Company were to pass on 
the contracts and take us in. For some rea-
son or another my father refused to go on 
with the deal and consequently destroyed 
these two contracts and called off further 
negotations. 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You and your father were actually in Stern's 
office on the 2nd of January, were you not? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Do you not remember that your father was 
very indignant because Stern never gave him the 
balance sheet that he had promised? A. I believe 
that was the one reason why we did not go further 
with the meeting as of December 31st, 1924. 
Q. Because you did not get the balance sheet as 
of November 30, 1924? A. I believe that was the 
reason. 
Mr. Marshall: Your witness. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. If you had known and your father had known, 
that Stern was a bankrupt even in December, you 
certainly would not have thought of holding any 
meetings with him to discuss this matter on De-
cember 31? A. Absolutely not. 
Q. You would not have given up the good jobs 
that you had with Ultramares, would you? A. I 
do not think that had anything to do with the 
proposition on hand. 
Q. You believed that Stern really was a man 
worth, as his statement showed, over a million 
dollars? A. Absolutely. 
Q. And that is why you were willing to sign 
these contracts and go through with the employ-
ment if the subsequent statements were furnished? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. 
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Redirect examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You had intermediate information—you had 
information from Stern in the fall of 1924 about 
his profits for the year 1924, had you not? 
Mr. Podell: We have not disputed that. 
It is in Von Goeben's testimony and in this 
man's testimony. 
The Court : This man testified to that. 
Q. Why did you resign and your father resign 
from Ultramares? 
Mr. Podell: I submit that that has been 
covered. It is quite immaterial. 
Mr. Marshall: He did not say the reason 
why and you opened the door by asking him 
whether he would have done it if he had 
known certain facts. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Will you tell us as nearly as you can recol-
lect why you and your father resigned from Ultra-
mares? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. I do not 
know what there is in it. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I think the internal af-
fairs of Ultramares are very much in issue 
here. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except. 
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw the objection 
if you want to go into that. 
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The Court: No. 
(Witness excused.) 
Mr. Marshall: Defendants rest. 
Mr. Podell: Defendant sort of intimated 
that he will take up until noon to-morrow. 
Mr. Marshall: I had an idea that we 
would. 
Mr. Podell: I am very happy that you 
rested. I should like to consider whether 
there is any rebuttal; and if there is, it 
would be very brief. 
The Court: You want to consider it fur-
ther? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: The jury may retire until 
to-morrow morning. 
(Whereupon an adjournment was taken 
until to morrow, April 11, 1929, at 10 o'clock 
A. M.) 
New York, April 11, 1929. 
T r i a l C o n t i n u e d . 
(Same appearances.) 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, we omitted to mark in 
evidence the other time sheets of Mr. Rea. I would 
like to offer those now. 
Mr. Marshall: May we have the copies of the 
time sheets which were made with Mr. Rea's time 
on them put in instead of the originals which have 
notations concerning other engagements and so 
forth? 
The Court: Yes. Those are the time sheets ap-
plicable to this? 
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Mr. Podell: I would like these to be marked 
and we can use the copies. 
The Court: All right, 
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 95.) 
Mr. Podell: We rest, your Honor. 
The Court: And the defendants rest, too? 
Mr. Marshall: And the defendants rest, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Gentlemen, we are going to argue 
some motions that are applicable to this situation, 
and I think the legal proposition will be a matter 
of considerable discussion, so we are going to let 
you go until 2 o'clock, and then you will return 
here; and if the situation is so created, we will have 
summation and I will charge you in the morning, 
so I will not have you locked in the jury room 
during the evening to-night and I think that will 
work out the proposition the best way. So if you 
will come back at 2 o'clock, gentlemen, we will be 
ready then to go ahead with summations. 
(Jury excused from court room.) 
Mr. Louis Marshall: May it please the Court, 
in the first place, I move that the plaintiff elect be-
tween the two causes of action. The first cause of 
action is for negligence; the second is for fraud 
and deceit. There is an inconsistency between those 
two causes of action. An act cannot at the same 
time be fraudulent and negligent, and to go to the 
jury with such a confused state of the pleadings 
would certainly lead to confusion on their part and 
to an inability to understand just exactly what is 
to be decided. I think a statement of that propo-
sition is sufficient without further argument to in-
dicate that in fairness and justice to the parties 
2561 
2562 
855 
Motion to Elect. 2563 
Motion to Dismiss. 
concerned the case should not be tried before a jury-
on such two inconsistencies. 
The Court: And for that reason you now ask 
that they elect? 
Mr. Marshall: That they elect, yes. 
The Court: What does counsel for the plaintiff 
think on that subject? 
Mr. Limburg: We respectfully decline so to do, 
and there is not the slightest inconsistency. If 
your Honor wishes me to argue it, I will be glad to. 
The Court: Does counsel decline to do so? 
Mr. Limburg: We do decline, sir. 
The Court: All right. I will wait further on 
that. 
Mr. Marshall: You will not decide it now? 
The Court: Not at this point. 
Mr. Marshall: I next move that the second 
cause of action so-called be dismissed on the ground 
that it does not state facts and no facts have been 
proven on the trial sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action against the defendant based on fraud. 
Mr. Louis Marshall: Now I move generally to 
dismiss the complaint, first, on the ground there 
is no contractual relation between the plaintiff and 
the defendants upon which a cause of action has 
accrued. There has been no fraud on the part of 
the defendant. I repeat that in this connection. 
Third, that there is no proof of negligence on the 
part of the defendants, not sufficient facts to con-
stitute a cause of action on that ground. Next, 
that there is no guarantee or insurance on the part 
of the defendants with respect to any acts which 
they did as to the plaintiff. Next, that the de-
fendants were under no duty to the plaintiff, and 
that they delivered the certificate and balance sheet 
to their employer, Fred Stern & Company, and that 
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the plaintiff is a total stranger to the transaction 
and has no right of action growing out of that 
transaction even if there was negligence on the part 
of the defendants in the preparation of the balance 
sheet and of the certificate. 
We claim further that the defendants were not 
negligent in the preparation of the balance sheet 
and that the work of preparing it was performed 
by men who were competent, in a competent man-
ner, and that the defendants acted in accordance 
with the proper practice. 
Next, that the representations claimed in the 
defendants' balance sheet, namely, that it was in 
accordance with the books and with the information 
and explanations given to the defendants and in 
their opinion presented a true and correct view of 
the financial condition of Fred Stern & Company, 
Inc., on December 31, 1923, was true. Therefore, 
no cause of action has been established. 
Next, that the plaintiff did not rely on the bal-
ance sheet prepared and certified by the defendants, 
but that they relied upon their previous dealings 
with Fred Stern & Company, Inc., on the personal 
reputation of Stern, its president, on the security 
received by the plaintiff in the form of trust re-
ceipts covering specific rubber and of accounts re-
ceivable representing proceeds of the sale of the 
rubber, and that they also relied upon the fact that 
this account was a profitable one from which large 
profits accrued to them. There is, therefore, failure 
to show reliance in this case upon this certificate. 
There is also no legal proof showing the actual 
condition of the books of Stern & Company at the 
time of the audit. 
Next, on the ground that if the plaintiff did rely 
upon the balance sheet, it was negligent in doing 
so, because at the time of the transactions which 
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are the subject-matter of this particular transac-
tion and as to which it is claimed that loss was 
sustained, the balance sheet was nearly a year old 
and could not accurately represent the true state 
of affairs of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., at the 
time when the advances were made. 
Next, that the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in failing to inquire into the exist-
ence or character of the security mentioned in the 
trust receipts, in failing to inspect the purchase 
and sales contract of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., 
in making loans when Fred Stern & Company were 
in default in the payment of prior loans and in 
the delivery of security covering prior loans. 
Next, that the plaintiff's damage was caused by 
the intervening fraud and criminal acts of Fred 
Stern, consisting of his failure to enter all the lia-
bilities of the concern on its books, his entering 
first false assets upon his books, his submitting to 
the plaintiff a balance sheet known by him to be 
false for the purpose of procuring credit; of his 
giving to the plaintiff trust receipts purporting to 
describe non-existing merchandise, and his failure 
to deliver to the plaintiff accounts receivable which 
he had promised to deliver; and the fact also that 
he had made later definite false representations as 
to his financial standing, months after the delivery 
of this balance sheet, and likewise had made false 
statements as to the profits made by him at the 
time, of the balance sheet. I will also add that he 
was guilty of fraudulent and criminal acts in di-
verting the money which he received from the 
plaintiff to purposes other than those for which 
the money was given to him. 
Next, that, the plaintiff's loss and damage was 
caused by the breach of contract on the part of 
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Fred Stern & Company due to its failure to deliver 
to the plaintiff assigned accounts receivable equal 
to the amount of the loans. 
The Court: On the first cause of action, the 
Court will not ask any discussion from counsel 
for the plaintiff, because the Court has determined 
to reserve decision on the first cause of action. 
In relation to the second cause of action, the 
motion of counsel for the defendants to dismiss is 
granted, with an exception, given to counsel for the 
plaintiff. 
Mr. Podell : Before your Honor decides that, 
would you not like to hear further from us? 
The Court: No. I have made up my mind on 
that, Mr. Podell. That I have passed on. I con-
sidered and thought well on that, and have passed 
on it. 
Mr. Podell: That is a very, very serious matter. 
The Court: I appreciate that, and I appreciate 
it that to me it is serious and that it is serious 
to you and to all involved. 
Mr. Podell: I would like very much, if you care 
to. to give me an idea what particular proposition 
it is on which you are granting this motion. 
The Court: Upon what ground? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: On the ground that the Court fails 
to find anything in the evidence or from the tes-
timony by which scienter can be found, and that 
is my pure ground and only ground. 
Mr. Podell: Really, your Honor, I firmly am 
satisfied that that to my mind is so clearly error— 
and I say it with greatest deference to your 
Honor 
The Court: I know you do. 
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Mr. Podell: That I would like to have an oppor-
tunity to persuade you of that, and I would like 
to refer first to the testimony. 
The Court : The Court has made up its mind 
on that and I stand on that as ruled, so we will 
now have summation, gentlemen, at 2 o'clock, on 
the issue of negligence. 
Mr. James Marshall: And may I call your 
Honor's attention to two facts of intervening fraud 
which I do not think have been brought out yet? 
Mr. Louis Marshall: What is the use of talking 
on that? 
The Court: On the first cause of action? 
Mr. James Marshall: On the first cause of 
action. 
The Court: No. That I am going to send to 
the jury as an issue of fact. 
Mr. Louis Marshall: Your Honor says you re-
serve until some future time the determination of 
that motion? 
The Court: I will entertain the motion after 
the completion of the jury's deliberations, because 
I have the power to make such reservation. 
Mr. Marshall: For prudential reasons, of course, 
I would like to have an exception to the non-
granting of that motion now. 
The Court: Certainly. 
Mr. James Marshall: May we also make a mo-
tion at the same time for a directed verdict, which 
I do not think was made? 
The Court: You may have that motion. 
Mr. Marshall: On the various grounds we have 
stated? 
The Court: That motion is denied. 
Mr. Marshall: And we respectfully except. 
(Recess until 2 o'clock P. M.) 
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AFTER RECESS. 
(Mr. Marshall summed up to the jury on behalf 
of the defendants.) 
(Mr. Podell summed up to the jury on behalf of 
the plaintiff.) 
(Whereupon, at 4.45 o'clock P. M., adjournment 
was taken until to-morrow, April 12th, 1929, at 10 
o'clock A. M.) 
TENTH DAY. 
New York, April 12, 1929. 
(Trial continued.) 
(Same appearances). 
The Court charged the jury as follows: 
Charge to the Jury. 
WALSH, J . : Now, gentlemen of the jury, we 
have arrived at the point of the trial where you 
become a very important factor because up to this 
point you have been the spectators of the testimony 
that has been presented in order to sustain or 
overcome this particular cause of action; and I 
am quite sure that you must realize the tremendous 
amount of work that has been done in preparation 
for this trial and the labors through which counsel 
representing the plaintiff and the defendants must 
necessarily have passed in order to present these 
facts to you. 
2579 
2580 
861 
Charge and Requests to Charge. 2581 
I call that to your attention so that you may have 
a realization of the seriousness of your responsibil-
ity and therefore the necessity of following closely 
the statement of the law that becomes applicable 
to this situation. 
You will recall that at the end of the plaintiff's 
case, counsel for defendants moved for the dismissal 
of the complaint, at which time the Court reserved 
its decision on the motion. At the conclusion of 
the entire case, in the jury's absence, the Court 
granted the motion of the defendants' attorney to 
dismiss the second cause of action, which is the one 
founded on fraud, so that there is only left for 
consideration and determination by you the issues 
in the cause of action predicated on negligence. 
You are to understand that the failure of the Court 
to dismiss the complaint so far as the cause of 
action founded on negligence is concerned is not 
to be taken by you as any indication as to the opin-
ion of the Court as to the merits of this cause of 
action, but is merely indicative of the fact that the 
Court deems that as a matter of law there are ques-
tions of fact for your determination. 
The function of the Court is to state the law of 
the case for the purposes of the trial and to rule 
upon the admission and exclusion of evidence. If 
the Court in so ruling is guilty of error, such error 
will be remedied by the Appellate Court. That is 
something with which you have nothing to do. You 
are the sole judges of the facts. That is your re-
sponsibility. You are not bound by the statement 
of facts made by counsel or by the Court and if, 
in my charge, I refer to the facts, you will under-
stand that it is simply for the purpose of endeavor-
ing to convey to you what I believe has been pre-
sented, but that it is not my intention to invade 
your province as sole judges of the facts. 
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Plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendants the 
sum of $187,000. It is plaintiff's contention that 
the defendants, who are public accountants and 
who were employed by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in 
1924 to audit Stern's books and prepare a balance 
sheet showing the financial condition of Stern as 
of December 31, 1923, improperly performed the 
work they were hired to do. That as a result the 
balance sheet prepared by and certified to by them 
incorrectly represented Stern's financial condition 
in that it showed Stern to be a going concern with 
assets largely in excess of liabilities, whereas, as 
a matter of fact had the defendants properly done 
the work the balance sheet would have shown that 
Stern was insolvent with liabilities greatly in ex-
cess of assets. It is plaintiff's further contention 
that defendants when they undertook to audit 
Stern's books and prepare the balance sheet were 
informed and knew that the same would be used 
by Stern in dealings with its creditors and prospec-
tive creditors for the purpose of showing its finan-
cial condition and that such creditors would rely 
upon the same as indicating the financial standing 
of Stern. That thereafter Stern, for the purpose 
of borrowing money from the plaintiff, exhibited to 
them Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which included the cer-
tificate and balance sheet and that plaintiff, in re-
liance upon the truth of the same, extended credit 
to and loaned Stern large sums of money. That 
Stern was thereafter adjudged a bankrupt and 
failed to repay to plaintiff the moneys so loaned. 
Plaintiff claims that the said loss so sustained by 
it was caused by the negligence, carelessness and 
unskillfulness of defendants in making said audit. 
The defendants admit that they are public ac-
countants and that they audited Stern's books and 
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that the balance sheet prepared by them might be 
submitted by Stern to some of its bankers; in all 
other respects they deny the allegations upon which 
plaintiff relies to establish its cause of action. 
You have heard the proof and it will be unneces-
sary for me to again fully detail the facts to you. 
It will, however, be necessary for me to instruct 
you with reference to the law so that when passing 
upon the facts you may be guided by the rules as 
laid down. These rules you are bound to apply in 
order to render such verdict as will upon the state 
of facts proved upon the trial establish the rights 
of the parties to this suit. 
Plaintiff's cause of action is based upon the 
ground of negligence. 
By negligence is meant the failure or omission 
to use reasonable and ordinary care in the perform-
ance of a duty which one owes to another. Negli-
gence is the want of ordinary care, the failure to 
exercise the care required under the circumstances. 
It is the omission to do that which one is under 
duty bound to do. 
The first question for your consideration is 
whether or not the defendants were under any 
duty to the plaintiff, for, if there was no duty 
owing by them to plaintiff, then there can be no 
negligence. Defendants concededly were under no 
contractual liability to plaintiff. But, even though 
such a liability did not exist, it may still be that 
defendants, when they undertook the task of audit-
ing Stern's books, knew or ought to have known 
that the result of such audit would be used by Stern 
to represent its financial condition to persons from 
whom Stern might seek to borrow money; that 
the end and aim of such transaction was to enable 
Stern to show its financial condition to persons 
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with whom it had transactions and who were to 
be governed by such financial condition. If the 
defendants knew or ought to have known that the 
balance sheet as made and certified to by them 
would be so used and would be relied upon by such 
persons as indicating the financial condition of 
Stern as disclosed by their audit, then I instruct 
you that defendants were under a duty to plaintiff 
to exercise due care in the making of said audit 
and balance sheet. If, on the other hand, you find 
that the defendants neither knew nor should have 
known that the audit was or might be so used, then 
they owed plaintiff no duty, in which event it will 
be unnecessary for you to proceed further with the 
consideration of this case, for your verdict must 
then be for the defendants. On the other hand, if 
you find that there was such duty, then you will 
pass on to the consideration of whether or not the 
defendants were guilty of negligence in the making 
of their audit and preparation of their balance 
sheet. 
When a person holds himself out as an account-
ant and assumes to exercise this duty in behalf of 
another for hire, he must be understood as prom-
ising to exercise reasonable care and skill in the 
performance of such duty, and if injury results to 
him to whom he owes a duty, such accountant, even 
though acting through his servants within the scope 
of their employment, may be held to respond in 
damages to the extent of the injury caused. Au-
ditors and accountants are not insurers of the cor-
rectness of their work. They neither guarantee 
nor are they called upon to guarantee the correct-
ness of their audit. They are not bound to do more 
than to exercise reasonable care and skill in making 
inquiries and investigations. An auditor must not 
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certify what he does not believe to be true and he 
must exercise reasonable care and skill before he 
believes that which he certifies is true. But no 
man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that 
the task he assumes shall be performed without 
error. He undertakes for good faith and integrity, 
but not infallibility, and he is liable to one to whom 
he owes a duty for negligence, bad faith or dis-
honesty, but not for the erroneous consequences of 
mere error of judgment. I t is for you to deter-
mine whether or not the defendants, in exercising 
their calling as auditors, exercised the skill and 
care required of them, and in the event you find 
that they did not, but instead acted in a negligent 
and careless manner, as a consequence of which 
the balance sheet made by them was incorrect, then 
their negligence will have been established. Such 
negligence, however, even though established, is 
not sufficient of itself to predicate liability on the 
defendants unless it be fur ther shown such negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the loss sustained 
by the plaintiff. The proximate cause is the one 
that is in clear sequence with the result and unless 
it could have been reasonably anticipated that the 
consequences complained of would result from the 
alleged act, then such act is not the proximate 
cause; if the consequences were only made possi-
ble by the intervening act of a third party which 
could not reasonably have been anticipated, then 
the sequential relation between act and results 
would not be regarded as so established as to come 
within the rule of proximate cause. To establish, 
therefore, that the defendants' acts were the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's loss, it is necessary for 
plaintiff to show that had it not been for the pre-
sentation to it of the balance sheet certified by 
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the defendants, it would not have made the loans 
to Stern which it did. For instance, if you find 
that the defendants, irrespective of the balance 
sheet and the presentation thereof to them, would 
nevertheless have loaned to Stern in November and 
December, 1924, the moneys which it did, and that 
said balance sheet was not the inducing cause of 
the making of such loans, then in such event I 
instruct you to find that the negligence of the de-
fendants was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
subsequent loss. If, on the other hand, one of the 
inducing causes of the making of the loans was the 
presentation by Stern to plaintiff of the incorrect 
balance sheet and the plaintiff relied thereon in 
making said loans, then, even if such reliance was 
not the sole ground upon which plaintiff based its 
actions, nevertheless the defendants would still be 
liable. But, in the event the plaintiff's action in 
loaning Stern money was induced not by the bal-
ance sheet, but by the fact that it had deposited 
collateral to secure plaintiff for the amount of said 
loans or by any other reason shown by the evidence, 
then in that event the inducing cause of the deal-
ings between Stern and the plaintiff was not the 
presentation of the balance sheet and hence there 
would not be any liability on the part of these 
defendants. 
As I have heretofore stated, plaintiff must not 
only establish a duty upon the part of the defend-
ants to it, but also a violation of that duty by 
failure to exercise the degree of skill and care that 
the situation called for. Also that the violation 
of duty, if any, was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff making the loans to Stern, and that plain-
tiff's loss was occasioned thereby. If you do not 
find all of the elements have been established, then 
your verdict must be for the defendants. 
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In addition to the matters required to be shown 
by plaintiff in order to enable it to establish its 
cause of action, the additional duty rests upon 
plaintiff to establish that it was free from contribu-
tory negligence. In other words, whether or not 
it exercised that degree of care that was incumbent 
on it in the circumstances. Thus, if the plaintiff 
knew or should have known that the financial con-
dition of Stern was not as represented by the bal-
ance sheet and ignored the knowledge it had or 
should have had, then I charge you that it cannot 
recover herein, for, in such case, its want of care 
contributed to its loss and as a consequence it is 
precluded from recovering notwithstanding the fact 
that you find the defendants were negligent. 
These are the general principles which should 
guide you in making your finding. 
In determining the question of whether or not 
the defendants were negligent you will of course 
consider the entire testimony in the case, but, by 
way of illustration, I shall present to you the main 
contentions of the plaintiff upon which it seeks 
to show that the defendants were negligent, and 
also the contentions of defendants to the effect that 
they exercised due care. 
Plaintiff has shown that after the defendants un-
dertook their task of auditing Stern's books they 
discovered: 
That though the books indicated that the inven-
tory was stated to show goods on hand of the value 
of $347,000, the actual value thereof was but $131,-
000. That the account books of Stern contained 
an overstatement of accounts receivable of some 
$20,000 and of acceptances payable of approximate-
ly $67,000. 
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That in the ledger sales account of Stern there 
appeared that there had been sales made in the 
month of December, 1923, of a total of $644,000 
and $706,000, making in all some $1,300,000. That 
said sum was greatly in excess of the total sales 
made by Stern in any other month; also that the 
entries of the sales for this month were made by 
two separate entries, whereas, in all previous 
months, such sales were represented by but one 
entry. Also that the invoices alleged to represent 
the transactions upon which these entries were 
based were a different type of invoice than those 
at any time theretofore used by Stern. 
That the accounts of Stern showed that the 
United Baltic Company, which had always been a 
seller of rubber to Stern, was indebted to Stern 
in the sum of approximately $113,000, whereas in 
fact Stern was in reality indebted to said Baltic 
Company in the sum of $250,000. 
That the books of Stern showed that various 
shipments of rubber had been pledged by Stern to 
different banks. In other words, that the same 
shipment had been pledged to different banks. In 
this respect, it was shown that, out of a total of 
some forty-one invoices, six had been pledged once, 
twenty-seven twice, seven three times and one four 
times. 
It is claimed by the plaintiff that, in view of these 
irregularities appearing on the books of Stern, 
which irregularities were discovered by defendants, 
it was their duty to exercise a greater degree of 
care than would ordinarily be required of them, 
and it was their duty, in view of these circum-
stances, to exercise greater caution than if such 
irregularities had not been discovered by them. 
In this respect, I charge you that if, in connec-
tion with their examination of Stern's accounts, 
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there were any circumstances which indicated or 
should have indicated that the books were not cor-
rectly kept, then, in such event, it was the duty of 
defendants to exercise a greater degree of care than 
would ordinarily be required of them in making 
their audit. 
The defendants, on the other hand, claim that, 
when they discovered the overstatements of the in-
ventory value and of accounts receivable and ac-
ceptances payable, they immediately called the at-
tention of Stern to such errors and corrected the 
books accordingly. That they were assured that 
the errors were due to inadvertence and consequent-
ly were entitled to believe that this was so. 
With respect to the ledger sales account, the 
defendants assert that they noticed the difference 
in sales between the month of December and prior 
months. That upon discovering same they made 
examination of the invoices and found same corre-
sponding with the other entry in the books and 
as they had no suspicion that the same invoices 
were not correct and true, they were justified in 
relying upon the same. 
So far as the Baltic account is concerned, de-
fendants assert that it was not their duty to verify 
each account appearing on Stern's books. That 
they had verified a number of accounts on the books, 
and, having ascertained same to be correct, were 
under no obligation nor was it their duty to assume 
that other accounts were incorrect and that they 
needed verification. 
As to the same shipments of rubber being pledged 
with different banks, defendants state that, though 
they had information which indicated this fact, 
they inquired of Stern and Romberg relative to 
the matter and relied upon the explanation given 
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to them and also received from them the certifi-
cates which have been marked in evidence. 
It thus appears that there concededly were ir-
regularities in Stern's accounts. I charge you that, 
if you find that these irregularities were of such a 
character that they should have indicated to de-
fendants that Stern was not keeping its books hon-
estly and correctly and to arouse suspicion in de-
fendants' mind that the entries in Stern's accounts 
were not honestly made, then it was the duty of 
defendants to exercise a greater degree of care 
than they would be required to use ordinarily, and, 
in the event they failed to use the care commensu-
rate with the circumstances, as a result of which 
they failed to discover Stern's true financial con-
dition, then they are guilty of negligence. On the 
other hand, if you find that, even though there were 
mistakes found in the accounts of Stern, which mis-
takes were not of such a nature as to indicate that 
the errors were other than inadvertent ones, and 
defendants were justified, after inquiry of Stern, 
in believing that the facts were as stated by him, 
then it was not their duty to make any further 
investigation to ascertain whether such statements 
were true, but they were entitled to rely upon the 
information so given to them. 
You will, therefore, upon all the facts as they 
have been shown by the evidence, determine 
whether or not the defendants used that degree of 
skill and care commensurate with the duty of a 
careful and prudent accountant under the circum-
stances, and, if you determine that they did not, 
it is your duty to find that they were guilty of 
negligence. 
I desire to call your attention to the fact that 
the loss sustained by plaintiff was in connection 
2009 
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with loans made to Stern in November and Decem-
ber, 1924, about seven months after the presenta-
tion to plaintiff of the audit made by the defend-
ants. If you find that this loss of plaintiff was 
caused either by reason of a change in the finan-
cial condition of Stern since the time of the pre-
sentation of the audit to plaintiff or to the fact 
that plaintiff, at such time, was extending credit 
to Stern, not in reliance upon such statement but 
upon any other intervening cause, then I charge 
you that the presentation of the account to plain-
tiff in April, 1924, was not the proximate cause 
of the loss sustained by the plaintiff. Further, if 
plaintiff, in November and December, 1924, had 
knowledge that there had been a change in the 
financial condition of Stern between the time of 
the audit and the time it made its loans in Novem-
ber and December, it was not entitled to rely on 
such statement without also taking in considera-
tion the facts which had come to its knowledge of 
the change in Stern's financial condition. Nor if, 
in November and December, the plaintiff no longer 
relied on the financial statement, but instead made 
its loans on the strength of Stern's statements to 
it or any other information, then the defendants 
are not chargeable with negligence. 
One who asserts a claim is entitled to no greater 
consideration than the one against whom the claim 
is asserted. In fact, the law places a greater burden 
upon him who makes the assertion. The law puts 
upon the plaintiff the duty of establishing by a 
preponderance of credible evidence all of the facts 
which he relies on as a basis for his claim. Upon 
him also rests the further duty of establishing his 
own freedom from contributory negligence. Pre-
ponderating evidence is not the number of witnesses 
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that are called by one side or the other. It is the 
quality of the testimony rather than the quantity. 
The requirement in relation to the burden of proof 
is a substantial one and must be borne by the party 
charged therewith. If you find that the evidence 
is evenly balanced in relation to the alleged acts of 
negligence and contributory negligence, you must 
find against the person having the burden. 
In deciding this cause you must take into con-
sideration the interest that each witness has in 
the result of the trial and the probability of the 
story told by him and then to his testimony give 
such credence as you believe it is entitled to be-
cause you are not only the sole judges of the facts 
but you are also the judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses. And where there is an irreconcilable 
conflict of testimony it is your duty to determine 
where the true facts in the case are. That is the 
purpose of your being here, and if in your examina-
tion you find that a witness has deliberately and 
intentionally sworn falsely to a material fact you 
may disregard the testimony of the witness as to 
this statement or you may disregard his entire 
testimony, and as to his whole statement you may 
give such credence to any part which you in your 
good judgment determine to do. 
Now, gentlemen, you realize the importance of 
this litigation to both of these parties. You too 
realize that you and myself have no interests what-
soever in the ultimate determinations of our de-
liberations; so therefore our duty comes only from 
the sphere in which we find ourselves. You pass 
without prejudice, without sympathy and without 
bias on the facts presented, me to give you the law 
as best my mentality can present it, so if after a 
determination of these facts you resolve in favor 
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of the plaintiff, you will then come to the considera-
tion of the damages. 
There is before you an exhibit which covers these 
particular items that have been placed in evidence, 
and to that exhibit you may direct your attention 
in your final determinations. 
Are there any requests? 
Mr. Podell: I think your Honor inadvertently 
made an error in a statement of fact, which I am 
sure was inadvertent, and I am sure you will want 
to correct it. 
The Court : I will, if I did. 
Mr. Podell: You stated to the jury that the 
claim of the defendants was that they made an 
examination of the invoices supporting the $706,000 
item. That was included in your charge. Our 
complaint is that they did not make an examination 
of those invoices; so I think to that extent you at 
least want to either correct it or perhaps your 
Honor would want to say to the jury that as re-
gards that or any other facts, their recollection is 
to govern. 
The Court: Yes. If, in any reference I made 
to a fact, human as I am and as counsel for both 
plaintiff and defendants are, if your recollection is 
at variance with any statement made by the Court 
or counsel, use your own recollection. 
Mr. Podell: Now, is your Honor going to cover 
our requests or as many of them 
The Court: I am going to recite them one after 
the other. 
Mr. Podell: I did not want you to do that. 
The Court: I will tell you the ones I charge 
and the ones I decline to charge. 
Mr. Podell: That applies to both sides, I as-
sume? 
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The 'Court: Yes. Both sides will have the same 
opportunity. 
Mr. Podell: I wonder if there would be any 
objection to my having a copy of their requests? 
The Court: No. 1, I charge. The plaintiff was 
at liberty to contract with Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
upon such terms as they mutually agreed upon 
and it was not required by any rule of law to ask 
for any security other than such as was offered 
and was satisfactory to the plaintiff. 
No. 2, refused, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff 's request No. 2 read as follows: 
" I t is not necessary for plaintiff to prove that 
it relied solely upon the certified balance sheet pre-
pared by the defendants. I t is sufficient for plain-
tiff to show that it relied upon the balance sheet 
and would not have made the loans but for such 
balance sheet.") 
The Court: No. 3, refused, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff 's request No. 3 read as follows: 
"The plaintiff had a right to rely upon a number 
of things in making advances to Stern, in addition 
to the financial statement certified by defendants. 
They had a right to rely upon any security that 
was given them, such as trust receipts and accounts 
receivable, in addition to such statement.") 
Mr. Podell: I take it, we may have an exception 
to this? 
The Court: On all general refusals. 
Mr. Podell: But will your Honor be good enough 
to note 
Mr. Louis Marshall: Let us have an understand-
ing on that, as to both sides. 
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Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: Certainly. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, when you refuse some 
of these requests, there is not occasion for me tak-
ing an exception to all of them, because some of 
them are the same things reworded. 
The Court: On all requests refused, counsel for 
plaintiff and defendants may have a general excep-
tion. 
Mr. Louis Marshall: May it please the Court, 
I do not want a general exception. I think the 
proper way would be that as to each request of 
the plaintiff that is charged, we are to have an 
independent separate exception; as to each request 
of the defendants which is refused, we are to have 
a separate and independent exception. 
The Court: And the same to counsel for the 
plaintiff? 
Mr. Podell: That applies to us. 
Mr. Louis Marshall: That applies to both. I 
do not want to have anything you cannot have. 
Mr. Podell: I would like to have a copy. I 
would be very happy to give a copy of mine to you. 
Mr. Marshall: I have only this copy. 
The Court: I will go so fast you will not be 
able to follow. 
Mr. Podell: The only concern I have, your 
Honor, is that sometimes we may consent. 
The Court: I appreciate that, and you may con-
sent to all of them, but I have had them, you know, 
at 10 o'clock last night. 
Mr. Podell: I know. 
The Court: No. 4, refused, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 4 read as follows: 
"If you come to the conclusion that under all 
the facts and circumstances Ultramares Corpora-
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tion would not have done business at all with Stern 
if the financial statement had accurately disclosed 
Stern as being insolvent, then, of course, you may 
find therefrom that Ultramares Corporation relied 
upon that financial statement.") 
The Court: No. 4a, the mere fact that Stern 
was dishonest and that Stern was the one who 
delivered the statement to Ultramares Corporation, 
would not bar plaintiff from recovery if you find 
that it is otherwise entitled to recovery, under the 
rules as I have expressed them. 
No. 5. Upon this trial the defendants expressly 
admitted the fact that they knew generally that 
these reports would be used as financial statements 
to banks or to creditors, or to stockholders or to 
purchasers or sellers. 
No. 5a, declined, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff's request 5a read as follows: 
"If the defendants knew that their certified bal-
ance sheet was going to be used by Stern for the 
purpose of procuring credit thereon, they are 
chargeable with the knowledge of the normal con-
sequences that would ensue from such use of the 
balance sheet.") 
The Court: No. 6, granted, with the exception 
which I will refuse to read. In determining whether 
Touche, Niven & Co. knew that their certified 
balance sheet would be used by Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc., to procure loans upon the faith thereof, you 
may consider that Touche, Niven & Co. furnished 
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., thirty-two counterparts 
of this balance sheet, each bearing the defendants' 
original signature to the certificate; that to their 
knowledge Stern's business was conducted through 
borrowing large sums of money. 
The balance is refused. 
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(Balance of plaintiff's request No. 6 read as fol-
lows : 
"And you may further consider whether defend-
ants knew that large sums of money are not ordi-
narily loaned unless a certified financial statement 
is presented to the lender.") 
The Court: No. 7, refused. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 7 read as follows: 
"You may also consider whether to defendants' 
knowledge there was or could have been any pur-
pose in furnishing thirty-two original certified bal-
ance sheets other than to permit their use to pro-
cure loans upon the faith of such balance sheets.") 
The Court: No, 8, refused. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 8 read as follows: 
"It was not incumbent upon plaintiff to prove 
by direct evidence that defendants knew that the 
balance sheet would be used by Stern for the pur-
pose of procuring loans on the faith thereof, but 
such knowledge may be found by you from circum-
stantial evidence.") 
The Court: No. 10. If the defendants knew that 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., intended to use the balance 
sheets prepared and certified by defendants in or-
der to procure loans upon the face thereof, it is 
wholly immaterial that defendants did not know 
the names of the particular parties to whom Stern 
intended to apply for such loans. 
No. 11. The amount of compensation which the 
defendants may have agreed upon with Stern for 
their work does not in anywise affect the rule of 
law that such work as they did undertake they 
were bound to do prudently and with reasonable 
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care. If the defendants were not satisfied with 
the compensation they were to receive, they were 
at liberty not to undertake the audit, but, having 
undertaken it, for whatever compensation they 
agreed upon, they were bound to make that audit 
in a reasonably careful manner and not in a negli-
gent manner. 
No. 12, declined, except as already charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 12 read as follows: 
"The law requires that where any person or 
concern hold themselves out to the public as skilled 
professional men—in this case, accountants—that 
they exercise their profession with reasonable pru-
dence and care. That is a duty which the law im-
poses and the failure on the part of professional 
men to exercise that degree of care and prudence 
which the law requires, constitutes a breach of 
that duty.") 
The Court: There is not any 13. 
Mr. Podell: That was stricken out. 
Mr. Marshall: They were superstitious. 
Mr. Podell: We made up for it by 14a and 16a. 
The Court: No. 14, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 14 read as follows: 
"While an accountant is not a guarantor of the 
correctness of his work, he is obliged to have rea-
sonable skill and is required to exercise such pru-
dence and care as is ordinarily exercised by ac-
countants in making audits.") 
The Court: No. 15, declined, except as already 
charged. 
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(Plaintiff's request No. 15 read as follows: 
"No accountant is required to certify to a bal-
ance sheet unless he has fully satisfied himself of 
its correctness. His signature constitutes a repre-
sentation that he has made an examination with 
the degree of care which a reasonably prudent ac-
countant would employ and that the balance sheet 
has been prepared as the result of an examination 
conducted with such care.") 
The Court: No. 16, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 16 read as follows: 
"While an accountant is not required to approach 
his audit of any set of books with any suspicion 
that they have been falsified, nevertheless if during 
his audit he discovers apparent irregularities, it 
is his duty to take every precaution to ascertain 
the true state of facts. If, under such circum-
stances, an accountant fails to examine available 
books and records which would have disclosed such 
irregularities, which, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, he should have examined, you may conclude 
that he has not performed his full duty and was 
negligent,") 
The Court: No. 16a, refused. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 16a read as follows: 
"The evidence shows that Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc.'s, books were audited by the defendants only 
once a year and as of December 31st, in such year. 
The balance sheet as of December 31st, 1923, pre-
pared by the defendants, was the last one prepared 
by them prior to plaintiff's loans to Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc.") 
The Court: No. 17, declined, except as charged. 
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(Plaintiff's request No. 17 read as follows: 
"While it is true that the defendants were not 
obligated to approach or begin the audit of the 
books of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., with any sus-
picion, I charge you that if in the course of their 
audit circumstances developed which would have 
shown to any reasonably careful man that irregu-
larities existed in the books of account, that it then 
became the duty of the defendants to make a thor-
ough investigation and a thorough inquiry until 
they were genuinely satisfied of the correctness and 
honesty of the records.") 
The Court: No. 18, declined, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 18 read as follows: 
"If you believe from the testimony that it was 
customary since a number of years prior to 1924, 
in auditing the accounts of rubber concerns, to 
communicate with the customers whose accounts 
receivable were held in order to ascertain the 
amounts which such customers admitted to be due, 
then you may find that it was negligent on the 
part of the defendants not to make such communi-
cation." ) 
The Court: No. 19, declined, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 19 read as follows: 
"Irrespective of whether there was at the begin-
ning of the audit any obligation existing on the 
part of the accountants to communicate with the 
customers whose accounts receivable were held, 
nevertheless if in the course of the audit the ac-
countants discovered irregularities which made or 
should have made them suspicious of the correct-
ness and honesty of the records kept by Fred Stern 
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& Co., Inc., then you may find that they were neg-
ligent in not taking every reasonable precaution to 
ascertain the true facts, including communication 
with the customers.") 
The Court: No. 20, refused. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 20 read as follows: 
"The jury are not bound to accept the state-
ment of the defendants' employees that they 
received satisfactory explanations of apparent ir-
regularities, in the absence of evidence as to what 
the explanations were, and whether the explana-
tions were such as should have satisfied a reason-
ably prudent accountant without further independ-
ent examination and verification of the facts.") 
The Court: No. 21, declined, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 21 read as follows: 
"An accountant may not close his eyes to irregu-
larities discovered in his audit, nor accept without 
independent verification a statement made to him 
by those in charge of the books if a reasonably pru-
dent accountant would make such independent ex-
amination." ) 
The Court: No. 22. In determining whether 
these accountants were negligent, you may consider 
not only the records that they actually had exam-
ined, but such other available records as in the 
exercise of reasonable care they ought to have 
examined. 
No. 23, declined. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 23 read as follows: 
"There is no evidence that any book, document 
or record of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was withheld 
or concealed from the accountants in their audit.") 
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The Court: No. 24. A mere statement, whether 
verbal or written, given to the accountants either 
by Stern or his bookkeepers certifying to the cor-
rectness, honesty or accuracy of the books and 
records or explaining irregularities will not protect 
the accountant if at the same time he knew or had 
good reason to believe that the books were not ac-
curate or honest and that an accountant in the 
exercise of reasonable care would have made fur-
ther investigation of the facts. 
No. 25, certain letters, the exhibit numbers of 
which I have forgotten, but more in relation to 
the two letters which were signed by Stern and 
Romberg, the two certificates which you will recall, 
gentlemen, Towell had signed by Mr. Romberg and 
Mr. Stern, have been offered in evidence by the 
defendants, which were signed by Stern and Rom-
berg. I charge you that these letters will not pro-
tect the accountants if from the facts and circum-
stances of the case you find that, at the time these 
letters were given, the accountants knew or had 
strong reason to believe that the books and records 
of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., were either dishonest 
or inaccurate, and made no further investigation 
of the truth of the statements contained in those 
letters. 
Mr. James Marshall: Those exhibits, your 
Honor, were offered by the plaintiff. 
The Court: Marked by the plaintiff. 
Mr. Limburg: We offered the entire working 
sheets and they were connected with them. 
The Court: They are before the jury. That is 
immaterial. 
No. 26. If you find that at the time when these 
accountants issued their certificate and the state-
ment annexed, they knew or had good reason to 
know that the books and records of Fred Stern & 
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Co., Inc., had been falsified, and that knowing such 
a condition to exist they failed to make such exam-
inations and adjustments as would truly reflect the 
actual financial condition of the business, then they 
violated their duty and were guilty of negligence. 
No. 27, declined, except as already charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 27 read as follows: 
" I charge that if you find from all of the facts 
and circumstances that had these accountants been 
prudently careful in their audit they would have 
or should have discovered the irregularities or in-
accuracies which existed in the books of Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., that then they violated their duty and 
are guilty of negligence.") 
The Court: No. 28, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 28 read as follows: 
"If you find from all of the facts and circum-
stances that these defendants shut their eyes to 
irregularities and failed and neglected to properly 
investigate them and failed and neglected to in-
clude the results of such investigation in the finan-
cial statement which they prepared, they committed 
a breach of their duty and are guilty of negli-
gence." ) 
The Court: No. 29, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 29 read as follows: 
"The defendants in this case admit that they 
were engaged to make an audit of the books of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and admit further that they 
made what is known as a balance sheet audit and 
that they issued a statement certifying to that 
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audit, which is before you as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
I charge you that if you find from all of the facts 
and circumstances of the case these defendants 
were negligent in the making of that audit, that 
they did not exercise reasonable prudent care in 
the making of that audit, that then they committed 
a breach of the duty which the law imposes upon 
them.") 
The Court: No. 30, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 30 read as follows: 
"The liability of the defendants is exactly the 
same if the negligent acts were those of their 
subordinates, as it would be if they were person-
ally guilty of negligence.") 
The Court: No. 31, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 31 read as follows: 
"The defendants, having selected their own 
agents to make the audit, are responsible for the 
acts of their agents in the course of that audit, 
and any neglect by such agents in the course of 
their work.") 
The Court: No. 32, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 32 read as follows: 
"In making loans to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
plaintiff was called upon to exercise such care 
only as a reasonably prudent person would have 
exercised under all the conditions presented.") 
The Court: No. 33, declined. 
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(Plaintiff's request No. 33 read as follows: 
"In determining whether plaintiff exercised rea-
sonable care in making the loans which were not 
repaid, you may consider the facts that large previ-
ous loans had been repaid, that plaintiff was re-
ceiving assignments of valid accounts receivable 
every few days and collecting upon the accounts 
previously assigned to it; that the accounts re-
ceivable previously assigned to the plaintiff were 
regularly and punctually paid at maturity, and 
that plaintiff had defendants' certificate as to the 
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of 
December 31, 1923.") 
The Court: 33a, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 33a read as follows: 
"In considering the question of contributory neg-
ligence, you should bear in mind that the law does 
not require any extraordinary care or caution on 
the part of merchants doing business. The law 
did not require plaintiff to make an examination 
of the books of Stern in order to determine the 
correctness of the financial statement submitted 
to them. If you find that they believed in Touche, 
Niven & Co. and if you find further that they be-
lieved the contents of the financial statement to 
be true, then you may find that plaintiff had a 
right to rely upon the financial statement.") 
The Court: No. 34, declined. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 34 read as follows: 
"If you gentlemen find that the Ultramares Cor-
poration or its officers believed the representations 
made in the financial statement and certificate sent 
by Touche, Niven & Co. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), 
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to wit: that Stern had total assets of $2,550,671.88, 
and that he had liabilities of $1,479,956.62, leaving 
a net worth of $1,070,715.26, then I charge you as 
a matter of law that you may find that they had 
a right to rely on the truthfulness of that state-
ment and that it would not be negligence on the 
part of the Ultramares Corporation if in such re-
liance they extended credit to Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc., with or without security.") 
The Court: No. 35, declined. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 35 read as follows: 
"You have a right to exercise your business ex-
perience in determining whether or not the Ultra-
mares Corporation was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence if in reliance upon the statement of Touche, 
Niven & Co. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) it extended 
credit to Stern with or without security. In other 
words, if you find that Ultramares Corporation be-
lieved in the truthfulness and accuracy of the 
financial statement and knew nothing to be con-
trary, you may from that find that Ultramares 
Corporation was justified in making the loans in 
question with or without any security.") 
The Court: No. 36, declined. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 36 read as follows: 
" I charge you that the law does not impose upon 
any lender the requirement that he must get se-
curity for a loan that he makes. In a proper case 
he may make loans without security. There is 
nothing in the law which compelled Ultramares 
Corporation to exact security for any loans that 
it made.") 
The Court: No. 37, declined, except as already 
charged. 
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(Plaintiff's request No. 37 read as follows: 
"When you come to consider the question of 
whether or not Ultramares Corporation was guilty 
of any contributory negligence, then the law sim-
ply exacts of the Ultramares Corporation ordinary 
reasonable care in making the loan.") 
The Court: No. 38, declined. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 38 read as follows: 
"The Ultramares Corporation was not obligated 
to use any extraordinary precautions in making the 
loan to Fred Stern. It was not obligated to do 
anything more in connection with making such a 
loan except what you would expect of any person 
or concern that acted with ordinary care. If you 
find that any concern or person acting with ordi-
nary business prudence and care would have on 
the strength of the financial statement furnished 
by Touche, Niven & Co. made the loans in ques-
tion even without security, then you may conclude 
from that that the Ultramares Corporation were 
justified in making such loans even without se-
curity, and in such an event they would not on 
those facts be guilty of any contributory negli-
gence. The test is what did ordinary usual care 
require them to do.") 
The Court: No. 39, declined. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 39 read as follows: 
"The evidence shows that certain so-called trust 
receipts were given at the very same time that 
the advances were made. I charge you there is no 
law which obligated the Ultramares Corporation 
to record such instruments.") 
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The Court: No. 40. I charge you further that 
you cannot predicate a finding that the Ultramares 
Corporation was contributorily negligent simply 
because they charged certain commissions that have 
been referred to during the trial. That evidence 
was not admitted in connection with any claim of 
contributory negligence. The Ultramares Corpo-
ration had a perfect right to charge such com-
missions as the parties agreed upon, and there is 
nothing illegal or improper in those charges. 
41, declined. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 41 read as follows: 
"There is no evidence in the case that the Ultra-
mares Corporation charged commission of 25%. 
The evidence is that the commission charged by 
them was at first half a cent per pound of rubber, 
and thereafter 1% of the amount of the loan in 
each case wholly irrespective of the length of time 
that the loan would be outstanding. Such charge 
of commission was in every respect lawful and 
proper.") 
No. 42, declined. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 42 read as follows: 
"Of course, gentlemen, where there is a running 
account established between two parties, it is not 
unusual that the losses incurred will be incurred 
toward the end of the running account, That in 
itself would not be a bar to plaintiff's recovery if 
otherwise you find it is entitled to it.") 
The Court: No. 43, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 43 read as follows: 
"The plaintiff's position in this case is that had 
it known that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was insol-
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vent or kept, dishonest books, it would never have 
done any business with Fred Stern & Co., Inc. If 
you find that to be the fact, then you may find that 
the loss incurred by plaintiff resulted from the 
negligence of the defendants certifying the state-
ment, if you find they were negligent.") 
The Court: No. 44, declined, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 44 read as follows: 
"The mere span of time between delivery of the 
financial statement and the time when any loan 
was made will not bar the plaintiff from recovering 
if you find that the plaintiff relied upon the 
statement and would not have done any business 
at all with Stern had plaintiff known the true con-
dition of Stern's finances.") 
The Court: No. 45, declined, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 45 read as follows: 
"A financial statement certified in February, 
1924, and delivered toward the end of March, 1924, 
may still be relied upon in December, 1924, if, in 
the meantime, plaintiff had received no informa-
tion that such financial statement was untrue, and 
if, on the contrary, you find that the plaintiff had 
received information that Stern's financial condi-
tion had improved upon that shown in the state-
ment.") 
The Court: No. 46, declined, except as charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 46 read as follows: 
"If the accountants when making their audit 
either discovered, or, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, should have discovered that the books of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., were dishonestly kept, and if 
thereafter they issued a statement which in their 
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opinion certified the books to be accurate, then 
YOU may find from that that the defendants were 
negligent both in their audit and in the statement 
which they furnished.") 
The Court: And 47, I have already charged. 
(Plaintiff's request No. 47 read as follows: 
"If you conclude that any witness has wilfully 
testified falsely, upon any material matter, you 
are at liberty to disregard his entire testimony.") 
Mr. Podell: Now, may I add just one request, 
your Honor? 
The Court: I hope our jury will not be confused 
now. 
Mr. Podell: No. I am going to try to make it 
just as simple as I can. I am going to ask your 
Honor to instruct the jury, if the jury believe or 
find from the facts and circumstances presented 
to them in this case that the Ultramares Corpora-
tion would never have done any business at all 
with Stern if these accountants had presented an 
accurate statement reflecting the true condition of 
Stern, then that they may find that the damage or 
loss was a result of the negligence. 
The Court: So charged, with the addition, how-
ever, that in relation to that request the jury must 
take into consideration all other facts. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Mr. James Marshall: Exception. 
Mr. Podell: I think your Honor would want to 
correct one charge of your own. You spoke of 
changes in the financial condition of Stern. I as-
sume that you meant changes for the worse and 
not for the better. 
The Court: Changes of any kind which the jury 
may find the fact to be. The evidence refers to 
worse and not better. 
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Mr. Louis Marshall: May it be considered—I 
do not know whether our first statement covers 
it—that we take an exception to every one of the 
requests that your Honor has granted? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Louis Marshall: Separately and independ-
ently? 
The Court: I will say that the requests of the 
defendants being at variance with the theory of 
the law the Court has taken, I decline all of these 
requests. 
Mr. Louis Marshall: Then, we will take an 
exception as to each. 
The Court: Let me state them separately: 
No. 1. declined, except as already charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 1 read as follows:) 
"There was no contractual relation between the 
plaintiff and the defendants.") 
The Court: No. 2, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 2 read as follows: 
"This action is brought on the theory that the 
defendants were negligent in preparing the balance 
sheet of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which was an-
nexed to the certificate of February 26, 1924, and 
the burden rests upon the plaintiff not only to prove 
the allegations of negligence, but also to prove an 
absence of contributory negligence on its part and 
a breach of duty on the defendants' part and that 
the damage claimed to have been sustained by the 
plaintiff was proximately caused solely in conse-
quence of a breach of duty and of negligence on 
the part of the defendants.") 
The Court: No. 3, declined. 
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(Defendants' request No. 3 read as follows: 
"The defendants having made the audit of the 
balance sheet of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of De-
cember 31, 1923, under a contract between them 
and Fred Stern & Co., Inc., they were under no 
duty to the plaintiff in respect to the preparation 
of the audit.") 
The Court: No. 4, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 4 read as follows: 
"The plaintiff being in the eye of the law a 
stranger to the defendants in respect to the prep-
aration of the audit and of the certificate, no duty 
rested upon the defendants to the plaintiff in the 
making of such audit and such certificate.) 
The Court: No. 5, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 5 read as follows: 
"An accountant who makes a balance sheet audit 
on the books of a commercial concern is not an 
insurer as to the accuracy of the audit; nor does 
he guarantee that the books audited correctly show 
the true position of the affairs of the person or 
corporation whose books are the subject of the 
audit.") 
The Court: No. 6, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 6 read as follows: 
"When there is nothing to excite the suspicion 
of an accountant engaged in making a balance sheet 
audit of a business concern, the accountant is not 
called upon to make a minute investigation and 
inquiry, but is justified in selecting at random 
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various accounts for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether they are correct and may assume that 
others like them are also correct.") 
The Court: No. 7, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 7 read as follows: 
"There being nothing in this case to indicate to 
the defendants that Fred Stern, the president of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., whose balance sheet was 
the subject of the audit, or Romberg, who had 
charge of the company books, had falsified them 
for the purposes of their own, the defendants were 
not called upon to act as detectives or to approach 
their work with suspicion against the owner of the 
business or with the foregone conclusion that there 
was something wrong about the accounts. They 
were justified in believing Stern and Romberg, in 
assuming that they were honest, and in relying 
upon their representations.") 
The Court: No. 8, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 8 read as follows: 
"The defendants are not liable for failing to 
discover ingenious and carefully laid schemes of 
fraud on the part of Stern, the president of the 
company whose books were being audited, when 
there was nothing to arouse their suspicions as to 
the existence of such schemes.") 
The Court: No. 9, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 9 read as follows: 
"The defendants did not undertake to perform 
the task of auditing the balance sheet of Fred Sten 
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& Co., Inc., without fault or error. All that they 
undertook, even as to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was 
to act in good faith and with integrity, but not 
infallibly.") 
The Court: No. 10, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 10 read as follows: 
"The fact that the defendants, at the request of 
Stern, prepared duplicates of the balance sheet and 
certificate, and that they knew or inferred that 
Stern might supply such copies to those with whom 
his company had business relations, did not impose 
any special obligation on the part of the defend-
ants to the persons to whom such balance sheet 
and certificate might subsequently be delivered by 
Stern.") 
The Court: No. 11, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 11 read as follows: 
"The defendants, having the right reasonably 
to assume the honesty of Stern and of Romberg, 
could not be expected to anticipate that the bal-
ance sheet prepared from the books of Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., was known to Stern to be incorrect, 
and that he, with knowledge of its incorrectness, 
would show such balance sheet and certificate to 
the creditors of his company.") 
The Court: No. 12, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 12 read as follows: 
"The certificate prepared by the defendants bear-
ing date February 26, 1924, as of December 31, 
1923, merely stated that they had examined the 
accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year 
ending December 31, 1923, and that they certified 
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that the annexed balance sheet was in accordance 
therewith and with the information and explana-
tions given to them in their opinion presented a 
true and correct view of the financial condition of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923. 
This did not constitute a representation that such 
statement in fact presented a true and correct view 
of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
but was a mere statement of an opinion based upon 
the accounts presented to the accountants and in 
accordance with the information and explanations 
given to the defendants by Stern and Romberg and 
by others connected with the business of Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc.") 
The Court: No. 13, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 13 read as follows: 
"The defendants had the right to rely upon the 
accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as presented 
to them and upon the information and explanations 
given by Stern and Romberg, and were not bound 
to suspect that the very person who had employed 
them, who was the principal owner of the business, 
was engaged in fraudulently representing to them 
the facts pertaining to such business.") 
The Court: No. 14, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 14 read as follows: 
"When Stern delivered to the plaintiff a copy of 
the balance sheet and certificate as of December 
31, 1923, and on the various occasions when he 
obtained advances from the plaintiff, he in legal, 
effect fraudulently and feloniously represented to 
the plaintiff that the statements contained in the 
balance sheet of December 31, 1923, were true, and 
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his act in thus obtaining from the plaintiff the ad-
vances specified in the complaint in this action was 
the efficient cause of the loss, if any, sustained by 
the plaintiff and for which it seeks recovery in this 
action.") 
The Court: No. 15, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 15 read as follows: 
"If the act of Stern in presenting to the plaintiff 
for action the balance sheet of December 31, 1923, 
and any other representations made to the plaintiff 
at that time or subsequently for the purposes of 
obtaining advances, influenced the plaintiff in mak-
ing such advances, then, even if it should be found 
that there was negligence on the part of the de-
fendants or their employees in making the audit, 
the intervening act of Stern was the proximate 
cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff and 
the defendants would be entitled to a verdict.") 
The Court: No. 16, declined, as except as al-
ready charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 16 read as follows: 
"To constitute actionable negligence the injury 
claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiff 
must be the natural consequence of the alleged neg-
ligent act or one which might reasonably have been 
anticipated, and the neglect complained of must be 
the proximate cause of the injury, otherwise there 
can be no recovery." 
The Court: No. 17, declined, except as already 
charged. 
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(Defendants' request No. 17 read as follows: 
"The test for determining proximate cause is 
whether there is an unbroken connection between 
the alleged negligent act and the injury complained 
of. Even natural and probable consequences of 
a wrongful act or omission are not chargeable to 
the person claimed to have been negligent if a suffi-
cient independent cause intervenes between the al-
leged wrong and the injury.") 
The Court: No. 18, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 18 read as follows: 
"Where it is claimed that there has been negli-
gence on the part of a defendant the law regards 
those consequences as remote and, therefore, not 
actionable which are produced by the intervention 
of a human agency other than the defendant, or the 
voluntary act of a person over whom the defendant 
has no control.") 
The Court: No. 19, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 19 read as follows: 
"The act of a party sought to be charged with 
liability for negligence is not to be regarded as a 
proximate cause unless the injury is in clear and 
unbroken sequence with the alleged negligent act, 
and unless it could have been reasonably antici-
pated that the consequence complained of would 
result from the alleged negligent act. If the con-
sequences were only made possible by the inter-
vening act of a third party, in this case Stern, 
"inch could not reasonably have been anticipated, 
then the relation between the alleged negligent act 
2690 
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and the injury claimed to have resulted will not 
be regarded as so established as to bring the case 
within the rule of proximate cause.") 
The Court: No. 20, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 20 read as follows: 
"If the injury for which recovery is sought may 
have been caused by the wilful and tortious act of 
Stern intervening between the preparation of the 
balance sheet and certificate and the damage, there 
can be no recovery here even if the jury should 
find that there had been negligence in the prepara-
tion of the balance sheet.") 
The Court: No. 21, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 21 read as follows: 
"Even if the alleged negligence of the de-
fendants afforded Stern an opportunity to commit 
frauds upon the plaintiff, the defendants are nev-
ertheless free from legal liability for the loss sus-
tained by the plaintiff in view of Stern's interven-
ing unlawful and fraudulent misconduct in using 
the balance sheet and certificate to carry out his 
criminal purposes.") 
The Court: No. 22, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' Request No. 22 read as follows: 
"When Stern received the certificate of the audi-
tors and the balance sheet he knew that through 
his contrivance the balance sheet did not truthfully 
and correctly represent the financial condition of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923. 
When he thereupon made use of the certificate and 
2693 
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balance sheet and secured from the plaintiff the 
advances for which a recovery is now sought 
against the defendants, he consciously committed 
a crime. But for the interposition of his wrong-
ful act the defendants' negligence, if any, would 
have produced no injury. The casual connection 
between such alleged negligence and the injury 
complained of was due to the intervening crimi-
nal act of Stern, for which the defendants are not 
legally liable.") 
The Court: No. 23, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 23 read as follows: 
"Even if the jury should find that the defendants 
were guilty of negligence and that such negligence 
was the proximate cause of the damages sustained, 
nevertheless if the plaintiff was likewise guilty of 
negligence which contributed to the loss, there can 
be no recovery.") 
The Court: Declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 24 read as follows: 
"The plaintiff, by failing to inquire of the de-
fendants as to the nature of the information and 
explanations given to them and referred to in the 
certificate of February 26, 1924, was guilty of con-
tributory negligence.") 
The Court: No. 25, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 25 read as follows: 
"I f the plaintiff, by making inquiry as to the 
information and explanations given to the defend-
ants referred to in the certificate of February 26th, 
1924, would have questioned the correctness of the 
2696 
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balance sheet as setting forth the financial condi-
tion of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 
1923, its failure to make such inquiry constitutes 
contributory negligence and debars a recovery.") 
The Court: No. 26, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 26 read as follows: 
"The plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence in failing to inquire into the existence or 
character of the security purporting to be given 
to it by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in failing to in-
spect the purchase and sales contracts of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., in making advances to Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., at times when that corporation 
was in default in the payment of earlier loans and 
in the delivery of security to cover prior loans, and, 
therefore, cannot recover.") 
The Court: No. 27, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 27 read as follows: 
"If the plaintiff by making a diligent inquiry as 
to the existence or character of the security pur-
porting to have been given to it by Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc., in the form of trust receipts, or by inspecting 
the purchase and sales contracts of Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., or by declining to make advances to it 
when Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was in default in the 
payment of prior loans and in delivering the secur-
ity covering prior loans, could have prevented the 
losses which it subsequently sustained, and the 
plaintiff failed to make such inquiry, it was guilty 
of contributory negligence and cannot recover.") 
The Court: No. 28, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 28 read as follows: 
"If at the time of making advances of money 
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in November and De-
2699 
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cember, 1924, and at the time when Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., was in default in the payment of prior 
loans and in the delivery of security covering such 
prior loans, the plaintiff relied upon the balance 
sheet of December 31, 1923, knowing that it could 
not correctly represent the true state of the busi-
ness of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. at the time when 
the advances were made, it was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence.") 
The Court: No. 29, declined. 
(Defendants' request No. 29 read as follows: 
" I f the plaintiff in making pecuniary advances 
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc. relied upon the personal 
reputation of Fred Stern, the president of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., and upon his oral representations 
as to the profitable character of his business during 
the year 1924, or on the security received by it in 
the form of trust receipts covering specific mer-
chandise, or on the security of accounts receivable 
representing the proceeds of the sale of rubber 
purporting to be covered by such trust receipts, or 
upon the profit accruing to it from interest and 
commissions received in connection with its trans-
actions with Fred Stern & Co., Inc., the plaintiff is 
not entitled to recover.") 
The Court: No. 30, declined, except as already 
charged. 
(Defendants' request No. 30 read as follows: 
"There is no claim that the defendants or any 
of their employees were guilty of fraud or dishon-
esty, in connection with the audit.") 
Mr. Louis Marshall: Now, your Honor under-
stands that as extending to each modification that 
your Honor charged in each of the various requests 
which have been presented. 
2702 
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The Court: Yes, sir. I will include that, and 
upon that you may have an exception. 
I guess, gentlemen, that is the finish of our part 
of the deliberations. 
Now, when you go to your jury-room, gentlemen, 
if you are desirous of an exhibit, notify the officer. 
In the meantime counsel will prepare as best they 
can this tremendous amount of exhibits and any 
particular one that you want, ask for and we will 
have it sent to you, or any amount of them you 
wish, ask for and we will have them sent to you. 
Mr. James Marshall: Why not give them all the 
exhibits now? 
Mr. Podell: I think it would be better that if 
the jury wants any exhibits, that they specify just 
what they want, and we will pick it out, because 
there are so many of them. 
Does your Honor mean to give these figures? 
The Court: Not unless they ask for them. 
(Whereupon at 10:55 o'clock A. M. the jury re-
tired. ) 
Mr. Limburg. The plaintiff respectively excepts 
to that portion of the charge in which the Court 
stated in substance that if the defendants knew 
that the audit might be used by Stern, they were 
under no duty to the plaintiff. 
I further except to that portion of the charge 
in which the Court defined and left to the jury the 
question of proximate cause; and the question 
whether the loans might reasonably have been an-
ticipated and likewise that portion in which the 
Court submitted to the jury whether there was any 
intervening act of a third party which could not 
reasonably have been anticipated. 
I except to that portion in which the Court sub-
mitted the question of inducing cause, and to the 
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submission of the question of contributory negli-
gence. 
I particularly except to that portion of the 
charge in which the Court said that if the plaintiff 
knew or should have known that Stern's financial 
condition was not as shown by the balance sheet, 
they cannot recover; on the ground that it is con-
trary to law and that there is no evidence in sup-
port of it. 
I except to that portion of the charge in which 
the Court said that the defendants' claim is that 
they discovered the two entries of the December, 
1923, sales which are in the rubber sales account. 
The Court: You mean on the question of fact? 
Mr. Limburg: For the jury. I do not think 
there was any such claim. The testimony was that 
they did not know whether they noticed it or not. 
The Court: That is purely a question of fact. 
Mr. Limburg: To that portion in which the 
Court said that under the facts outlined by it, 
there was no duty to verify the United Baltic ac-
count. 
To that portion in which the Court stated that 
if Stern's mistakes were only inadvertent and if 
the defendants so concluded after inquiry, there 
was no further duty on its part to investigate and 
that they had a right to rely on the information 
given. 
And to that portion where the Court said there 
could be no recovery in case the loss was caused 
by a change of financial condition on Stern's part 
or intervening causes; that in that event there was 
no proximate cause. 
And to that portion in which the Court submit-
ted to the jury the question whether the plaintiff 
had knowledge of a change of Stern's financial con-
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dition and stated that in that event the plaintiff 
was not entitled to rely on the balance sheet. 
Mr. Louis Marshall: The defendants except to 
so much of the Court's charge as submitted to the 
jury the question of the duty owing by the de-
fendants to the plaintiff, or that there was any 
duty which the defendants owed to the plaintiff. 
The defendants except to so much of the charge 
in which it is said in substance that if the de-
fendants knew of the use that would be made by 
Stern of the balance sheet and the certificate of 
the defendants, that the defendants came under a 
2711 duty to the plaintiff to exercise due care in the 
making of the balance sheet and audit. 
Also, I except to that part of the charge in which 
the Court lays down the duty which an account-
ant owes as applicable to the facts in this case 
and as applicable to any duty which the defendants 
claim to have owed to the plaintiff in this case. 
I also except to so much of the Court's charge in 
which it said in substance that if the balance sheet 
and certificate of defendants was one of the in-
ducing causes which led the plaintiff to make the 
loan to the defendants, that the plaintiff may re-
cover in this action, if the jury comes to the con-
clusion that it is negligence and that the plaintiff 
is free from contributory negligence. 
2712 I except to so much of the Court's charge in 
which it has said in substance that if on examina-
tion of Stem's books there would have been dis-
closed any circumstances that would have shown 
that the books were correctly kept, the defendants 
were bound to exercise greater care than they ordin-
arily would, and that a failure to exercise such 
increased care would constitute negligence. 
I also except to that portion of the Court's charge 
in which it has said in substance that if on inves-
905 
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tigation of Stern's books by the defendants it was 
shown that they were not honestly kept, it was 
incumbent on the defendants to exercise great care, 
and if they did not, then the jury may find that 
the defendants were guilty of negligence. 
(The jury returned at 12:10 o'clock P. M. and 
rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants in the sum of $187,576.32.) 
Mr. James Marshall: I move to set aside the 
verdict, on all the grounds stated in Section 549 
of the Civil Practice Act, except the ground of in-
adequacy of the verdict. 
The Court: Decision reserved. 
(Briefs to be submitted by May 10th, 1929; the 
defendants to serve their brief upon the plaintiff 
within two weeks, and the plaintiff to answer with-
in two weeks thereafter.) 
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2716 Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
This exhibit consists of the balance sheet of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923, 
and the certificate dated February 26, 1924, signed 
by the defendants, attached thereto, both of which 
are printed in this record at pages 15-17 as exhibits 
attached to the complaint (designated in the com-
plaint as Exhibits A and B). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
was ADMITTED AS 
This exhibit is the general control ledger for the 
years 1921 to 1923, inclusive, of Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-A. 
The following words and figures on the second 
page were added by one of the accountants for the 
Trustee in Bankruptcy of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
and are not to be considered a part of this exhibit: 
615007.63 O.K. in Debit 
250474.00—fictitious Memo Book. 
Fictitious—not in Debit Memo Book. 
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2722 Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. 
This exhibit was admitted as the book in which 
are bound carbon copies of invoices of Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., for sales of rubber, including December 
31, 1923. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. 
This exhibit was admitted as the accounts receiv-
able ledger of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the years 
1922 to 1924, inclusive. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. 
This exhibit was admitted as the debit memo 
book (sales journal) of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for 
the period from July, 1923, to December 31, 1924, 
inclusive. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5-A. 
This exhibit was admitted as page 33 of the debit 
memo book (sales journal) of Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc. (Exhibit 5). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. 
This exhibit was admitted as the book of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., containing the shipping record 
of United Baltic Corporation. 
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This exhibit was admitted as the book in which 
are bound the shipping and delivery records of 
merchandise sold by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which 
bear numbers 10001 to 10500 and cover the period 
from October 5, 1923, to December 19, 1923. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. 
This exhibit was admitted as the book in which 
are bound the shipping and delivery records of 
merchandise sold by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which 
bear numbers 10501 to 11000 and cover the period 
from December 18, 1923, to March 5, 1924. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9. 
This exhibit was admitted as the ledger of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., for notes and trade acceptances 
receivable for the years-4922 to 1925. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 10. 
This exhibit was admitted as the book containing 
the trial balances of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for 
accounts payable for the years 1923 and 1924. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11. 
This exhibit was admitted as the book containing 
the trial balances of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for 
accounts receivable for the years 1923 and 1924. 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 12. 
This exhibit was admitted as the debit memo 
book or sales journal of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for 
the period from September, 1922, to July, 1923. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13. 
This exhibit was admitted as the credit memo 
book or purchase journal of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
for the period from January, 1922, to January, 
1925. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14. 
This exhibit was admitted as the ledger of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., for accounts with banks and for 
letters of credit for the period from January, 1923, 
to December 31, 1923. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15. 
This exhibit consists of the work sheets prepared 
by Touche, Niven & Co. in connection with their 
audit, which was the basis of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
A photostatic copy of this exhibit is to be handed 
to the Court. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-A. 
These are the accounts receivable work sheets 
prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. in connection 
with said audit, being part of Exhibit 15. 
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These are the accounts payable work sheets pre-
pared by Touche, Niven & Co. in connection with 
said audit, being part of Exhibit 15. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-C. 
This is the trial balance prepared by Touche, 
Niven & Co. in connection with said audit, being 
part of Exhibit 15. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-D. 
This is the schedule prepared by Touche, Niven 
& Co. in connection with said audit, and lists notes 
and trade acceptances receivable, being part of 
Exhibit 15. 
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COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of L. M. Seiss 
Prom January 26 to January 31 1924 inclusive 
Engagement 
Details of Work Hours 
Per 
Item State Briefly Items of Programme 
SATURDAY 
* * * * * * 
SUNDAY 
* * * * * 
MONDAY 
Fred A. Stern & Co. Balancing Gen. Ledger & Trial 
Bal. for April 
T U E S D A Y 
4 
Fred Stern & Co. Posting May, June & ½ of July 
W E D N E S D A Y 
5½ 
Fred Stern & Co. Posting ½ of July & Trial Bal. 
at end of July 
THURSDAY 
7 
Fred Stern & Co. Posting Aug. Sept. & Oct. 
FRIDAY 
7 
* 
TOTAL 23 ½ 
EXPENSE REPORT 
From January 26 to January 31 1924 inclusive 
2735 
2736 
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SUMMARY OF TIME AND EXPENSES 
Time (Hours) 
Chargeable to Expenses 
Regular Overtime Total 
Fred Stern & Co. 23½ 23½ 
TOTALS 23½ 23½ 
NOTE— 
(1) Time and expense reports must be written up DAILY 
and approved by senior in charge. 
(2) Reports must reach the office on Saturday morning each 
week to the previous day, and on the first of each month 
to the end of the previous month. 
(3) Seven hours constitute a working day, i. e., seven hours 
exclusive of time taken for meals. 
(4) To enable the statements of the Firm to its clients to be 
substantiated, if necessary in detail, the exact time of 
arrival each morning, departure to lunch, return from 
lunch, departure to supper, return from supper and final 
departure must be stated in the spaces provided for that 
information. 
(5) Overtime is only chargeable after forty-two hours per 
week have been worked and must not be charged be-
tween the hours of 9:00 a. m. and 5:30 p. m. (except 
on holidays) or for periods less than one hour. The 
maximum overtime chargeable for traveling after 5 :30 
p. m. is four hours, no charge extending beyond mid-
night. 
(6) A charge for supper money is not allowed unless at least 
two hours overtime has been worked. 
Signature L. M. SEISS 
COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of L. M. Seiss 
From February 1 to February 1 1924 inclusive 
SATURDAY 
SUNDAY 
2738 
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MONDAY 
* * * * * * 
TUESDAY 
* * * * * 
WEDNESDAY 
* 
* * * * 
THURSDAY 
* * * * * * 
FRIDAY 
Fred Stern & Co. Posted Nov. & Trial Bal. at end 
of November 7 
TOTAL 7 
EXPENSE REPORT 
* * * * * * 
SUMMARY OF T IME AND EXPENSES 
Time (Hours) 
Chargeable to Expenses 
Regular Overtime Total 
Fred Stern & Co. 7 7 
* * * 
TOTALS 7 7 
2742 
* * * * * * 
Signature L. M. SEISS 
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COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of L. M. Seiss 
From Feb. 2 to Feb. 8 1924 inclusive 
Engagement 
Details of Work Hours 
Per 
Item State Briefly Items of Programme 
S A T U R D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Trial Bal. at Nov. 7 
S U N D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Posting Dec. & Dec. Trial Bal. 3½ 
MONDAY 
Fred Stern & Co. Trial Bal. Dec. 7 
T U E S D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Checking assets & liabilities Dec. 
trial Bal. 7 
W E D N E S D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Comparative Trial Bal. 1/1/23 
12/31/23 Reconcilement of banks 7 
T H U R S D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Reconcilement of banks 7 
F R I D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. General 7 
T O T A L 
EXPENSE REPORT 
* * * * * 2745 
SUMMARY OF T I M E AND EXPENSES 
Time (Hours) 
Chargeable to Expenses 
Regular Overtime Total 
Fred Stern & Co. 42 3½ 45½ 
* * * 
T O T A L S 42 3 ½45½ 
Signature L. M. SEISS 
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COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of L. M. Seiss 
Prom Feb. 9 to Feb. 15 1924 inclusive 
Engagement 
Details of Work Hours 
Per 
Item State Briefly Items of Programme 
SATURDAY 
Fred Stern & Co. Ck. notes & Trade Accept. Rec. 
SUNDAY 
4 
* 
* * * * * 
MONDAY 
Fred Stern & Co. Accts. Rec. Petty Cash Count & 
General 
TUESDAY 
7 
* 
WEDNESDAY 
Fred Stern & Co. Accts. Rec. Acct. Pay. & General 
THURSDAY 
7 
Fred Stern & Co. Acct. Rec. Notes & Trade Accp. 
Rec. & General 
FRIDAY 
7 
Fred Stern & Co. General 7 
T O T A L 32 
EXPENSE REPORT 
* * * * 
SUMMARY OF T I M E AND EXPENSES 
Chargeable to 
Time (Hours) 
Regular Overtime Total 
Expenses 
Fred Stern & Co. 
* * * 
32 32 
TOTALS 32 32 
Signature L. M. SElSS 
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COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of L. M. Seiss 
From February 16 to February 22 1924 inclusive 
Engagement 
Details of Work 
State Briefly Items of Programme 
Hours 
Per 
Item 
S A T U R D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. L. of C. Anticipations, etc. 7 
SUNDAY 
* 
* * * * * 
M O N D A Y 
2 7 5 0 Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Stocks & bonds, Borrowed secu-
rities, collateral schedules and 
• general 7 
TUESDAY 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. General 8 
W E D N E S D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Future commitments 8 
T H U R S D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. General 7½ 
FR IDAY 
* * * * * * 
T O T A L 
EXPENSE REPORT 
From February 16 to February 22 1924 inclusive 
SUMMARY OF T I M E AND EXPENSES 
Time (Hours) 
Chargeable to Expenses 
Regular Overtime Total 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 37½ 37½ 
* * * 
TOTALS 37½ 37½ 
Signature L. M. SEISS 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 17. 
This exhibit was admitted as the accounts pay-
able ledger of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the years 
1921 to 1924. 
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COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of Sydney Towell 
From February 9 to 15 1924 inclusive 
Details of Work Hours 
Engagement Per 
State Briefly Items of Programme Item 
* 
SATURDAY * * * * 
* 
* 
SUNDAY * * * * 
* 
* 
MONDAY 
* 
* 
TUESDAY 
* 
Fred Stern & Co. 
WEDNESDAY 
Audit December 31, 1923 8 
Fred Stern & Co. 
THURSDAY 
Audit December 31, 1923 8 
Fred Stern & Co. 
FRIDAY 
Audit December 31, 1923 10 
TOTAL 
EXPENSE REPORT 
From February 9 to 14 1924 inclusive 
2752 
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SUMMARY OF T I M E ANd E X P E N S E S 
Time (Hours) 
Chargeable to Expenses 
Regular Overtime Total 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 26 26 1.50 
* * * 
T O T A L S 
* * *Signature S Y D N E Y T O W E L L 
COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of Sydney Towell 
From February 16 to February 22 1924 inclusive 
Engagement 
Details of Work Hours 
Per 
Item State Briefly Items of Programme 
S A T U R D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Audit Dec. 31, 1923 7 
S U N D A Y 
* * * * * * 
MONDAY 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Audit Dec. 31, 1923 9 
T U E S D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Audit Dec. 31, 1923 11 
W E D N E S D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Audit Dec. 31, 1923 8 
T H U R S D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Audit Dec. 31, 1923 12 
F R I D A Y 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Audit Dec. 31, 1923 7 
2756 
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EXPENSE REPORT 
From February 16 to February 22 1924 inclusive 
State Daily Disbursements 
Not Accruals Tuesday Thursday Total 
Subsistence: 
Room 
Meals 
Sundries: 
1.50 1.50 
TOTALS 3.00 
SUMMARY OF T I M E AND EXPENSES 
Chargeable to 
Time (Hours) 
Expenses 
Regular Overtime Total 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 54 54 3.00 
TOTALS 54 54 3.00 
* * * * * * 
Signature SYDNEY TOWELL 
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COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of Sydney Towell 
From February 23 to February 29 1924 inclusive 
Engagement 
Details of Work Hours 
Per 
Item State Briefly Items of Programme 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
SATURDAY 
Balance sheet as Dec. 31, 1923 9 
* 
SUNDAY * * * * * 
Fred Stern & Co. 
MONDAY 
Minutes etc. 2 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
TUESDAY 
Sundry & Report 5 
* 
WEDNESDAY * * * * * 
* 
THURSDAY * * * * * 
* 
FRIDAY * * * * * 
TOTAL 16 
EXPENSE REPORT 
From February 23 to February 29 1924 inclusive 
SUMMARY OF TIME AND EXPENSES 
Time (Hours) 
Chargeable to -— Expenses 
Regular Overtime Total 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 16 16 
* * * 
TOTALS 16 16 
* * * * 
Signature SYDNEY TOWELL 
2762 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
COPY 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. Office—New York 
Time Report of Sydney Towell 
From March 1 to 7 1924 inclusive 
Engagement 
Details of Work Hours 
Per 
Item State Briefly Items of Programme 
* 
SATURDAY 
* * * * * 
* 
SUNDAY * * * * * 
* 
MONDAY 
TUESDAY 
* 
* 
* * * * WEDNESDAY * 
* 
THURSDAY 
* 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. Report 
FRIDAY 
3 
* * * * 
TOTAL 3 
EXPENSE REPORT 
From March 1 to 7 1924 inclusive 
* * * * * 
2766 SUMMARY OF TIME AND EXPENSES 
Time (Hours) 
Chargeable to Expenses 
Regular Overtime Total 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 3 3 
* * * 
TOTALS 3 3 
* * * * * * 
Signature SYDNEY TOWELL 
2765 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. 
This exhibit was admitted as numerous journal 
vouchers of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., about twenty-
five in number, for the month of October, 1923. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20. 
This exhibit was admitted as numerous journal 
vouchers of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., about twenty-
five in number, for the month of November, 1923. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21. 
This exhibit was admitted as numerous journal 
vouchers of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., about twenty-
five in number, for the month of December, 1923. 
2769 
2768 
2767 
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2770 Plaintiff's Exhibit 21-A. 
1923 No. 12-28 
JOURNAL VOUCHER 
Closing entries by Touche Niven 
Debit Acct. P S S P Acct. Credit 
38.23 A-70 15,000.00 
50.40 A-34 45.00 
15,000.00 A-34 .51 
.03 
45.00 A-31 A-31 38.23 
.51 50.40 
.03 D-2-5 
1,262.50 D-9 D-1-9 1,262.50 
.09 C-5 D-9 .09 
30.— D-11 D-9 30.00 
11,500.00 D-33 A-29 11,500.00 
1,876,755.84 D-13 A-42 1,876,755.84 
347,219.08 A-42 D-13 347,219.08 
5,416.00 A-112 A-46 5,416.00 
1,690.39 A-113 A-47 1,690.39 
1,000.00 A-88 D-30 1,000.00 
551.52 A-94 C-5 551.52 
17,441.14 B-50 C-9 17,441.14 
23,782.72 D-20 D-1-1 23,782.72 
1.40 A-16-1 D-2-5 1.40 
2,301,784.85 Total 2,301,784.85 
2772 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 22 and 22-A. 
These exhibits were admitted as the journal 
vouchers of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., showing the 
adjustment entries suggested by Touche, Niven & 
Co. in connection with their audit. 
2771 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 for Identification. 2773 
This exhibit was admitted as a book containing 
records of shipments received from the United 
Baltic Corporation by Fred Stern & Co., Inc. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24. 
This exhibit was admitted as the invoices con-
tained in a book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in which 
are bound copies of trust receipts executed by Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., to the United Baltic Corporation 
and invoices made by United Baltic Corporation to 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc. Only the invoices are in 
evidence. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25. 
This exhibit was admitted as the common stock 
certificate book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 26. 
This exhibit was admitted as the preferred stock 
certificate book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. 
2774 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 27. 
(Letterhead of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.) 
New York, Feb. 21st, 1924. 
Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co., 
80 Maiden Lane, 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
We hereby certify, each for ourselves, that all 
the liabilities of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. at Dec. 31st, 
1923 are shown on the books of the Corporation at 
that date and there are no contingent liabilities or 
claims pending against the Corporation other than 
those shown on the company's records under the 
items Trade Accounts Discounted $159,682.28 and 
certain borrowed securities, memorandum of which 
has been handed to you. 
Yours very truly, 
FRED STERN, 
Pres. of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. 
H . W . ROMBERG, 
Cashier. 
2778 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 28. 
(Letterhead of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.) 
New York, Feb. 21st, 1924. 
Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co., 
80 Maiden Lane, 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
I hereby certify that the Inventory of Crude 
Rubber afloat or in stock amounting to 495,051 lbs. 
on Dec. 31st, 1923 as compiled from the stock rec-
ords of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. was taken under my 
general supervision and direction and all items 
contained therein were properly supported by 
Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, or other 
proper evidences of ownership. 
All purchases for dollars are priced at cost and 
all purchases for Sterling at sterling cost converted 
at 4.34 3/8, the rate prevailing at Dec. 31st, 1923, 
the total value being $131,423.81 which is within 
a few dollars of market prices at Dec. 31st, 1923. 
All liabilities to Creditors, Banks, or Bankers 
in respect to this Inventory are shown on the books 
of the company. 
I further certify that the Corporation had no 
speculative contracts for the purchase or sale of 
Crude Rubber open at Dec. 31st, 1923 and that 
future contracts for the purchase of Crude Rubber 
and the Inventory of Rubber, as stated above, are 
fully covered by sales contracts at a marginal 
profit. 
Yours very truly, 
FRED STERN, 
Pres. of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. 
H . W . ROMBERG, 
Cashier. 
2779 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 for Identification. 
This exhibit is a portion of the examination of 
Romberg under Section 21-A before the Referee in 
the Matter of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., Bankrupt, 
and printed herein at pages 243-246. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 30. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 4th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
25 South William St., 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Att. Mr. von Goeben 
We beg to refer to arrangements completed in 
regard to financing approximately $100,000 value 
of Ribbed Smoked Sheets by your company, for 
which you will charge us 6% p. a. on the various 
amounts advanced and ½¢ per lb. commission on 
every transaction. 
The above arrangement is agreeable and we here-
with confirm same. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
HR :CF 
2782 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 31. 
April 5th, 1924. 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co., Inc. 
277 Broadway 
New York City 
Dear Sirs: 
We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of 
even date in which you enclose three trust receipts 
covering 85 tons of Rubber, and we accordingly 
hand you herewith our check for $43,680.00. 
It is understood that your invoices to the buyers 
are to be sent to us for mailing to the respective 
parties and that the invoices will be assigned and 
made payable to us. 
Very truly yours, 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
HM:x 
Encl. 
President. 
2787 
2786 
2785 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 32. 
FRED STERN & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 4th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
25 South William St., 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Att. Mr. von Goeben 
This afternoon we expect the presentation of the 
following Proforma Invoices: 
Andean Trading Co 10 Tons $ 5040.— 
to be shipped: to the Goodyear T 
& R Co., Akron, Ohio 
American Trading Co 25 Tons 15960.— 
to be shipped to the Miller Rubber 
Co., Akron, Ohio 
Anglo Eastern Trading Co.. 50 Tons 25760.— 
to be shipped to the Goodyear T 
& R Co., Akron, Ohio 
$46760.— 
In anticipation of the above we would appreciate 
if you would put us in funds so that payment can 
be effected. 
We would appreciate if you would hand bearer 
some Trust Receipt forms. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
(Enc) 
HR :CF 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 33. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 5th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust 
Receipts as follows: 
#1—10 Tons $ 5040.—sold to Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio 
#2—25 Tons 12880.—sold to Miller Rubber Co. 
Akron, Ohio 
#3—50 Tons 25760.—sold to Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio 
Assigned invoices in cover of the above will be 
forwarded to you within a few days. 
We would appreciate if you would put us in 
funds in cover of the above. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
(Enc) 
H R : C F 
2791 
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2794 Plaintiff's Exhibit 34, 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
No. 1789 New York, Apr 5 1924 
T H E MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$43680.00 Forty Three Thousand Six Hundred 
Eighty Dollars. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING A . VON GOEBEN 
Cashier President 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
or Order 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Apr 7 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
(Endorsed) 
Pay 
2796 New York W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
2795 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 35. 
TRUST RECEIPT 
New York, N. Y., April 5th, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
William St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows: 
Marks No. Commodity 
T. F. S.S. 'M. S. Dollar' 50 Tons 
Pier 16 Stapleton 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. hereby agree to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under sales contracts, and to deliver as 
soon as received the full net proceeds thereof direct 
to the Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to 
hold the same separate and apart for account and 
as the property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its 
security for due provision for the payment of the 
Ultramares Corp. for the amount noted at foot, 
and as its security for the payment of any other 
indebtedness or liability of ours to the Ultramares 
Corp. 
We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
thereon, hereby waiving any lien which we might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 3 
$25,760.— 
Sold to 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Akron, Ohio. 
2797 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 36. 
TRUST RECEIPT 
New York, N. Y., April 4, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
William St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows; 
Marks No. Commodity 
E A S.S. M. S, Dollar 25 Tons 
C Pier 16 Stapleton R. ss. 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. hereby agree to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under sales contracts, and to deliver as 
soon as received the full net proceeds thereof direct 
to the Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to 
hold the same separate and apart for account and 
as the property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its 
security for due provision for the payment of the 
Ultramares Corp. for the amount noted at foot, 
and as its security for the payment of any other 
indebtedness or liability of ours to the Ultramares 
Corp. 
We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
thereon, hereby waiving any lien which we might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
FRED STERN & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 2 
$12880.— 
Sold to 
Miller R. Co. 
Akron, Ohio 
2800 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 37. 2803 
TRUST RECEIPT 
New York, N. Y., April 5th, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
William St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows: 
Marks. No. Commodity 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. hereby agree to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under sales contracts, and to deliver as 
soon as received the full net proceeds thereof direct 
to the Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to 
hold the same separate and apart for account and 
as the property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its 
security for due provision for the payment of the 
Ultramares Corp. for the amount noted at foot, 
and as its security for the payment of any other 
indebtedness or liability of ours to the Ultramares 
Corp. 
We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
thereon, hereby waiving any lien which we might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
S 
F 
S/S 'Heffron' 10 Tons 
#3 Amber Crepe 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 1 
$5040.— 
Sold to 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio. 
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2806 Plaintiff's Exhibit 38. 
#18618 #11165 
FRED STERN & CO. INC. 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 2nd, 1924. 
Messrs. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
Akron, Ohio. 
Payable to Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
25 South William St., New York. 
Terms: Payment due April 20th, 1924. 
All claims for damage or deficiency to be made within three days 
after receipt of goods. Goods shipped at the risk of buyers. 
Payable in New York Funds 
Your Order No. G 2644 
Date of Sales #14970 10/31/23 
2808 
397/470 
F 
1297/1370 
F S 191 
F S 193 
S/S "HEFFRON" 
To No. 3 Amber Gristly Crepe Rubber 
74 c/s G 13181½ T 1951½ N 11230 lbs. 
74 " 13118½ 1870½ 11248 " 
148 c/s G 26300 T 3822 N 22478 lbs. 
Net 22478 lbs. @ per lb. 
Rubber Association Fee 
Weight slip herewith 
Deld to your Representative. 
D/O #12593 #12605 
(7793 7795) 
Trust Receipt No. 1 
Pd 4/22/24 
$5563.31 
6.74 
$5570.05 
2807 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 2809 
April 7, 1924. 
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
Akron, Ohio. 
Dear Sirs: 
We hand you herewith invoice in duplicate of 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., for $5570.05, to-
gether with weighers certificates and executed as-
signments of this account in our favor. 
Trusting to be favored with your check to our 
order at the maturity of this invoice. We are, 
Yours very truly, 
Cashier. 
HM/MK. 
encl. 
2810 
April 25, 1924. 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
277 Broadway, 
New York City. 
Dear Sirs : 
Confirming our telephone conversation of this 
A. M., we beg to advise having received on April 
22nd, check for $5570.05 from the Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., in payment of your invoice for like 
amount relating to trust receipt No. 1. 
Very truly yours, 
Cashier. 
HM/MK. 
2811 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 39. 
#18661 #11202 
FRED STERN & CO. INC. 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 8th, 1924. 
Messrs. Miller Rubber Co., 
Akron, Ohio. 
Payable to Ultramares Corp. 
25 So. William St., New York. 
Terms: Net cash 30 days from date of invoice. 
All claims for damage or deficiency to be made within three days 
after receipt of goods. Goods shipped at the risk of buyers. 
Payable in New York Funds 
Your Order No. 27272 
Date of Sales #14981 11/2/23 
S/S "M. S. DOLLAR" 
E A To 390 c/s #4 Amber Crepe, 
C 
G-78201 T 10480 N 67721 lbs. @ per lb. $16760.95 
27272 
Rubber Association Fee, 20.32 
$16781.27 
Weight slip herewith 
Bill of Lading to follow 
(7680) 
This invoice is assigned and made payable to the 
Ultramares Corp., New York. 
FRED STERN & Co. INC. 
Pd 5/16/24 
President. 
2812 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 2815 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 10th, 1924. 
The Miller Rubber Co., 
Akron, Ohio 
Dear Sirs: 
We are enclosing herewith invoice covering 
390 c/s Rubber amounting to $16,781.27 
You will note that this invoice bears a notation 
that same is assigned and made payable to the 
Ultramares Corp., 25 So. William St. and we would 
appreciate if you would remit the above amount to 
the Ultramares Corp. on the due date. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
(Enc) 
C F — 
2S17 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
April 11, 1924. 
Miller Rubber Co., 
Akron, Ohio. 
Dear Sirs: 
We hand you herewith invoice in duplicate of 
the Fred Stern & Co. Inc., for $16,781.27 accom-
panied by weighers certificate and a letter advising 
the assignment on this account to this Corporation. 
Trusting to be favored with your check to our 
order at the maturity of this invoice, we are, 
Very truly yours, 
Cashier. 
HM/MK. 
encl. 
May 16, 1924. 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., 
New York City. 
Dear Sirs: 
We beg to advise having to-day received from 
the Miller Rubber Co., check for $16,781.27 in pay-
ment of invoice, which amount we have placed to 
the credit of your account. 
Very truly yours, 
Cashier. 
HM/MK. 
2819 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 40. 
#18707 #11250 
FRED STERN & CO. INC. 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 17th, 1924. 
Messrs. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
Akron, Ohio. 
Payable to Ultramares Corp. 
25 S. William St., New York. 
Terms: Payment due 5/5/24. 
All claims for damage or deficiency to be made within three days 
after receipt of goods. Goods shipped at the risk of buyers. 
Payable in New York Funds 
Your Order No. 15018 
Date of Sales #2705 11/15/23 
T & F To Prime Ribbed Smoked Sheets 
F S 6 c/s G 1334½ T 112½ N 1222 lbs. 
133 " 25387½ 2479 22908½ " 
196 308 " 42212 2802 39410 
247 " 51959½ 3041½ 48918 
694 c/s G 120893½T 8435 N 112458½ lbs. 
Net 112458½ lbs. @ 27¾¢ per lb. $31207.23 
Rubber Association Fee, 33.74 
$31240.94 
Weight slip herewith 
Deld to your Representative. 
D/O #12631 
(7839 6 7863 688) 
This invoice is assigned and made payable to 
Ultramares Corp., 25 S. William St., New York. 
FRED STERN & Co., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
Pres. 
Pd 5/5 
2821 
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2824 Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
April 21, 1924. 
The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 
Akron, Ohio. 
Dear Sirs : 
We hand you herewith invoices in duplicate of 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc. for $31,240.94 
12,529.35 
3,135.54 
together with weigher's certificate also three as-
signments duly executed. 
Trusting to be favored with your check to our 
order at the maturity of these invoices, we are, 
Very truly yours, 
Cashier. 
HM/MK. 
encl. 
2826 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 41. 2827 
1919 
11/21 
20 
21 
20 
20 
20 
12/16 
19 
1920 
1/30 
2/18 
3/4 
10/8 
1921 
4/21 
6/30 
9/30 
10/7 
10/5 
1922 
2/27 
3/15 
3/27 
7/1 
9/11 
12/30 
1923 
3/1 
3/24 
4/10 
6/20 
6/29 
1924 
2/6 
5/1 
5/14 
6/24 
6/27 
7/12 
7/24 
1 
6 
19 
13 
4 
case Rubber 
2 6 " 
4 " 
92 " 
22 bales Balata 
10 bales Balata 
35 " 
60 cases Rubber 
55 bales Balata 
156 pkges Rubber 
20 bales Balata 
83 
2 
5 
5 
32 
Rubber 
Balata 
Rubber 
87 cases Rubber 
6 " 
13 " 
25 " 
6 
7 cases Rubber 
11 " 
5 
56 bales Rubber 
27 eases Rubber 
6 " Balata 
6 " 
Terms 
Cash 10 
10 
Cash 
Cash 10 
" 10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Cash 
Cash 
Cash 10 
10 
Cash 
Cash 
30 
60 
60 
Amount 
$ 86.29 
609.15 
1576.25 
1800.90 
651.31 
328.82 
819.36 
8012.42 
2207.26 
354.62 
15852.18 
1023.86 
643.66 
2029.26 
3520.92 
3219.00 
4818.69 
1101.84 
4432.61 
125.25 
88.32 
235.68 
2681.46 
6500.53 
657.28 
1431.37 
2247.05 
467.58 
385.77 
637.86 
344.35 
918.54 
1029.76 
705.20 
711.85 
Broker 
Direct 
Earle Bros. 
E. G. Curry 
Crude Rubber Brok. 
" " " 
Earl Bros. 
Crude Rubber Brok. 
W. Hammersdorf 
M. Rothschild 
Direct 
R. Badenhop 
Direct 
Crude Rubber Brok. 
C. A. Morse & Co. 
Crude Rubber Brok. 
Earle Bros. 
Diamond Rubber 
Brok. 
Direct " 
Earle Bros. 
Direct 
2828 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 42. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 7th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust 
Receipts as follows: 
#4—40 Tons $21,056.—sold to General Electric 
Co., Schenectady, N. Y. 
#5—30 Tons 15,792.—sold to Boston Woven 
H & R Co., Cambridge, 
Mass. 
#6—15 Tons 7,728.—sold to Michelin Tire 
Co., Milltown, N. J. 
#7—20 Tons 9,856.—sold to Acme Rubber 
Mfg. Co., Trenton, N. J. 
Assigned invoices in cover of the above will be 
forwarded to you within a few days. 
We would appreciate if you would put us in 
funds in cover of the above. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
(Enc) 
HR :CF 
2830 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 2833 
April 7, 1924. 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., 
277 Broadway, 
New York City. 
Dear Sirs: 
We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of 
even date, in which you enclose three receipts cov-
ering 105 tons of Rubber, and we accordingly hand 
you herewith our checks for $54,432.00. 
It is understood that your invoices to the buyers 
are to be sent to us for mailing to the respective 
parties and that the invoices will be assigned and 
made payable to us. 
Very truly yours, 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
President. 
HM/MK 
encl. 
2835 
2834 
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2836 Plaintiff's Exhibit 43 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
No. 1792 New York, Apr 7 1924 
THE MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL BANK 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$24432.00 Twenty Four Thousand Four Hundred 
Thirty Two Dollars. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
(Endorsed) 
Pay to the order of 
The Chemical Nat'l Bank 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Endorsements Guaranteed 
Rack Department 
Apr 9 1924 
The Chemical National Bank 
of New York 
H . MANNING 
Cashier 
A . VON GOEBEN 
President 
2838 
No. 12 
2837 
947 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 44. 2839 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25-31 South William Street 
B A N K OF N E W YORK AND TRUST COMPANY 
Banking Office—48 Wall St. 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$30000.00 Thirty Thousand Dollars. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
Pay to the order of 
The Chemical Nat'l Bank 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Endorsements Guaranteed 
Rack Department 
Apr 9 1924 
The Chemical National Bank 
of New York 
No. 6981 New York, Apr 7 1924 
H . MANNING 
Cashier 
A . VON GOEBEN 
President 2840 
(Endorsed) 
No. 12 2841 
948 
2842 Plaintiff's Exhibits 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 50. 
These exhibits are the invoices and accompanying 
letters relating to Trust Receipts (loans) 4, 5, 6 
and 7. They are in the same form and follow the 
same practice as under the earlier trust receipts, 
as shown by Plaintiff's Exhibits 38, 39 and 40, 
supra. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 51, 52, 53 and 54. 
These are Trust Receipts Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7, which 
are referred to in Plaintiff's Exhibit 42, supra, and 
which are in the same form as the earlier trust re-
ceipts, Plaintiff's Exhibits 35, 36 and 37, supra. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 55. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 9th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
25 So. William St. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
The present serves to advise you that we expect 
to have an invoice tomorrow for the Miller Rubber 
Co. but we do not expect any more invoices for at 
least 3 or 4 days after that. 
2843 
2844 
949 
Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
We expect the presentation of invoices within 
the forth-coming 3 or 4 days for Crude Rubber 
which is to be shipped to the following Manufac-
turers: 
Miller Rubber Co 34 Tons $18848.-30 days 
Mishawaka Woolen & R 
Mfg. Co 50 " 28000.—15 " 
General Tire & Rubber 
Co 25 " 13720.—15 " 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co 25 " 15120.—5/25 
Ford Motor Co 25 " 12880.—10 " 
General Tire & Rubber 
Co 25 " 12320.—15 " 
Total $100888.00 
Kindly advise us if you care to arrange the 
financing of the above lots or part of same for us. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President, 
F S :CF 
2847 
2845 
2846 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 56. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 10th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust 
Receipts as follows: 
#8—34 Tons—sold to Miller Rubber 
Co., Akron, Ohio $18848.— 
#9—50 " —sold to M i shawaka 
Woolen & R Mfg. Co., 
Mishawaka, Ind 28000.— 
#10—25 " —sold to General Tire 
& Rubber Co., Akron, 
Ohio 13720.— 
#11—25 " —sold to Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., Akron, 
Ohio . . . . . : . . . . 15120.— 
#12—25 " —sold to Ford Motor Co., 
Detroit, Mich 12880.— 
#13—25 " —sold to General Tire 
& Rubber Co., Akron, 
Ohio 12320.— 
$100888.— 
Assigned invoices in cover of the above will be 
forwarded to you within a few days. 
We would appreciate if you would put us in 
funds in cover of the above. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
H . W . ROMBERG. 
(Enc) 
F S : C F 
2850 
2848 
2849 
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F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, April 10th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp., 
New York City. 
Dear Sirs: 
Will you kindly give Bearer the necessary funds 
to finance the following lots. Trust Receipts for 
which have already been sent down to your good-
selves. 
Miller Rubber Co 34 Tons $18848. 30 days 
General Tire & Rubber 
Co 25 " 13720. 15 " 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co 25 " 15120. Payable 
May 25th 
Tota l . . . .....$47688. 
Thanking you for your kind attention, we re-
main, 
Yours very truly, 
FRED STERN & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
2852 
2853 
952 
2854 Plaintiff's Exhibit 57. 
April 11, 1924. 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., 
New York City. 
Attention Mr. Fred Stern. 
Dear S i r : 
We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of 
the 10th, in which you enclose trust receipts Nos. 
8-13 inclusive, to cover an advance aggregating 
$100,888.00. 
In accordance with your letter of even date, we 
hand you herewith our check for $47,688.00 as an 
advance against trust receipts Nos. 8 and 9. 
On Monday, April 14th, we will hand you our 
check for $53,200.00 as an advance against trust 
receipts Nos. 9, 12 and 13. 
Trusting to be favored with your invoices ac-
companied by a letter of assignment addressed to 
the purchasers, in duplicate, we are, 
Very truly yours, 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
President, 
HM/MK. 
encl. 
2856 
2855 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 58 2857 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
No. 1864 New York, Apr 14 1924 
THE MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL BANK 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$53200.00 Fifty Three Thousand Two Hundred 
Dollars. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING A . VON GOEBEN 
Cashier President 
Pay to the order of 
The Chemical Nat'l Bank 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Endorsements Guaranteed 
Rack Department 
Apr 15 1924 
The Chemical National Bank 
of New York 
(Endorsed) 
No. 12 2859 
2858 
954 
2860 Plaintiff's Exhibit 59 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
No. 1851 New York, Apr 11 1924 
THE MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL BANK 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$47688.00 Forty Seven Thousand Six Hundred 
Eighty Eight Dollars. 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
or order 
Fred Stem & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Apr 12 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
New York 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
2861 H . MANNING 
Cashier 
A . VON GOEBEN 
President 
(Endorsed) 
Pay 
2862 W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
955 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 60 for Identification. 2863 
Period 
Acct. 
No. 
Advances 
made by 
Ultramares 
Interest and 
Commission 
Charges 
Collections 
from 
Accounts 
Receivable 
Apr. 5/24-June 28/24 1 589,426.00 15,917.00 444,211.90 
June 28/24—July 31/24 1 105,000.00 3,395.99 222,062.44 
July 31/24—Sept. 3/24 1 
2 
3 
180,100.00 
224,692.00 
52.40 
3,233.18 
549.67 
69,788.84 
97,029.40 
19,522.23 
Sept. 3/24-Sept. 30/24 2 
3 
4 369,800.00 
74.37 
5,597.35 
6,004.97 
70,544.53 
173,792.04 
39,959.67 
Sept. 30/24—Oct. 31/24 
Oct. 20/24-
3 
4 
5 
79,000.00 
249,000.00 
10.00 
5,353.64 
2,821.32 
47,976.20 
300,535.22 
53,912.11 
Oct. 31/24—Nov. 30/24 4 
5 351,800.00 
223.07 
4,998.28 
86,877.82 
191,245.11 
Nov. 30/24-Dec. 31/24 4 
5 195,000.00 
35.70 
3,440.85 
12,990.73 
300,320.57 
Dec. 31/24-Jan. 31/25 5 1,058.15 77,399.63 
$2,343,818.00 $52,765.94 $2,208,168.44 
Total advances made by Ultramares $2,343,818.00 
Interest and commission charges 52,765.94 
Total charges to Jan. 31/1925 $2,396,583.94 
Total credits to Jan. 31/1925 2,208,168.44 
$ 188,415.50 
Deduct commission on loans wholly or partly unpaid Jan. 
31/1925 1,950.00 
Balance due Jan. 31/1925 $ 186,465.50 
Interest to April 1/1929 47,238.05 
$ 233,703.55 
Payments by Ultramares since Jan. 31/1925 52,329.49 
Interest thereon to April 1/1929 4,105.33 
$ 290,138.37 
Credit collections since Jan. 31/1925 35,394.21 
$ 254,744.16 
Credit interest on collections to April 1/1929 4,506.76 
BALANCE April 1/1929 $ 250,237.40 
2864 
2865 
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2866 Plaintiff's Exhibit 61. 
This consists of the amendment of the complaint 
incorporating the second cause of action; this is 
already printed in the record following the com-
plaint. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 62. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, Nov. 25th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust 
Receipt as follows: 
#105—75 Tons, $50,000.—sold to Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio 
We would appreciate if you would put us in 
funds, i. e., $50,000.—to finance the above lots. 
Invoices for the above will be forwarded to you 
within a few days. 
Yours very truly, 
FRED STERN & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
(Enc) 
CF— 
2867 
2868 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 2869 
TRUST RECEIPT. 
New York, N. Y., Nov. 25th, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
William St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows: 
Marks No. Commodity 
E A C 
B A T O E S.S. "Veendyke" 75 Tons 
F C 
H & C 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as 
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the 
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold 
the same separate and apart for account and as the 
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security 
for the provision for the payment of the Ultramares 
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its se-
curity for the payment of any other indebtedness 
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp. 
We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 105 
$50,000. 
Sold to 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
Akron, Ohio 75 Tons 
2870 
2871 
2872 
958 
Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
#19765 #12364 
FRED STERN & CO. INC. 
277 Broadway 
New York, Dec. 15th, 1924. 
Messrs. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
Akron, Ohio. 
Payable to Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
25 South William St., New York. 
Terms: Net cash 15 days from date of bill of lading. 
All claims for damage or deficiency to be made within three days 
after receipt of goods. Goods shipped at the risk of buyers. 
Payable in New York Funds 
Your Order No. 903 
Date of Sales #15944 10/28/24 
Blocks 
C H To 335 c/s Peruvian Tails, 
903 G 159512 T 24216 N 135296 lbs. @ 17½ per lb. $23676.80 
Rubber Association Fee, 40.59 
$23717.39 
Weight slip herewith 
Bill of Lading to follow 
(8413) 
This invoice is assigned and made payable to the 
Ultramares Corp., 25 South William St., New York. 
FRED STERN & Co., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Pd 1/2/25 
2873 
2874 
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F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, Dec. 16th, 1924. 
Messrs. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
Akron, Ohio. 
Dear Sirs: 
We are enclosing herewith invoice covering 
335 c/s Crude Rubber amounting to $23717.39 
You will note this invoice bears a notation that 
same is assigned and made payable to the Ultra-
mares Corp. 25 South William St. New York, and 
we would appreciate if you would forward your 
remittance for the above amount to the Ultramares 
Corp. on due date. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
(Enc) 
C F — 
877 
2876 
960 
2878 Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
December 16th, 1924. 
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
Akron, Ohio 
Dear Sirs: 
We beg to hand you herewith invoice in tripli-
cate of Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc. for $23,717.39 
accompanied by weigher's certificate, bill of lading 
and a letter advising the assignment of this ac-
count to our corporation. 
Trusting to be favored with your check to our 
order at the maturity of this invoice, we remain, 
(No Receipt Necessary) 
Statement of Remittance in Favor of 
Messrs Ultramares Corp 
25 South William St 
New York N Y 
2879 Very truly yours, 
Cashier. 
HM :hv 
encl. 
12-15-24 
D/M #1308 4059 
D/M #1078 15912 
Dec 1924 1687 
2371739 
2880 
19971 19971 
2351768 
Fred Stern & Co Inc Invoice 
277 Broadway 
New York N Y 
Yours truly, 
THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER Co. 
961 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 62-A, 62-B, 62-C, 62-D, 2881 
62-E, 62-F and 62-G. 
Exhibits 62-A, 62-B, 62-C, 62-D, 62-E, 62-F and 
G2-G include the following invoices which were de-
livered and assigned by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to 
Ultramares Corporation under and pursuant to 
Trust Receipt No. 105: 
Date of 
Invoice Purchaser of Merchandise Quantity Price 
Dec. 23, 1924 Whitall Tatum Co. 2190 lbs. $ 672.86 
Dec. 17, 1924 International Shoe Co. 1490½ lbs. 573.36 
Dec. 23, 1924 Detroit Insulated Wire Co. 4459 lbs. 1,759.67 
Dec. 24, 1924 International Shoe Co. 4495½lbs. 1,723.43 
Jan. 1, 1925 Cooper Corp. 9466 lbs. 2,435.39 
Jan. 1, 1925 Clifton Mfg. Co. 4723 lbs. 1,215.16 
Dec. 23, 1924 Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. 27,297 lbs. 9,280.98 
Dec. 23, 1924 Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. 444 lbs. 150.96 
Dec. 23, 1924 Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. 4519 lbs. 1,536.46 
Dec. 23, 1924 Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. 4504½ lbs. 1,531.53 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
New York City 
New York, Nov 25 1924 No. 6642 
NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE 
in New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$10000.00 Ten Thousand Dollars through the New 
York Cleaning House. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING A . VON GOEBEN 
Cashier President 
2882 
2883 
962 
Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
(Stamped) 
Accepted 
Nov 25 1924 
Payable through the New York Clearing House 
and only if Unaltered since issuance 
and if Properly Endorsed 
National Bank of Commerce 
in New York 
(Endorsed) 
Pay 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
or order 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Nov 26 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
New York 
W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63-A. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
No. 13449 New York, Nov 25 1924 $15000.00 
THE: EQUITABLE TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Fifteen Thousand Dollars. Payable through the 
New York Clearing House. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING A . VON GOEBEN 
Cashier President 
2885 
2886 
2884 
963 
Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
(Stamped) 
Certified 
Payable through New York Clearing House 
Nov 25 '24 
When Properly Endorsed 
The Equitable Trust Company 
of New York 
37 Wall St. 
(Endorsed) 
Pay 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
or order 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Nov 26 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
New York 
W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63-B. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 2889 
No. 3570 New York, Nov 26 1924 
THE MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$25000.00 Twenty Five Thousand Dollars. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING A . VON GOEBEN 
Cashier President 
2887 
2888 
964 
2890 Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
(Endorsed) 
Pay 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
or order 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Nov 28 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
New York 
W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 64. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, Nov. 29, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp., 
25 So. William St., 
New York, N. Y. 
Dear Sirs: 
Kindly be advised that we expect to make de-
livery immediately to the following manufacturers: 
Tons Amount Terms 
Endicott Johnson, John-
son City, Pa 25 $16,000 15 Days 
National Metal Moulding 
Co., Economy, Pa 20 14,000 10 Days 
$30,000 
2891 
2892 
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Kindly advise us if you care to finance the above, 
and oblige, 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
JKU :WM 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, Dec. 1st, 1924. 
The Ultramares Corp. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust 
Receipt as follows: 
#106: 45 Tons, $30,000—sold to 
Endicott Johnson Corp. 25 Tons 
Johnson City, N. Y. 
National Metal Moulding Co. 20 Tons 
Economy, Pa. 
We would appreciate if you would put us in 
funds, i. e. $30,000.—to finance the above lots. 
2894 
2895 
966 
2896 Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
Invoices for the above will be forwarded to your 
good-selves within a few days. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
(ENC) 
C F 
TRUST RECEIPT. 
New York, N. Y., Dec. 1st, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
William St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows : 
Marks No. Commodity 
E A C M S Dollar 45 Tons 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as 
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the 
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold 
the same separate and apart for account and as the 
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security 
for the provision for the payment of the Ultra-
mares Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as 
its security for the payment of any other indebted-
ness or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp. 
2897 
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We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
FRED STERN & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 106 
$30,000. 
Sold to 
Endicott Johnson Corp. 
Johnson City, N. Y. 25 Tons 
National Metal Moulding Co. 
Economy, Pa. 20 Tons 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 64-A, 64-B and 64-C. 
Exhibits 64-A, 64-B and 64-C include the follow-
ing invoices which were delivered and assigned by 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to Ultramares Corporation 
under and pursuant to Trust Receipt No. 106: 
Date of 
Invoice 
Dec. 5, 1924 
Dec. 17, 1924 
Dec. 20, 1924 
Dec. 22, 1924 
Dec. 4, 1924 
Purchaser of Merchandise 
National Metal Moulding 
Co. 
Endicott Johnson Corp. 
Endicott Johnson Corp. 
Endicott Johnson Corp. 
National Metal Moulding 
Co. 
Quantity Price 
15732 lbs. 
11274 lbs. 
6019½ lbs. 
38090½ lbs. 
$5,501.60 
3,875.44 
2,069.20 
13,093.61 
29090 lbs. 10,170.51 
2900 
2901 
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ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
No. 3014 New York, Dec 1 1924 
THE MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL BANK 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$30000.00 Thirty Thousand Dollars. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING H . MEYERS 
Cashier Vice-President 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
2903 
(Endorsed) 
Pay 
or order 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Dec 2 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
New York 
W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
2904 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 66. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC. 
NEW YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, Dec. 8th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust 
Receipts as follows: 
2906 
#107: 40 Tons, $29,700.— sold to 
Detroit Insulated Wire Co. 5 Tons 
Detroit, Mich. 
Whitney Blake Co. 18 " 
New Haven, Conn. 
Goodyear Rubber Ins. W. Co. 7 " 
New York 
Michelin Tire Co. 10 " 
Milltown, N. J. 
#108: 48½ Tons, 34,000.— sold to 
Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. 5 Tons 
Yonkers, N. Y. 
G. R. Cummings Jr. & Co. 3 " 
St. Louis, Mo. 
Hadley Bros. Uhl Co. 2 " 
St. Louis, Mo. 
Johns-Manville, Inc. " 
Manville, N. J. 
Toycraft Rubber Co. 3 " 
Akron, Ohio. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 30 " 
Akron, Ohio. 
#109 : 60 Tons, 38,700.— sold to 
Lovell Mfg. Co. 20 Tons 
Erie, Pa. 
Pharis Tire & Rubber Co. 20 " 
Findlay, Ohio. 
Corduroy Tire Co. 20 " 
Grand Rapids, Mich. 
$102,400.— 
2905 
2907 
2908 
970 
Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
We would appreciate if you would put us in 
funds, i. e. $100,000.—to finance the above lots. 
Invoices for the above will be forwarded to your 
good-selves within a few days. 
Yours very truly, 
FRED STERN & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
JKU :CF 
(Enc) 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 66-A, 66-B, 67, 67-A, 67-B, 
70 and 70-A. 
Exhibits 66-A and 66-B include the following 
invoices which were delivered and assigned by 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to Ultramares Corporation 
under and pursuant to Trust Receipt No. 107 : 
Date of 
Invoice Purchaser of Merchandise Quantity Price 
Dec. 30, 1924 Hood Rubber Co. 22403½ lbs. $7,224.47 
Dec. 30, 1924 Hood Rubber Co. 22232 lbs. 7,171.01 
Dec. 30, 1924 Garlock Packing Co. 33750 lbs. 13,064.48 
These exhibits included Trust Receipt No. 107, 
which is as follows: 
TRUST RECEIPT. 
New York, N. Y., Dec. 8th, 1921. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
Williams St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows : 
Marks No. Commodity 
E A C M. S. Dollar 40 Tons 
2909 
2910 
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For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as 
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the 
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold 
the same separate and apart for account and as the 
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security 
for the provision for the payment of the Ultramares 
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its se-
curity for the payment of any other indebtedness 
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp. 
We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 107 
$29,700.— 
Sold to 2913 
Detroit Insulated Wire Co. 5 Tons 
Detroit, Mich. 
Whitney Blake Co. 
New Haven, Conn. 
18 Tons 
Goodyear R. Insulating Co. 7 Tons 
New York 
Michelin Tire Co. 
Milltown, N. J. 
10 Tons 
2912 
2914 
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Exhibit 67-A is Trust Receipt No. 108, which 
is as follows: 
TRUST RECEIPT. 
New York, N. Y., Dec. 8th, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
Williams St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows: 
Marks No. Commodity 
H L K Madioen 48½ Tons 
I H E C 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as 
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the 
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold 
the same separate and apart for account and as the 
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security 
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares 
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its se-
curity for the payment of any other indebtedness 
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp. 
We further agree to hold said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
2915 
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Trust Receipt No. 108 
$34,000.— 
Sold to 
Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. 5 Tons 
Yonkers, N. Y. 
G. R. Cummings Jr. & Co. 3 Tons 
St. Louis, Mo. 
Hadley Bros. Uhl Co. 2 Tons 
St. Louis, Mo. 
Johns-Manville, Inc. 5½ " 
Manville, N. J. 
Toycraft Rubber Co. 3 " 
Akron, Ohio. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 30 " 
Akron, Ohio. 
Exhibit 67-B is Trust Receipt No. 109, which 
is as follows: 
TRUST RECEIPT. 
New York, N. Y., Dec. 8th, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
Williams St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows: 
Marks No. Commodity 
M S 
184 Madioen 60 Tons 
M W 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said 
2918 
2919 
974 
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goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as 
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the 
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold 
the same separate and apart for account and as the 
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security 
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares 
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its se-
curity for the payment of any other indebtedness 
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp. 
We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 109 
$38,700.— 
2922 
Sold to 
Lovell Mfg. Co. 20 Tons 
Erie, Pa. 
Pharis T & R Co. 20 Tons 
Findlay, Ohio. 
Corduroy Tire Co. 20 Tons 
Grand Rapids, Mich. 
2921 
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Exhibit 70 is Trust Receipt No. 110, which is as 
follows: 
TRUST RECEIPT. 
New York, N. Y., Dec. 12th, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
Williams St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows : 
Marks No. Commodity 
A F T City of Yokohama 45 Tons 
R S S 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as 
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the 
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold 
the same separate and apart for account and as the 
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security 
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares 
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its se-
curity for the payment of any other indebtedness 
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp. 
We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
2923 
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Trust Receipt No. 110 
$25,000.— 
Goodyear T. & Rubber Co. 25 Tons 
Akron, Ohio 
Michelin Tire Co. 20 Tons 
Milltown, N. J. 
Exhibit 70-A is Trust Receipt No. 111, which is 
as follows: 
TRUST RECEIPT. 
New York, N. Y., Dec. 23rd, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
Williams St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows: 
Marks No. Commodity 
A F T B E N S.S. "Teucer" 70 Tons 
E A C 578 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as 
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the 
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold 
the same separate and apart for account and as the 
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security 
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares 
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its se-
curity for the payment of any other indebtedness 
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp. 
We further agree to keep said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
2927 
2928 
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mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
FRED STERN & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 111 
$40,000.— 
Sold to 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 70 Tons 
Akron, Ohio. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 68. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William St. 
No. 11533 New York, Dec 9 1924 
BANK OF NEW YORK AND TRUST COMPANY 
52 Wall Street 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$25000.00 Twenty Five Thousand Dollars. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING A . VON GOEBEN 
Cashier President 
2931 
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(Endorsed) 
Pay 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
or order 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Dec 10 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
New York 
W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 68-A. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
2934 
No. 3622 New York, Dec 9 1924 
THE MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL BANK 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$75000.00 Seventy Five Thousand Dollars. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING A . VON GOEBEN 
Cashier President 
2933 
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(Endorsed) 
Pay 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
or order 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Dec 10 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
New York 
W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 69 for Identification. 
This is a statement produced by the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., from the 
records of the said Trustee, purporting to show the 
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as 
of August 1, 1924. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 71. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
No. 3627 New York, Dec 13 1924 
THE MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL BANK 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$25000.00 Twenty Five Thousand Dollars. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING H . MEYERS 
Cashier Vice-President 
2937 
2936 
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2939 
(Endorsed) 
Pay 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y. 
or order 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
Dec 15 1924 
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank 
New York 
W. B. Tallman, Cashier 
2940 
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ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
25 South William Street 
No. 3632 New York, Dec 23 1924 
THE MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K 
of the City of New York 
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
$40000.00 Forty Thousand Dollars. 
U L T R A M A R E S C O R P O R A T I O N 
H . MANNING A . VON GOEBEN 
Cashier President 
(Endorsed) 
Pay to the order of 
The Chemical Nat'l Bank 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
Received Payment 
Through New York Clearing House 
Endorsements Guaranteed 
Rack Department 
Dec 24 1924 
The Chemical National Bank 
of New York 
No. 12 
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F R E D S T E R N & CO. , INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, Dec. 9, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp., 
25 South William St., 
New York, N. Y. 
Dear Sirs: 
Confirming our telephone conversation regarding 
our loan of $100,000, kindly be advised that we 
will make arrangements to liquidate this loan 
within a week's time. 
Thanking you for your efforts in this matter, we 
remain, 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
P e r FRED STERN, 
Pres. 
JKU :WM 
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December 18, 1924. 
Msrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., 
New York City. 
Att. Mr. Fred Stern. 
Dear Sir: 
With reference to our conversation of to-day, at 
which you advised us that not having received the 
funds which you expected from one of your clients, 
you were unable to meet your obligation to reim-
burse us in the amount of $125,000.00 re-payment 
of which you had promised would be effected on 
December 16th, 1924. 
We are considerably disappointed in respect to 
this matter as we had expected the reimbursement 
of the funds in accordance with the arrangements 
as agreed upon between you and ourselves, but in 
view of the circumstances in connection with this 
matter, we will extend the time of re-payment until 
December 24th, 1924, but must insist that payment 
of the amount be made on or before that date for 
reasons as previously explained to you. 
We also wish to point out that there is a con-
siderable amount due us in invoices and would 
appreciate your expediting the shipments in order 
that we may be put in possession of the assigned 
invoices. 
Thanking you for your kind attention to this 
matter, we are, 
Very truly yours, 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
President. 
HM/MK. 
2944 
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Telephone Broad 0801 
N E W YORK 
CHICAGO 
CLEVELAND 
ST. LOUIS 
MINNEAPOL IS 
Sir George Touche, Bart. 
J. B. Niven 
A. W. Tait 
C. R. Whitworth 
H. E. Mendes 
F. J. Clowes 
E. H. Wagner 
V. H. Stempf 
C. A. Narlian 
Cable Address "Retexo" 
ENGLAND 
London Birmingham 
C A N A D A 
Montreal Toronto 
Winnipeg Calgary 
Edmonton Vancouver 
SOUTH AMERICA 
Buenos Aires Rosario 
Rio de Janeiro Sao Paulo 
Montevideo 
Valparaiso Santiago 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
42 Broadway 
New York, February 16, 1923 
CERTIFICATE OF AUDITORS 
2948 
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern 
& Company, Incorporated, for the year ended De-
cember 31, 1922, and hereby certify that the an-
nexed balance sheet is in accordance therewith and 
with the information and explanations given us. 
We further certify that, subject to provision for 
federal taxes on income, the said statement, in our 
opinion, presents a true and correct view of the 
financial condition of Fred Stern & Company, In-
corporated, as at December 31, 1922. 
TOUCHE NIVEN & CO. 
Public Accountants. 
2949 
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FRED STERN & COMPANY, INCORPORATED 
BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1922 
A S S E T S L I A B I L I T I E S 
Current Assets: 
Cash: 
Current funds , $ 48,673.11 
Held by banks in anticipation of 
maturity of acceptances under 
letters of credit and loans 149,249.19 $ 197,922.30 
Notes and trade acceptances receivable: 
Held by the Company, accrued in 
part by collateral which has 
been repledged of a face value 
of $53,811.93 $ 117,895.51 
Pledged as collateral for loans, 
etc 173,901.69 
$ 291,797.20 
Trade accounts receivable and sun-
dry debtors: 
Held by the Company 1,255,715.86 
Pledged as collateral for loans, 
etc ... 435,055.38 
Accrued interest 5,826.63 
Less reserve for doubtful ac-
counts 
$1,988,395.07 
575,613.41 
Inventory of crude rubber pledged under trust 
receipts and letters of credit 
Marketable securities : 
The Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company 8% prior preference 
stock at redemption price : 
Held by the Company, 100 
shares $ 8,560.00 
Pledged as collateral for 
loans, etc., 1,829 shares. . . 156,562.40 
Pledged as collateral for loans : 
Voting trust certificates, Racine Horseshoe 
Tire Corp 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Less reserve for depreciation. 
1,412,781.66 
548,940.34 
165,122.40 $2,324,766.70 
Investments at Cost: 
Advances for participating interests 
in miscellaneous syndicate $ 7,106.39 
Participation certificate in Class A 
preferred stock, Bennett Day Co.. 1,502.33 $ 8,608.72 
19,600.00 
8,683.92 
8,683.92 
28,208.72 
$2,352,975.42 
Current Liabilities: 
Secured by cash, notes, trade acceptances, trade 
accounts receivable, merchandise and securities 
per contra and borrowed securities aggregating 
$1,617,914.92: 
Bank loans $ 143,069.13 
Bank dollar acceptances 543,415.15 
Sterling acceptances 583,429.72 
Unsecured : 
Accounts payable. 
$1,269,914.00 
108,756.53 $1,378,670.53 
Capital and Surplus: 
Capital Stock: 
Preferred— 
Authorized, 10,000 8% cumu-
lative redeemable shares of 
$100.00 each $1,000,000.00 
Issued, 4,150 shares* 
Common— 
Authorized, 100 shares of 
$100.00 each $ 10,000.00 
Issued, 100 shares. 
Capital surplus at date of acquisi-
tion $ 390,439.14 
Earned surplus 158,865.75 
Total surplus, subject to provision for federal 
taxes on income for current and prior years 
Contingent liabilities: 
Trade acceptances discounted... $ 89,700.81 
Loss as at December 31, 1922 on 
future short sales—356 tons at 
$.0556 per lb 44,359.00 
Securities borrowed and pledged 
of a nominal value of about.. 81,000.00 
$ 415,000.00 
10,000.00 
$ 425,000.00 
549,304.89 * 974,304.89 
$ 215,059.81 
$2,3 
* The corporation is under obligation, as soon as specific accounts and notes receivable aggregating over $585,000.00 have been realized by the receipt c 
or other valuable consideration, to issue fully paid preferred stock of par value corresponding to the amount of accounts and notes so realized but 
excess of $585,000.00. The preferred stock so issued will be charged against capital surplus after unnecessary reserves provided for the collection 
specific accounts and notes have been credited thereto. 
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2954 
2955 
Date of 
No. Loan 
1 Apr. 5, 1924 
a 
3 
4 Apr. 7, 1924 
5 
6 
7 
8 Apr. 11, 1924 
9 Apr. 14, 1924 
10 Apr. 11, 1924 
11 Apr. 11, 1924 
12 Apr. 14, 1924 
13 " 
14 Apr. 21, 1924 
15 " 
16 " 
17 May 1, 1924 
18 May 1, 1924 
19 " 
2 0 " 
2 1 " 
22 May 6, 1924 
23 May 6, 1924 
24 
25 " 
Date of 
Assignment 
Apr. 7, 1924 
Apr. 10, 1924 
Apr. 17, 1924 
Apr. 22, 1924 
Apr. 21, 1924 
Apr. 14, 1924 
Apr. 19, 1924 
Apr. 17, 1924 
Apr. 7, 1924 
Apr. 14, 1924 
Apr. 17, 1924 
Apr. 25, 1924 
Apr. 21, 1924 
Apr. 17, 1924 
Apr. 25, 1924 " 
May 16, 1924 
May 27, 1924 
May 29, 1924 
May 29, 1924 " 
Apr. 29, 1924 
Apr. 22, 1924 
May 5, 1924 
May 17, 1924 
May 15, 1924 
May 16, 1924 
May 5, 1924 " 
May 17, 1924 
May 13, 1924 
May 12, 1924 
May 20, 1924 
May 17, 1924 
May 17, 1924 
Date of 
Payment 
Apr. 22, 1924 
May 16, 1924 
May 5, 1924 
May 7, 1924 
May 22, 1924 
May 15, 1924 
June 6, 1924 
May 20, 1924 
May 8, 1924 
May 22, 1924 
Apr. 28, 1924 
May 5, 1924 
May 8, 1924 
May 5, 1924 
May 8, 1924 
May 9, 1924 
May 16, 1924 
June 9, 1924 
June 12, 1924 
June 20, 1924 
June 9, 1924 
May 29, 1924 
June 4, 1924 
May 19, 1924 
June 2, 1924 
May 31, 1924 " 
May 19, 1924 
May 15, 1924 
June 14, 1924 
June 12, 1924 
June 17, 1924 
May 31, 1924 
June 2, 1924 
May 31, 1924 
2956 
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Date of Date of 
No. Loan Assignment 
26 May 22, 1924 May 22, 1924 
27 
" 
July 1, 1924 
June 16, 1924 
28 
" 
June 9, 1924 
June 6, 1924 
June 13, 1924 
29 
" 
May 29, 1924 
30 
" 
June 2, 1924 
31 
" 
May 29, 1924 
32 
" " 
33) 
" 
May 27, 1924 
34} 
35 May 26, 1924 June 7, 1924 " 
36 
" 
June 30, 1924 
37 
" 
June 9, 1924 
38 
" 
June 6, 1924 
39 
" 
June 12, 1924 
40 May 27, 1924 June 13, 1924 
41 
" 
June 9, 1924 
42 
" " 
43 
" 
June 4, 1924 
44 
" 
June 13, 1924 
45 
" 
June 10, 1924 
June 6, 1924 
46 
" 
May 29, 1924 
June 2, 1924 
June 23, 1924 
June 25, 1924 
47 June 10,1924 
" 
48 
49 
June 10, 1924 
June 20, 1924 
June 10, 1924 June 17, 1924 
Date of 
Payment 
July 1, 1924 
July 29, 1924 
July 2, 1924 
June 25, 1924 
July 10, 1924 
July 21, 1924 
June 5, 1924 
July 2, 1924 
June 24, 1924 
June 9, 1924 
June 17, 1924 
July 10, 1924 
June 16, 1924 
July 9, 1924 
June 19, 1924 
July 7, 1924 
July 18, 1924 
July 9, 1924 
Aug. 1, 1924 
June 19, 1924 
June 13, 1924 
June 21, 1924 
July 2, 1924 
June 14, 1924 
June 10, 1924 
June 5, 1924 
July 25, 1924 " 
July 26, 1924 
June 19, 1924 
July 9, 1924 
June 26, 1924 
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51 
Date of Date of 
No. Loan Assignment 
50 July 3, 1924 July 18, 1924 
July 17, 1924 
July 10, 1924 
July 17, 1924 
July 10, 1924 
July 21, 1924 
July 9, 1924 
52 July 7, 1924 \ July 9, 1924 
July 8, 1924 
July 11, 1924 
July 18, 1924 
July 9, 1924 
July 18, 1924 " 
July 14, 1924 
July 15, 1924 
July 17, 1924 
July 17, 1924 
July 21, 1924 
53 
54 
July 31, 1924 
Aug. 1, 1924 
55 July 24, 1924 Aug. 5, 1924 
July 25, 1924 
Aug. 5, 1924 
July 24, 1924 
56 " Aug. 9, 1924 
July 24, 1924 
Date of 
Payment 
Aug. 18, 1924 " 
July 17, 1924 
July 26, 1924 
Aug. 7, 1924 
Aug. 18, 1924 
July 15, 1924 
Aug. 12, 1924 
July 17, 1924 
Aug. 8, 1924 
July 28, 1924 
July 30, 1924 " 
Aug. 8, 1924 
Aug. 25, 1924 
Aug. 15, 1924 " 
July 22, 1924 
Aug. 1, 1924 
July 25, 1924 
Sept. 4, 1924 
Aug. 20, 1924 
Aug. 19, 1924 
Aug. 23, 1924 
Sept. 8, 1924 
Aug. 22, 1924 
" 
Aug. 20, 1924 
Aug. 30, 1924 
Sept. 5, 1924 
Aug. 8, 1924 
2960 
2961 
2962 
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No. 
Date of 
Loan 
57 July 26, 1924 
Date of 
Assignment 
Aug. 15, 1924 
Aug. 11, 1924 
Aug. 29, 1924 
Aug. 4, 1924 
Aug. 5, 1924 
2963 
58 
59 
60 
Aug. 29, 1924 
Aug. 4, 1924 
Aug. 5, 1924 
Aug. 9, 1924 
" July 31, 1924 
Aug. 4, 1924 
July 30, 1924 
July 29, 1924 Aug. 5, 1924 
July 31, 1924 
Aug. 5, 1924 
Aug. 19, 1924 
July 31, 1924 
" Aug. 19, 1924 
2964 
Aug. 21, 1924 
Aug. 9, 1924 
Aug. 6, 1924 " 
Aug. 14, 1924 
Aug. 12, 1924 
61 Aug. 6, 1924 Aug. 11, 1924 
Sept. 5, 1924 
Aug. 15, 1924 
Aug. 28, 1924 
Sept. 2, 1924 
Date of 
Payment 
Aug. 20, 1924 
Sept. 
Sept. 
Sept. 
Sept. 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Sept. 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Sept. 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Sept. 
9, 1924 
10, 1924 
3, 1924 
2, 1924 
30, 1924 
15, 1924 
14, 1924 
2, 1924 
12, 1924 
30, 1924 
8, 1924 
14, 1924 
6, 1924 
5, 1924 
21, 1924 
19, 1924 
15, 1924 
Aug. 27, 1924 
Sept. 17, 1924 
Sept. 8, 1924 
Sept. 15, 1924 
Sept. 4, 1924 
Sept, 11, 1924 
Sept. 23, 1924 " 
Sept. 11, 1924 
Oct. 8, 1924 
Sept. 15 1924 
Sept. 26, 1924 
Sept. 24, 1924 
Oct. 10, 1924 
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No. 
62 
Date of 
Loan 
63 Aug. 13,1924 
64 Aug. 13, 1924 
65 Aug. 25, 1924 
Date of Date of 
Assignment Payment 
Aug. 8, 1924 Sept. 8, 1924 
Aug. 9, 1924 Sept. 10, 1924 
Aug. 6, 1924 Sept. 20, 1924 
Aug. 16, 1924 Sept. 16, 1924 
Aug. 12, 1924 Sept. 20, 1924 
Aug. 15, 1924 Sept. 2, 1924 
Aug. 14, 1924 Aug. 21, 1924 
Aug. 15, 1924 Sept. 17, 1924 " 
Aug. 25, 1924 
Aug. 29, 1924 Sept. 12, 1924 " 
Sept. 10, 1924 
Aug. 28, 1924 
" 
Aug. 19, 1924 Aug. 27, 1924 
Aug. 29, 1924 Sept. 19, 1924 
Aug. 27, 1924 Sept. 8, 1924 " 
Oct, 1, 1924 " 
Sept. 23, 1924 " 
Sept. 5, 1924 
Aug. 25, 1924 Sept. 23, 1924 
Aug. 29, 1924 Sept. 8, 1924 
Aug. 16, 1924 Sept. 2, 1924 
Aug. 19, 1924 Sept. 18, 1924 " 
Sept. 22, 1924 
Aug. 28, 1924 Sept. 26, 1924 
Aug. 27, 1924 
" 
" 
Sept. 23, 1924 
Aug. 29, 1924 Oct. 1, 1924 
Aug. 20, 1924 Sept. 23, 1924 
Aug. 29, 1924 Sept. 8, 1924 
Aug. 27, 1924 Sept. 10, 1924 
Aug. 29, 1924 Sept. 10, 1924 
Sept. 5, 1924 Oct. 8, 1924 " 
Oct. 4, 1924 
2966 
2967 
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2968 Plaintiff's Exhibits. 2959 
2969 
2970 
66 Aug. 25, 1924 Sept. 3, 1924 
Sept. 6, 1924 
67 Aug. 29, 1924 
Sept. 3, 1924 
68 Sept. 2, 1924 Sept. 6, 1924 
Sept, 26, 1924 
69 Sept. 5, 1924 Sept. 11, 1924 
Sept. 4, 1924 
Sept. 11, 1924 
Sept. 18, 1924 
70 Sept. 8, 1924 Sept. 11, 1924 " 
Sept. 9, 1924 " 
Sept. 15, 1924 " 
71 Sept. 12, 1924 Sept. 12, 1924 
Sept. 13, 1924 
Sept. 12, 1924 
Sept. 15, 1924 
Sept. 22, 1924 
Sept, 19, 1924 
72 " Sept. 18, 1924 
[Sept. 15, 1924 
Sept. 27, 1924 
73 Sept. 15, 1924 Sept. 24, 1924 
Sept. 22, 1924 
Sept. 18, 1924 
Oct. 6, 1924 
Sept. 22, 1924 
Oct. 1, 1924 
Sept. 22, 1924 
Discounted 
Sept. 27, 1924 
Oct. 27, 1924 
Sept. 29, 1924 
Oct. 16, 1924 
Oct. 17, 1924 
Oct, 20, 1924 
Oct. 29, 1924 
Sept. 29, 1924 
Oct. 10, 1924 
Oct. 8, 1924 
Oct. 14, 1924 
Oct. 15, 1924 
Oct. 14, 1924 
Sept. 22, 1924 
Sept. 19, 1924 
Sept. 16, 1924 
Sept. 17, 1924 
Oct. 21, 1924 
Oct, 18, 1924 
Sept. 26, 1924 
Oct. 17, 1924 
Oct. 18, 1924 
Sept. 29, 1924 
Oct. 29, 1924 
Oct. 30, 1924 
Oct. 8, 1924 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 2971 
No. 
Date of 
Loan 
76 Sept. 29, 1924 
Date of 
Assignment 
Date of 
Payment 
74 Sept. 19, 1924 
75 Sept. 26, 1924 
" 
Oct. 8, 1924 
Sept. 23, 1924 Oct. 9, 1924 
Sept. 26, 1924 Oct. 14, 1924 
Sept. 29, 1924 Oct. 15, 1924 
Sept. 26, 1924 Oct. 7, 1924 
Sept. 29, 1924 Oct. 14, 1924 
Oct. 3, 1924 Nov. 3, 1924 " 
Oct. 20, 1924 
Oct, 9, 1924 Oct. 31, 1924 
Oct. 6, 1924 Dec. 9, 1924 
Sept. 30, 1924 Oct. 27, 1924 2972 " 
Oct. 28, 1924 
Oct. 1, 1924 Nov. 1, 1924 
Oct. 4, 1924 Oct, 10, 1924 
Oct. 17, 1924 Nov. 19, 1924 
Oct. 7, 1924 Nov. 6, 1924 
Oct. 8, 1924 Oct. 16, 1924 
Oct. 17, 1924 Nov. 19, 1924 
Oct. 8, 1924 Nov. 7, 1924 
" 
Nov. 10, 1924 
Oct. 10, 
Oct. 17, " 
1924 
1924 
77 Oct. 3, 1924 
Oct. 11, 1924 
Oct. 9, 1924 
Oct. 10, 1924 
78 Oct. 7, 1924 
Oct. 11, 1924 
Oct. 16, 1924 
Oct. 8, 1924 
Oct. 17, 1924 
Oct. 24, 1924 
Nov. 3, 1924 
" 
Nov. 21, 1924 2973 
Nov. 11, 1924 " 
Nov. 10, 1924 
Oct. 25, 1924 
Nov. 1, 1924 
Oct, 16, 1924 
Jan. 6, 1925 
2974 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
Date of Date of Date of 
No. Loan Assignment Payment 
Oct. 21, 1924 Oct. 29, 1924 
Oct. 25, 1924 Oct. 30, 1924 
Oct. 22, 1924 Nov. 22, 1924 
79 Oct. 20, 1924 Oct. 29, 1924 Nov. 14, 1924 
Oct, 30, 1924 Nov. 17, 1924 " 
Nov. 14, 1924 
Nov. 3, 1924 Nov. 11, 1924 
Nov. 1, 1924 Nov. 19, 1924 
80 Oct. 24, 1924 Oct. 31, 1924 Nov. 29, 1924 
81 
" 
Nov. 8, 1924 Dec. 15, 1924 
82 
" 
Nov. 3, 1924 Dec. 8, 1924 
83 
" 
Oct. 28, 1924 Nov. 13, 1924 
84 Oct. 27, 1924 Nov. 13, 1924 Dec. 11, 1924 
85 
" 
Nov. 6, 1924 Nov. 22, 1924 
86 
" 
Nov. 5, 1924 Nov. 12, 1924 
87 
88 Oct. 28, 1924 Nov. 10, 1924 Nov. 26, 1924 
89 Nov. 12, 1924 Dec. 6, 1924 
" 
Dec. 11, 1924 
90 
" 
Nov. 15, 1924 Nov. 22, 1924 
91 Nov 3, 1924 Nov. 5, 1924 Nov. 21, 1924 
92 
" 
Nov. 3, 1924 Nov. 25, 1924 
93 
Nov. 20, 1924 Dec. 4, 1924 
94 
" 
Nov. 12, 1924 Nov. 22, 1924 
" 
Dec. 11, 1924 
Nov. 20, 1924 Dec. 17, 1924 
Nov. 15, 1924 Nov. 25, 1924 
95 Nov. 13, 1924 Nov. 22, 1924 
Nov. 8, 1924 Nov. 19, 1924 
96 Nov. 6, 1924 Nov. 20, 1924 Dec. 6, 1924 
Nov. 14, 1924 Nov. 22, 1924 
97 " (Nov. 24, 1924 Dec. 2, 1924 
1 Nov. 19, 1924 Dec. 8, 1924 
2975 
2976 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits. 2977 
Date of Date of 
No. Loan Assignment 
98 Nov. 12,1924 Dec. 8, 1924 
Nov. 26, 1924 
Nov. 22, 1924 
Dec. 1, 1924 " 
Nov. 26, 1924 
Dec. 2, 1924 " 
99 Nov. 18, 1924 Dec. 6, 1924 
Dec. 2, 1924 
Dec. 4, 1924 
Dec. 12, 1924 
Dec. 1, 1924 
Dec. 12, 1924 
100 " Nov. 25, 1924 
101 " Nov. 26, 1924 
102 Nov. 19, 1924 Nov. 26, 1924 
Nov. 28, 1924 
103 Nov. 24, 1924 
104 Nov. 24,1924 
Dec. 4, 1924 
Dec. 13, 1924 
Dec. 12, 1924 
Dec. 15, 1924 
Dec. 12,1924 
" 
Dec. 4, 1924 
Dec. 13, 1924 " 
Dec. 16, 1924 
Dec. 15, 1924 
Dec. 12, 1924 
Dec. 16, 1924 
Dec. 18, 1924 
Date of 
Payment 
Dec. 18, 1924 
Dec. 26, 1924 
Dec. 20, 1924 
Dec. 27, 1924 
Dec. 31, 1924 
Dec. 18, 1924 
Dec. 19, 1924 
Dec. 20, 1924 
Dec. 24, 1924 
Dec. 27, 1924 
Jan. 2, 1925 " 
Dec. 9, 1924 
Dec. 11, 1924 
Dec. 18, 1924 
Dec. 13, 1924 
Dec. 11, 1924 " 
Dec. 13, 1924 
Dec. 2, 1924 
Dec. 4, 1924 
Dec. 13, 1924 
Dec. 27, 1924 
Dec. 26, 1924 
Dec. 26, 1924 
Dec. 23, 1924 
Dec. 22, 1924 
Dec. 18, 1924 
Dec. 19, 1924 
Dec. 29, 1924 
Jan. 2, 1925 
Jan. 2, 1925 
Jan. 10, 1925 
Jan. 14, 1925 
Jan. 16, 1925 
2978 
2979 
29S0 
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Plaintiff 's Exhibits. 
2981 
Date of Date of Date of 
No. Loan Assignment Payment 
Dec. 16, 1924 Jan. 2, 1925 
Dec. 23, 1924 Dec. 30, 1924 
Dec. 26, 1924 Jan. 5, 1925 
105 Nov. 25, 1924 Dec. 27, 1924 Jan. 8, 1925 " 
Jan. 5, 1925 
Dec. 27, 1924 Feb. 9, 1925 " 
Feb. 3, 1925 
Dec. 23, 1924 Jan. 3, 1925 
106 Dec. 1, 1924 
" 
Jan. 7, 1925 
Dec. 6, 1924 Dec. 17, 1924 
Dec. 15, 1924 
" 
Dec. 31, 1924 Payable 
107 Dec. 9, 1924 Jan. 12, 1925 
" Payable 
Jan. 29, 1925 
108 
109 
110 
111 
Dec. 9, 1924 
Dec. 9, 1924 
Dec. 12, 1924 
Dec. 23, 1924 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 77 for Identification. 
This exhibit is the testimony of Alexander von 
Goeben under Section 21-A before the Referee in 
the Matter of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., Bankrupt ; 
this was thereafter read into the record and ap-
pears as part of the testimony herein. 
2982 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 78. 2983 
This exhibit was admitted as seventeen invoices 
in the book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. (Exhibit 3), 
containing copies of invoices ; these seventeen in-
voices were claimed by plaintiff to be fakes; all of 
the seventeen invoices are in the same form and 
one of them is printed as follows: 
"#18252 
Dec. 7th, 1923 
Messrs. Western Electric Co. 
New York. 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. 
New York. 
Due March 15th, 1924. 
To 300 c/s Prime Ribbed Smoked Sheets. 
G 86762½ T 3798 N 82964½ lbs. @ 
35¢ per lb $29037.57" 
2984 
This exhibit includes, also, several hundred other 
invoices in the book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. (Ex-
hibit 3), admittedly genuine, all in the same form, 
and one of them is printed as follows: 
"#18004 #10547 
Dec. 31st, 1923. 
Messrs. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. 
Mishawaka, Ind. 
Bank of New York & Trust Co. 
48 Wall St. New York 
Net cash 10 days from date of invoice. 
#14579 7/16/23 
S/S 'ALCINOUS' 
E A C To Thin First Latex Crepe Rubber, 
Various 160 c/s G 25389 T 2981 N 22408 lbs. 
1 " 179½ 16 163½ " 
R T C M 
161 c/s G 25568½ T 2997 N 22571½ lbs. 
204/70 
Net 22571½ lbs. @ 25¾ per lb. $5812.16 
S Cartage, 51.14 
Rubber Association Fee, 6.77 
$5870.07 
Weight slip herewith 
Bill of Lading " 
(7597 160 7533 1)" 
2985 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 79. 
FRED S T E R N & C O M P A N Y , I N C . 
SCHEDULE OF FICTITIOUS SALES INVOICES—NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1923 
Schedule No. 1. 
Date of 
Invoice 
1923 
Invoice 
Number Name of Customer Address 
L. F. 
Customers' 
Ledger 
Due Date and Amount 
of Invoice 
Amount Due Date 1924 
Terms 
Per Ledger 
Nov. 24 17790 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. Mishawaka, Ind. M 3 $ 75,835.20 May 1 
Nov. 24 17791 Spreckles Savage Tire Co. San Diego, Cal. S 7 50,198.40 Mar. 1 
Nov. 24 17792 G. F. Goodrich Co. Akron, Ohio G 9 74,998.00 Apr. 1 
Nov. 24 17793 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. Akron, Ohio F 3 49,442.40 Mar. 15 
TOTAL POSTED TO GENERAL LEDGER IN NOVEMBER, 1923 $250,474.00 
Nov. 17 18235 Brunswick Balke Collender Co. Chicago, Ill. B10 $ 52,948.82 Mar. 1 
Nov. 18 18236 Endicott Johnson Corp. Johnson City, N. Y. E23 28,337.72 Mar. 1 
Dec. 7 18237 Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of America Buffalo, N. Y. D30 48,426.84 Mar. 15 
Dec. 6 18238 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. Akron, Ohio F 3 56,873.36 Mar. 15 
Nov. 12 18239 Ford Motor Co. Detroit, Mich. F15 64,641.14 Mar. 1 
Dec. 12 18240 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Akron, Ohio G 1 57,393.75 Mar. 15 
Nov. 15 18241 General Tire & Rubber Co. Akron, Ohio G 8 46,090.10 Mar. 15 
Dec. 13 18242 Garlock Packing Co. Palmyra, N. Y. G20 29,850.80 Apr. 1 
Dec. 21 18243 Hood Rubber Company Watertown, Mass. H 2 34,279.35 Mar. 15 
Nov. 13 18244 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. Mishawaka, Ind. M 3 38,315.00 Mar. 1 
Dec. 15 18245 Miller Rubber Co. Akron, Ohio M10 56,977.20 Apr. 1 
Nov. 16 18246 Michelin Tire Company Milltown, N. J. M12 30,076.17 Mar. 1 
Dec. 8 18247 Pennsylvania Rubber Co. Jeannette, Pa. P11 47,323.17 Apr. 1 
Dec. 8 18248 Spreckles Savage Tire Co. San Diego, Cal. S 7 40,904.28 Apr. 1 
Dec. 17 18250 A. A. Wire Co. Newark, N. J. A13 21,531.12 Mar. 15 
Nov. 3 18251 American Hard Rubber Co. New York A27 23,836.68 Mar. 1 
Dec. 7 18252 Western Electric Co. New York W10 29,037.57 Mar. 15 
TOTAL POSTED TO GENERAL LEDGER IN DECEMBER, 1923 $706,843.07 
TOTAL FICTITIOUS SALES INVOICES $957,317.07 
N/C 10 days D/I 
N/C 30 days D/I 
N/C 15 days 
N/C 15 days B/L 
N/C 30 days D/I 
N/C 15 days D/I 
N/C 30 days D/I 
N/C 15 days B/L 
N/C 10 days D/I 
N/C 15 days D/I 
N/C 15 days D/I 
N/C 10 days D/I 
N/C 30 days 
Delivery Boston 
N/C 10 days D/I 
N/C 30 days D/I 
N/C 30 days D/D 
15th Prox. 
N/C 30 days D/I 
N/C 10 days D/I 
N/C 10 days D/D 
N/C 30 days D/I 
Comments 
Numerous Dec. items on 10 day terms 
Last previous sale June 1922. 
Some advance dating 
Dec. 13 sale on 15 days terms 
Numerous subsequent Dec. items on usual 
terms 
Dec. 13 sale on 15 days terms 
Nov. & Dec. items on usual terms 
Nov. & Dec. items on usual terms 
Dec. items on usual terms 
Numerous Dec. items on 10 day terms 
Numerous Nov. & Dec. sales on usual 
terms 
Numerous Nov. & Dec. sales on usual 
terms 
Nov. & Dec. sales on usual terms 
Dec. sales on usual terms 
Nov. sales on usual terms 
D/I = Date of Invoice 
D/S = Date of Shipment 
B/L = Date of Bill of Lading 
N/C = Net Cash 
D/D = Date of Delivery 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 80. 
F R E D S T E R N & C O M P A N Y , I N C . 
SUMMARY OF JOURNAL ENTRIES PREPARED BY TOUCHE, NIVEN & COMPANY-
TRUSTEE'S EXHIB IT 22, MARCH 23, 1926 
Schedule No. 2. 
Journal Entry 
Number 
Purchase Acct. 
Debited 
Inventory 
Debited 
Acceptances 
Account 
Credited 
Inventory 
Credited 
Accounts 
Receivable 
Credited 
Purchase 
Account 
Credited 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
16 
37 
29 
30 
$ 8,426.30 
19,031.65 
5,473.12 
14,807.84 
18,728.20 
225,590.94 
27.62 
6,439.64 
14,025.39 
$312,550.70 
87. 5 
6,254.09 
8,687.50 
$15,029.04 
8,513.75 
5,473.12 
47,361.94 
6,254.09 
$67,602.90 
$ 19,031.65 
14,807.84 
18,728.20 
178,229.00 
27.62 
$230,824.31 
$ 6,439.64 
14,025.39 
$20,465.03 
3,687.50 
$8,687.50 
COMMENTS : 
No. 5 To record following shipments *** sold to Dunlop T & R and 
paid for by them Dec. 18, 1923 (Shown by J. B. Moors & Co. on 
their confirmation letter Dec. 31, 1923) 
No. 6 To charge the purchase account with the following 
have been included in the inventory twice. *** 
lots which 
No. 7 To record the following shipment not entered in the Purchase 
Account till Jan. 1924 but sold to Hood Rubber Co. Dec. 26, 1923 
Inv. 17978 *** (Shown on Bingham & Co. Statement Dec. 31, 
1923) 
No. 8 To eliminate from Inventory Dec. 31, 1923 Lot 7586 *** which 
was sold and charged to Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. in 
Dec. 1923 
No. 9 To eliminate the following 
been sold in Dec. 1923 
Lots from inventory, same having 
No. 10 
No. 12 
No. 16 
No. 17 
No. 29 
No. 30 
To eliminate items taken into inventory which were not received 
till January and drafts for which are not reported by banks as 
having been accepted in Dec. 1923 and to set up as liability other 
items in the inventory which were not put through books until 
January but drafts for which were accepted by Huth & Co. in 
December *** 
Accepted by Huth & Co. in Dec. 1923 but not entered until 
Jan. 1924 
To correct error in original inventory figures 
To take out of Inventory item already included in Claim Acct. 
Invoice 18006 sold in Dec. 1923 but purchase not charged Rubber 
purchases till January *** 
To adjust the following accts. for invoices (At cost) paid for 
in Dec. and charged to accounts but invoices not credited to 
creditors accounts. All this merchandise was sold in Dec. *** 
$ 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 81. 
HUTH & CO. 
30 Pine St. 
Cable Address : Huth-New York 
FREDK. H U T H & Co. 
London 
New York, January 18, 1924. 
Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co., 
80 Maiden Lane, 
New York City, N. Y. 
Dear Sirs: 
With reference to your letter of January 3rd, 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co., Inc., were liable on De-
cember 31st for the following: 
Total drafts accepted by us $127,423.20 
Balance remaining on Loan of 
$15,491.91 4,879.20 
as per accounts rendered to the above Corporation. 
On the other hand we held $5,170.12, to be used 
as anticipation funds on Sterling Drafts accepted 
by Messrs. Fred'k Huth & Co., London. 
As collateral for the dollar acceptances we held 
the following securities: 
£ 2,000.— Ecuadorian Corp. Ltd. 6% Deb. 
£ 100.— British Funding 4% 1990 Loan 
£ 1,500.— British Victory 4% 1919 Loan 
50 shares The Asbestos Textile Co. 1st Preferred 
$28,836.03 Note of The Syra Cord Tire Co. of Syra-
cuse, due Jan. 2nd, delivered to Messrs. 
2992 
2993 
2994 
999 
Plaintiff's Exhibits. 2995 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc. on Dec. 28th for 
collection for our account. Payable in 
preferred stock for face of note. 
As security for the Loan Account we held a 
promissory note signed in the Corporation's name 
for the full amount and trade acceptances as listed : 
Gregory Rubber Co. Jan. 2nd $ 374.50 
Larkide Co. " 8th 900.— 
Eno Rubber Co. " 15th 326.82 
Trent Rubber Co. Feb. 16th 4,800.— 
McTe " " " 16th 250.— 
Gregory Rubber Co. " 1st 374.50 
With reference to the various credits opened and 
drafts accepted by Messrs. Fred'k Huth & Co. of 
London, we are advising you by separate letter. 
We are, dear Sirs 
Yours very truly, 
HUTH & CO. 
P.S. We also enclose a list of invoices that are 
assigned to us covering the merchandise against 
which the dollar drafts are drawn. 
2996 
2997 
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2998 Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
ACCEPTANCES FOR $43,898.40, due Jan. 28th against 71¼ Tons 
Rubber 
Invoice 
Date Tons Payer Terms Amount 
12/22/23 20 Dunlap Tire & Rubber Corp. 30 d/d Inv. $12,862.08 
12/26/23 15 Hood Rubber Co. 8,882.74 
25 " " " " 15,162.21 
10 
" " 5,921.83 
70 $42,828.86 
ACCEPTANCES FOR $21,400.— due Feb. 4th, against 35 Tons 
Rubber 
Invoice 
Date Tons Payer Terms Amount 
12/1/23 20¼ Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. 60 d/d Inv. $11,709.53 
11/21/23 5 Murray Rubber Co. ½—60 d/s T.A. 
½—90 d/s " 3,012.12 
25¼ $14,721.65 
ACCEPTANCES FOR $30,844.80 due Feb. 11th against 45 Tons 
Rubber 
Invoice 
Date Tons Payer Terms Amount 
12/1/23 20½ Murray Rubber Co. ½—60 d/s T.A. $12,821.30 
½—90 d/s " 
11/22/23 25 Western Electric Co. 60 d/d Inv. 14,990.12 
12/1/23 5 Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. 60 d/d Inv. 2,924.21 
50½ 
$30,735.63 
ACCEPTANCES FOR $31,220.— due March 7th against 762 cases 
of Rubber purchased from United Baltic Corp. 
No Invoices. 
3000 P.S.—On all of the above acceptances we held Trust Re-
ceipts covering the Rubber. 
2999 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 82. 
HUTH & CO. 
30 Pine St. 
Cable Address: Huth-New York 
FREDK. H U T H & Co. 
London 
New York, January 31, 1924. 
Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co. 
80 Maiden Lane 
New York City 
Dear Sirs : 
In reply to your letter of the 3rd instant, we 
beg to give below list of Confirmed Credits open 
on our books, per the 31st of December, 1923, for 
account of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and our London 
friends' acceptances thereunder: 
L/C #2495—£6,710.—.— 
. /. paid off 1,160.—.— 
£5,550. in favor of United Baltic Corp., 
Ltd., London 
Acceptances: £ 132.17.- due Jan. 18 in London 
653.11.1 
" 
" 16 " " 
668.13.7 
" 
" 17 " " 
666.14.-
" 
" 19 " " 
1,331.13.3 
" " " " 
531. 5.6 
" " 26 " " 
664. 2.6 
" " 28 " " 
164. 7.1 
" 
" 31 " " 
664. 2.6 
" 
Feb. 15 " " 
£5,477. 6.6 
3001 
3002 
3003 
1002 
3004 Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
L/C #2500—£4,200. in favor of Francis Peek & 
Co., Ltd., Batavia 
Acceptances: £4,168.15.7 due Mar. 2 in London 
L/C #2501—$26,700. in favor of Francis Peek & 
Co., Ltd., Batavia 
Acceptances: $13,399.10 due Feb. 23 in London 
$13,300.90 " Mar. 21 " " 
L/C #2503—£8,500. in favor of Francis Peek & 
Co., Ltd., Batavia 
Acceptances: £5,348.8.7 due Mar. 21 in London 
L/C #2504—£6,900. in favor of United Baltic 
Corp., Ltd., London 
Acceptances: £1,360.13. 9 due Mar. 6 in London 
684. 1.10 " " 13 " " 
681.12. 8 " " 16 " " 
1,369. 3. 5 " " 16 " " 
506.16.11 " " 23 
" " 
675. 9. 9 " " 23 " " 
£5,277.18. 4 
L/C #2505—£3,500, in favor of United Baltic 
Corp., Ltd., London 
Acceptances: £3,409.3.1 due Mar. 5 in London 
L/C #2508—£3,500. in favor of United Baltic 
Corp., Ltd., London 
Acceptances: None 
L/C #2510—£3,200. in favor of Low Peng Yam 
Bros., Singapore 
Acceptances: None 
3005 
3006 
1003 
Plaintiff's Exhibits. 3007 
L/C #2512—£4,000. in favor of Rowley, Davies & 
Co., Ltd., London 
Acceptances: £1,310.12.8 due Mar. 22 in London 
L/C #2514—£3,200. in favor of Neesoon & Sons, 
Ltd., Singapore 
Acceptances: None 
L/C #2520—£1,450. in favor of Alfred Stern, Lon-
don 
Acceptances: £1,439.15.10 due Apr. 2 in London 
We also enclose a list of invoices that are as-
signed and payable to us, aggregating $41,966.82. 
We enclose a repetition of the above letters of 
credit and acceptances thereunder showing totals 
as follows: 
London Acceptances: £26,432.—. 7 
" " $26,700.— 
Confirmed Credit Open £44,000.—.— 
Total of Credit £44,000.—.— 
$26,700.— 
Yours very truly, 
HUTH & CO. JRS/AMT 
P.S.—We also held on December 31, 1923, $5,-
170.12 cash as anticipated cover against the above 
London acceptances. This was already mentioned 
in our letter to you of the 18th instant. 
3008 
3009 
1004 
3010 Plaintiff's Exhibits. 
REpETTIOn OF LONDON LETTERS OF CREDIT 
L/C 
No. 
Total 
Amount 
of L/C 
Accepted 
Drafts 
Contingent 
Liability 
for Unused 
Portion 
of Ls/C 
2495 £ 5,550. £ 5,477. 6. 6 £ 72.13. 6 
2500 £ 4,200. £ 4,168.15. 7 £ 31. 4. 5 
2501 $26,700. $26,700. $ None 
2503 £ 8,500. £ 5,348. 8. 7 £ 3,151.11. 5 
2504 £ 6,900. £ 5,277.18. 4 £ 1,622. 1. 8 
2505 £ 3,500. £ 3,409. 3. 1 £ 90.16.11 
2508 £ 3,500. None £ 3,500. 
2510 £ 3,200. None £ 3,200. 
2512 £ 4,000. £ 1,310.12. 8 £ 2,689. 7. 4 
2514 £ 3,200. None £ 3,200. 
2520 £ 1,450. £ 1,439.15.10 £ 10. 4. 2 
Total £44,000. £26,432.—. 7 £17,567.19. 5 
$26,700. $26,700. None 
3012 
3011 
1005 
Plaintiff's Exhibits. 3013 
LIST OF INVOICES ASSIGNED & PAYABLE TO HUTH & CO., N. Y. 
Invoice Cases Due 
Date Buyer Rubber Amount Date 
Re: London acceptance £653.11. 1, due Jan. 16, against 77 cases per 
S/S TALTHYBIUS 
Nov. 1 Reliance Rubber Corp., Keyport 8 $ 338.97 Nov. 11 
3 Boston Belting Co., Boston 65 3,180.28 Dec. 3 
Re London acceptance £668.13. 7, due Jan. 17, against 68 cases per 
S/S HALF MOON 
Nov. 2 Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co., Jersey City 43 $1,658.97 Nov. 12 
Nov. 14 Avon Sole Co., Avon ' 12 730.73 Dec. 14 
10 Hadley Bros. Uhl Co., St. Louis 14 657.89 Nov. 25 
Re: London acceptance £666.14.—, due Jan. 19, against 68 cases per 
S/S EGREMONT CASTLE 
Nov. 24 Metal Hose & Tubing Co., Brooklyn, 
N. Y. 56 $3,156.72 Dec. 24 
Re: London acceptance £531. 5. 6, due Jan. 26, against 60 cases per 
S/S ANTILOCHUS 
Nov. 26 Toycraft Rubber Co., Ashland, O. 14 $707.45 Dec. 26 
Re: London acceptance £664. 2. 6, due Tan. 28, against 70 cases per 
S/S VIRGINIA DOLLAR 
Nov. 24 Whitall Tatum Co., N. Y. 28 $1,675.60 Dec. 2 
Dec. 27 Essex Rubber Co., Trenton 51 3,545.28 Feb. 27 
Re: London acceptance £164. 7. 1, due Jan. 31, against 18 cases per 
S/S VEENDYK 
Dec. 26 Durkee, Atwood Co., Minneapolis. 
Minn. 16 $580.86 Feb. 26 
Re: London acceptance $13,399.10, due Feb. 23, against 305 cases per 
S/S STEEL NAVIGATOR 
Dec. 21 E. M. Smith Co., Los Angeles 9 $411.37 Dec. 31 
" 22 Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of 
America, Buffalo 300 $12,862.08 Feb. 22 
Re: London acceptance £4,168.15. 7, due Mar. 2, against 441 cases per 
S/S STEEL NAVIGATOR 
Dec. 31 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. 
Co., Mishawaka, Ind. 136 $5,877.34 Feb. 15 
Re: London acceptance £1,360.13. 9, due Mar. 6, against 160 cases per 
S/S ALCINOUS 
Dec. 31 Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of 
America, Buffalo 160 $6,583.28 Mar. 2 
TOTAL $41,966.82 
3014 
3015 
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3016 Plaintiff's Exhibit 83 
BINGHAM & CO. 
91 Wall Street 
New York 
Letter of Credit, 
Import, Export, 
Calcutta and Strawbraid 
Departments of Smith & Schipper 
Successors to Cable Address "Chasbing' 
Telephones 
Bowling Green 5930-37 
Chas. T. Bingham 
Chas. E. Bingham 
LETTER OF CREDIT DEPARTMENT 
New York Agents for 
WM. BRANDT'S SONS & CO., LONDON. 
New York, Jan. 12, 1924 
3017 
Messrs. Touche Noven & Co. 
80 Maiden Lane 
New York, N. Y. 
Dear Sirs, 
In accordance with your letter of the 3rd in-
stant, we enclose herewith statement of account of 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., New York, with 
Messrs. Wm. Brandt's Sons & Co., London, as of 
December 31, 1923. 
Very truly yours, 
per pro BINGHAM & CO. 
LAWRENCE RIPLEY, 
F R A N K A . DILLON, 
Joint Attorneys. 
BH :DW 
Enclosure 
3018 
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STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT 
of 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. New York, with Wm. Brandt's Sons & Co. London 
as of December 31, 1923. 
DRAFT ACCOUNT 
L/C No. Due in London Draft Amount Merchandise Vessel 
29848 Jan. 10/1924 £ 1225 0 0 140 cases Rubber CITY OF BENARES 
30046 12/ " 2893 6 8 200 TALTHYBIUS 
29953 " 259 
639 
17 
8 
3 
8 
22 
48 CITY OF BOSTON 
" 16/ " 649 13 9 55 TALTHYB IUS 
" 17/ " 649 13 9 56 HALFMOON 
" 23/ " 1303 0 2 100 EGREMONT CASTLE 
30046 26/ " 
8/ " 
1446 13 4 100 ANTILOCHUS 
30162 Feb. 1248 6 8 140 BELLEROPHON 
30232 Mar. 5/ " 
"/ " 
2027 0 6 168 CELTIC PRINCE 
" " 945 18 8 77 WEST MAHOMET 
" " 6/ " 3107 8 11 246 ALCINOUS 
8/ " 678 5 11 50 SURUGA 
30141 12/ " 1260 0 0 130 ALCINOUS 
" 15/ 1890 0 0 195 CELTIC PRINCE 
£20223 14 3 
COLLATERAL ACCOUNT 
We had on hand Dec. 31/1923 the following assigned invoices: 
Invoice Date" Sold to Mdse. Amount of Invoice 
Nov. 20/1923 " " / " Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Co. 
50 cases $ 3,255.71 $ 3,255. 
Gutta Percha & Rubber Mfg. Co. 33 " 1,857.23 1,857. 
Dec. 10/ " Metal Hose & Tubing Co. 56 " 3,117.24 3,117. 
Oct. 31/ " Gryphon Rubber Tire Corporation 25 " 1,352.10 1,352. 
Nov. 27/ " Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of America 75 " 3,522.64 3,522. 
Dec. 12/ " American Rubber & Tire Co. 100 " 6,249.11 6,249. 
Nov. 13/ " Hadley Bros. Uhle Co. 11 " 658.83 658. 
" " / " Star Rubber Co. 22 " 1,168.29 1,168. 
" " / " Hadley Bros. Uhle Co. 12 " 1,085.26 1,085. 
" " / " J. C. Haartz Co. 11 " 686.62 686. 
Dec. 8/ " Hadley Bros. Uhle Co. 8 " 724.84 724. 
Nov. 14/ " Plymouth Rubber Co., Inc. 31 " 1,180.71 1,180. 
" 27/ " Indiana Rubber & Insulated Wire Co. 37 " 1,499.26 1,499. 
" 13/ " Atlantic Insulated Wire & Cable Co. 55 " 3,090.71 3,090. 
Dec. 1/ " Murray Rubber Co. 206 " 12,821.30 12,821. 
" 11/ " " " / " Mercer Rubber Co. 
47 " 1,721.67 1,721. 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. 135 " 6,036.75 6,036. 
" 18/ " American Hard Rubber Co. 70 " 4,714.80 4,714. 
" 27/ " Garlock Packing Co. 213 " 11,753.36 11,753. 
" 28/ " Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co. 33 " 1,346.70 1,346. 
" 26/ " Hood Rubber Co. 130 " 5,921.85 5,921. 
$73,754. 
LETTER OF CREDIT ACCOUNT 
L/C No. in favor of Amt. of L/C Amt. Used Amt. still open 
30162 Mann Taylor & Co. Ltd., London £3800.— £1248.6.8 £2551 13 4 
30281 Boasson & Van Overzee, Batavia 3500.— — £3500 0 0 
30288 Chin Seng Hong & Co., Singapore 3700.— — £3700 0 0 
30358 Neesoon & Sons Ltd. 3100.— — £3100 0 0 
30386 Lewis Lazarus & Sons, London 11500.— — £11500 0 0 
30425 Thornett & Fehr " 6300.— — £6300 0 0 
£30651 13 4 
1008 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 84. 
Schedule No. 3 
FRED STERN & COMPANY, INC. 
SCHEDULE OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE ASSIGNED TO HUTH & COMPANY AND W M . BRANDT'S SONS & COMPANY (BINGHAM & COMPANY, AGENT) 
AS AT DECEMBER 31, 1923 
Paid by Cash, 
Note or Trade 
To Whom Assigned Number of Acceptance 
Per Touche, Niven & Company Times Before 
Working Papers Assigned Dec. 31, 1923 
Dec. 22 Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp, $ 12,862.08 Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. 2 
Dec. 26 Hood Rubber Co. 8,882.74 Chemical National Bank Chemical National Bank 2 
Dec. 26 Hood Rubber Co. 15,162.21 Chemical National Bank Chemical National Bank 2 
Dec. 26 Hood Rubber Co. 5,921.83 $ 5,921.85 Chemical National Bank J. B. Moors & Co. 4 
Dec. 1 Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. 11,709.53 Central Trust & Savings Co. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. 
Chemical National Bank 3 
Nov. 21 Murray Rubber Co. 3,012.12 Central Trust & Savings Co. Central Trust & Savings Co. 2 * 
Dec. 1 Murray Rubber Co. 12.821.30 12,821.30 Central Trust & Savings Co. Central Trust & Savings Co. 3 
Nov. 22 Western Electric Co. 14,990.12 Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. Bank of N. Y. and Chemical 2 
Dec. 1 Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. 2,924.21 Central Trust & Savings Co. Bank of N. Y. and Chemical 3 
Nov. 1 Reliance Rubber Corp. 338.97 Huth & Company No open balance 1 * 
Nov. 3 Boston Belting Co. 3,180.28 Huth & Company Huth & Company 1 
* Nov. 2 Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co. 1,658.97 Huth & Company J. B. Moors & Co. 2 
Nov. 14 Avon Sole Co. 730.73 Huth & Company No open balance 1 * 
Nov. 10 Hadley Bros. Uhle Co. 657.89 Huth & Company Huth & Co. and 
J. B. Moors & Co. 1 * 
Nov. 24- Metal Hose & Tubing Co. 3,156.72 Huth & Company J. B. Moors & Co. 
and Chemical N. Bk. 2 
Nov. 26 Toycraft Rubber Co. 707.45 Huth & Company J. B. Moors & Co. 2 * 
Nov. 24 Whitall Tatum Co. 1,675.60 Huth & Company Chemical N. Bk.— 
Open Balance $449.69 2 * 
Dec. 27 Essex Rubber Co. 3,545.28 Chemical National Bank Bank of N. Y. and Chemical 2 
Dec. 26 Durkee, Atwood Co. 580.86 Chemical National Bank J. B. Moors & Co. 
3 
Dec. 21 E. M. Smith Co. 411.37 J. B. Moors & Co. Huth & Company 2 
Dec. 31 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. 5,877.34 Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. 2 
Dec. 31 Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of America 6,583.23 Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. 2 
Nov. 20 Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Co. 3,255.71 Bingham & Co. Credit Balance $8.99 1 * 
Nov. 20 Gutta Percha & Rubber Mfg. Co. 1,857.23 Bingham & Co. Chemical National Bank 2 * 
Dec. 10 Metal Hose & Tubing Co. 3,117.24 J. B. Moors & Co. J. B. Moors & Co. 
and Chemical 2 
Oct. 31 Gryphon Rubber Tire Corp. 1,352.10 Bingham & Co. J. B. Moors & Co. 2 * 
Nov. 27 Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. 3,522.64 Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. 2 
Dec. 12 American Rubber & Tire Co, 6,249.11 Metropolitan Trust Co. Metropolitan Trust Co. 2 
Nov. 13 Hadley Bros. Uhle Co. 658.83 Bingham & Co. Huth & Co. and 
J. B. Moors & Co. 2 * 
Nov. 13 Star Rubber Co. 1,168.29 Bingham & Co. J. B. Moors & Co. 2 * 
Nov. 13 Hadley Bros. Uhle Co. 1,085.26 Bingham & Co. Huth & Co. and 
J. B. Moors & Co. 2 * 
Nov. 13 J. C. Haartz Co. 686.62 Bingham & Co. Chemical National Bank 2 * 
Dec. 8 Hadley Bros. Uhle Co. 724.84 J. B. Moors & Co. Huth & Co. and 
J. B. Moors & Co. 2 * 
Nov. 14 Plymouth Rubber Co., Inc. 1,180.71 Bingham & Co. J. B. Moors & Co. 2 * 
Nov. 27 Indiana Rubber & Insulated Wire Co. 1,499.26 Central Trust & Savings Co. J. B. Moors & Co. 2 
Nov. 13 Atlantic Insulated Wire & Cable Co. 3,090.71 Bingham & Co. No open balance 1 * 
Dec. 11 Mercer Rubber Co. 1,721.67 J. B. Moors & Co. J. B. Moors & Co. 2 
Dec. 11 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. 6,036.75 Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co. J. B. Moors & Co. 3 
Dec. 18 American Hard Rubber Co. 4,714.80 Chemical National Bank J. B. Moors & Co. 3 
Dec. 27 Garlock Packing Co. 11,753.36 Chemical National Bank J. B. Moors & Co. 3 
Dec. 28 Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co. 1,346.70 J. B. Moors & Co. J. B. Moors & Co. 2 
Late of 
Invoice Assigned to Assigned to To Whom Assigned 
1923 Customer Huth & Co. Bingham & Co. Per Customers' Ledger Acct. 
$117,390.88 $ 73,764.98 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 85. 3025 
This is Defendants' Exhibit M for Identification, 
which was received in evidence as Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 85; it is an article on accountancy by George 
O. May. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 86. 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes: Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
277 Broadway 3026 
New York, Nov. 24th, 1924. 
The Ultramares Corp. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust 
Receipt 
#104—75 Tons, $50,000.—sold to Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio. 
We would appreciate if you would put us in 
funds, i.e. $50,000.—to finance the above lot. 
Invoices for the above will be forwarded to your 
good-selves within a few days. 
Yours very truly, 
FRED STERN & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
(Enc) 
CF 
3027 
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TRUST RECEIPT. 
New York, N. Y., Nov. 24th, 1924. 
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South 
Williams St., New York, for their account, mer-
chandise specified as follows: 
Marks No. Commodity 
313 D E I 
R M C S P S.S. Perseus 75 Tons 
Y A C O 
For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we, 
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said 
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New 
York and at its disposal for the purpose of deliver-
ing same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as 
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the 
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold 
the same separate and apart for account and as the 
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security 
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares 
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its se-
curity for the payment of any other indebtedness 
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp. 
We further agree to hold said property insured 
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-
mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not 
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred 
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might 
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp. 
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon. 
FRED STERN & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
Trust Receipt No. 104 
$50,000. 
Sold to 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
Akron, Ohio. 
3028 
3029 
3030 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 87. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVED BY ULTRAMARES 
CORPORATION BETWEEN DEC. 9 AND DEC. 16, 1924. 
T. R. Date of 
No. Assign. Debtor Amount 
104 Nov. 24 Dec. 12 Johns Manville $ 1794.24 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 4249.25 
Hadley Bros. 1560.79 
Toycraft 2354.24 
Montgomery 807.22 
$10,765.74 
Dec. 13 Cummings $ 1631.70 
Johns Manville 2587.56 
Goodyear 5135.98 
Habishaw 2553.89 
$11,909.13 
Dec. 15 Poison $ 874.57 
889.98 
Detroit 1743.78 
$ 3,508.33 
Dec. 16 Carborundum $ 258.75 
1478.62 
Falls 1603.33 
894.89 
105 Nov. 28 " Firestone 23717.39 
$27,952.98 
$54,136.18 
3033 
3031 
3032 
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3034 Plaintiff's Exhibit 88. 
3035 
ASSIGNMENTS RECEIVED BY ULTRAMARES CORPORATION 
AFTER DEC. 16, 1924. 
T. R. 
No. 
107 
Date 
T. R. 
Date of 
Assign. Debtor 
104 Nov. 14 Dec. 18 Davis Jones 
" Canfield 
" Canfield 
105 Nov. 25 Dec. 23 International Shoe 
106 Dec. 1 Endicott Johnson 
105 Nov. 25 Dec. 26 Firestone 
105 Nov. 25 Dec. 27 Detroit 
International Shoe 
Cooper 
Clifton 
Dec. 9 Dec. 31 Garlock 
" Hood 
Amount 
$ 901.92 
342.23 
1121.55 
I 573.36 
3875.44 
2069.20 
13093.61 
$12499.93 
$ 1759.67 
1723.43 
2435.39 
1215.16 
$13064.48 
7224.47 
7171.01 
$ 2,365.70 
$19,611.61 
$12,499.93 
$ 7,133.65 
$23,459.96 
$65,070.85 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 89 for Identification. 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY ULTRAMARES CORPORATION ON 
ACCOUNT OF ASSIGNED INVOICES FROM DECEMBER 
9, 1924, TO DECEMBER 16, 1924, INCLUSIVE. 
December 9, 1924 Home Wire Co. $3,557.36 
3,873.66 
11, " Montgomery Bros. Inc. 601.39 
785.59 
Hood Rubber Co. 18,114.07 
Carborundum Co. 766.25 
Pharis Tire Rubber Co. 8,506.33 
General Tire Rubber Co. 16,012.47 
Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. 14,527.99 
13, " Whitehall Tatum Co. 2,140.63 
Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. 9,834.86 
Firestone Tire Rubber Co. 3,831.46 
7,635.89 
7,655.10 
15, " Michelin Tire Co. 11.130.72 
3036 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 90 for Identification. 3037 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY ULTRAMARES CORPORATION ON 
ACCOUNT OF ASSIGNED INVOICES FROM DECEMBER 
17, 1924, TO DECEMBER 31, 1924, INCLUSIVE. 
December 17, 1924 Nat. Metal Mold Co. $ 10,170.51 
5,501.60 
Perfect Rubber Co. 765.69 
18, " General Tire Rubber Co. $2177.11 
Less disct. 9 ds. at 5 2.99 2,174.12 
Ford Motor Co. 37,141.51 
Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co. 1,188.49 
1,503.77 
19, " Goodyear Rubber Ins. Co. $5135.98 
Less disc. 22 ds. at 6 18.83 5,117.15 
Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. $2553.89 
Less bill 12/8 $33.45 
" 12/9 67.17 100.62 2,453.27 
Hadley Bros. Uhl Co. 1,598.45 
20, " Hood Rubber Co. 7,361.59 
Geo. S. Cox Bros. Inc. 1,575.29 
22, " Armstrong Cork Co. 4,249.25 
23, " Johns Manville Inc. 1,794.24 
24, " Detroit Ins. Wire Co. 814.05 
26, " Poison Rubber Co. 874.57 
889.98 
Johns Manville Inc. 2,587.66 
Mansfield Tire Rubber Co. 11,004.51 
27, " G. R. Cummings Jr. Co. 1,631.70 
Montgomery Bros. Inc. 768.54 
Hood Rubber Co. 9,439.04 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 91, 92 and 93 for 
Identification. 
These are pleadings in other actions against 
Ultramares Corporation. 3039 
3038 
3040 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 94. 
Interest 
to April 
Loans Date Amount 8th, 1929 
107, 8 & 9 Dec. 9, 1924 $100,000.00 $26,350.00 
110 " 13, " 25,000.00 6,570.83 
111 " 23, " 40,000.00 10,446.67 
$165,000.00 $43,367.50 
43,367.50 
$208,367.50 
Collections by Ultramares Corporation 
Oct. 11, 1927 $ 6,523.26 $ 592.50 
Jan. 13, 1928 7,177.42 538.30 
" 14, 1928 5,543.05 416.65 
$19,243.73 $1,547.45 
1,547.45 
$20,791.18 
Total advances & interest... $208,367.50 
" collections & interest. . 20,791.18 
Balance as of Apr. 8/29.. $187,576.32 
3042 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 95. 
This consists of the time sheets of George Rea. 
3041 
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Defendants' Exhibit A. 3043 
May 5, 1924. 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., 
New York City. 
Dear Sirs: 
We beg to acknowledge receipt to-day, check 
from the Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co., 
for $16,944.50 in payment of the following invoices: 
$6,245.36 
4,492.71 
1,091.12 
5,115.31 
3044 
and from the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. for 
$46,905.83 in payment of the following invoices: 
$12,529.35 
3,135.54 
31,240.94 
which amounts we have placed to the credit of 
your account. 
We presume that we will receive from you to-
day, invoice for the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
and would appreciate your advising us when we 
may expect the invoice covering the advance made 
against merchandise represented by trust receipts 
No. 17-21 inclusive. 
Thanking you for your kind attention to this 
matter, we are, 
Very truly yours, 
Cashier. 
HM/MK. 
3045 
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Defendants' Exhibit B. 
May 1, 1924. 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
New York City. 
Dear Sirs: 
We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of 
the 30th ultimo, and in accordance with your re-
quest we are enclosing two (2) checks aggregating 
$66,188.00 as an advance against merchandise cov-
ered by trust receipts Nos. 17-21 inclusive. 
We would appreciate your including in your ap-
plications the price at which the merchandise has 
been sold and also a description of the rubber. 
Trusting to receive your invoices together with 
your letters of assignment in due course, we are, 
Very truly yours, 
T C 
Cashier. 
HM/MK 
encl. 
3048 
3046 
3047 
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Defendants' Exhibit C. 3049 
November 3, 1924. 
Msrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., 
New York City. 
Dear Sirs: 
With reference to our advances to you against 
contracts covering sales of rubber, we would ap-
preciate your confirming to us that the amounts 
are to be refunded as follows: 
Invoices (except in cases otherwise agreed upon) 
are to be assigned and made payable to the Ultra-
mares Corporation. 
All invoices are to be paid promptly at their re-
spective maturities and should any invoice become 
overdue beyond a reasonable time of transit for the 
remittance, the amount advanced against the same 
together with interest and expenses becomes due 
and payable by Msrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., at the 
option of the Ultramares Corporation. 
In the event of the failure, suspension or assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors of any of the pur-
chasers whose invoices are thus assigned to the 
Ultramares Corporation, the amount of such ad-
vance or advances plus interest and expenses shall 
forthwith become immediately due and payable by 
Msrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., to the Ultramares 
Corporation without further notice from the latter 
Corporation. Kindly confirm the above. 
Very truly yours, 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
President. 
HM/MK 
3050 
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Defendants' Exhibit D. 
FRED STERN & CO., INC. 
N E W YORK 
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415 
Cable Address: Sternbrunn 
Codes : Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private Western Union 
277 Broadway 
New York, Nov. 5th, 1924. 
Messrs. Ultramares Corp. 
New York. 
Dear Sirs: 
In accordance with your request as stated in 
your favor of Nov. 3rd, we take pleasure in con-
firming to you in regard to your advances to us 
against contracts covering sales of rubber, that the 
amounts are to be refunded as follows: 
Invoices (except in cases otherwise agreed upon) 
are to be assigned and made payable to the Ultra-
mares Corporation. 
All invoices are to be paid promptly at their re-
spective maturities and should any invoice become 
overdue beyond a reasonable time of transit for the 
remittance, the amount advanced against the same 
together with interest and expenses becomes due 
and payable by Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., at 
the option of the Ultramares Corporation. 
In the event of the failure, suspension or assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors of any of the 
purchasers whose invoices are thus assigned to the 
Ultramares Corporation, the amount of such ad-
vance or advances plus interest and expenses shall 
forthwith become immediately due and payable by 
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc. to the Ultramares 
Corporation without further notice from the latter 
Corporation. 
Yours very truly, 
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC., 
FRED STERN, 
President. 
FS :CF 
3052 
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Defendants' Exhibit E for Identification. 3055 
This exhibit is a letter dated March 31, 1924, 
which is not printed. 
Defendants' Exhibit F. 
High Low 
Dec. 1923 271/8 26 
Jan. 1924 265/8 247/8 
Feb. 255/8 25 
March 251/8 21 
April 231/8 22 
May 225/8 175/8 
June 195/8 181/8 
July 23½ 185/8 
August 27¼ 233/8 
Sept. 283/8 26½ 
Oct. 32¾ 285/8 
Nov. 351/8 34 
Dec. 401/8 35½ 
Jan. 1925 397/8 343/8 
Ribbed Smoked Sheets 
Defendants' Exhibit G. 
This exhibit is the account between Ultramares 
Corporation and Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which is 
attached to the bill of particulars. 
3056 
3057 
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Defendants' Exhibit G-1. 
This exhibit is a summary of Defendants' Ex-
hibit G, showing advances made by Ultramares 
Corporation to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and charges 
made in the account for interest and commissions. 
Date of Date of 
Account First Last 
No. Advance Advance Advances Interest Commissions 
1 Apr. 5, 1924 July 7, 1924 $ 694,426. $ 3,556.00 $15,809.39 
2 Aug. 1, 1924 Aug. 1, 1924 180,100. 1,056.30 2,251.25 
3 Aug. 6, 1924 Sept. 2, 1924 224,692. 1,126.47 5,030.55 
4 Sept. 6, 1924 Oct. 7, 1924 448,800. 2,353.22 9,294.86 
5 Oct. 20, 1924 Dec. 23, 1924 795,800. 4,560.60 7,758.00 
TOTALS $2,343,818. $12,657.59 $40,144.05 
Defendants' Exhibit H. 
This exhibit is the summons and complaint in an 
action instituted by Equitable Trust Company of 
Baltimore against Ultramares Corporation in the 
United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in February, 1926. The com-
plaint alleges that two shipments of rubber, of 
seventy-five and fifty tons, respectively, which had 
been given up by the Equitable Trust Company to 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., under trust receipts exe-
cuted by the latter, in accordance with letters of 
credit previously issued, had been sold by Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., and the accounts receivable there-
for had been assigned to and collected by the Ultra-
mares Corporation. The complaint further alleged 
that although Stern had executed and delivered to 
Ultramares Corporation so-called "trust receipts," 
Ultramares Corporation had not relied thereon nor 
on any of the documents delivered by the plaintiff 
1021 
Defendants' Exhibits. 3061 
to Stern under its trust receipts. The following is 
taken from the complaint: 
"ELEVENTH : At none of the times when the 
defendant received any of the said documents 
purporting to be trust receipts, and at no time 
prior thereto, did the said defendant advance 
any money or give any negotiable instrument 
or other obligation in writing upon the faith 
of any possession entrusted to the bankrupt of 
any bill or bills of lading, custom-house permit 
or permits, warehouseman's receipt or receipts 
for the delivery of, or other documentary evi-
dence of title to, the said 750 cases of rubber 
or any part thereof, nor upon the faith of any 
possession entrusted to the bankrupt of said 
750 cases of rubber or any part thereof, nor 
upon the faith, induced by any such possession, 
that the bankrupt was the true owner of said 
750 cases of rubber or any part thereof; and 
said documents purporting to be trust receipts 
were invalid and of no force or effect, and did 
not convey to the defendant any interest what-
ever in said 750 cases of rubber or the proceeds 
of the sale thereof. 
* * * * * * 
FOURTEENTH: At none of the times when 
the defendant received any of the said docu-
ments purporting to be assignments of the ac-
counts receivable resulting from the sale of 
said 750 cases of rubber as aforesaid, and at 
no time prior thereto, did the said defendant 
advance any money or give any negotiable in-
strument or other obligation in writing upon 
the faith of any possession entrusted to the 
bankrupt of any bill or bills of lading, custom-
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house permit or permits, warehouseman's re-
ceipt or receipts for the delivery of, or other 
documentary evidence of title to, the said 750 
cases of rubber or any part thereof, nor upon 
the faith of any possession entrusted to the 
bankrupt of said 750 cases of rubber or any 
part thereof, nor upon the faith, induced by 
any such possession, that the bankrupt was the 
true owner of said 750 cases of rubber or any 
part thereof; and said documents purporting 
to be assignments of the said accounts receiv-
able were invalid and of no force or effect, and 
did not convey to the defendant any interest 
whatever in said accounts receivable or the 
proceeds thereof.'' 
Defendants' Exhibit I. 
This exhibit is the answer in the action insti-
tuted by Equitable Trust Company of Baltimore 
against Ultramares Corporation. It was verified 
March 23, 1926, by Horatio Manning, its treasurer; 
it denies the allegations of the complaint, Defend-
ants' Exhibit H, supra, including the paragraphs 
quoted, and admits only that Ultramares Corpora-
tion received the sum of $47,746.33 from General 
Tire & Rubber Company and the sum of $34,141.51 
from the Ford Motor Company. 
The answer also alleges seven affirmative de-
fenses. The following is taken from the third de-
fense : 
"IX. The plaintiff entrusted Fred Stem & 
Co., Inc., as agent, with the possession of the 
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bills of lading: and other documentary evidence 
of title in and to the rubber mentioned in the 
first cause of action and authorized said Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., to take possession of said 
rubber and to sell and dispose of the same and 
to deal therewith and with the accounts re-
ceivable created by the sale thereof as the sole 
and true owner thereof; that said Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., represented to defendant that it 
was the sole true and lawful owner of such 
rubber and of the accounts receivable created 
by the sale thereof, and defendant believed 
such representations to be true and on the faith 
thereof and of the apparent ownership by said 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., of the said rubber and 
of said accounts receivable and without knowl-
edge of any right or claim on the plaintiff's 
part advanced money and gave other valuable 
consideration to said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
in an amount in excess of the amount men-
tioned in the first cause of action; that said 
representations made by Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc., were made by it for the purpose of in-
ducing the defendant to make such advances 
and to give such valuable consideration, and, 
if defendant had known of plaintiff's alleged 
claim or alleged rights, such advances would 
not have been made nor such consideration 
given. 
X. Upon the making of the advances and 
giving such valuable consideration by the de-
fendant to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as aforesaid, 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., duly assigned to de-
fendant said accounts receivable created by the 
sale of said rubber; the defendant duly notified 
the purchasers of said rubber of the assign-
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ment of such accounts receivable, and the de-
fendant duly collected the said accounts re-
ceivable created by the sale of said rubber when 
the said accounts severally matured, to-wit, on 
November 22, December 6 and December 11, 
1924, but neither upon said respective dates or 
at any time prior thereto, nor at any time prior 
to January 5, 1925, did the plaintiff make any 
claim in or to the said accounts receivable or 
the proceeds thereof or demand the same or the 
proceeds from the purchasers of said rubber or 
the said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., or from the 
defendant, but, on the contrary, the plaintiff 
permitted the defendant to retain the said pro-
ceeds as its own without question and without 
claim thereto by the plaintiff and without hav-
ing notified the purchasers of said rubber at 
any time of any right, title or interest of the 
plaintiff in and to the accounts receivable for 
said rubber or the proceeds thereof. That rely-
ing upon the due transfer of the said accounts 
receivable by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to the 
defendant and relying upon defendant's title 
in and to ownership of said accounts receivable 
and the proceeds thereof, the defendant after 
said three dates respectively advanced to Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., large sums of money which 
have not been repaid by the said Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., and which vastly exceed the aggre-
gate of the amounts mentioned in the various 
causes of action set forth in the complaint. 
That if plaintiff had asserted its claim, if any, 
to the ownership in and to such accounts or the 
proceeds thereof, defendant would not have 
made advances to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., upon 
said accounts or given such valuable considera-
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tion subsequent to the said dates, and would 
not have made such further advances, but, on 
the contrary, would have resorted to its legal 
right against the said Fred Stern & Co. and 
against its president, Fred Stern, who person-
ally participated in the representations afore-
said, with knowledge of the facts herein set 
forth." 
Defendants' Exhibit J. 
This exhibit is the balance sheet made by Touche, 
Niven & Co. of the accounts and records of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1921. 
Defendants' Exhibit K. 
This exhibit is the balance sheet made by Touche, 
Niven & Co. of the accounts and records of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1920. 
Defendants' Exhibit L for Identification. 
This is an article on accountancy by Charles B. 
Couchman printed in the Journal of Accountancy 
for January, 1929. 
Defendants' Exhibit M for Identification. 
This is the same as Plaintiff's Exhibit 85. 
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Defendants' Exhibit N for Identification. 
F R E D S T E R N & CO. 
COMPARATIVE CONDENSED BALANCE SHEETS 
A S S E T S 
CURRENT ASSETS: 
Notes and accounts receivable: 
1920 1921 1922 1923 
DEFERRED ASSETS: 
Notes, trade acceptances, etc., maturing 
subsequent to June 30, 1922 
INVESTMENTS 
FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 
PREPAID CREDIT INSURANCE 
35,000.00 
7,345.32 
$2,576,061.54 
L I A B I L I T I E S 
CURRENT L IABIL IT IES : 
Secured $1,307,252.94 
Unsecured 
371,170.29 
4,145.44 
28,208.72 
NET WORTH. 
270,961.41 
$1,578,214.35 
997,847.19 
2,045,885.65 
$ 812,488.29 
206,481.03 
$1,018,969.32 
1,026,916.33 
$1,269,914.00 
108,756.53 
$1,378,670.53 
974,304.89 
Notes and trade acceptances $1,194,221.99 $ 309,701.46 $ 291,797.21 $ 208,762.91 
Trade accounts and sundry debtors 1,226,341.92 1,353,210.58 1,696,597.86 2,252,566.26 
$2,420,563.91 $1,662,912.04 $1,988,395.07 $2,461,329.17 
Reserves for doubtful accounts 425,066.00 700,605.06 575,613.41 427,541.78 
$1,995,497.91 $ 962,306.98 $1,412,781.66 $2,033,787.39 
236,078.75 112,638.13 197,922.30 206,051.69 
Inventory of rubber 199,383.55 285,097.81 548,940.34 131,423.81 
102,756.01 310,527.00 165,122.40 
Total current assets $2,533,716.22 $1,670,569.92 $2,324,766.70 $2,371,262.89 
176,188.55 
3,220.44 
,352,975.42 $2,550,671.8 
$1,362,357.90 
117,598.72 
$1,479,956.62 
1,070,715.26 
$2,576,061.54 $2,045,885.65 $2,352,975.42 $2,550,671.88 
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6% Interest $12,657.59 
Commission 40,144.05 
Total Return on Advances $52,801.64 
If 6% =$12,657.59 
Then 1% = 2,109.59 
and $40,144.05 = 19% + 
6% + 19% = 25% 
Interest Commission Total Return on Loans 
3080 
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AGREEMENT made this day of December, 
1924, between FRED STERN & Co. INC., hereinafter 
called the Company, and ALEXANDER VON GOEBEN, 
WITNESSETH : 
The parties hereto mutually agree as follows: 
1. The Company hereby employs the said Von 
Goeben as Manager of its financial affairs, for the 
term hereof. 
2. The Company agrees to pay to the said Von 
Goeben as and for compensation for his services, 
the sum of $18,000. per annum, payable in equal 
monthly instalments of $1,500. each, and in addi-
tion thereto, as further compensation, to pay to 
the said Von Goeben annually, a sum equal to 
twenty (20%) per cent. of its net profits. Said 
net profits shall be ascertained at the end of each 
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calendar year, and the compensation to said Von 
Goeben as measured thereby, shall be payable on 
or before February 1st of each year. 
3. Said Von Goeben hereby accepts said em-
ployment and agrees to devote his best efforts and 
his entire time and attention to the business of the 
Company. 
4. This agreement shall be for a term of at least 
three (3) years commencing January 1st, 1925, and 
ending December 31st, 1927. It may be terminated 
on December 31st, 1927, by six (6) months previous 
written notice by either party to the other, and 
unless so terminated, it shall continue from year 
to year thereafter until terminated on December 
31st of any year thereafter by either party giving 
to the other six (6) months previous written notice. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have 
hereunto set their hands and seals the day and 
year first above written. 
In presence of: 
FRED STERN & CO. INC., 
B y FRED STERN. 
ALEXANDER VON GOEBEN (L. S.) 
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AGREEMENT made this day of December, 
1924, between FRED STERN & Co. INC., hereinafter 
called the Company, and CARL J. VON GOEBEN, 
WITNESSETH : 
The parties hereto mutually agree as follows: 
1. The Company hereby employs the said Von 
Goeben to perform such duties as the directors may 
direct, for the term hereof. 
2. The Company agrees to pay to the said Von 
Goeben as and for compensation for his services, 
the sum of $6,000., per annum, payable in equal 
weekly instalments. 
3. Said Von Goeben hereby accepts said em-
ployment and agrees to devote his best efforts and 
his entire time and attention to the business of the 
Company. 
4. This agreement shall be for a term of at least 
three (3) years commencing January 1st, 1925, 
and ending December 31st, 1927. It may be termi-
nated on December 31st, 1927, by six (6) months' 
previous written notice by either party to the other, 
and unless so terminated, it shall continue from 
year to year thereafter until terminated on Decem-
ber 31st of any year thereafter by either party 
giving to the other six (6) months' previous writ-
ten notice. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have 
hereunto set their hands and seals the day and 
year first above written. 
In presence of: 
FRED STERN & CO. INC., 
B y FRED STERN. 
CARL J. VON GOEBEN (L. S.) 
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The foregoing case contains all of the evidence 
adduced and proceedings had upon the trial herein, 
together with the exceptions of both sides taken on 
said trial. 
Stipulation as to Exhibits. 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED that the original of any 
exhibit received in evidence upon the trial of this 
action, which exhibit is not printed or printed in 
part only, in this record, may be referred to by 
either of the parties in their respective briefs or 
upon the argument of the appeal and the original 
of said exhibits or any of them may be handed up 
to the Court. 
Dated, New York, March 6 , 1930. 
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents. 
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S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
TRIAL TERM—PART X V I I I . 
By Mr. Justice WALSH. 
Ultramares Corp'n v. Touche et al.—This action 
was tried before the court and a jury and resulted 
in a verdict for the plaintiff. Motions were made 
at the close of the plaintiff's case and again at the 
conclusion of the trial to dismiss the complaint 
upon which decision was reserved. After the ren-
dition of a verdict a motion was made to set same 
aside, as to which decision also was reserved. De-
fendants are public accountants. In February of 
1924 they were employed by Fred Stern & Com-
poy, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Stern), to 
audit its books and prepare a balance sheet as of 
December 31, 1923. The audit was made and the 
balance sheet prepared. Attached to the balance 
sheet was a certificate of defendants attesting to 
their examination and certifying that the balance 
sheet was in accordance therewith and represented 
in their opinion a true and correct view of Stern's 
financial condition as of December 31, 1923. De-
fendants negligently performed their work. The 
balance sheet prepared by them was incorrect and 
showed Stern to be a going concern with assets 
greatly in excess of liabilities, whereas had defend-
ants' audit been carefully made the balance sheet 
would have shown that Stern was insolvent. De-
fendants were not informed by Stern that the bal-
ance sheet was to be used by it for any particular 
purpose or that the same was to be presented to 
any particular person or persons. They knew gen-
erally that the same would be used by Stern to 
evidence its financial condition; that it probably 
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would be exhibited to banks or to creditors or to 
stock brokers or purchasers or sellers; that balance 
sheets prepared by auditors are used for the pur-
pose of securing credit and that the balance sheet 
furnished by them might be used by Stern to ex-
tend loans, secure credit and to induce banks and 
others to advance money to it; also that lenders to 
whom Stern might apply for loans would probably 
rely upon the balance sheet as indicative of its 
financial condition. Beginning in March, 1924, 
and continuing for the balance of the year plain-
tiff advanced to Stern large sums of money, rely-
ing upon the correctness of the balance sheet pre-
pared by defendants. In the latter part of 1924 
Stern was adjudged a bankrupt. Some of the 
moneys so advanced were not repaid to plaintiff. 
It is to recover the amount of these unpaid ad-
vances that this action was brought. Negligence 
is not actionable unless there is a breach of a duty 
owing by defendants to plaintiff. There must ex-
ist between the party inflicting the injury on the 
one injured some privity by contract or otherwise 
by reason of which the former owes some legal 
duty to the latter. Contractually, defendants owed 
no duty to plaintiff because no such relationship 
existed between them, nor was there such privity 
between the plaintiff and the defendants as to im-
pose upon the latter a liability to the former for 
their negligence in performing their contract obli-
gation with Stern. While in this state a party may 
sue on a contract made expressly for his benefit, 
though he is not a party thereto, the doctrine has 
not been extended so as to place upon the promisee 
under a contract a duty to all who either poten-
tially or incidentally may be beneficiaries thereof. 
The doctrine of beneficial interest is recognized as 
an exception to the general rule, which proceeds 
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on the natural presumption that a contract is in-
tended only for the benefit of those who are par-
ties to it, and therefore before a stranger can avail 
himself of its benefits he must at least show that 
it was intended for his direct benefit. The right 
of the beneficiary to sue on contracts made for his 
benefit is confined to a limited class of cases 
(Scaver v. Ransom, 234 N. Y., 233), in which this 
neither categorically nor in principle is included. 
To hold that defendants' duty extended not only to 
Stern, but to all persons to whom Stern might ex-
hibit the balance sheet and who would act in re-
liance thereon, would compel defendants to assume 
a potential liability to practically the entire world. 
The law does not go so far, but limits the liability 
to those for whose direct benefit, to defendants' 
knowledge, the work for Stern was performed 
(Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S., 195; Day v. 
Reynolds, 23 Hun, 131; Glawatz v. Peoples Guar-
anty Search Co., 49 A, D., 465; Derry v. Peek, 
L. R., 14 App. Cas., 337; Le Lievre v. Gould, 1 
Q. B., 491; National Wire & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 
312 Ill., 245). The cases relied on by plaintiff 
are no authority to the contrary. In Glanzer v. 
Shepard (in 233 N. Y., 236) plaintiff, to defend-
ant's knowledge, was a direct beneficiary of the 
work performed by defendant. So also in the cases 
in other jurisdictions where liability has been 
fastened on abstracters, notaries, inspectors, &c., 
for negligently furnishing a certificate or perform-
ing work, it has invariably been shown that the 
work was to be performed or the certificate made 
to the knowledge of the one performing the work 
or issuing the certificate: that the same was for 
direct use and benefit of the injured persons 
(Economy Building & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey 
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Title Guaranty Co., 64 N. J. L., 27 : Denton v. Nash-
ville Title Co., 312 Tenn., 320; Murphy v. Fidelity 
Abstract & Title Co., 114 Washington, 77; Western 
Loan Co. v. Silver Abstract Co., 31 Mont., 448). 
International Products Co. v. Erie RR. (244 
N. Y., 331) merely holds that a negligent state-
ment when acted upon by one to whom a duty is 
owing may be the basis for the recovery of dam-
ages. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (in 217 
N. Y., 382) is an extension of the doctrine of 
Thomas v. Winchester (6 N. Y., 397), as liberalized 
by Devlin v. Smith (89 N. Y., 470) and Statler v. 
Ray Manufacturing Co. (395 N. Y., 478). The 
rule in these cases is that a person supplying goods 
or machinery which may be used by others, which 
articles were negligently made, are reasonably cer-
tain to place the lives and the limbs of others in 
peril, is under a duty to make same carefully, and 
the right to enforce liability for the manufacturer's 
negligence is not confined to the immediate buyer, 
but extends to the persons or class of persons for 
whose use the thing is supplied. Liability in such 
cases is held to rest not upon contract or direct 
privity between the manufacturer and the persons 
injured, but upon the general duty which the law 
imposes on everyone to refrain from doing that 
which is dangerous to the lives and limbs of others. 
This doctrine has not been extended beyond per-
sonal injury cases. As defendants were under no 
duty to plaintiff, no cause of action against them 
has been established, and hence the complaint must 
be dismissed. This determination renders unnec-
essary a consideration of the other grounds urged 
by defendant to set aside the verdict. Submit or-
der on notice. 
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Stipulation Settling Case. 
I T IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED that the 
foregoing case contains all the evidence adduced, 
proceedings had, and exceptions taken upon the 
trial of this action, and that the same may be 
settled and ordered on file. 
Dated, New York, March 6 , 1930. 
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents. 
Order Settling Case. 
Pursuant to the foregoing stipulation, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED that the foregoing case contains all the 
evidence adduced, proceedings had, and exceptions 
taken upon the trial of this action, and the same 
is hereby settled and ordered on file. 
Dated, New York, March 13 , 1930. 
JOHN L. WALSH, 
J. S. C. 
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Stipulation Waiving Certification. 
Pursuant to Section 170 of the Civil Practice 
Act, it is hereby stipulated that the foregoing con-
sists of true and correct copies of the notice of 
appeal, the judgment roll, and case and exceptions 
as settled, and the whole thereof, now on file in 
the office of the Clerk of the County of New York, 
and certification thereof by the Clerk, pursuant to 
Section 616 of the Civil Practice Act, is hereby 
waived. 
Dated, New York, March 6 , 1930. 
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents. 
Order Filing Record in Appellate Division. 
Pursuant to Section 616 of the Civil Practice 
Act, it is 
ORDERED, that the foregoing printed record be 
filed in the office of the Clerk of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court in the First Ju-
dicial Department. 
Dated, New York, March 13 , 1930. 
JOHN L. WALSH, 
J. S. C. 
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Notice of Appeal of Defendants to Court of 
Appeals. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
NEW YORK COUNTY. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
against 
GEORGE A . TOUCHE, JOHN B. 
NIVEN, ANDREW W . TAIT, 
C H A R L E S R . WHITWORTH, 
HENRY E. MENDES, FRANCIS 
J. CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF, 
E . H . WAGNER and C. A . H . 
NARLIAN, co-partners, doing 
business under the firm name 
and style of Touche, Niven & 
Co., 
Defendants. 
Sirs: 
6473-1927. 3110 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-named de-
fendants, George A. Touche, John B. Niven, An-
drew W. Tait, Charles R. Whitworth, Henry E. 
Mendes, Francis J. Clowes, Victor H. Stempf, 
E. H. Wagner and C. A. H. Narlian, co-partners, 
doing business under the firm name and style of 
Touche, Niven & Co., hereby appeal to the Court 
of Appeals of the State of New York, from so much 
of the judgment herein, entered in the office of the 
Clerk of the County of New York on or about June 
18, 1930, as modifies the judgment entered herein 
on July 1st, 1929, in the office of the Clerk of the 
County of New York, and the order entered on the 
25th day of June, 1929, by reversing so much 
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thereof as set aside the verdict and dismissed the 
amended complaint as to the first cause of action, 
and as reinstates the verdict of the jury in favor 
of the plaintiff, for $187,576.32 and grants the 
plaintiff judgment against the defendants for 
$187,576.32, with interest from April 12, 1929, 
amounting to $13,317.90, together with $2,164.75 
costs, amounting in all to $203,058.97, and upon 
such appeal said defendants will bring up for re-
view so much of the order entered in the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, 
on or about June 13, 1930, and as resettled by the 
order entered in said Appellate Division on July 
3, 1930, as orders, adjudges and decrees that said 
judgment entered July 1st, 1929, and said order 
entered June 25th, 1929, be modified as aforesaid. 
Dated, New York, July 9, 1930. 
Yours, etc., 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Office and Post Office Address, 
No. 120 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
New York City. 
T O : 
Messrs. LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
No. 160 Broadway, 
New York City. 
And to the 
COUNTY CLERK OF NEW YORK COUNTY. 
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Notice of Appeal of Plaintiff to Court of 
Appeals. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
NEW YORK COUNTY. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
against 
GEORGE A . TOUCHE, JOHN B. 
NIVEN, ANDREW W . TAIT, 
C H A R L E S R. WHITWORTH, 
HENRY E. MENDES, FRANCIS 
J. CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF, 
E . H . WAGNER and C. A . H . 
NARLIAN, co-partners, doing 
business under the firm name 
and style of Touche, Niven & 
Co., 
Defendants. 
3116 
Sirs: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the above-named plain-
tiff hereby appeals to the Court of Appeals of the 
State of New York from so much of the order of the 
Appellate Division herein entered the 13th day of 
June, 1930, as resettled nunc pro tunc by order 
dated July 2, 1930, and from the judgment entered 
thereon in the office of the Clerk of the County of 
New York on or about June 18, 1930, as (1) af-
firmed any part of the judgment herein entered 
July 1, 1929, and the order herein entered on the 
25th day of June, 1929, and (2) such part as failed 
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3119 
to reverse that portion of the judgment herein en-
tered the 1st day of July, 1929, which dismissed the 
second cause of action contained in the amended 
complaint herein upon the merits. 
Dated, New York, July 14, 1930. 
Yours, etc., 
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Office & Post Office Address, 
No. 160 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
City of New York. 
To: 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, Esqs., 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Office & Post Office Address, 
No. 120 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
City of New York. 
COUNTY CLERK OF NEW YORK COUNTY. 
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Order of Appellate Division. 
At a term of the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court held in and 
for the First Judicial Department in 
the County of New York, on the 13th 
day of June, 1930. 
Present: Hon. VICTOR J. DOWLING, 
Presiding Justice, 
" EDWARD R. FINCH, 
" JOHN V . MCAVOY, 
" FRANCIS MARTIN, 
" JAMES O'MALLEY, 
Justices. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
Applt., 
vs. 
GEORGE A . TOUCHE, JOHN B. 
NIVEN, ANDREW W . TAIT, 
C H A R L E S R . WHITWORTH, 
HENRY E. MENDES, FRANCIS 
J . CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF, 
E . H . WAGNER and C. A . H . 
NARLIAN, co-partners, etc., 
Respts. 
An appeal having been taken to this court by the 
plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court, 
New York County, entered on the 1st day of July, 
1929, and from an order made by said court and 
entered on the 25th day of June, 1929, setting aside 
the verdict of the jury and directing said judg-
ment, 
5435. 
3123 
3122 
3121 
1042 
3124 Order of Appellate Division. 
And said appeal having been argued by Mr. 
Herbert R. Limburg, of counsel for the appellant, 
by Mr. James Marshall, of counsel for the respond-
ents, and by Mr. Mahlon B. Doing, of counsel for 
the American Institute of Accountants, as amicus 
curiae; and due deliberation having been had 
thereon, 
I T IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED ( t w o of the 
justices dissenting) that the judgment and order 
so appealed from be and the same are hereby, in 
all things, modified by reversing so much thereof 
as sets aside the verdict and dismisses the amended 
complaint as to the first cause of action, and by 
directing that the verdict be reinstated and judg-
ment entered thereon, with costs to the plaintiff, 
and as so modified affirmed without costs. 
Enter, 
E. R. F. 
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At a Term of the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court, held in and 
for the First Judicial Department in 
the County of New York, on the 2nd 
day of July, 1930. 
Present: Hon. EDWARD R. FINCH, 
" JOHN V. MCAVOY, 
" FRANCIS MARTIN, 
" JAMES O'MALLEY, 
Justices. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, \ 
Appellant, 
against 
GEORGE A . TOUCHE, JOHN B. 
NIVEN, ANDREW W . TAIT, 
C H A R L E S R. WHITWORTH, 
HENRY E. MENDES, FRANCIS 
J. CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF, 
E. H . WAGNER and C. A . H . 
NARLIAN, co-partners, etc., 
Respondents. 
An application having been made to resettle the 
order made and entered herein, bearing date the 
thirteenth day of June, 1930, and the said appli-
cation having duly come on to be heard, 
Now, on reading and filing the notice of applica-
tion for resettlement, and on motion of Limburg, 
Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess, attorneys for appellant, 
it is 
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ORDERED, that the said order of June 13, 1930, be 
and the same hereby is resettled nunc pro tunc so 
as to read as follows: 
At a Term of the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court held in and 
for the First Judicial Department in 
the County of New York, on the 13th 
day of June, 1930. 
Present: Hon. VICTOR J. DOWLING, 
Presiding Justice, 
" EDWARD R. FINCH, 
" JOHN V . MCAVOY, 
" FRANCIS MARTIN, 
" JAMES O'MALLEY, 
Justices. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
Applt., 
VS. 
GEORGE A . TOUCHE, JOHN B. 
NIVEN, ANDREW W . TAIT, 
C H A R L E S R . WHITWORTH, 
HENRY E . MENDES, FRANCIS 
J. CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF, 
E . H . WAGNER and C. A . H . 
NARLIAN, co-partners, etc., 
Respts. 
An appeal having been taken to this court by the 
plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court, 
New York County, entered on the 1st day of July, 
1929, and from an order made by said court and 
5435. 
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entered on the 25th day of June, 1929, setting aside 
the verdict of the jury and directing said judg-
ment, 
And said appeal having been argued by Mr. 
Herbert R. Limburg, of counsel for the appellant, 
by Mr. James Marshall, of counsel for the respond-
ents, by Mr. Martin Conboy, of counsel for Federal 
International Banking Company, as amicus curiae, 
and by Mr. Mahlon B. Doing, of counsel for 
the American Institute of Accountants, as amicus 
curiae; and due deliberation having been had 
thereon, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED ( t w o of the 
justices dissenting) that the judgment and order 
so appealed from be and the same are hereby, in 
all things, modified by reversing so much thereof 
as sets aside the verdict and dismisses the amended 
complaint as to the first cause of action, upon the 
law and the facts, the Court having found the ver-
dict of the jury to be in accordance with the facts, 
and by directing that the verdict be reinstated and 
judgment entered thereon, with costs to the plain-
tiff, and as so modified affirmed without costs. 
Ent., 
J. V. M., 
J. 
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S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
NEW YORK COUNTY. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
against 
GEORGE A . TOUCHE, JOHN B. 
NIVEN, ANDREW W . TAIT, 
C H A R L E S R . WHITWORTH, 
HENRY E. MENDES, FRANCIS 6473-1927 
J. CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF, 
E . H . WAGNER and C. A . H . 
NARLIAN, co-partners, doing 
business under the firm name 
and style of Touche, Niven & 
Co., 
Defendants. 
Issue having been joined in the above-entitled 
action, and the action having duly come on for trial 
before Honorable John L. Walsh and a jury at 
Trial Term, Part XVI I I , of this Court, on the 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th 
days of April, 1929, and the plaintiff having ap-
peared by Messrs. Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch & 
Hess, Esqs., its attorneys (David L. Podell and 
Herbert R. Limburg, Esqs., of counsel), and the 
defendants having appeared by Messrs. Guggen-
heimer, Untermyer & Marshall (James Marshall, 
Esq., of counsel), and the jury having rendered a 
verdict on the 12th day of April, 1929, for the plain-
tiff for the sum of One hundred eighty-seven thou-
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sand five hundred seventy-six and 32/100 Dollars 
($187,576.32), and a motion having been granted 
and order made on June 25, 1929, setting aside the 
verdict upon the law only and not upon the facts 
and dismissing the complaint upon the merits, and 
judgment having been entered on the 1st day of 
July, 1929, dismissing the complaint upon the 
merits and awarding defendants One hundred 
twenty-six and 26/100 Dollars ($126.26) costs, and 
an appeal having been taken to the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Depart-
ment, by the plaintiff herein from the said judg-
ment and order; and said appeal having duly come 
on to be heard in the said Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department; 
and said Appellate Division having ordered and 
adjudged (two of the justices dissenting) that the 
judgment and order so appealed from be modified 
by reversing so much thereof as set aside the ver-
dict of the jury and dismissed the amended com-
plaint as to the first cause of action, and by direct-
ing that the verdict be reinstated and judgment 
entered thereon with costs to the plaintiff, and as 
so modified be affirmed without costs; and the 
plaintiff's costs having been duly taxed at $2,164.75, 
Now, on motion of Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch 
& Hess, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the judg-
ment entered herein on the first day of July, 1929, 
and the order made by this Court and entered on 
the 25th day of June, 1929, be modified by revers-
ing so much thereof as set aside the verdict and 
dismissed the amended complaint as to the first 
cause of action, and it is further 
3140 
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the verdict 
of the jury in favor of the plaintiff for $187,576.32 
be reinstated and that the plaintiff herein recover 
judgment against the defendants, George A. 
Touche, John B. Niven, Andrew W. Tait, Charles 
R. Whitworth, Henry E. Mendes, Francis J. 
Clowes, Victor H. Stempf, E. H. Wagner and 
C. A. H. Narlian, co-partners, doing business un-
der the firm name and style of Touche, Niven & 
Co., for $187,576.32, with interest thereon from 
April 12, 1929, amounting to $13,317.90, together 
with $2,164.75 costs, amounting in all to $203,-
058.97, and that plaintiff have execution therefor. 
Judgment entered June 18, 1930. 
DANIEL E. FINN, 
(Seal) Clerk. 
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S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
APPELLATE DIVISION—FIRST DEPARTMENT. 
May, 1930. 
VICTOR J. DOWLING, P.J., 
EDWARD R . FINCH, 
JOHN V . MCAVOY, 
FRANCIS MARTIN, 
JAMES O'MALLEY, J J. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, \ 3146 
Appellant, 
against 
GEORGE A . TOUCHE, JOHN B. 
NIVEN, ANDREW W . TAIT, 
C H A R L E S R . WHITWORTH, 
HENRY E. MENDES, FRANCIS 
J. CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF, 
E . H . WAGNER and C. A . H . 
NARLIAN, co-partners, etc., 
Respondents. 
Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Supreme 
Court, New York County, made at Trial Term, 
granting defendants' motion to set aside a ver-
dict in plaintiff's favor on the first cause of 
action herein and dismissing the complaint; 
and from a judgment entered thereon. 
No. 5433. 
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HERBERT R. LIMBURG, of counsel (LIONEL S. POP-
KIN and JOSEPH L . WEINER with him on the 
brief; LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS, 
attorneys) for appellant. 
JAMES MARSHALL, of counsel (ABRAHAM SHAMOS 
with him on the brief; GUGGENHEIMER, UNTER-
MYER & MARSHALL, attorneys) for respond-
ents. 
MAHLON B. DOING, of counsel (FREDERIC R. COU-
DERT, J. HARRY COVINGTON and SPENCER GOR-
DON with him on the brief; COUDERT BROTHERS, 
attorneys) for American Institute of Account-
ants, Amicus Curiae. 
MARTIN CONBOY (DAVID ASCH and CHARLES W . 
TOOKE with him on the brief), amicus curiae. 
MCAVOY, J . : 
The defendants, public accountants, have been 
held liable to the plaintiff, to whom they owed no 
contractual duty through any contract of employ-
ment which the plaintiff entrusted to them. 
Whether a duty arises here, in the absence of direct 
contractual relation, out of the situation shown 
by the evidence, is the problem for solution. 
The general principle involved, and upon which 
plaintiff relies for imposition of liability, is that 
if one undertakes to discharge any duty by which 
the conduct of others may be governed, he is bound 
to perform it in such a manner that those who are 
thus led to action in the faith that such duty will 
be properly performed, shall not suffer loss through 
improper performance of the duty or neglect in its 
execution. Thus, we have the buyers of merchan-
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dise given recovery against public weighers who 
were to make return of the weight and to furnish 
buyers with a copy. The public weighers certified 
the weight and the buyers paid the sellers on that 
basis. Discovery that the weight had been incor-
rectly certified as a result of defendant's negligence 
was found to give the plaintiffs the right to the re-
sulting damage. 
It was decided there that the use of the certifi-
cates was not an indirect or collateral consequence 
of the action of the weighers; that it was a conse-
quence "which, to the weighers' knowledge, was the 
end and aim of the transaction." The sellers 
ordered, but the buyers were to use the certificates. 
Public weighers hold themselves out to the public 
as "skilled and careful in their calling." (Glanzer 
v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 238.) 
The duty was held not to be bound in terms of 
contract, nor of privity; although arising from con-
tract, its origin is not exclusive from that realm. 
If the contract and the relation are found, the duty 
follows by rule of law. Diligence—it was pointed 
out—was owing not only to the person who ordered 
the employment, but also to those who relied there-
on. 
Plaintiff here is in the business of factoring. The 
defendants were engaged by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
to audit its books and accounts and certify a bal-
ance sheet as of the end of the year 1923. They 
prepared a balance sheet and attached it to a certifi-
cate signed by them, which they dated February 26, 
1924. This balance sheet stated that Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., had a net worth amounting to $1,070,-
715.26, when the fact (as thereafter found) was 
that at the very time of this certification the firm 
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was insolvent, with impairment of thousands of 
dollars in its assets and credit and much enhance-
ment of its reported liabilities. 
The finding of the jury would justify a conclu-
sion that defendants were guilty of a gross degree 
of negligence in their audit, and it is even urged 
that the evidence also warranted the finding that 
the balance sheet was made up in fraud of the rights 
and obligations which accountants, engaged in pub-
lic calling, would owe to those to whom they had 
reason to believe such balance sheets would be ex-
hibited for purposes of obtaining loans, extending 
credit, or to induce the sale of merchandise. 
The evidence showed that these accountants knew 
for four years that their client (Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc.) was a borrower from banks in large sums; 
that these banks required certified balance sheets 
as a basis for making loans; and that Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., would require these certified balance 
sheets for continuing existing loans and securing 
new loans. So that this might be done, some thirty-
two original counterparts of the certified balance 
sheet were requested by the client, Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., and furnished by the accountants (de-
fendants ). 
The jury's verdict thus imports that defendants 
knew that the certified balance sheets would be 
used by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the purpose of 
procuring loans, and that the very purpose of em-
ployment in the transaction between Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., and Touche, Niven & Co., the accountants, 
was to allow Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to bring it 
about through these balance sheets. This results: 
that loans on the faith thereof would be made by 
persons who would be governed by its declarations. 
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Financial statements in the course of trade have 
come to be used customarily for the purpose of se-
curing credit, and accountants indicate in their 
public advertisements that makers of loans should 
require the safeguard of an independent audit pre-
pared by public accountants, so a correlative obliga-
tion is placed upon them. It is their duty—if they 
do not wish their audit to be so used—to qualify 
the statement of their balance sheet and the certifi-
cate which accompanies it in such a way as to pre-
vent its use. One cannot issue an unqualified state-
ment which will be so used, and then disclaim re-
sponsibility for his work. 
Banks and merchants, to the knowledge of these 
defendants, require certified balance sheets from 
independent accountants, and upon these audits 
they make their loans. Thus, the duty arises to 
these banks and merchants of an exercise of rea-
sonable care in the making and uttering of certified 
balance sheets. 
The facts here are brought within the rule in 
the case of International Products Co. v. Erie Rail-
road Co. (244 N. Y. 331) that "there must be 
knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information 
is desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom 
it is given intends to rely and act upon it; that if 
false or erroneous he will, because of it, be injured 
in person or property. * * * The relationship of 
the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, 
must be such that in morals and good conscience the 
one has the right to rely upon the other for infor-
mation, and the other giving the information owes 
a duty to give it with care." 
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The certificate which these accountants attached 
to the balance sheet reads: 
"TOUCHE, NIVEN & Co., 
Public Accountants, 
Eighty Maiden Lane, 
New York. 
February 26, 1924. 
CERTIFICATE OF AUDITORS. 
We have examined the accounts of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., for the year ended December 
31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed 
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and 
with the information and explanations given 
us. We further certify that, subject to provi-
sions for federal taxes on income, the said 
statement in our opinion, presents a true and 
correct view of the financial condition of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923. 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & Co., 
Public Accountants." 
From this certificate and the findings made by 
the jury which are entitled to be held conclusive in 
behalf of the plaintiff there is established: That 
the defendants knew that the result of the audit 
would be used by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to repre-
sent its financial condition to persons from whom 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., might seek to borrow money, 
and that the balance sheet would be relied upon 
by such persons as indicating the true financial 
condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.; that defend-
ants, in exercising their public calling as auditors, 
did not exercise that care and skill required of 
them, but acted in a negligent and careless manner, 
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as a consequence of which the balance sheet made 
by them was incorrect, and that such negligence 
was the proximate cause of the loss sustained by 
plaintiff, i. e., that there was a causal relation be-
tween the neglect and the loss sustained which 
could reasonably have been anticipated, and that 
the presentation of the balance sheets, as certified 
by defendants, was the inducing cause for making 
these loans to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which plain-
tiff made, and that the loss was not caused by rea-
son of any change in the financial condition of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., from the time of the pres-
entation of the audit to the plaintiff, or because of 
any reliance of plaintiff on other intervening 
causes; and that plaintiff's conduct was free from 
contributory negligence, and we therefore conclude 
that a liability was properly found, arising out of 
a duty owed by the defendants to plaintiff not to 
misrepresent, wilfully or negligently, the financial 
condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and that the 
judgment for the plaintiff was correct and should 
not have been set aside. 
That the particular person who was to be in-
fluenced by defendants' act was unknown to the 
defendants is not material to a right of recovery, 
for it is not "necessary that there should be an 
intent to defraud any particular person." In this 
case there was no mere, casual representation made 
as a matter of courtesy; there was a certificate in-
tended to sway conduct. There was "the careless 
performance of a service which found in the words 
of a certificate its culmination and its summary." 
Here is an act performed carelessly, intended to 
influence the actions of third parties, and one that 
reasonably might be expected, when carelessly per-
formed, to cause substantial loss. 
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A duty exists towards those whom the account-
ants know will act on the faith of their certificates. 
The loss occurring here was the very result which 
reasonably was to be anticipated if the balance 
sheet was carelessly prepared. 
While negligence was established and was the 
proximate cause of the loss, and, as we have seen, 
the duty arose out of this situation which, while not 
contractual, was, nevertheless, a ground of liability, 
yet we do not think that there was sufficient proof 
upon which to found a liability in fraud. We think 
that there was no error at the close of the entire 
case, in the Court's decision to dismiss the second 
cause of action based upon that ground. Misjudg-
ment, however gross, or want of caution, however 
marked, is not fraud. The mere breach of duty, 
or the omission to use due care is not fraud. In-
tentional fraud, as distinguished from a mere 
breach of duty or the omission to use due care, is 
an essential factor in an action for deceit (Kountze 
v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124). 
We think that there was a proper conclusion 
with respect to damages. The amount of cash loans 
made to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., with interest there-
on, credited with all monies repaid or collected by 
plaintiff, whether through voluntary action or suit, 
without deduction of costs of collection, was the 
approximate damage, and while other proof of dam-
age was excluded by the Trial Court, no appeal has 
been taken by plaintiff which raises a construction 
of that rule. 
The judgment and order appealed from should 
therefore be modified by reversing so much thereof 
as sets aside the verdict and dismisses the amended 
complaint as to the first cause of action, and by 
directing that the verdict be reinstated and judg-
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ment entered thereon with costs to the plaintiff, 
and as so modified affirmed without costs. 
Bowling, P.J., and O'Malley, J., concur. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
APPELLATE DIVISION—FIRST DEPARTMENT. 
May, 1930. 
VICTOR J. DOWLING, P.J., 
EDWARD R . FINCH, 
JOHN V . MCAVOY, 
FRANCIS MARTIN, 
JAMES O'MALLEY, JJ. 
[SAME TITLE.] 
FINCH, J. (Dissenting) : 
Assuming that the defendants may be held liable 
for the negligence of their employees where they 
undertake a duty to a definite plaintiff (Glanzer v. 
Sheppard, 233 N. Y. 236), or to a definite class 
(Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix National Bank, 253 
N. Y. 369), yet, for the following reasons the de-
fendants are not liable to this plaintiff: first, be-
cause they undertook to make only a "balance sheet 
audit" at the request of their client; second, be-
cause in their certificate the defendants purported 
only to furnish their opinion based upon an exam-
ination in connection with "the information and 
explanations given us." But even more important, 
the defendants furnished such a report and certifi-
cate without reference to any particular person or 
class of persons. 
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The plaintiff seeks to liken the facts in the case 
at bar to a case where the defendants were to make 
an audit which to their knowledge was for a definite 
plaintiff, to induce such plaintiff to make loans 
thereon. (Glanzer v. Sheppard, supra.) This 
record does not sustain such a contention. The 
courts have not gone to the length of holding that 
defendants in a case like the case at bar can be 
held liable in negligence to the whole world, or, as 
has been aptly said, liable for "negligence in the 
air." 
In other words, not only the purpose for which 
the statement is to be used, but the person or class 
of persons who is to rely thereon, must be definite 
to the knowledge of the defendants. The plaintiff 
relies upon the stipulation in the record that the 
defendants "knew generally that these reports 
would be used as financial statements to banks or 
to creditors or to stockholders or to purchasers or 
sellers." In accordance with the authorities, this 
general knowledge is not sufficient. 
As Judge Andrews said in International Prod-
ucts Co. v. Erie E. E. Co. (244 N. Y. 331), speak-
ing of the information given, 
"that he to whom it is given intends to rely 
and act upon it; that if false or erroneous he 
will because of it be injured in person or prop-
erty." 
In Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (245 N. Y. 377), Judge 
Pound writes: 
" I t (the defendant) did not deal with ap-
pellant, had no relations with it and was under 
no duty of care to it." (See also Savings Bank 
v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195.) 
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The professional man, be he accountant or other-
wise, certifies for his client and not for all the 
world. If the client makes it clear to such a man 
that the statement is to be used in a particular 
transaction in which a third party is involved, such 
circumstance should create a duty from the profes-
sional man to such third party. If the accountant 
is to be held to an unlimited liability to all persons 
who may act on the faith of the certificate, the ac-
countant would be obliged to protect himself by a 
verification so rigid that its cost might well be 
prohibitive and a limited but useful field of service 
thus closed to him. The smallness of the compen-
sation paid to the defendants for the services re-
quested is in striking contrast to the enormity of 
the liability now sought to be imposed upon them. 
I f in the case at bar the plaintiff had inquired of 
the accountants whether they might rely upon the 
certificate in making a loan, then the accountants 
would have had the opportunity to gauge their re-
sponsibility and risk, and determine with knowl-
edge how thorough their verification of the account 
should be before assuming the responsibility of 
making the certificate run to the plaintiff. 
It also appears in the case at bar that the loss 
of the plaintiff resulted because of its own con-
tributory negligence in failing to check the col-
lateral. (Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55; aff'd 
242 N. Y. 569.) 
In so far as the claim of actual fraud is con-
cerned, there is no proof in this record sufficient to 
support such a finding by a jury. The Court, there-
fore, properly dismissed this cause of action. (Civil 
Practice Act, Section 457-a.) This is so, even as-
suming that personal connivance and fraud on the 
part of the employees of defendants could be held 
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within the scope of the authority given to these 
employees by the defendants, which at least is 
doubtful. (Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1 ; Credit 
Alliance Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre Co., 241 N. Y. 
216; Martin v. Gotham Nat'l Bank, 248 N. Y. 313.) 
I t follows that the judgment and order should 
be affirmed: 
Martin, J . , concurs. 
Stipulation Waiving Certification of Court of 
Appeals Record. 
Pursuant to Section 170 of the Civil Practice 
Act, it is hereby stipulated that the foregoing are 
true and correct copies of the notices of appeal to 
the Court of Appeals, the orders of the Appellate 
Division, the judgment entered thereon, and of the 
record of the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court upon which the appeal was heard, now on 
file in the office of the Clerk of the County of New 
York, and certification thereof by said Clerk is 
hereby waived. 
Dated, New York, July 21, 1930. 
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent-
Appellant. 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants-
Respondents. 
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